Comment: Lucas on involuntary unemployment

Keynes distinguishes three concepts: voluntary, frictional and(Keynesian) involuntary unemployment. Frictional unemploymentis a Classical form of involuntary unemployment (not voluntary,as Lucas suggests), and reflects the Marshallian, rather thanWalrasian, treatment of time and equilibrium. Lucas contradictsboth Keynes and Pigou in asserting that there are always immediatevacancies for unskilled labour, and abstracts from the veryproblem that Keynes seeks to address. If voluntary unemploymentis re-defined appropriately, as De Vroey helpfully suggestselsewhere, the prefix ‘involuntary’ is dispensable,not because all unemployment is voluntary, as Lucas would haveit, but because it is all involuntary.     

Keynes, Lucas and involuntary unemployment: a reply to Hayes

In this response to Mark Hayes's criticism of his article, ‘Lucason involuntary unemployment’, the author insists on theneed to draw a distinction between labour rationing (a marketoutcome) and unemployment (the activity of job seeking). Economictheory is mainly concerned with the former. Yet the issue ofthe voluntarity versus the involuntarity of unemployment pertainsto unemployment as an activity. Failing to make this distinctioncannot but lead to semantic confusion.     

A new model of equilibrium involuntary unemployment

Summary. We show that equilibrium involuntary unemployment emerges in a multi-stage game model where all market power resides with firms, on both the labour and the output market. Firms decide wages, employment, output and prices, and under constant returns there exists a continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria involving unemployment and positive profits. A firm does not undercut the equilibrium wage since then high wage firms would attract its workers, thus forcing the undercutting firm out of both markets. Full employment equilibria are payoff dominated by unemployment equilibria, and the arguments are robust to decreasing returns.Received: 21 May 2001, Revised: 15 April 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D43, E24.Correspondence to: Leo KaasWe thank an anonymous referee, Woojin Lee, Klaus Ritzberger and seminar participants in Konstanz, Manchester, Milan, Prague, Vienna, and Warwick for helpful comments. Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) under grant L138251030 and from the Manchester School Visiting Fellowship Scheme is gratefully acknowledged.     

The Italian theories of progressive taxation∗

In this paper I evaluate the logical consistency of Patinkin's claim that involuntary unemployment can result from slow speed of adjustment. I argue that Patinkin's argument is flawed because of an unjustified breach of continuity in the trade technology assumption between the microeconomic and the macroeconomic parts of Money, Interest, and Prices. Finally, I claim that the issue of flexibility versus rigidity should be linked to the trade technology assumption. As soon as a centralized trade technology is assumed, flexibility automatically comes in.     

Equilibrium unemployment, search behaviour and unemployment persistency

Unemployment persistency and high equilibrium unemployment isoften assumed to be caused by rigidities and low search efficiencyin the labour market, especially in European welfare stateswith generous income replacement schemes. These arguments aretested on data from Sweden, an old welfare state with a longperiod of full employment that has changed into a situationwith high unemployment. Data show a clear and very strong unemploymentduration dependency, but it is not possible to prove that thisis a result of low employability among the long-term unemployed.Getting a job is most of all associated with relative qualifications,recall expectations and local labour market conditions, andnot with search behaviour or high wage demands. It is arguedthat unemployment duration when unemployment is high can bestbe understood as a selection process rather than a search process,and that econometric estimations of equilibrium unemploymentare too pessimistic about the potential for an expansive economicpolicy. It is also argued that an active labour market policyis a more efficient compliment to such a policy than changesin income replacement ratios.     

Monopolistic equilibrium and involuntary unemployment

This note provides a simple example of an economy in which involuntary unemployment may be the consequence of monopolistic behavior on the product market.     

Re-employment probabilities of unemployment benefit recipients

This article studies transitions out of unemployment for benefit recipients in Spain. We analyse the duration of unemployment, distinguishing between spells that end in recall (workers returning to the previous employer) and spells that end in exit to a new job. This distinction allows us to find that the recall hazard rate increases around the time of exhaustion of benefits. However, this happens only for workers receiving Unemployment Insurance (UI). Because we are unable to replicate this result for workers receiving Unemployment Assistance (UA), we believe the finding lends support to the hypothesis that in Spain firms and workers make a strategic use of UI.     

Layoffs,recalls and unemployment duration: evidence from Sweden

The question addressed in this paper is whether the possibility of exit from unemployment to the previous employer affects the duration of unemployment spells in Sweden. The empirical analysis is performed using an employee–employer dataset that includes a number of enterprise characteristics and provides information on individual tenure. The econometric approach employs estimation of a competing risk duration model to distinguish between exits to the previous employer and exits to a new job. The findings suggest that greater tenure raises the risk of transition to the previous employer, while high education levels increase the risk of obtaining a new job. Moreover, the impact of benefit exhaustion is observed only for transitions to new employment.     

The impact of tax reforms on unemployment in a SMOPEC

This paper analyzes revenue-neutral tax reforms for a small open economy which is constrained to a balanced current account and whose producers have market power on the world market. We consider origin-based and destination-based commodity taxes as well as taxes on income, the payroll, and on an imported factor of production. Our main findings are the following. First, the strength, and for some parameter constellations, even the sign of the employment effect of tax reforms varies with the degree of openness of the economy. Second, the indeterminacy of the sign of the employment effect crucially hinges on the presence of an internationally mobile factor. The central mechanism underlying our results are adjustments of the real exchange rate which have repercussions on wage and price setting and therefore on employment.     

Keynes,investment, unemployment and expectations

In Keynes’ General Theory, investment determines effective demand, which determines unemployment and the labour market plays a negligible role. In New Keynesian models, labour market institutions determine the natural rate of unemployment and the speed at which unemployment adjusts to it. Investment is mostly ignored as a key variable behind the problem of high unemployment, despite a strong empirical association between investment and unemployment. We discuss the evolution of the ‘Keynesian’ model, and how in the process of domesticating the General Theory, the central relationship between unemployment and investment and the role of the state of confidence was bred out of the model. We then present some evidence of the centrality of investment and expectations to the long‐term evolution of unemployment in OECD countries. We also argue that recent results in finance, which find that individuals do not behave rationally and, moreover, that there may be no basis for rational calculation, provides support for Keynes’s notion that animal spirits play a central role in investment.     

Women's unemployment during transition Evidence from Czech and Slovak micro-data

We analyse women’s weekly probabilities of leaving unemployment in the Czech and Slovak Republics (CR and SR) in order to investigate three questions: 1) Why are unemployment rates much lower in the CR than the SR?; 2) Does the unemployment compensation scheme (UCS) substantially lengthen unemploy-mentspells?; and 3) Why are women’s unemployment rates higher than men’s? We find that differences in the behaviour of the individuals, employers and institutions in the SR and CR (as measured by differences in coefficients) play a larger role in determining the CR’s shorter female unemployment spells than do differences in measured demand and demographic variables. The UCS has only a moderate effect on duration and its impact is greater in the CR. The differences between men’s and women’s spells (in each republic) are explained more by differences in coefficients than by differences in observed characteristics. JEL classification: C41, H53, J23, J64, O15, P2.     

Measuring the severity of unemployment

A social-welfare (illfare) function framework is applied to compare two demographic groups as to the severity of their unemployment experience. This is based on the assumption that for each individual the disutility of unemployment is an increasing and convex function of spell length. The very concept of spell length and its distribution, however, is not unambiguous. In contrast to previous literature which focuses exclusively on the interrupted spell length in a stock of unemployed, we stress the usefulness of the concept of complete spell length in a cohort of unemployed. We establish an equivalence relationship between second-degree dominance in the cohort and first-degree dominance in the stock. For specific illfare functions the disutilityU(x) when applied to the cohort and the disutilityU(x) when applied to the stock will produce the same value of aggregate welfare (illfare).     

美国的失业保险制度及其对我国的启示

从美国失业保险制度的发展入手,简介其发展概况,分析其特点和经验。并由此根据我国失业保险制度的发展实际,得出相应的借鉴对策,以规范我国失业保险制度,促进再就业,促进失业保险的发展和完善。     

Economic growth,structural change,and search unemployment

Economic growth is driven by structural change. Structural change does not come without a cost. The most evident social cost of structural change is high and persistent unemployment. This paper develops a model with an endogenously expanding service sector, where the constant flow of workers in and out of employment leads to structural unemployment. The main finding is that the level of unemployment is different between the initial period and the long-run equilibrium growth path, and that along the transition path, the level of unemployment will overshoot its equilibrium level, which can explain the long-run pattern of unemployment in most industrialized countries.      

The impact of unemployment on inequality and poverty in OECD countries

The purpose of this research is to examine the contribution of unemployment to income inequality and poverty in various OECD countries. These relationships have been explored using Luxembourg Income Study micro-data. Considerable differences across OECD countries are revealed through the use of within-household unemployment distributions. These differences help to explain most of the observed divergences in the relationship between unemployment and income distribution, in conjunction with the heterogeneous influence of social benefits on the economic position of the unemployed in these countries. A sub-group decomposition analysis corroborates the limited effect of unemployment on income distribution in most of the considered countries. However, it seems clear that the unemployed are among those with the highest risk of experiencing poverty.
JEL classification: D31, I32, J31.     

Long-term unemployment, the invention of 'hysteresis' and the misdiagnosis of structural unemployment in the UK

This paper investigates the empirical basis for the belief thatunemployment makes people less ‘employable’, andthat the existence of a pool of long-term unemployed peopleis therefore in itself a barrier to full employment. Drawingon data for Great Britain from the 1940s to the present day,it shows that this idea has arisen through misinterpretationsof the statistical evidence. The resulting policies, besidesdiverting resources from the demand-side programmes appropriateto the true situation of structural unemployment, appear tohave created a problem of the kind they were intended to address,by encouraging unemployed people to move onto sickness benefits.     

On the links between unemployment rate, monetary creation and the value-added sharing

In this paper, we investigate the analytical links between the rate of unemployment, monetary creation and how individuals share the value added in an economy with three types of agents: capital owners, managers and employees. This relationship relies on the fact that the rate of unemployment depends on many macroeconomic characteristics such as: creation of money, external balance of goods and services and mark-up pricing. The latter being decomposed into the expected margin rate and the growth rate of the unitary wage cost that characterize the primary value-added sharing.     

Urban unemployment and optimal trade policy in a cash-in-advance economy

This paper examines the welfare effects of commercial and tax/subsidy policies on a developing economy with sectoral unemployment and differential cash-in-advance constraints. The optimal tariff can be negative when the cash-in-advance requirement for buying the importable good is larger than that for the exportable good. In addition, when capital is sectorally mobile, production taxes are superior to production subsidies to the importable sector. Nevertheless, to reach the first-best optimum, a uniform wage subsidy to both sectors is required.