STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS

This paper analyses how strategic export policies are affected by introducing an imperfectly competitive intermediate good into a Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign final‐good firm export to a third‐country market. It is shown that when the home and foreign markets for the intermediate good are segmented, the optimal export policy towards the final good is a tax. In contrast, under integrated markets, the optimal export intervention is a subsidy. Whether bilateral export intervention is welfare improving compared with free trade, depends on the degree of product differentiation between the home and foreign final goods.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY*

This paper investigates the effect of a home firm's lobbying on a strategic export policy in a third market with a differentiated duopoly. We focus on its effect on domestic welfare under Bertrand and Cournot competition. Regardless of the mode of competition, the strategic export policy cannot improve domestic welfare in the presence of lobbying if the degree of product differentiation is high or the government is overly concerned with political contribution relative to domestic welfare. Moreover, for the same degree of product differentiation, the lobbying‐induced export policy is more likely to deteriorate domestic welfare relative to free trade under Cournot competition.     

The Nonequivalence of Import and Export Quotas in Strategic Equilibrium

The authors use a standard general‐equilibrium trade model to show that export and import policies are not symmetric in the equilibrium of a strategic game with quotas. It is assumed that N (identical) large countries, without cooperation, set their import (or export) quotas to maximize domestic welfare. It is shown that the equilibrium in which all countries use import quotas differs from, and is superior to, the equilibrium in which countries use export quotas. The difference arises because the elasticity of the residual foreign export supply schedule differs between the two equilibria. The authors also study the properties of the sequential equilibrium of the game. In a simultaneous‐move game, each country is indifferent as to whether it uses an import or export quota, given the policy of the other country. However, in a sequential‐move game, the first mover will prefer to use an import quota rather than an export quota.     

EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE BY DESTINATION COUNTRY

The main focus of this paper is the relationship between export diversification and export performance. The key difference with respect to the previous literature is that export diversification is measured and related to export volume by destination country. The approach is empirical and an aggregate export demand setting is adopted to test the significance and influence of export diversification, measured via the Herfindahl index, on export performance by destination country. The econometric estimation is performed using export data for Spain to its partner countries for the period 1999–2011. The main finding is the positive relationship between Spanish export concentration and export performance by destination market. This finding is shown to be robust to several econometric specifications.     

ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS, SUBSIDIES AND THE WTO EXEMPTION

Owing to the World Trade Organization (WTO) exemption that allows governments to subsidize arms exports, the arms trade is one of the few remaining areas of trade where we observe export subsidies. This paper examines the effect of arms controls, in the form of licensing delays, on the incentives to subsidize arms exports and conversely the effect of the WTO arms trade exemption on the incentives to break arms control agreements. Our main result is that arms controls and free trade commitments re‐enforce each other. Licensing delays reduce the incentive to subsidise and free trade without subsidies reduces the benefits of a unilateral abrogation of arms controls. Transparency actually worsens the Nash inefficiencies at play in that incomplete information leads to lower subsidies and lower arms exports.     

Can Production Subsidies Explain China's Export Performance? Evidence from Firm‐level Data*

This paper analyses the relationship between production subsidies and firms’ export performance using a very comprehensive and recent firm‐level database and controlling for the endogeneity of subsidies. It documents robust evidence that production subsidies stimulate export activity at the intensive margin, although this effect is conditional on firm characteristics. In particular, the positive relationship between subsidies and the intensive margin of exports is strongest among profit‐making firms, firms in capital‐intensive industries, and those located in non‐coastal regions. Compared to firm characteristics, the extent of heterogeneity across ownership structure (SOEs, collectives, and privately owned firms) proves to be relatively less important.     

The effects of periodic quotas limiting the stock of imports of durables

Analyses of trade quotas typically assume that the quota restricts the flow of some nondurable good. Many real-world quotas, however, restrict the stock of durable imports. We consider the cases where (1) anyone is free to export against such quotas and where (2) only those allocated portions of the total quota are free to export against such quotas. Recent econometric investigations of such quotas have focused on the price of the durable as an indicator of tightness induced by the quota. We show why this is an inappropriate indicator and suggest alternatives.     

ON THE CONSISTENT CONJECTURES EQUILIBRIUM OF EXPORT SUBSIDY GAME

This paper explores an export subsidy game in an international duopoly in which governments of countries as well as firms hold conjectures about the response of other governments. In the framework with linear demand/quadratic cost functions, a homogeneous good and no home consumption, I shall obtain the relations among the conjectural variation of firms, that of governments, and the optimal subsidies for countries. And I shall show that if and only if firms hold the consistent conjectures, Nash type behavior (zero conjectural variation) of governments is consistent.     

FIRM‐LEVEL INVESTMENT AND EXPORT DYNAMICS*

This article characterizes the complementarity between exporting and investment in physical capital. We argue that new investment allows young exporters to grow faster and survive longer in export markets while reducing their vulnerability to productivity or demand shocks across markets. We structurally estimate our model using detailed firm‐level data. We find that the choice of cost structure has a large impact on model performance and the estimated costs of exporting or investment. Using detailed capital and output tariff rates, we quantify the impact of policy change on aggregate export and investment growth.     

ESTIMATING IMPORT AND EXPORT DEMAND ELASTICITIES FOR MAURITIUS AND SOUTH AFRICA

In this paper, we re‐estimate the import and the export demand functions for Mauritius and South Africa using time series data. We use the bounds tests for cointegration and find evidence of a long‐run relationship between import demand, income and prices for both countries. Our long run elasticities reveal that domestic income and relative prices have significant effects on the import demand for both countries, with income being the most important determinant. Furthermore, we find that while South Africa's export demand is not responsive to relative prices or income; for Mauritius income is statistically significant.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.     

Industrial heterogeneity and international product cycles

We analyze the superiority of the specific, demand and cost ad valorem subsidies in industrial and export policies. The criterion employed to measure the ranking of the superiority of the subsidy policies in this paper is that, given an identical total output, the smaller the amount of the subsidy, the superior the subsidy policy. We show that the demand ad valorem subsidy is the least efficient policy, regardless of whether it is measured in regard to the industrial or export subsidy policies. The superiority related to the specific and cost ad valorem subsidies hinges upon the production technology. We can thus provide a theoretical explanation to the real world phenomenon as to why governments usually offer a specific or cost ad valorem subsidy policy to agricultural products and exports.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPORT STATUS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN SERVICES: A FIRM‐LEVEL ANALYSIS FOR SPAIN

This paper analyses the relationship between export status and productivity in a major service exporter, Spain, during 2001–07. I find that exporters in the services sector are 45 percent more productive than non‐exporters. This productivity premium is larger for firms that supply non‐internet‐related services than for firms that supply internet‐related services. The results show that exporters were more productive than non‐exporters before beginning to export, and also that exporting increases productivity growth; however, this positive shock vanishes quickly.     

Tax Policy When Countries Compete for Third Market Exports

We examine the welfare and other consequences of tax policy in a third market export model where duopolists located in two countries compete in prices. With tax competition between governments, we allow for welfare‐maximizing governments in the two countries to delegate tax setting responsibility to policy‐makers who have different objectives than the governments. The unique equilibrium in the tax competition environment involves both governments delegating tax setting responsibility to tax revenue‐maximizing policy‐makers. This equilibrium yields higher welfare for both countries than the outcome when the governments delegate to welfare‐maximizing policy‐makers. The paper also compares tax competition with tax harmonization and shows that when the entire export market is served, tax harmonization improves the welfare of the country that houses the low cost firm, while the other country may be immiserized.     

Is Corporate Environmentalism Good for Domestic Welfare?

Many private firms voluntarily care about the environment and declare that their products and production processes are environmentally friendly. This paper shows that corporate environmentalism may reduce the effectiveness of government policies. A simple third‐market trade model with strategic environmental and trade policy is employed, in which an environmentally conscious domestic firm competes with a profit‐maximizing foreign firm. It is shown that even if emission taxes and export subsidies are both available, corporate environmentalism may reduce domestic welfare when pollution is transboundary. In the realistic situation where export subsidies are prohibited, welfare may fall even if pollution is local.     

从出口优先与内需扩大走向中性贸易政策——出口导向与内需扩展政策的价格、销量与福利效应分析

文章以中国出口导向型经济为原型,建立出口—消费补贴局部均衡模型,并以自由贸易为参照,分别探讨了出口补贴、消费补贴以及二者组合政策的价格、数量和国民福利效应,由此证明了从中性贸易政策、消费补贴政策、出口补贴与消费补贴组合政策到出口补贴政策的最优政策排序。文章提出如下的政策转型建议:(1)以创造就业和加速增长为目标,将单一出口补贴政策转向出口补贴和消费补贴组合政策;(2)以降低贸易摩擦、扩大内需为目标,将内外双重补贴政策转向单一消费补贴政策;(3)以建立和谐市场经济为目标,将非中性贸易政策转向以自由贸易为基础的中性贸易政策。     

不完全信息、反倾销威胁与最优出口贸易政策

通过扩展Brander和Spencer(1985)的基本模型,本文首先证明了,在反倾销威胁下,基于完全信息假设的最优出口贸易政策要求出口国政府给予低成本企业更高的出口补贴或更低的出口征税,在无效激励机制下必然导致出口企业隐匿自己的真实成本类型,基于完全信息假设的最优出口贸易政策失效。在此基础上,本文进一步论证了不完全信息和反倾销威胁下激励相容的最优出口贸易政策,该政策要求出口国政府依据进口国国内要求保护压力的大小,采用不同的出口征税和一次性转移支付政策组合,激励出口企业如实报告成本类型,并使国家整体福利最大化。     

DOUBLING U.S. EXPORTS UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL EXPORT INITIATIVE: IMPLICATIONS OF SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION

President Obama's National Export Initiative (NEI) is targeted at doubling U.S. exports between 2010 and 2015. We apply USAGE to quantify what the NEI would need to do to foreign import‐demand curves and domestic export‐supply curves to achieve this target. USAGE is a dynamic economy‐wide model of the U.S. incorporating recession‐relevant factor market specifications including excess capacity and wage/labor‐demand elasticities that vary with the level of employment. In our central simulation, export‐promotion policies compatible with the President's target reduce the cost of the current recession from about 70 million 1‐year jobs for the period 2008–2020 to 45 million jobs. (JEL E17, C68, E62, E65, F16)     

城市化能降低中国的出口依赖吗

现有研究通常认为中国的城市化进程可以促进内需，降低出口依赖度。但是现实数据却显示，中国存在城市化水平与出口依赖度同时上升的现象。本文通过实证研究对这一现象进行了解释。实证研究表明：收入差距扩大是导致中国出口依赖度增强的决定性因素。中国的城市化进程一方面通过扩大收入差距导致出口依赖度上升，另一方面通过促进投资导致出口依赖度下降。但是由于内生于城市化进程的收入差距扩大和外生的收入差距扩大所共同产生的提高出口依赖度的效应，超过了城市化通过投资渠道降低出口依赖度的效应，最终导致中国城市化水平与出口依赖度同时上升的现象出现。     

HOW JAPAN FIRST BEGAN TO EXPORT MACHINE‐MADE MANUFACTURES TO EAST ASIA*

Drawing on late Meiji period data, the efforts of Japan's cotton spinning mills to overcome overseas competition and establish themselves in the Chinese, Korean and Hong Kong markets are examined. Estimating a probit model of the decision to export, it is found that despite readily available export finance and commercial networks that should have greatly lowered the costs of participating in East Asian markets, sunk entry costs still appear to have been quite large. Many otherwise capable mills apparently saw little prospect of entering tariff‐less East Asian markets, notwithstanding the possibility of generous subsidies and trade association devised predatory strategies.