Engineering solutions to software problems: Some institutional and social factors shaping change

Software is the core of information technology systems, the major factor i n system costs and the main source o f system malfunctions. The software development process is currently characterized as a labour-intmsive craft activity which has resisted automa- tion. Software engineering covers a set of approaches which are intended to address the long-standing twin problems of low productizlity in software development and the poor quality of software products. It encompasses a range of tools, methods and procedures which aim to assert a n engineering culture to displace existing ad hoc processes. Many governments have supported programmer of software engineering R&D. This article argues that the adoption of sotiware engineering is mediated and resisted by social, organizational, cultural and in~titutionat factors. These are identified and their implications discussed.     

Entrepreneurship and institutional change

Entrepreneurs do more than just buy low and sell high; they sometimes also change our institutions, including our categories of thought. New institutional economics has been examining incentives that drive individuals to bring about market-supporting institutional arrangements. There is, however, an aspect of entrepreneurship conducive to institutional changes that has been neglected by contemporary institutionalist theories and that remains underdeveloped in entrepreneurship research. When and how does entrepreneurship bring about institutional change? I suggest that entrepreneurs are agents of institutional change when cultural categorization is ambiguous with regard to the proper and permissible applications of novel artifacts. Motherhood, for example, used to be a simple category, but surrogacy changed that radically. Examining newspaper evidence, social surveys, statutory law, and judicial cases, I show how entrepreneurs, by provoking a change in interpretation and judgment, challenged the existing institutional legal ordering of procreation turning a technically feasible method of surrogacy into current practice.     

Partisan influence on social spending under market integration,fiscal pressure and institutional change

In this paper we examine whether partisan influence on social expenditure in the OECD has decreased over the past three decades. We analyze whether a reduced partisan influence is due to more trade openness, larger budget deficits or the creation of new supranational institutions. Our empirical approach distinguishes between the effects on the long-run growth of social expenditures and its short-run adjustment to violations of the long-run equilibrium linking social spending with macroeconomic and demographic trends. We find that partisan motives, indeed, play an important role in the explanation of short-run dynamics in social spending. Left-wing parties are found to spend significantly more than their right-wing counterparts and parties spend more before elections. However, the partisan influence has changed over time. While ideology has lost some of its influence, the electoral cycle has become more important to explain changes in social expenditure. This result should be addressed to a general institutional change that took place in the early 1990s and continued over that decade. While changes in trade openness, indebtedness and budget deficits have not changed the partisan influence on social spending, they are particularly important to explain the short-run dynamics of social spending.     

Technological change and institutional inertia: a game-theoretic approach

In this paper, we study a co-evolutionary model of economic change at two hierarchical levels. At the lower level, institutions are given and the focus is on how resources are allocated and innovation produced in response to the pay-off structure induced by prevailing institutions. At the higher level, it is the institutions themselves that change as the outcome of a process of social bargaining. The main objective of the paper is to study the interaction between these two levels of change, attempting to provide some insight on issues like technological/institutional divergence, technological dead-end, institutional inertia, etc.It appears that evolutionary economics must be the theory of a process of cultural growth as determined by the economic interest, a theory of a cumulative sequence of economic institutions stated in the terms of the process itself. Thorstein Veblen (1898, p. 393).This work was undertaken while the author was a Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.     

The new institutional economics and its relevance to social economics

There has been a quiet revolution in economic theory, led by the New Institutionalists. Pioneered by Douglass C. North, this group argues that institutions are the main determinants of economic performance, yet neoclassical economics has no role for institutions. Contrary to many misconceptions, this theory of institutions can be integrated with neoclassical economics, leaving mainstream economic theory in tact, but broader and more relevant. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, the main arguments of the New Institutionalists are summarized. Second, the bridge between institutions and social economics is explored. The article concludes by arguing that the New Institutional approach is fruitful, and that the theory will gradually be integrated with neoclassical economics, until the two merge into a single body of theory.     

Violent conflict and institutional change*

Violent conflict such as civil war may influence institutional quality by changing the political equilibrium or by changing preferences and norms. This study presents empirical evidence that in some cases civil war deteriorates institutional quality. By applying the synthetic control method to 25 cases of civil war between 1960 and 2010, I construct the counterfactual path of institutional quality in the absence of civil war. The effects of civil war are heterogeneous, but for a substantial minority of cases civil war appears to deteriorate institutional quality. These findings have implications for post-civil war economic recovery as well as long run economic development.     

Why China's approach to institutional change has begun to succeed

In the constantly changing modern economic environment, a country's ability to implement institutional reforms is crucial to maintain economic growth and to promote the welfare of its citizens. Unfortunately, it can be difficult to persuade institutional stakeholders that the change is necessary, and as a result, efforts at institutional change often fail. To avoid situations in which change is sudden and disruptive, China has chosen a more cautious approach of gradual institutional change leading to smooth reform, which Deng Xiaoping referred to as “crossing the river by stepping from stone to stone” — a metaphor that translates into doing a careful experiment before broad application of an approach for which you lack prior experience. This approach allows adaptation to local conditions during subsequent broader adoption of a new approach, and can thereby decrease the risks and costs of adopting a new strategy by first testing the change and then demonstrating the potential benefits to local residents and governments. This innovative approach has been a key component of China's economic reforms since 1978, and the Chinese experience shows how adapting programs to local natural and social conditions can help to motivate change and sustain the implementation of new institutions.     

International flows of people and institutional change

International travel clearly increases human interaction over space and exposes societies to foreign influences, foreign ideas, and foreign institutions. Does international travel promote institutional change in a traveler's home country? This paper uses panel data from 149 countries to test the hypothesis of institutional change stemming from international travel. We generally find that foreign travel does not affect political institutions. In one sub-sample, we find limited evidence that international travel can be a determinant of institutional quality in the home country depending upon whether the home country is an autocracy or democracy.     

Trade patterns and institutional change in East Asia

We investigate how trade patterns – institutionally intensive exports (IIX) – affect institutional quality in East Asia compared to the rest of the world, and whether the effect changed due to the Asian financial crisis. To examine this, we use panel data of 117 countries for the period 1988–2007. Our fixed effect model estimation reveals that the effect of IIX on institutional quality is negative and significant for East Asia, while the effect is insignificant for the rest of the world. The negative effect in East Asia is more pronounced for the five East Asian countries that were strongly affected by the crisis – South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand – than for other East Asian countries. Furthermore, our results reveal that the negative effect for East Asia does not change significantly after the crisis, both in the short and long term, and that improvement in institutional quality after the crisis is not different from that of the rest of the world. This suggests that the crisis had no significant impact on East Asia's institutional quality or on the effects of IIX on institutional quality.     

A class of solutions to bargaining problems

A reformation of Nash's axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is proposed, generalizing an idea due to Roth. It involves the concept of a reference function g, whose purpose is to summarize the main features of the bargaining problem and so facilitate the evaluation of the relative bargaining positions of the players. It is with respect to g that the Independence condition is reformulated. In conjunction with the other axioms used by Nash, it is shown that if g satisfies certain natural properties, the bargaining problem admits of a unique solution. Several examples of reference functions are shown to satisfy these conditions. An existence problem discovered by Roth for a particular choice of g is shown to be resolved if solutions are permitted to be multi-valued, the axioms being correspondingly reformulated.     

Explicit solutions to dynamic portfolio choice problems: A continuous-time detour

Recently, many academic researchers have implemented several numerical procedures to solve a dynamic portfolio choice problem especially in incomplete markets. The subsequent numerical results are sometimes significantly different from one paper to another. Thus, they have all advocated the accuracy of their methods. This paper contributes to the previous accuracy debate by showing how to obtain some accurate numerical results without numerical approximations. We use the dynamic programming approach in continuous-time, and illustrate the framework with one risky and one riskless asset. The framework is flexible enough to cover all the HARA class of utility functions. We derive explicit solutions with a stochastic market price of risk and with a stochastic volatility. 7 countries are considered in numerical illustrations.     

Household responsibility system and China's agricultural Growth revisited: Addressing endogenous institutional change

The rise of the Household Responsibility System has been widely viewed as a significant contribution to China's agricultural growth. However, this empirical conclusion is rested upon a convenient but doubtful presumption that the process of institutional change, also known as decollectivization, is exogenous. We contribute to this literature by explicitly recognizing the endogeneity of institutional changes, and exploit exogenous variations in lagged weather shocks and initial fixed assets for consistent estimation. With improved data on irrigation, mechanization, weather and institutional changes in a provincial panel data during 1970–1987, the results of panel instrumental estimations reveal that the Household Responsibility System had a significantly positive effect on China's agricultural growth, which was larger than indicated by OLS estimates that suffer from adverse selection and attenuation biases.     

Strategies and public propositions in games of institutional change: Comparative historical cases

This paper argues that the game-theoretic approach is incomplete for institutional studies, because comparative institutions as well as institutional changes involve the possibility of multiple equilibria. In order to solve the common knowledge problem, this paper proposes to unify game theoretic thought with an analysis of public representations/propositions to summarize salient features of the recursive/emergent states of play. From this perspective the paper tries to reconcile differences in three accounts of institutions: endogenous outcome, exogenous rules and constitutive rules accounts. Then, the unified approach is applied to comparative and historical cases of Tokugawa Japan and Qing China. Specifically it sheds new light into the coalitional nature of the Tokugawa Baku-Han regime nesting the fundamental Samurai-village pact as well as the tendency toward decentralization of political violence and fiscal competence to the provincial level toward the end of Qing China. From these new historical interpretations, endogenous strategic forces and associated public propositions leading to institutional changes through the Meiji Restoration and the Xinhai Revolution are identified and compared.     

Coevolution of economic behaviour and institutions: towards a theory of institutional change

Traditionally, economics has regarded institutions, notably norms and regulations, as fixed or exogenous. Surprisingly few insights on institutional evolution from natural and social sciences have made their way into economics. This article gives an overview of evolutionary theories of institutions in biology, sociology, anthropology and economics. These theories are subsequently compared with non-evolutionary theories of institutions. Next, the insights and approaches are integrated into a framework for analysis of institutions based on the notion of coevolution.JEL Classification: B52, D10, D70, D64, Z13J.C.J.M. van den Bergh     

Technology and social change: William Fielding Ogburn revisited

This paper reviews William Fielding Ogburn's work on technology and social change. An overview of his basic theory is presented, as well as later refinements found in such works as Recent Social Trends in the United States, Technological Trends and National Policy, The Social Effects of Aviation, and other books and articles. It is suggested that while Ogburn is most widely remembered for his thesis of cultural lag, some of his later work on technology and social change is actually more important and deserves reconsideration and extension. One kind of extension might follow the lines of a systems approach rather than continuing the technological primacy strategy that Ogburn is normally considered to have used. The paper also surveys Ogburn's important work in the areas of technology, planning, and social policy, including materials on technology assessment. Ogburn's nontechnocratic approach to these questions, as well as his insistence that social scientists have a great deal to offer to the formulation of technological and social policies, are some of his most important contributions. Questions of technology and social change remain important contemporary issues, yet there is a surprising paucity of social science work on these crucial topics. Further study, extension, and reformulation of Ogburn's pioneering ideas offer fruitful means of embarking on new social science analyses of technology and society.     

The state of technological and social change: Impressions

As the long-wave theory has predicted, we are seeing a period of consolidation in which the pace of radical technological innovation seems exceeded by the pace of social change. Peter Drucker's dictum, that technology changes faster than society, appears now to have been reversed. The article offers research and anecdotal support for these assertions, linking them to specific trends and trend interactions, including patents and intellectual property litigation, new product development, and politics and revolution.     

The institutional change under lobbying and the distribution of power

In this paper, we develop a model of institutional change of land property right in China, which include the influences of lobbying and the political power division in 1978. The model illustrates how extra gains are produced under different institutions and how lobbying and political power division can affect the change. It is clear that the institutional innovation has something to do with the leaders’ legal income, the cost of institutional change and the conversion rate. Given the pattern of leader’s power division, it is the best way for the people in rural areas to change their institutional framework, and it is efficient to mix local and central governmental policies. And lobbying and leading power division can affect the direction and the course of institutional changes that would lead different result among different areas. __________ Translated from Nankai jingji yanjiu 南开经济研究 (Nankai Economic Research), 2007, (6): 17–32     

Rent seeking: Some conceptual problems and implications

Conclusion Rent-seeking waste is a matter of opinion depending on one's view of the appropriate role of the state, which must ultimately be determined on the basis of ethics rather than economic theory. If emphasis is placed on the freedom of individual choice, there are genuine opportunities for improvements in the political system and strong reasons to reduce the current level of redistributive activity. Rent-seeking activities by organized groups are important in the growth of the bargaining society or transfer society with its stifling effect on the competitive market process and concomitant shrinking of liberty of choice. Moreover, while there can be little doubt that there has been a pronounced increase in the number of groups organized for redistributive purposes, group activities generally pose little reason for concern in the absence of government assistance. Thus, limiting the role of the state is essential in minimizing the effects of rentseeking activity.³⁰ There is mounting evidence that a revision of the constitutional contract will be necessary to reduce the role of the state. Regardless of the approach taken in reducing the scope of government, however, a necessary first step is increased awareness of the economic and ethical implications of redistributive activities by individuals and groups.This article was presented as a paper at a New York University-Liberty Fund Research seminar in Austrian economics, August 7–11, 1983. The author wishes to thank members of the seminar and Terry Anderson, Marc Johnson, Dwight Lee, Jim Leiby, Rolf Mueller, and Ray Palmquist for helpful comments and suggestions.