Debt, Growth and Budgetary Regimes

Within the Barro (1990) model of productive public services, but with the inclusion of public debt, we derive and characterize on the balanced growth path, a set of welfare‐maximizing fiscal rules under two budgetary regimes – one with only the standard dynamic government budget constraint, and the other involving the golden rule of public finance. We demonstrate analytically that the optimal fiscal policy differs in the two budgetary regimes considered. We also analyse two cases within the second regime: one, where the ratio of current spending to tax revenues is parametrically given, and another, where this ratio is optimally chosen by the government.     

内生经济增长理论框架下的市场失效与财政政策

内生经济增长理论认为,知识和人力资本的外部效应与创新带来的垄断势力推动经济增长的同时,也会带来非帕雷托最优的经济增长收入分配的不公平,将阻碍经济增长;加快知识和人力资本积累、促进技术进步以及缓解收入分配不公平的财政政策能纠正市场失效,使长期经济增长达到社会最优.     

Economic Growth,Public Debt and Welfare: Comparing Three Budgetary Rules

Abstract. We present an endogenous growth model with externalities of capital and elastic labor supply where we allow for public debt and welfare‐enhancing public spending. We analyze different debt policies as regards convergence to a balanced growth path and their effects on long‐run growth and welfare. Three budgetary rules are considered: the balanced budget rule, a budgetary rule where debt grows in the long run but at a rate lower than the balanced growth rate and a rule where public debt grows at the same rate as all other economic variables but where it guarantees that the intertemporal budget constraint is fulfilled.     

Financial development,institutional quality and maximizing-growth trade-off in government finance

This paper studies monetary and fiscal policies in an endogenous growth model with transaction costs. We show that the relation between long-run economic growth and both monetary and fiscal policies is subject to threshold effects, a result that gives account of a number of recent empirical findings. Furthermore, the model shows that, to finance public expenditures, growth-maximizing governments must choose relatively high seigniorage (respectively income taxation), if “institutional quality” and “financial development” indicators are low (respectively high). Thus, our model may explain why some governments resort to seigniorage and inflationary finance, and others rather resort to high tax rates, as a result of growth-maximizing strategies in different structural environments (notably concerning institutional and financial development contexts). In addition, the model allows examining how the optimal mix of government finance changes in response to different public debt contexts. A short empirical section confirms our theoretical results.     

Fiscal Transfers and Distributive Conflict in a Simple Endogenous Growth Model with Unemployment

Abstract. In the simplified formal treatment proposed in this paper, a decrease in a policy parameter – the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP – can monotonically increase long-term growth rate and may lead to a higher employment level. This notwithstanding, the paper shows that the redistributive implications of such a decrease may induce the wage earners to oppose it. As a consequence, policy-makers reflecting social preferences may undertake redistributive transfers generating persistent unemployment and lowering growth even if commitment technologies allowing them to follow preannounced tax policies were feasible.     

转型期资本投资、产业结构、市场化对中国就业效应的实证研究

本文通过对投资、技术进步、市场化程度、产业结构变动、实际工资等因素对我国就业量的影响进行实证分析与检验的结果显示,90年代以来,资本投资增加、产业结构变动及实际工资上涨是拉动就业增加的主要因素,市场化程度提高抑制了就业增加.但随着时间的推移,投资、产业结构变动对就业的贡献度逐渐下降,工资增长对就业的拉动作用逐渐增加,市场化对就业的抑制作用逐渐减弱.     

(Non)optimality of the Friedman rule and optimal taxation in a growing economy with imperfect competition

This paper shows that if capital generates production externality, there exists a wedge between returns to money and to capital, driving the Friedman rule is not optimal. However, in the absence of capital externality, the Friedman rule may be valid even under imperfect competition.