Government expenditure,external and domestic public debt,and economic growth

This paper analyzes the relationship between government expenditure, tax on returns to assets, public debt, and growth in an endogenous growth model. Public debt is composed of two components, domestic debt and external debt. We show conditions for existence, uniqueness, and multiplicity of the steady states. More precisely, existence of steady state requires a sufficiently high productivity and a sufficiently low tax on returns to assets. We also provide the effects of an increase in the tax rate on returns to assets on the steady state. In particular, the relation between public spending and the tax rate has a bell shape. Domestic debt unambiguously increases with tax whereas external debt displays an inverted U‐shaped curve. A high tax rate leads to a reallocation of public debt in favor of domestic debt (to the detriment of external debt). The effect of taxation on consumption (and production) also displays a nonlinear pattern when the output elasticity of capital is lower than unity (the effect is monotonously increasing if this elasticity is unity). We also derive the conditions under which a tax increase can boost or reduce the balanced growth rate.     

Growth,revenue, and welfare effects of tariff and tax reform: Win–win–win strategies

We examine growth, revenue, and welfare effects of tariff and tax reform with a two-good, two-factor endogenous growth model. Learning-by-doing and intersectoral knowledge spillovers contribute to endogenous growth consistent with incomplete specialization. We obtain two main results. First, trade liberalization raises (or lowers) the growth rate if and only if the import sector is more effective-labor-intensive (or capital-intensive). Second, we can attain growth, revenue, and welfare gains by combining consumer–price–neutral tariff and tax reform for growth enhancement with an additional rise in the consumption tax on the less distorted good.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

International Asset Trade,Capital Income Taxation,and Specialization Patterns

This paper constructs a small economy version of dynamic Heckscher‐Ohlin models with overlapping generations and analyzes effects of capital income taxation on the specialization pattern of the country. It is shown that once international asset trade is allowed, in the presence of international technological asymmetries, a small country eventually leads to perfect specialization in our overlapping generations model. It is also shown that the residence‐based tax has no effect on the specialization pattern while the source‐based tax has a negative effect on capital accumulation and thereby it can affect the specialization pattern of the small country.     

Pollution,Private Investment in Healthcare,and Environmental Policy*

In this paper, we demonstrate that, in a two‐period overlapping‐generations model, the relationship between environmental taxation and economic activity (output level and growth) has an inverted‐U shape when we take into account the detrimental impact of pollution on health and the individual decision of each working‐age agent to improve her health. We also demonstrate that the link between environmental tax and lifetime welfare also has an inverted‐U shape, and that a tighter environmental policy might enhance economic activity while reducing steady‐state lifetime welfare. Finally, we investigate the social optimum and the determinants of the optimal environmental tax.     

Government financing in an endogenous growth model with financial market restrictions

Summary. In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model with market regulations on explicitly modeled financial intermediaries to examine the effects of alternative government financing schemes on growth, inflation, and welfare. In the presence of binding regulation, there is always a unique equilibrium. We perform four alternative policy experiments; a change in the seigniorage tax rate, a change in the seigniorage tax base, a change in the income tax and a change in the fiscal-monetary policy mix. We find that in the presence of binding legal reserve requirements, a marginal increase in government spending need not result in a reduction in the rate of economic growth if it is financed with an increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Raising the seigniorage tax base by means of an increase in the reserve requirement retards growth and it has an ambiguous effect on inflation. An increase in income tax financed government spending also suppresses growth and raises inflation although not to the extent that the required seigniorage tax rate alternative would. Switching from seigniorage to income taxation as a source of government finance is growth reducing but deflationary. From a welfare perspective, the least distortionary way of financing an increase in the government spending requirements is by means of a marginal increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Under the specification of logarithmic preferences, the optimal tax structure is indeterminate. Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: June 26, 2001     

Growth and Welfare Maximization in Models of Public Finance and Endogenous Growth

This paper evaluates the trade‐off between growth and welfare maximization from two perspectives. First, it synthesizes and extends endogenous growth models with public finance to compare the growth‐ and welfare‐maximizing tax rates. Second, it examines the distinct model outcomes in terms of the growth rates and welfare levels. This comparison highlights the range of trade‐offs: the growth‐maximizing tax rate can lie above, below, or on the welfare‐maximizing equivalent. We find however that even relatively large differences in growth‐ and welfare‐maximizing tax rates translate into relatively small differences in growth rates, and, in some cases, welfare levels.     

Endogenous growth through investment-specific technological change

This paper examines a model in which growth takes place through investment-specific technological change, which in turn is determined endogenously through research spending. In particular, the role of the degree of substitutability between research spending and new capital construction is explored. It is shown that the effect of a change in the capital tax rate on the growth rate can depend on the degree of substitutability between research spending and new capital construction. Research subsidies tend to have a larger impact on the growth rate than would an investment tax credit of the same magnitude. Increases in the capital tax rate can increase the growth rate of the economy, even in the absence of externalities. In contrast to the existing literature, the welfare cost of capital taxation in this model can be negligible. There may be multiple tax rates on capital that achieve the same growth rate. It is demonstrated that in the presence of certain types of positive externalities, the optimal growth rate can be attained through the use of capital taxes—rather than subsidies.     

Reexamination of Economic Growth, Tax Policy, and Distributive Politics

The paper examines the relationship between economic growth, tax policy, and distribution of capital and labor ownership in a one‐sector political‐economy model of endogenous growth with productive government spending financed by a proportional tax on capital income. The analysis shows that inequality in wealth and income can be positively or negatively related to the optimal tax rate. In either environment, higher inequality leads to a lower after‐tax return to capital, thereby reducing the economy's growth rate.     

LONG‐RUN GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF TAX REFORM

This paper introduces an endogenously‐determined fertility rate into a Romer‐type endogenous growth model and, accordingly, investigates the effects on fertility, economic growth and social welfare of a revenue‐neutral tax reform that involves switching from an income tax to a consumption tax. We show that, in a departure from the existing literature, tax reform could be harmful, rather than favourable, to both growth and welfare, due to an endogenous fertility rate. We also conduct a simple numerical analysis to investigate under what conditions the negative effect on growth and welfare occurs.     

必要增长率与财政政策的理论与实证研究

本文利用我国1992～2003年的年度统计数据,检验了开放经济条件下必要增长率与财政政策关系模型,验证了财政支出水平变化、财政支出结构变化、财政投资结构变化、所得税税率变化及销售税税率的变化对我国国民经济必要增长率的影响,提出了尽量减少必要增长率与民间投资增长率缺口、提高财政支出水平、改善财政支出与投资结构、提高所得税税率与销售税税率、改善所得税结构的政策建议.     

Tax Enforcement Policy and the Provision of Public Goods with the Presence of Tax Havens

A tax competition model is presented to investigate the effects of tax havens on the public good provision. We show that when countries facing a rise in tax havens change their tax enforcement strategies in response, the existence of tax havens may result in a higher level of equilibrium public good provision as compared to the case with no tax havens. Accordingly, tax havens could be welfare enhancing for non‐haven countries. This result offers a possible explanation for the recent empirical evidence that the corporate tax revenues in high‐tax countries have actually increased with the growth in the flow of foreign direct investment to tax havens.     

Optimal Protection of Property Rights in a General Equilibrium Model of Growth*

We incorporate weak property rights into an otherwise standard general equilibrium model of growth and second‐best optimal policy. In this setup, the state plays two of its key roles: it protects property rights and provides public services. The government chooses policy (the income tax rate, as well as the allocation of collected tax revenues between law enforcement and public services) to maximize the growth rate of the economy. The focus of our analysis is on how weak property rights generate multiple decentralized competitive equilibria, the different properties of these equilibria, and the implications of second‐best optimal policies.     

Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with Habit Formation

It has recently been shown that incorporating “keeping up with the Joneses” preferences into a prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model leads to higher marginal tax rates for both types of agents. In particular, the high‐skill type faces a positive marginal tax rate, rather than zero as in the conventional case. In this paper, agents’ utility functions are postulated to exhibit “habit formation in consumption” such that the prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model becomes a dynamic analytical framework. We show that if the government can commit to its future fiscal policy, the presence of consumption habits does not affect the standard results on optimal marginal tax rates. By contrast, if the government cannot precommit, the high‐skill type will face a negative marginal tax rate, while the low‐skill type’s marginal tax rate remains positive.     

Government policy to reduce pollution emissions within the overlapping generations model

This article develops an overlapping generations model with multiple categories of capital. The importance of this article is in its ability to analyse changes in the distribution of various categories of capital along the growth path of the economy. Economic growth is accompanied by capital growth as well as increase in pollution emissions. Implementing a government policy to reduce pollution emission would change the equilibrium path of capital distribution. Within the model, the government builds a corporate tax function that defines the tax rate as a function of a ‘desired’ pollution level. The tax rate decreases as the ‘desired’ pollution level is higher. When the ‘desired’ pollution level is higher than the actual pollution level, production is subsidized and pollution levels rise. An example and a simulation are presented in order to confirm the theoretical results and demonstrate that the model can be used for empirical analysis.     

Tax Reform with Useful Public Expenditures

We examine the effects of tax reform in an endogenous growth with two types of useful public expenditures. The optimal fiscal policy shifts the tax base to private consumption and generally requires a change in the size of government. If a tax reform holds the size of government fixed to satisfy a revenue‐neutrality constraint, then the reform will be suboptimal; theory alone cannot tell us if welfare will be improved. For some model calibrations, we find that a revenue‐neutral consumption tax reform can result in large welfare gains. For other quite plausible calibrations, the exact same reform can result in tiny or even negative welfare gains as the revenue‐neutrality constraint becomes more severely binding. Overall, our results highlight the uncertainty surrounding the potential welfare benefits of fundamental tax reform.     

MONETARY EXPANSION AND PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN A CASH‐IN‐ADVANCE ECONOMY*

Using a dynamic optimization model that incorporates a cash‐in‐advance constraint on both consumption and investment and productive public capital financed by a lump‐sum tax and seigniorage, this paper analyses the steady‐state effects of an increase in the inflation rate (the money growth rate) on output, private capital and welfare. The effects are negative at high inflation rates. However, at low inflation rates, the effects depend on the amount of lump‐sum tax revenue collected and therefore are either positive or negative.     

Comparative advantage and strategic specialization

This paper shows that a strong comparative advantage is necessary for free trade and specialization in a 2 × 2 symmetric Ricardian model to be achieved in a Nash equilibrium. Governments strategically control labor distribution across industries, and representative agents maximize Cobb–Douglas utilities. A Nash equilibrium with complete specialization is achieved if and only if relative productivity exceeds a key value of 3, which is considered a very large number based on previous empirical studies. This paper also introduces a two‐stage game where each government chooses labor distribution first and then tariffs. In this two‐stage game, complete specialization is never achieved for any relative productivity level. Finally, by generalizing the Cobb–Douglas model into constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences, I show that if immiserizing growth effects exist, complete specialization could not be achieved for any level of relative productivity.     

Endogenous distribution and equilibrium growth: a note

Does distributive conflict diminish during the course of economic development? This article outlines a model in which distribution, the tax rate and growth evolve endogenously over time. When voting occurs over a tax on capital, we show that the growth rate is maximized at the political equilibrium in the long run. When voting occurs over a general income tax, we show that the growth rate is maximized at the political equilibrium in both the short and long run. These results suggest that the transitional dynamics of growth models with redistributive politics lead to growth‐maximizing outcomes, as distributive conflict diminishes in the course of development. This implies that the democratic process leads to greater consensus over policy choices, with a perfect convergence of interest across individuals with respect to the tax rate.     

TAX COMPETITION IN A SIMPLE MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS: HOW LARGER MARKETS REDUCE PROFIT TAXES*

We set up a simple two‐country model of tax competition where firms with different productivity decide in which location to produce and sell output. In this model, a unique, asymmetric Nash equilibrium is shown to exist, provided that countries are sufficiently different with respect to their exogenous market size. Sorting of firms occurs in equilibrium, as the smaller country levies the lower tax rate and attracts the low‐cost firms. A simultaneous expansion of both markets that raises the profitability of firms intensifies tax competition and causes both countries to reduce their tax rates, despite higher corporate tax bases.