Search, money, and inflation under private information

I study monetary exchange and inflation when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay for certain goods. Introducing imperfect information in the Lagos-Wright [A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. Polit. Economy 113(3) (2005) 463-484] economy shows that the existence of monetary equilibrium is a more robust feature of the environment. In general, my model has a monetary steady state in which only a proportion of the agents hold money. Agents who do not hold money cannot participate in trade in the decentralized market. The proportion of agents holding money is endogenous and depends (negatively) on the level of expected inflation. As in Lagos and Wright's model, in equilibrium there is a positive welfare cost of expected inflation, but the origins of this cost are very different.     

Policy trade-off in the long run: A new Keynesian model with technological change and money growth

In this study, we introduce a constant rate of technological change and money growth into the standard new Keynesian model, in which both prices and nominal wages are supposed to be sticky. Using such a model, we examine whether a policy trade-off exists between curbing inflation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap in the steady state. If we take only price stickiness into consideration, a policy trade-off does not occur. However, if both nominal wage stickiness and price stickiness are taken into consideration, a policy trade-off occurs.