韩国存款保险公司救助和处置机制及启示

<正>近年来,韩国多次发生储蓄银行倒闭风波。韩国存款保险公司综合运用多种处置方式,成功缓释了储蓄银行风险,实现了对倒闭机构及时有序合理的处置,维护了金融稳定。借鉴韩国存款保险制度成功经验,对我国研究建立存款保险制度具有一定的参考价值。一、韩国存款保险制度概况韩国曾经实行隐性存款保险制度,1983年建立第一个存款保险基金以来,曾先后建立覆盖银行、证券和保险等6个行业的强制性存款保险基金~①。1995年12月,韩国出台了     

存款保险制度及差别费率机制降低银行风险承担了吗？——来自我国48家银行机构的经验证据

本文使用我国48家银行机构2013-2021年的季度面板数据，实证分析存款保险制度实施、存款保险费率机制转变对商业银行及政策性银行风险承担的影响，并分析不同类型银行风险承担的异质性特征。结果表明：第一，存款保险制度的实施显著降低了银行的风险承担水平，这种影响存在显著异质性，对政策性银行的影响不显著，但对大型国有商业银行、股份制商业银行、城市商业银行和农村商业银行的风险承担有显著抑制作用，且抑制效果依次增强；第二，存款保险单一费率机制调整为风险差别费率机制进一步降低了银行风险承担水平，这种影响也存在显著异质性，对政策性银行的影响仍不显著，但对其他四类银行的风险承担均有显著抑制作用。上述研究结论表明，我国存款保险制度实现了降低银行风险、维护金融稳定的预期目标。下一步，应当进一步完善存款保险费率核定制度，探索建立跨周期和逆周期的差别费率制度，提升“成本最小化”“风险最小化”的效果。     

利率市场化、存款保险制度与系统性银行危机防范北大核心CSSCISSCI

本文基于全球88个国家1970～2012年的面板数据,研究了利率市场化改革和存款保险制度建设对系统性银行危机发生概率的影响。研究表明,利率市场化将提高系统性银行危机发生几率;存款保险制度对系统性银行危机发生几率的影响,取决于存款保险制度的金融稳定作用和导致的银行道德风险问题;尽管利率市场化完成后存款保险导致的银行道德风险上升、存款保险的金融稳定效应可能并不明显,但若利率市场化时期建有存款保险制度,将有助于降低利率市场化改革时期系统性银行危机发生概率。另外,加强银行监管有助于限制存款保险导致的银行道德风险、增进银行系统稳定性;提高市场约束力和防范道德风险的存款保险制度设计,也有助于防止系统性银行危机发生。     

世界存款保险制度的发展趋势

存款保险制度在全球的传播发展越来越快。20世纪60年代有9个国家创建了存款保险制度;70年代增加了7个国家;80年代,频繁爆发的银行危机促使越来越多的国家和地区加入到存款保险之列,10年间有19个国家和地区建立了存款保险制度;90年代,由于银行问题特别是发展中国家的银行问题继续恶化,约有三分之一的国家和地区在该时期建立了存款保险制度。     

政府外部治理、存款保险与银行风险承担

为保证社会公众利益，规范银行业经营，我国于2015年建立了存款保险制度。在存款保险制度之外，政府部门通过公共环境治理、政府干预及政企关系，也发挥着对银行经营的外部治理作用。本文选取2011～2021年我国93家商业银行的公开数据，通过中介效应模型分析了政府外部治理与存款保险制度对银行风险承担的作用机制，并对存款保险制度下政府外部治理如何影响银行风险承担展开进一步探讨。研究发现，政府通过提升公共治理环境，有效缓解了存款保险制度对银行风险承担的负面效应，而政府干预及政企关系等政府直接行为，虽然同样能够缓解存款保险制度的负面效应但作用效果有限。同时，在存款保险制度下，政府外部治理的正面效应可以有效提升银行的风险承担能力，而负面效应对银行风险承担的影响并不显著。本文研究有助于厘清存款保险制度下，政府外部治理与银行风险承担之间的关系，并为地方政府的金融稳定工作提供具有理论支撑和经验依据的政策参考。     

基于FDIC实践的中国上市银行存款保险费率测算

本文以美国联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)实施存款保险制度框架为基础,测算中国各上市银行2011~2012年的存款保险费率和存款保险制度成本负担。结果表明,实施显性存款保险制度将显著增加银行的保险费负担,现阶段中国大范围推行显性存款保险制度存在一定的制度执行阻力;中国显性存款保险制度应当实现银行存款全覆盖,但应当分批参保,先在总体风险小的银行间推行,再在风险相对较高的银行间推行,以确保存款保险基金的保障能力;短期内高风险银行需要政府担保,但中国最终应当建立独立于政府的市场化显性存款保险制度。     

美国存款保险新框架评析

90年代以来，美国的存款保险出现了一些新的特点。由于美国经济的持续繁荣，银行利润不断增加，银行业经过兼并重组，在现代科技的支持下，走上了新的发展道路，使得FDIC的保险基金储备不断增加，保险基金不断扩大，存款保险率达到了76％以上。基于风险的存款保险制度，使FDIC加强了对投保银行机构的监督检查，提高了银行机构的风险研究与防范的水平；银行保险基金、储蓄机构基金、信用社保险基金分别设立，使存款保险体系更加完善。     

存保基金资金来源的国际经验

<正>建立存款保险制度的目标是保护存款人的合法权益、防范和化解金融风险以维护金融稳定。为了实现这一目标，必须做到有序处置问题银行并及时赔付存款人，而存款保险基金在这方面发挥着重要作用。为了加快我国存款保险基金积累，增强存款保险基金处置风险的能力，笔者研究国际上存款保险基金流动性来源的主要做法，     

存款保险基金制度安排：东亚经济体的经验借鉴

我国引进存款保险制度需要解决的一个重要问题就是存款保险基金的组建和管理。存款保险基金是存款保险机构履行保障存款人利益、维护金融稳定职责的物质基础。大部分建立存款保险制度的国家和地区都设立了存款保险基金,并建立了完善的运作管理机制。本文以日本、韩国和中国台湾等与我国条件类似的东亚经济体为参照对象,分析存款保险基金的用途、资金来源、基金规模及损益处理等基本安排,并阐述对构建和实施我国存款保险基金制度的借鉴建议。     

存款保险制度的建立将进一步完善我国金融安全网

2014年11月30日,国务院法制办公室发布《存款保险条例（征求意见稿）》（以下简称（（征求意见稿》）,将在征求意见的基础上,正式推出存款保险制度。这标志着酝酿20多年的存款保险制度即将建立。所谓存款保险,是指存款银行交纳保费形成存款保险基金,当个别银行经营出现问题时,使用存款保险基金依照规定对存款人进行及时偿付。     

存款保险制度能否抑制银行个体风险承担?

基于2008-2019年我国30家上市银行的财务数据,研究了存款保险制度实施对银行风险承担行为的影响.对选取的经济变量进行单位根检验发现,变量均为平稳变量.利用固定效应模型进行实证回归分析,结果表明:总体上看,存款保险制度的推出增加了银行的风险承担行为;在将银行进行分类后,存款保险制度的实施对大型商业银行的风险承担影响...     

差别化存款保险费率与银行风险承担——基于我国农村银行的经验证据

本文拓展了Freixas and Rochet(2008)的理论模型,证明存款保险差别化费率机制对银行风险承担具有抑制作用,在此基础上选取我国农村银行为研究对象,运用2015—2019年某省119家法人投保机构进行实证检验。研究发现:引入差别化费率设计显著降低了农村银行的风险承担;这一作用存在异质性,对于自身风险承担水平较低、资产规模较大的农村银行来说,抑制作用更为明显。进一步研究发现,差别化费率机制在一定程度上缓和了农信社改制短期内对农商行风险可能造成的不利影响。本文结论对加强存款保险制度的早期纠正功能、防范化解金融风险以及深化农村金融机构改革具有一定的理论意义和参考价值。     

How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.     

Deposit insurance coverage,ownership, and banks' risk-taking in emerging markets

We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline on banks' risk-taking. Market discipline is determined by the extent of explicit deposit insurance, as well as by the credibility of non-insurance of groups of depositors and other creditors. Furthermore, market discipline depends on the ownership structure of banks and the responsiveness of bank managers to market incentives. An expected U-shaped relationship between explicit deposit insurance coverage and banks' risk-taking is influenced by country specific institutional factors, including bank ownership. We analyze specifically how government ownership, foreign ownership and shareholder rights affect the disciplinary effect of partial deposit insurance systems in a cross-section analysis of industrial and emerging market economies, as well as in emerging markets alone. The coverage that maximizes market discipline depends on country-specific characteristics of bank governance. This “risk-minimizing” deposit insurance coverage is compared to the actual coverage in a group of countries in emerging markets in Eastern Europe and Asia.     

市场约束、显性存款保险制度与银行风险承担——基于回归控制法的研究

基于我国利率市场化进程日趋完善和新推出显性存款保险制度的金融大背景,本文从市场约束与显性存款保险制度的视角,将显性存款保险制度政策视为一个“准自然实验”,采用2010~2016年的面板数据,研究了存款保险制度及其与市场约束的相互作用对银行风险承担的影响,并藉此评价了其政策效应。研究结果表明:(1)我国不同类别商业银行的两类市场约束效应存在较大差别。就价格约束效应而言,对地方银行显著有效,而对全国性银行和外资银行则不显著;就数量约束效应而言,三类银行均不显著。(2)基于回归控制法的估计结果表明,存款保险制度的实施对银行风险承担有显著的正向影响,且其对地方银行的冲击强于全国性银行。(3)进一步基于非线性双重差分的估计结果显示,存款保险制度显著弱化了市场约束对银行风险承担的负向影响,表明我国存款保险制度的政策影响逐渐开始发挥出来。     

Bank Time Deposit Rates and Market Discipline in Poland: The Impact of State Ownership and Deposit Insurance Reform

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure and changes in the deposit insurance system on the market for bank time deposits in Poland. In an environment of less restrictive bank supervision and a deposit insurance policy that favored state banks, we find that depositors exacted a price for risk-taking. After a new law increasing insurance coverage for private banks went into effect, however, bank specific variables became less important in explaining differences in deposit interest rates. We report, however, that the three fully guaranteed state banks pay significantly lower rates than private banks. Moreover, other state-owned banks, with the same explicit guarantee as private banks, pay significantly lower rates than private banks, so it appears that depositors treat these state-owned banks as if they have a larger implicit guarantee.     

Bank regulation and risk-taking incentives: An international comparison of bank risk

This paper uses a panel database of 251 banks in 36 countries to analyze the impact of bank regulation on bank charter value and risk-taking. After controlling for deposit insurance and for the quality of a country's contracting environment, the results indicate that regulatory restrictions increase banks' risk-taking incentives by reducing their charter value. Banks in countries with stricter regulation have a lower charter value, which increases their incentives to follow risky policies. These results corroborate a negative relation between regulatory restrictions and the stability of a banking system. Deposit insurance has a positive influence on bank charter value, mitigating the risk-shifting incentives it creates. This positive influence disappears when we control for the possible endogeneity of deposit insurance.     

Impact of regulatory interactions on bank capital structure

This article examines a bank's optimal capital structure and risk-taking decisions in a regulated environment. We focus on the interactive nature of the Fed's collateralized discount window lending and the FDIC's deposit insurance. Such regulatory interactions are shown to have nonlinear and nonuniform impacts on the bank's leverage and risk-taking decisions. Thus, bank moral hazard problems may persist, even when banks are charged risk-adjusted deposit insurance premia and are also subject to market discipline through subordinate debt. Our analysis yields several new policy implications about the design and pricing of bank regulations.     

RISK-TAKING INCENTIVES OF BANKS AND RISK-ADJUSTED DEPOSIT INSURANCE

The manager of a depository institution is shown to exhibit risk-taking behavior under the current insurance arrangement. Perfect monitoring or risk-based deposit insurance would eliminate this incentive if information were symmetric between bank managers and the insuring agency. Absent symmetric information, it is shown that a recently suggested scheme, where insurers collect insurance premiums based on projected and actual risk levels, does not control the risk-taking incentive. The only way to control this incentive through insurance rates is to levy a relatively high premium, which is not actuarially fair.     

Does deposit insurance improve financial intermediation? Evidence from the Russian experiment

This study examines how the introduction of deposit insurance affects depositors and banks, using the deposit-insurance scheme introduced into the Russian banking system as a natural experiment. The fundamental research question is whether the introduction of deposit insurance leads to a more effective banking system as evidenced by increased deposit-taking and decreased reliance upon State-owned banks as custodians of retail deposits. We find that banks entering the new deposit-insurance system increase both their level of retail deposits and their ratios of retail deposits to total assets relative to banks that do not enter the new deposit insurance system. These results hold up in a multivariate panel-data analysis that controls for bank- and time-random effects. The longer a bank has been entered into the deposit insurance system, the greater is its level of deposits and its ratio of deposits to assets. Moreover, this effect is stronger for regional banks and for smaller banks. We also find that implementation of the new deposit-insurance system has the effect of “leveling the playing field” between State-owned banks and privately owned banks. Finally, we find strong evidence of moral hazard following implementation of deposit insurance in the form of increased bank risk-taking. Financial risk and, to a lesser degree, operating risk increase following implementation.