Is transparency a good thing? How online price transparency and variability can benefit firms and influence consumer decision making

The internet has empowered consumers and changed the way they search and shop for products and services by increasing the availability and transparency of pricing and other comparative information. However, what is less clear from a managerial perspective is just how transparent pricing information should be. While it might seem that increasing price transparency would reduce consumer search, we find that it may actually increase search and delay. In this article, we review the use of firms’ application of price transparency in practice and propose that specific types of information can influence how transparent prices are to consumers, and how such transparency can influence consumer decisions in a way that is beneficial for the firm. We focus on a specific form of transparency: whether or not the consumer knows the range of pricing. We also discuss whether a high variability pricing approach versus a low variability pricing approach influences consumer decision making—and whether this influence is moderated by transparency.     

Emerging trends in retail pricing practice: implications for research

This article represents the first of several editorials to appear in the Journal of Retailing designed to examine the nexus between retail practice and research, with the goal of stimulating further research. This essay on emerging trends in pricing discusses recent advances in retail pricing optimization. We begin with a review of how retailers typically make pricing decisions using time-honored heuristics and attempt to infer the optimal decisions. However, current methods are suboptimal because they do not consider the affects of advertising, competition, substitute products, or complementary products on sales. Most fail to take into account how price elasticity changes over time, particularly for fashion merchandise, or how market segments react differentially to price changes. In addition, many retailers find it difficult to know how to price merchandise when their suppliers offer temporary “deals.” They are also generally unaware of how their pricing strategy influences their overall image. As these issues demonstrate, optimal pricing is not a static problem. Retailers must be able to react quickly to changes in the environment or sales patterns. This paper also provides examples of the more sophisticated pricing techniques that are currently being tested in practice. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the critical components that must be incorporated into retail pricing.     

Pricing as a driver of profitable growth: An agenda for CEOs and senior executives

Most CEOs take a narrow, tactical view of pricing and delegate pricing to lower levels of the organization. This myopic approach is costly, as it prevents companies from realizing their potential. In the hands of the best-run companies, pricing is not a battlefield tactic to win a particular competitive skirmish but a transformative long-term strategy for sustained competitive advantage. We present an agenda of six specific action items that defines how to unlock the power of pricing. CEOs and senior executives, our research suggests, should not set prices, but instead, they should create the context, the capabilities, the behaviors, the infrastructure, and the aspirations that enable their organization to excel in pricing.     

Is innovation in pricing your next source of competitive advantage?

Few companies treat innovation in pricing as seriously as product innovation or business model innovation. However, after interviews with 50 executives and the analysis of pricing practices of 70 companies worldwide, our research suggests that innovation in pricing may be a company's most powerful—and, in many cases, least explored—source of competitive advantage. Innovation in pricing brings new-to-the-industry approaches to pricing strategies, to pricing tactics, and to the organization of pricing with the objective of increasing customer satisfaction and company profits; too many companies today see pricing as a win/lose proposition between themselves and their customers. Innovation in pricing breaks this deadlock and shows how to increase profits and customer satisfaction conjointly. As a result of our research, we present a canvas laying out more than 20 possible avenues for innovation in pricing, offering to any organization—regardless of size, industry, or nationality—a few key ideas on how to increase both profits and customer satisfaction.     

A Comparison of Bundling and Sequential Pricing in Competitive Markets: Experimental Evidence

Technological advances enable sellers to identify relationships among offered goods. Sellers can leverage this information through pricing strategies such as bundling and sequential pricing. While these strategies have primarily been studied under monopoly assumptions, the strategies are available to competitive firms as well. This paper reports on a series of laboratory experiments comparing bundling and sequential pricing while varying the underlying relationship between the goods in markets where a fraction of buyers comparison shop. The results indicate that sequential pricing is generally as profitable to the seller; however, there is evidence that sequential pricing may be more harmful to consumers than bundling when the goods have complementary values or the buyer’s values are positively correlated.     

A guide to pay-what-you-wish pricing from the consumer’s viewpoint

As customer participation in business transactions increases, it is important to investigate how consumers approach financial transactions with firms in terms of selfishness and fairness. Pay-what-you-wish pricing models continue to attract managerial and academic interest as allowing customers to set prices provides an unorthodox setting in which to examine forces that drive buyer-seller interactions. This Executive Digest provides an overview of the current state of pay-what-you-wish (PWYW) pricing and the benefits it can provide to a firm.     

Free in-network pricing as an entry-deterrence strategy

This paper analyzes the entry-deterring power of free in-network pricing with multiple incumbents. Free in-network pricing may deter entry since it creates network externality that intensifies competition. One may expect that a particular entry-deterrent strategy adopted by all incumbents would have more entry-deterring power than when it is adopted by some incumbents only. However, we show that when free-in network plan has entry-deterrence power with two incumbent firms, sometimes one incumbent offering free in-network plan may have more entry deterrence power than both firms offering free in-network plans. In other words, we find that an asymmetric adoption of entry-deterrence strategies by the incumbent firms may be the best for entry deterrence. This result highlights the importance of the strategic choice of the pricing plan as a function of not only the likelihood/cost of entry but also of the plan choices of other firms, and may partially explain the asymmetric strategies used by competing firms.     

Pricing Experience Goods in Information Good Markets: The Case of eBusiness Service Providers

We study the pricing strategies of firms providing a service in experience good markets with switching costs. Using data on vendors providing “hosting and related services” at an early stage of the market, we test for pricing distortions that follow from oligopolistic competition with quality uncertainty and switching costs. We find that firms with a brand name charge a premium for their product – leveraging the reputation accumulated in closely related markets. As the theoretical literature suggests, we also find that the type of pricing distortions along the product line depends on consumers’ expectations about quality. If consumers underestimate the quality of the product, firms behave as if they discount introductory contracts in order to build trust, and later on markup upgraded contract. In contrast, firms that offer a quality level that is lower than consumers’ expectations markup initial contracts while discounting upgraded ones.     

Effectiveness of some simple pricing strategies under varying expectations of competitor behavior

A firm needs to tailor its pricing strategy to the particular competitive setting it faces. We show how a firm can select a pricing strategy that yields higher expected profit than other simple pricing strategies for the competitive conditions encountered. We show that no one strategy yields the highest expected profit for all competitive settings. In particular, we find that a more aggressive pricing strategy is needed for those markets that are either very cooperative or very competitive, while a more cooperative pricing strategy is preferred for markets which have a moderate degree of competition. We also find that a more aggressive pricing strategy is needed as the number of competitors increases. Our results suggest how to choose the pricing strategy that yields the highest expected profit given the likely behavior of a firm's competitors.The authors thank Terry Elrod and Robert Lusch for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.     

Uniform or spatially differentiated? Pricing Strategies for Information Goods under simultaneous and sequential decision-making in multi-market context

Product pricing has been one of the central issues in the field of marketing and consumer services for managers and researchers alike. However, pricing of information goods has not been paid much attention in literature. For information goods the marginal costs of production and transportation of information goods (online movies, video games, etc.) is almost zero. Hence, the pricing decisions need to be thought of purely in competitive profit maximizing terms. This paper proposes mechanisms for managers to evaluate and base their pricing decisions on rational frameworks that takes into account various situations when they enter a new market and when they are incumbent in a new market. This paper addresses the research gap of spatially differentiated pricing strategy for information goods that has not been studied in literature so far. We create stylized theoretical models under both, sequential and simultaneous decision-making conditions. We determine the equilibrium price and the equilibrium profit for the two firms for each of the four possible scenarios based on their pricing strategies. Our analysis reveals that the dominance of one pricing strategy over the other depends on product differentiation factor capturing joint effect of the product substitutability and consumer's price sensitivity under sequential decision making and the market size along with consumer's price sensitivity for simultaneous decision making. As an extension, we propose a generalized model demonstrating the uniform and spatially differentiated pricing strategies of the firms under simultaneous and sequential selection for multiple domestic and international markets.     

Per piece or per kilogram? Default-unit effects in retailing

Retailers offer a variety of products either per unit or per weight. Depending on the product category, consumers may find either one of these pricing strategies typical and the default. Especially online retailers are increasingly using unit-based prices, which is the non-default for many produce categories. So far, consequences resulting from non-default pricing strategies are unclear. This study addresses the questions of whether and how pricing strategies affect consumer behavior. In a series of four experiments, we show that default pricing strategies exist in the marketplace and that consumers prefer products that retailers offer using default pricing strategies. We also demonstrate that this behavior is due to uncertainty issues when assessing prices in non-default pricing strategies. Furthermore, we elaborate on the influence of weight expectations and explicitly stated weight information on this default-unit effect. The findings suggest that retailers can mitigate negative effects resulting from non-default pricing strategies by providing weight information.     

The market value for product attribute improvements under price personalization

Personalization of the marketing mix is a topic of much interest to marketing academics and practitioners. Using discrete choice demand theory, we investigate the aggregate market value for product attribute improvements when firms are engaged in personalized pricing. Our results provide a theoretically grounded rule for how to aggregate consumer valuations to assess the overall profitability of attribute improvements under price personalization. Under common pricing, each consumer contributes the same margin. Profitability of an attribute improvement is thus driven by inducing more consumers to buy. Consumers with high choice probabilities are given less weight in the market valuation under common pricing as they are less responsive to attribute improvements. Under personalized pricing, profitability of an attribute improvement is driven by extraction of consumer surplus from high valuation consumers. Consumers with higher valuations, and consequently higher choice probabilities, are given more weight in the market valuation under personalized pricing. Since individual consumers play a more central role in the market valuation under personalized pricing, estimation of consumer-level valuations is of increased importance. Under common pricing, the market valuation for an attribute improvement is robust to extreme estimates of the consumer-level valuations. Through our theoretical and empirical analyses, we demonstrate that this robustness does not hold under personalized pricing.     

Optimal criteria for selecting price discrimination metrics when buyers have log-normally distributed willingness-to-pay

This paper investigates how a monopoly seller should determine the optimal set of pricing variables (pricing metrics) for third-degree price discrimination applications in which buyers have log-normally distributed willingness-to-pay (WTP). In a setup that closely resembles linear and probit regressions, this paper shows that when the monopoly seller is restricted to using one metric and no price discrimination cost exists, the pricing metric that best reduces the residual variance of buyers’ willingness-to-pay is the one that maximizes revenue. Equivalently, the explanatory power of willingness-to-pay is the ordering criterion. This paper also shows that this criterion is not universally true when willingness-to-pay follows other distributions. When the seller incurs price discrimination costs associated with different metrics, the ordering criterion becomes the explanatory power of each pricing metric divided by its cost. This paper also discusses how to apply this model to solve real-world pricing problems with contingent valuation models or using probit regression.

Informative Brand Advertising and Pricing Strategies in Internet Markets with Heterogeneous Consumer Search

The use of information intermediaries has been shown to undermine the effect of brand in online markets. In this paper, the effect of consumer search on the relationship between brand advertising and pricing strategies is analysed. Price data are taken from the leading UK motor insurance comparison website, with the advantage that prices can be related to the search characteristics of consumers and to the advertising expenditure of firms. The paper finds that more-advertised firms have lower price rankings at the comparison site, indicating that advertising is informative in this market. The main result is that consumer search weakens the relationship between advertising and pricing. An implication is that increased usage of price comparison sites will make informative brand advertising less important.     

Procurement bidding with restrictions

In many procurement situations with simultaneously offered projects, firms face participation restrictions and can bid only on a subset of the projects. This phenomenon is prevalent in a variety of observed situations such as bidding for private label supplies, business to business procurement or government projects. We show that for the case of n bidding firms where each is restricted to bid on a subset of the offered projects, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which each bidder has a positive expected equilibrium profit. Prices are bounded away from marginal costs even if all the bidders are homogenous. This results from the fact that there is a positive probability that each firm will find itself in the position of being the sole bidder on a project. While the equilibrium probability of bidding on a project increases with its value, it is interesting to note that the bidding probability on the projects approaches an equiprobable one as the number of bidding firms increases. We find that the equilibrium profits decrease as firms are able to bid on more of the available projects. In contrast, bidder commitment to bid on specific projects increases the equilibrium profits of all firms. We also examine the effect of heterogeneity on equilibrium profits. Greater heterogeneity in the project valuations leads to lower firm profits. On the other hand, heterogeneity among bidders in terms of the number of projects that they are constrained to bid on leads to greater profits for the firms that can bid on more projects (regardless of the mix of the firms in the industry.) Finally, we analyze the effect of uncertainty in project valuations and show greater uncertainty in project valuations (as represented by a mean preserving spread) decreases the equilibrium profits. We conclude with an empirical analysis of bidding behavior that tests the predictions of the theory. We find that the probability of bidding on a particular project is increasing in its value, decreasing in the other projects values and decreasing in the number of bidding subjects. Furthermore, the value of the bids on a project increase with its valuation and decrease with the total number of bidders.

Optimal pricing in social networks considering reference price effect

We study the optimal monopoly pricing strategies in a social network, in which consumers experience a network effect that is dependent on their neighbors' consumptions and a reference price which is the average price received by their neighbors. We establish a two-stage game model for any social network. Utilizing the backward induction, we derive the equilibrium price by maximizing the monopolist's profit. In addition, we apply this model to the two most commonly used network structures: the star network and the bipartite network. We find that both the network effect and the reference price effect play a critical role in deciding pricing strategies in social networks. Moreover, our numerical results demonstrate that whether to implement discriminatory pricing depends critically on the network structure. This work provides monopoly firms a useful guideline for optimal pricing decisions in social network marketing.     

The six pricing myths that kill profits

Pricing is the most important driver of profits. Pricing is also, surprisingly, the area most executives overlook when implementing initiatives to increase profits. There is a reason: Research presented in this article suggests that most executives implicitly hold on to a series of weakly held assumptions about pricing that ultimately are self-defeating. These pricing myths are that (1) costs are the basis for price setting, (2) small price changes have little impact on profits, (3) customers are highly price sensitive, (4) products are difficult to differentiate, (5) high market share leads to high profits, and (6) managing price means changing prices. This research shows how executives can overcome these misconceptions and thus implement sustainable profit improvements via pricing.     

The price is right? Guidelines for pricing to enhance profitability

Pricing is a key element of the marketing strategy. It does not require significant investments or resources, and is perhaps the most accessible lever to manage profitability. Even minor fluctuations in pricing can have a significant impact on both revenues and profitability. As such, lack of careful planning in pricing is a wasted opportunity. With this as a backdrop, we make a case for precision in pricing to enhance profitability. Since consumers vary in their preferences, motivations, and propensity to spend, they assign varying degrees of emphasis regarding price upon their purchase decisions. We argue that pricing is a creative exercise in math and behavioral economics, and companies should stay focused on profits. We also provide a series of guidelines for creating effective base prices, and then modifying them to enhance profitability. Finally, monitoring prices at the transaction level will reduce leakage in profits and further add to the bottom line.     

Selling to strategic customers with cost uncertainty

Production cost can be influenced by previous sales in an uncertain way. In reality, production cost may decrease in the number of initial buyers due to the learning effect, or increase in the number of initial buyers due to the quality-improving pressure from negative comments of unhappy users. Taking this uncertainty into account, this paper studies the optimal intertemporal pricing strategies of a firm when selling to strategic customers in two periods where production cost in the second period randomly changes with the number of buyers in the first period. Our results suggest how firms should adjust their optimal pricing strategies under different market circumstances.