Welfare‐ranking ad valorem and specific tariffs under monopolistic competition

Abstract.  Actual trade and tariff policy prefers ad valorem tariffs to specific tariffs. Yet in this paper we show that, in a setting of monopolistic competition, realizing a given restriction on imports via a specific tariff would generate more consumer utility than obtaining the same restriction via an ad valorem tariff. JEL classification: F12     

Revenue raising trade-restricting policies under uncertainty: The sub-optimality of the expected welfare criterion and some safety-first results

The analysis of trade-restricting policies under uncertainty has typically argued in favour of the specific tariff over alternative commercial policies such as the ad valorem tariff and the quota, when the raising of revenue and maintenance of consumer's welfare are the policy objectives. This paper reconsiders this result. It is demonstrated that, when the shape of the welfare probability distribution is considered explicitly, the quota may be the dominant trade-restricting policy. In addition, the analysis of trade-restricting instruments is analysed for the case where the principle of safety-first is applied to the revenue-raising objective.We should like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

Dynamics of economic efficiency in tariff and trade

When the efficiency losses or gains as a result of an ad valorem import tariff are accounted for, the exisiting literature compares the equilibrium states before and after the tariff. However, after the imposition of an ad valorem tariff, the cost of the foreign producer to sell in the domestic market jumps upwards by the extent of the ad valorem tariff. This affects the quantity of imports, and the market is no longer in the initial equilibrium. The market then adjusts and after some efficiency loss, a new equilibrium state is arrived at. The mechanism of price adjustment has a basis of lack of coordination among buyers and sellers at the exisiting prices. The economic efficiency loss when the market is out of equilibrium is not taken into consideration in the literature, while deriving an optimal ad valorem tariff rate. In this article, an optimal ad valorem tariff schedule has been derived. From optimality, it should be construed that the economic efficiency losses get minimised when the market is adjusting and also during the equilibrium. A revenue constraint has to be met in addition.     

Reforming Tariffs and Subsidies in International Trade

This paper analyzes unilateral and multilateral reform of ad valorem tariffs and subsidies. The paper shows that under substitutability, extensive subsidization of exports is required for an increase in the lowest tariff rate to raise economic welfare. The paper derives also conditions for when a radial reduction of ad valorem tariffs and subsidies may fail to raise economic welfare.     

PERFORMANCE CONTINGENT PROTECTION*

In this paper we ask how to construct a tariff or quota schedule which depends on the behavior of a domestic monopsonistic monopolist in order to achieve the best tradeoff between two objectives of a government. We consider various political and economic tradeoffs which could face the policy maker: aggregate welfare versus industry profits, output and imports; and trade barrier revenue versus industry profits and domestic price. In all cases considered, performance contingent protection which takes the form either of a tariff which depends on domestic output or a quota which depends on the price charged is generally superior to a fixed tariff or quota and is sufficient to achieve optimality.     

On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under a Revenue Constraint

This paper sets out a duopolistic model to examine the price and welfare equivalence of tariffs and quotas, given the quota rent is equal to the tariff revenue. It shows that the domestic welfare ranking of the two trade policies crucially depends on the relative costs of the domestic and foreign firms; when the domestic firm's relative costs are lower than those of the foreign firm, a quota regime generally leads to a higher welfare level than that of an equivalent tariff regime. This finding contrasts sharply with the conclusions of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977 ), where it was found that a tariff regime always generates higher domestic welfare.     

State Trading and Tariff Rate Quotas: The Case of Korea's Rice Imports

This paper analyzes the effects of trade liberalization of tariff‐rate quotas under import “state trading enterprises” (STEs) in agriculture. An analytical framework is provided to determine the importance of which instrument is binding under competition (the in‐quota or out‐of‐quota tariff or the quota) and under the initial STE equilibrium. It also depends on whether or not the STE controls both the domestic market prices and owns/controls the import quota (and whether it is obligated to fill the quota or not). An empirical example of the rice STE in South Korea has simulations showing that an increase in imports can be achieved through a moderate expansion of the quota or a decrease in the out‐of‐quota tariff to the level where it becomes binding. However, a significant level of quota expansion induces the STE to switch to the autarky solution and social welfare declines.     

Trade Structure, Transboundary Pollution and Multilateral Trade Liberalization: The Effects on Environmental Taxes and Welfare

This paper considers a trade situation where the production activities of potentially heterogeneous countries generate pollution which can cross borders and harm the well-being of all the countries involved. In each of those countries the policy maker levies pollution taxes on the polluting firms and a tariff on imports in order to correct that distortion. The purpose of the paper is to investigate the effect of a reduction in the tariff on equilibrium pollution taxes and welfare. The existing literature has investigated this problem for trade between two identical countries. This paper analyzes the problem in the more realistic context where countries are not necessarily identical and trade can be multilateral. It becomes possible to show what bias is introduced when those two realities are neglected. I find that a tariff reduction can actually lower output; it can also lower welfare even if pollution is purely local.     

A Classroom Tariff-Setting Game

The author outlines a classroom tariff-setting game that allows students to explore the consequences of import tariffs imposed by large countries (countries able to influence world prices). Groups of students represent countries, which are organized into trading pairs. Each group's objective is to maximize welfare by choosing an appropriate ad valorem tariff that may be changed intermittently throughout the game. The game is built on a computable general-equilibrium model, which allows each nation's utility and terms of trade under alternative tariff regimes to be expressed quantitatively. The exercise encourages students to consider terms-of-trade improvements and efficiency losses resulting from large-country tariffs and provides a framework to discuss the Nash equilibrium of a tariff war. The game is a useful supplement to traditional teaching methods.     

Welfare–maximizing and revenue–maximizing tariffs with a few domestic firms

In this paper we compare the orthodox optimal tariff formula with the appropriate welfare–maximizing tariff when there are a few producing or importing firms. The welfare–maximizing tariff can be very low, voire negative in some cases, while in others it can even exceed the maximum–revenue tariff. The relationship between the welfare–maximizing tariff and the number of firms need not be monotonically increasing, because the tariff is not strictly used to internalize terms of trade externality. It is also used to manipulate cost asymmetries between producing and importing firms. Welfare–maximizing specific tariffs are never worse than their ad valorem counterparts. JEL Classification F13, L13
Tarif qui maximise le bien être et tarif qui maximise le revenu quand on est en présence de peu de firmes. Nous comparons le tarif optimal orthodoxe au tarif maximisant le bien être lorsqu'il y a peu de firmes productrices ou importatrices. Le tarif qui maximise le bien être est parfois très bas, même négatif, mais il peut excéder le tarif qui maximise le revenu dans d'autres cas. La relation entre le tarif et le nombre de firmes n'est pas nécessairement monotone parce que le tarif n'est pas strictement utilisé pour améliorer les termes d'échange. Il est aussi utilisé pour manipuler les asymétries dans les coûts des firmes productrices et importatrices. Le tarif spécifique n'est jamais dominé par le tarif ad valorem.     

Managed trade: The US–Mexico sugar suspension agreements

Under the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement, Mexican sugar producers were ultimately granted free access to the US sugar market, while all other suppliers, including US refiners, were subject to supply quotas. Following a surge in imports of Mexican sugar, the American Sugar Coalition initiated anti‐dumping and countervailing duty (ADCVD) proceedings against Mexico in early 2014. In December 2014, the ADCVD cases were halted as a result of two suspension agreements negotiated between the US and Mexico. This paper contributes to a small number of empirical studies that have estimated the impact of suspension agreements. We measure the impacts of the ADCVD filings and the suspension agreements on US domestic raw and refined prices, the raw‐to‐refined margin and the quantity and composition of sugar imports from Mexico. Results suggest US raw sugar prices increased by 3¢ per lb. (14%) under ADCVD proceedings, equivalent to an ad valorem tariff between 40% and 50%, while the suspension agreements increased US raw sugar prices by 5¢ (70% tariff equivalent). US refined sugar prices increased by similar amounts under the ADCVD proceedings and the suspension agreements (4.5¢ per lb.). Ultimately, both the ADCVD proceedings and the suspension agreements significantly reduced sugar imports from Mexico. US sugar refiner economic welfare hinges critically on the quantity and composition of raw sugar imports. As such, refiner revenue, following the ADCVD filings and suspension agreements, is estimated to have declined by 16%, relative to a free trade environment.     

Commodity taxes and welfare under endogenous market conduct

We consider consumption taxes in a model of endogenous Cournot versus Bertrand competition. It is argued that when the choice of unit versus ad valorem taxes affects longer-term decisions beyond the customary price or quantity decisions, the mix of the two taxes co-determines market conduct. This gives ad valorem taxes an anti-competitive effect that harms ad valorem taxes’ efficiency in comparison with unit taxes. We show that a mix of the taxes—or a unit tax alone if we compare one or the other of the taxes—is sometimes welfare superior on account of consumer-price and tax revenue effects. A practical implication of our findings is that pass-through rates are only sometimes useful guides for policy. In fact, we show when the proper response to demand for higher revenue is a higher unit tax rate and a lower ad valorem tax rate.     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOW WITH TARIFF-RIDDEN AND QUOTA-RESTRICTED IMPORTS*

The welfare effects of foreign capital inflow and changes in the foreign price and tariff rate of a tariff-ridden imported good are considered for a small country for both 3 times 2 and 3 times 3 trade models with a quota-restricted imported good (whose special case is a nontraded good). For the 3 times 2 model, foreign capital inflow does not affect home welfare when there is no tariff on imports, but it harms the home country if a tariff is imposed on the imports to the extent that the tariff-ridden imported good is more capital intensive than the exported good. On the other hand, for the 3 times 3 model the foreign-capital inflow benefits the home country if the tariff rate is below a certain level under the analogous capital-intensity assumptions. The welfare effects of changes in the foreign price of the tariff-ridden good and its tariff rate remain the same for both models.     

The Possibility of Inefficient Liberalization Through Tariffication*

A typical step in trade liberalization under the GATT is tariffication—the conversion of quantitative import restrictions to their ad valorem tariff equivalents. This paper shows that, if there is market power in the protected industry, tariffication may cause a global efficiency loss. In particular, in a small country, if the protected industry is a monopoly that is freely able to export but cannot profitably do so, then tariffication unambiguously imposes global efficiency costs. In a large country, the global efficiency effects are uncertain a priori. In both cases, however, tariffication unambiguously benefits the monopoly and lowers foreign welfare.     

Tariffs Versus Quotas in a Differentiated Products Market: A Conjectural Variations in Prices Approach

This paper examines the (non)equivalence of a tariff and a quota set at the level of imports generated by the tariff using a conjectural variations in prices model. It extends previous studies by considering a variety of firm behavior patterns in the tariff equilibrium and when the imports and the domestic products are complements. The results obtained encompass most of the previous results. In addition, for complements, replacing a tariff with a quota has opposite effects on the prices of two products. Also, the prices under tariffs and quotas are not necessarily equivalent for complements. [F13]     

Disguised Protectionism, Global Trade Rules and Alien Invasive Species

Current international law strongly favors policies designed to make imports safer (e.g., in terms of invasive species) over policies explicitly designed to discourage imports. We show that this preference may be counterproductive. A externality in trade is incorporated into a political-economy model of policy formation. Nations can address the externality by inspecting cargo and imposing a fine on contaminated imports. We compare the equilibrium when inspection is the only policy option relative to the equilibrium that emerging when nations may also manipulate the tariff. Ruling out the tariff causes socially excessive stringency in general, social welfare losses if domestic supply is highly inelastic, and in some circumstances an increase in the real tariff, measured as the difference between world and domestic prices.     

Trade taxes and subsidies with imperfect competition

Traditional results in the theory of international trade suggest that a country large enough to influence world prices can raise its national income by levying a tariff. In a partial equilibrium model Brander and Spencer (1984) suggest that a country facing a monopolistic supplier of importables may find it optimal to subsidize this activity rather that tax it. This result is reconsidered in a general equilibrium framework. It is, in general, correct; but specific and ad valorem forms of taxation may yield different results.     

Tariffs,quotas, and voluntary export restraints with endogenous labor supply

This paper develops a two-good, small-country, general equilibrium trade model with endogenous labor supply and wage taxes, and where trade is restricted by a tariff, or an import quota, or VERs. Within this framework we derive (i) the employment and welfare effects of the three types of trade restrictions, (ii) the price effect of an import quota and VERs, and (iii) the shadow price of foreign exchange under each type of trade restriction. The present results are compared to those where (i) factor supplies are fixed, and (ii) perfect international capital mobility exists.     

Capital Imports and Tariffs

This paper develops a three‐sector, three‐factor specific factor model with a tariff and presents conditions under which capital imports and tariffs can be welfare enhancing in a developing country. The impact on welfare depends on the tariff revenue effect and the repatriation effect. A capital import is welfare enhancing if it reduces the domestic output of imports. A tariff is welfare enhancing only if it reduces the return to foreign capital.     

Tariffs,Quotas, and Forward Contracts under Asymmetric Information*

We consider optimal trade policy for a large country with private information. We show that the optimal tariff leads to a signaling equilibrium with higher tariffs and lower welfare than under complete information, whereas the optimal import quota replicates the complete information equilibrium and thus is superior to the tariff. We also show that, with the tariff, the country may be better off being uninformed. Finally, we show that if the importing nation cannot commit to its tariff, the use of futures contracts together with the dynamically consistent tariff leads to the same equilibrium as under complete information with commitment.