Labor market reforms, job instability, and the flexibility of the employment relationship

We endogenize separation in a search model of the labor market and allow for bargaining over the continuation of employment relationships following productivity shocks to take place under asymmetric information. In such a setting separation may occur even if continuation of the employment relationship is privately efficient for workers and firms. We show that reductions in the cost of separation, owing for example to a reduction in firing taxes, lead to an increase in job instability and, when separation costs are initially high, may be welfare decreasing for workers and firms. We furthermore show that, in response to an exogenous reduction in firing taxes, workers and firms may switch from rigid to flexible employment contracts, which further amplifies the increase in job instability caused by policy reform.     

INCENTIVES AND THE COST OF FIRING IN AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS LAYOFFS*

I study the effects of firing costs in an equilibrium model of the labor market with moral hazard. Layoff is an incentive device, modeled as termination of the optimal long‐term contract. When the economy’s stock of firms is fixed, firing costs could reduce layoffs and increase worker welfare. In the long run when firms are free to enter and exit the market, firing costs generate not only lower employment, longer unemployment durations, and lower aggregate output, but also lower welfare for both employed workers and new labor market entrants.     

Does Price Stability Exacerbate Labour Market Rigidities in the EMU?

How will the commitment to price stability affect labour market rigidities in the European Monetary Union? I explore a model where firms choose between fixed wage contracts (where the employer cannot lay off the worker, and the wage can only be changed by mutual consent), or contracts where employment is at will, so that either party may terminate employment (with strong similarities to temporary jobs). A fixed wage contract provides better incentives for investment and training, while employment at will facilitates efficient mobility. Inflation erodes the real value of a fixed contract wage over time, and badly matched workers are more likely to quit for other jobs. Disinflation has opposing effects on labour market rigidity: fixed wage contracts become more rigid in real terms, but fewer firms will choose fixed wage contracts.     

SHORT-TERM CONTRACTS REGULATIONS AND DYNAMIC LABOUR DEMAND: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

We present a dynamic labour demand model where we evaluate the impact of employment regulations on permanent and temporary employment. We consider three different kinds of regulations, namely firing costs, hiring costs and a constraint on temporary contracts. These regulations differently affect the size and composition of employment. The theoretical results are interpreted and questioned on the basis of empirical evidence on the employment effects of the regulation reforms that occurred in the major European countries in the period 1983–1999. The empirical analysis is based on a new set of time‐varying indicators on permanent employment protection, fixed‐term contracts and temporary agency work regulations. We find evidence in support of the hypothesis that fixed‐term contracts have been effective stepping‐stones to permanent jobs during the period under observation. On the contrary, flexible temporary agency work regulations seem to induce a substitution of permanent with temporary contracts.     

Direct and Cross Effects of Employment Protection: The Case of Parental Childcare

I examine whether employment protection affects the willingness of working parents to provide childcare. Using a reform that made it easier for employers to dismiss workers in small firms, I find that softer employment protection reduces the use of temporary parental leave among directly treated fathers. In addition, I find that households respond to an increase in the dismissal risk by reducing temporary parental leave for the indirectly treated spouse. Spousal labor supply can thus serve as informal insurance against adverse income shocks.     

Employee treatment and corporate fraud

This paper examines the association between a firm’s relations with its employees and its likelihood of committing fraud. We find that firms treating their employees fairly (as measured by employee treatment index) have a lower likelihood of committing fraud since labor-friendly firms have incentives to signal their willingness to fulfill implicit contracts and maintain long-term relationships with employees. Further analysis shows that employee involvement and cash profit-sharing are the most important components in employee treatment to determine our results. Moreover, we show that the negative association between employee treatment and fraud propensity is more prominent when a firm is in a high-tech industry, when a firm in a less competitive industry, and when employees have less outside employment opportunities. Finally, we show that our results are not driven by the employee’s moral sensitivity or other labor related factors (i.e. labor wage, pension benefits, and labor union power).     

THE GREAT DEPRESSION RECONSIDERED: IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY

This paper reexamines the Great Depression of 1929–1933 within an analytical framework based on the terms of employment for labor. It shows that in areas such as the U.S. farm and Japanese industrial sectors where labor was employed organically—that is, as partners in common enterprise—costs proved flexible, prices fell, and output and employment held up in line with the predictions of Say's Law. Where labor was not employed organically—that is, labor was hired—output collapsed, unemployment mounted, and Say's Law failed. The apparent reason is that any hired input, capital or labor, demands downwardly rigid rates of pay. When demand softens, cost rigidity constrains price cuts, and firms must instead lay off labor. The paper also shows that given organic labor, even oligopolistic rivalry is sufficient to assure that prices will fall enough to sustain output and employment.     

Experience Rating versus Employment Protection Laws in a Model where Firms Monitor Workers*

While layoff costs in the U.S. are mostly due to experience‐rated unemployment insurance, layoff costs in European labour markets are primarily a consequence of employment protection laws. In this paper we compare the effects of experience rating and employment protection laws on employment and welfare in a model where unemployment arises due to efficiency wage setting and where labour turnover is inefficiently high. We show that a revenue‐neutral introduction of experience rating reduces labour turnover and increases employment and welfare. The introduction of employment protection laws may also reduce labour turnover but employment declines.     

The rise of part-time employment in the great recession: Its causes and macroeconomic effects

During the Great Recession, the U.S. economy witnessed a substantial rise in part-time employment for a sustained period. We extend the New Keynesian unemployment model by Galí et al. (2012) to allow substitutions between full-time and part-time labor, and estimate the model’s parameters by using the Bayesian method. In our model, households and firms can optimally allocate full-time and part-time labor, and disturbances exist in part-time labor supply (household disutility from part-time labor) and part-time labor demand (firms’ efficiency to use part-time labor). As for the Great Recession, the initial increase in part-time employment at the outset of the financial crisis is mostly explained by the rise of the risk premia; the persistently high level of part-time employment in the later period is mainly explained by an exogenous increase in part-time labor supply. A part-time labor supply shock also explains a significant portion of slow recovery in the gross wage during the recession, as the shock lowers the part-time wage and the proportion of full-time workers in total employment. Notably, the results from our model suggest that though the transition from full-time to part-time jobs contributed to mitigating the sharp contraction in total employment and labor force during the Great Recession, it played only a limited role in relieving recessionary pressure.     

Changes in cyclical patterns of the USA labor market: from the perspective of nonlinear Okun’s law

The validity of Okun’s law has been debated because of the increase in cyclicality in aggregate hours after 1985. To investigate this, I measure Okun’s coefficients in three phases of the business cycle – recession, early, and late expansions. I found that an increased coefficient for aggregate hours is due to the increased responsiveness of the employment rate during late expansions and to the increased responsiveness of hours per employee during early expansions. These findings question the flexible labor market hypothesis focusing on firms’ firing behaviors during recessions. Rather, working hours’ flexibility represents a more prominent feature of the post-1985 USA labor market.     

高校扩招背景下大学毕业生就业的经济学分析

本文尝试构建一个分割的劳动力市场模型,对我国高等院校扩招给大学毕业生、非大学毕业求业者、企业和社会在就业和工资等方面所造成的福利效应作一纯理论的分析.通过对模型中扩招前后均衡点的分析,我们发现,尽管高校扩招所带来的大学毕业生大量增加,从长期看为我国经济增长积聚了大量的人力资本,但就个人福利而言,投资于高等教育者其境况变坏,而没有上大学的人却境况变好.我们认为,要想方设法增加大学毕业生就业,使全社会潜在福利的增加变成现实的福利增长,需要进一步深化市场改革以拓宽市场规模,由此改善大学毕业生的就业状况并增加其收入.     

Pareto-improving firing costs?

We examine self-enforcing contracts between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms (the ‘invisible handshake’) in a labor market with search frictions. Employers promise as much wage-smoothing as they can, consistent with incentive conditions that ensure they will not renege during low-profitability times. Equilibrium is inefficient if these incentive constraints bind, with risky wages for workers and a risk premium that employers must pay. Mandatory firing costs can help, by making it easier for employers to promise credibly not to cut wages in low-profitability periods. We show that firing costs are more likely to be Pareto-improving if they are not severance payments.     

Aspects of International Fragmentation

The paper uses a specific‐factors framework to address efficiency and distributional implications of international fragmentation which is driven by a low foreign wage rate. Focusing on the cost‐savings linkage between fragmentation and labor demand in the remaining domestic activities, the author establishes a fragmentation surplus. If capital is an indivisible asset specific to the fragment produced abroad, then fragmentation may cause a domestic welfare loss, because outsourcing takes place in discrete steps where it affords firms “quasi‐market‐power” on the domestic labor market. The regime shift from domestic production to fragmentation is modeled as a two‐stage game. In stage one, firms locate indivisible assets at home or abroad; in stage two they choose optimal employment. The share of fragmented firms is endogenously determined. The paper explores conditions under which outsourcing is beneficial for the domestic economy.     

Does formality improve micro-firm performance? Evidence from the Brazilian SIMPLES program

This paper exploits an extensive Brazilian micro-enterprise survey and the 1996 introduction of a business tax reduction and simplification scheme (SIMPLES) to examine three questions. First, do high tax rates and complex tax regulations really constitute a barrier to the formalization of micro-firms? Second, does formalization improve firm performance measured along several dimensions, including revenues, employment and capital stock? Third, what are the channels through which this occurs? We find that SIMPLES led to a significant increase in formality in several dimensions. Moreover, newly created firms that opt for operating formally show higher levels of revenue and profits, employ more workers and are more capital intensive (only for those firms that have employees). The channel through which this occurs is not access to credit or contracts with larger firms. Rather, it appears that the lower cost of contracting labor leads to adopting production techniques that involve a permanent location and a larger paid labor force.     

Temporary Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance: Is Experience Rating Desirable?

Abstract. This paper explores how the introduction of an experience-rated system of unemployment insurance affects employment and welfare in a model where implicit contracts between firms and workers give rise to wage rigidities and unemployment. In the literature, it has been argued that experience-rated systems of unemployment insurance may reduce long-term employment as firms anticipate the higher costs of layoffs implied by experience rating. Our analysis shows that the introduction of experience rating may increase or decrease long-term employment but it unambiguously raises welfare.     

Partisan Cycles in Offshore Outsourcing: Evidence from U.S. Imports

The wage and employment effects of offshoring roil politics in the United States and around the world. Firms that offshore either outsource their activities to unaffiliated businesses, or internalize production by establishing subsidiaries from which they import intrafirm. We argue that the political environment in trade partner countries influences U.S. offshoring patterns in ways that have been ignored in the extant literature. Drawing on the political business cycle literature, we expect higher production costs and lower profits for firms in capital (labor) intensive sectors when the Left (Right) is in power. These partisan cycles, in turn, shape the sectoral composition of exports from the partner to the United States, and the degree to which trade is conducted intrafirm. Under a Left‐ (Right‐) leaning government in a partner country, U.S. intrafirm imports of capital‐ (labor‐) goods increase relative to total imports in these industries. Examining highly disaggregated U.S. import data, we find strong support for our argument. Our results indicate that the effect of partisan governments on offshore outsourcing depends on factor intensities of production, which vary across industries. The degree of internalization in global sourcing is shaped in part by the distributional objectives of partisan governments, and not by economic factors alone.     

Efficient risk sharing,non-marketable labor income and fixed-wage contracts

This paper seeks to explain fixed-wage labor contracts. The traditional rationale that fixed wages represent an implicit sale of ‘wage insurance’ by risk-neutral firms to risk-averse workers is rejected as being incompatible with the fact that firms are owned by risk-averse investors. Instead, it is shown that fixed-wage contracts might arise from the non-marketability of labor income. When human capital is not marketable, it becomes optimal to shift all the risk in production onto the firm, since trading in equity markets enables efficient allocation of the uncertainty. The fixed-wage contract shifts the risk to equity owners and in fact replicates the first-best equilibrium that would emerge if individuals were paid their realized marginal product and allowed to trade shares in human capital.     

Financial Markets and Wages

We study a labour market equilibrium model in which firms sign optimal long-term contracts with workers. Firms that are financially constrained offer an increasing wage profile: they pay lower wages today in exchange for higher future wages once they become unconstrained. Because constrained firms grow faster, the model predicts a positive correlation between the growth of wages and the growth of the firm. Under some conditions, the model also generates a positive relation between firm size and wages. Using matched employer–employee data from Finland and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for the U.S., we show that the key dynamic properties of the model are supported by the data.     

The Welfare and Resouce Allocation Implications of the U.S.Dairy Quotas

This paper examine the welfare and resource allocation implications of the U.S. dairy quotas. A computable general equilibrium model detailing five dairy sectors and nine aggregate sectors is calibrated to a 1989 benchmark of the U.S economy. The model is used to simulate the removal of the U.S.dairy quotas both the with and without a first-best subsidy to maintain a dairy farm output objective. Welfare, production, trade, and employment results are provided. The welfare cost of the U.S dairy quotas ranges from $0.7 to $1.0 billion. The first-best subsidy ranges from $2.0 to $2.3 billion or approximately $1.4 million per full-time equivalent job maintained in the dairy farm sector [F13, Q17]     

Pro-market institutions and labor market outcomes: A panel-data analysis of U.S. metropolitan areas

We expand previous U.S. state-level research on the relationship between pro-market institutions and labor market outcomes by examining this relationship at the U.S. metropolitan-area level. Using panel data for 1992–2012 in a fixed-effects model, we investigate the effect of pro-market institutions on the unemployment rate, labor force participation rate, employment-population ratio, and employment growth across 366 U.S. metropolitan areas. The results indicate that pro-market institutions are associated with a lower unemployment rate, higher employment-population ratio, and faster employment growth. These results suggest that local-area policies are important for achieving favorable labor market conditions at the local level.