Budget deficits and inflation feedback

This paper reinterprets the mixed evidence of the relationship between budget deficits and inflation in high inflation economies. The main finding is that recurrent outbursts of extreme inflation in these economies can be explained by a certain hysteresis effect associated with public finance. This interpretation meets the evidence that dramatic shifts between regimes of moderately high and extremely high (hyper-) inflation often occur without visible deterioration in public finance or abrupt shifts in fiscal or monetary policies. The existence of this hysteresis effect is explicitly explained by the action of two mechanisms: the arithmetic associated with the wrong side of the inflation tax Laffer curve and the Patinkin effect (the reverse of the much oftener cited Olivera-Tanzi effect). It is also shown that the division of the operational budget deficit into the part that is subject to negative inflation feedback and the part that is inflation-proof has implications for both the discussion of the inflationary consequences of budget deficits and the design of stabilization policy.     

Time consistent monetary policy with endogenous price rigidity

I characterize time consistent equilibrium in an economy with price rigidity and an optimizing monetary authority operating under discretion. Firms have the option to increase their frequency of price change, at a cost, in response to higher inflation. Previous studies, which assume a constant degree of price rigidity across inflation regimes, find two time consistent equilibria—one with low inflation, the other with high inflation. In contrast, when price rigidity is endogenous, the high inflation equilibrium ceases to exist. Hence, time consistent equilibrium is unique. This result depends on two features of the analysis: (1) a plausible quantitative specification of the fixed cost of price change, and (2) the presence of an arbitrarily small cost of inflation that is independent of price rigidity.     

The political economy of seigniorage

While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there is less agreement about the political, institutional and economic reasons for relying on it. This paper investigates the main political and institutional determinants of seigniorage using panel data on about 100 countries, for the period 1960–1999. Estimates show that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic and socially-polarized countries, with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing and with higher turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of this study is the need to develop institutions conducive to greater political stability as a means to reduce the reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits.     

ARE THE TWIN DEFICITS REALLY RELATED?

The emergence of record current-account and fiscal deficits in the United States during the 1980s draws increasing attention to what has become known as the "twin deficit" problem. Conventional wisdom is that a shift to larger government deficits entails a decline in government saving and results in larger trade deficits, Persistently large trade deficits are troublesome because they imply a transfer of wealth to foreigners and possibly a reduction in future generations' living standards.
This paper examines whether post-World War II data for the United States reveal a long-run secular relationship between the trade deficit and the fiscal deficit. The focus is on the secular relationship since that is the one most relevant to long-run policy concerns. The authors employ three different statistical techniques: (i) a deterministic technique for separating the secular components from the cyclical components to derive secular measures of the twin deficits, (ii) a stochastic procedure to isolate the secular components, (Hi) cointegration analysis to test for a long-run equilibrium relationship.
The authors conclude that, based on the first two approaches, evidence of a positive secular relationship between the twin deficits exists only under flexible exchange rates. This relationship appears quite strong–that is, a $1 change in the fiscal deficit eventually leads to roughly a $1 change in the trade deficit. On the other hand, findings based on cointegration analysis indicate no long-run equilibrium relationship between the twin deficits. This latter finding, however, may reflect a low power of the relevant statistical tests stemming from the shortness of the sample period.     

Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries

Many believe and argue that fiscal, or budgetary, transparency has large, positive effects on fiscal performance. However, the evidence linking transparency and fiscal policy outcomes is less compelling. To analyze the effects of fiscal transparency on public debt accumulation, we present a career-concerns model with political parties. This allows us to integrate as implications of a single model three hitherto-separate results in the literature on deficit and debt accumulation: that transparency decreases debt accumulation (at least by reducing an electoral cycle in deficits), that right-wing governments (at least for strategic reasons) tend to have higher deficits than left-wing governments, and that increasing political polarization increases debt accumulation. To test the predictions of the model, we construct a replicable index of fiscal transparency on 19-country OECD data. Simultaneous estimates of debt and transparency strongly confirm that a higher degree of fiscal transparency is associated with lower public debt and deficits, independent of controls for explanatory variables from other approaches.     

Analysis of Output Fluctuations in Taiwan: An Application of the IS–MP–AS Model

Extending the IS–MP–AS model, this paper finds that real GDP in Taiwan is positively affected by real depreciation and stock values and negatively associated with the government deficit/GDP ratio, the U.S. federal funds rate, and the expected inflation rate. Therefore, current large and rising government deficits, recent appreciation of the New Taiwan dollar, and gradual increases in the federal funds rate would hurt real output in Taiwan.     

Long-Run Links among Money, Prices and Output: Worldwide Evidence

Abstract. Starting from the quantity theory of money we analyse the dynamic relationships between money, real output and prices for an unbalanced panel of 110 economies. Complementary to trivariate analyses we also adopt a P-star model explaining inflation via an equilibrium price level (P-star), which in turn depends on potential output and money. A key issue of the paper is the cross-sectional stability of estimation and inference results. We find cointegration among the considered variables. Particularly for high inflation countries homogeneity between prices and money cannot be rejected. Given homogeneity we find evidence for an error-correction mechanism linking current price changes and the lagged price gap. Parameter estimates indicating the adjustment towards the price equilibrium are larger in absolute value for high inflation countries. The latter results indicate that central banks, even in high inflation countries, can improve price stability by controlling monetary growth.     

Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets

This article studies a two-period game between the public and a central bank about whose ability to commit to an announced target the public is uncertain. The central bank chooses between announcing a target for an intermediate variable (money growth) and its goal variable, inflation. Prior to setting its instrument, the central bank receives private, noisy information about the link between money growth and inflation. Monetary targeting facilitates communication of the central bank's type, in that the probability of separation is always higher than under inflation targeting. This advantage of monetary targets from a dependable central bank's perspective is outweighed for most parameter values by the advantage of inflation targeting in terms of inflation control. If the regime choice is treated as a strategic decision, over a large range of parameter values both central banks choose the regime that a dependable central bank would prefer.     

Modelling economic growth with internal and external imbalances: Empirical evidence from Portugal

Thirlwall's Law considers that growth can be constrained by the balance-of-payments when the current account is in permanent deficit. The Law focuses on external imbalances as impediments to growth and does not consider the case where internal imbalances (budget deficits or public debt) can also constrain growth. The recent European public debt crisis shows that when internal imbalances are out of control they can constrain growth and domestic demand in a severe way. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap by developing a growth model in line with Thirlwall's Law that takes into account both internal and external imbalances. The model is tested for Portugal which recently fell into a public debt crisis with serious negative consequences on growth. The empirical analysis shows that the growth rate in Portugal is in fact balance-of-payments constrained and the main drawback is the high import elasticity of the components of demand and in particular that of exports.     

The impact of fiscal-monetary policy interactions on government size and macroeconomic performance

This paper analyzes the relationship between inflation, output and government size by reexamining the time inconsistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with staggered timing structure for the acquisition of nominal money à la Neiss (Neiss, Katharine S. (1999), Discretionary Inflation in a General Equilibrium Model, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 31(3), pp. 357–374.), and public expenditure financed by means of a distortive tax. It is shown that, with predetermined wages, the equilibrium rate of inflation is above the Friedman rule and the equilibrium tax rate is below the efficient level. In particular, the discretionary rate of inflation is nonmonotonically related to the natural output, positively related to government size, and negatively related to the degree of central bank conservatism. Finally, a regime with commitment leads to welfare improvements over a regime with discretion.     

Banking crises in monetary economies

Abstract.  This paper analyzes the effect of inflation on banking crises in a model in which money and banks play essential roles. The model's equilibrium replicates some key features of actual banking crises, namely, the partial suspension of payments and the desire to hold cash even in the absence of pressing liquidity needs. When banks have access to a stable foreign currency, inflation has a threshold effect on banking crises: higher inflation reduces the likelihood of crises when inflation is below the threshold; the reverse happens when inflation exceeds the threshold. This result appears to be broadly consistent with available evidence.     

Dollarization and the inflation threshold

Abstract.  Empirical evidence suggests non-linearity in the impact of inflation on financial intermediation and real activity. Evidence also suggests that high inflation affects financial intermediation through the substitution of dollars 'under the mattress' for savings in domestic banks. We model an economy where inflation and real activity are positively related at low levels of inflation. However, when the inflation rate exceeds a threshold, agents substitute dollars for deposits issued by domestic banks, reducing the scale of financial intermediation and investment. As a consequence, at high levels of inflation, capital stock and output become negatively related to the inflation rate.     

Sustainability, flexibility, and inflation targeting

This paper examines sustainability of an inflation-targeting policy regime in terms of sustainable equilibrium using a canonical model in the recent literature. Overly flexible inflation targeting is not sustainable. Strict inflation targeting is sustainable only when shock persistence is high enough.     

Inflation and nominal tax system in an open economy

This paper provides an analysis of the implications of the interaction between inflation and a tax system which is not fully indexed within the context of an open economy. The model used is characterized by perfect foresight, full employment, imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets, and an endogenous stock of capital. Three distinct channels through which an increase in the inflation rate disturbs the initial equilibrium are analysed separately. The global effect is then discussed with respect to the position of the economy as debtor or creditor to the rest of the world. The financing of the public deficit is also briefly discussed.     

Deficit spending,money, and inflation: Some international empirical evidence

An attempt is made, in this study, to examine the monetarist propositions regarding the effects of budget deficits on money growth and inflation for ten industrialized countries. To this end, a two-equation econometric model consisting of the money supply growth and inflation equations has been specified and estimated. Based on the results, it is concluded that, in general, the government budget deficit is not a determinant of money supply growth or of inflation (directly or indirectly). The U.S. is an exception with some statistical evidence of direct and indirect effects of the budget deficit on inflation.     

Central bank design with heterogeneous agents

We study alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Inflation is determined by a policy board using either simple-majority voting, supermajority voting, or bargaining. We compare the equilibrium inflation rates to the first-best allocation.     

MONETARY EXPANSION AND PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN A CASH‐IN‐ADVANCE ECONOMY*

Using a dynamic optimization model that incorporates a cash‐in‐advance constraint on both consumption and investment and productive public capital financed by a lump‐sum tax and seigniorage, this paper analyses the steady‐state effects of an increase in the inflation rate (the money growth rate) on output, private capital and welfare. The effects are negative at high inflation rates. However, at low inflation rates, the effects depend on the amount of lump‐sum tax revenue collected and therefore are either positive or negative.     

Do tax cuts generate twin deficits? A multi‐country analysis

Abstract We study the effects of tax shocks on the budget and external deficits for 16 industrialized countries over the post‐1970 period. Our structural approach is based on a small open economy model where a tax cut affects the external deficit by two distinct channels. The demographic channel works through the overlapping‐generation structure of the model. The forecasting channel works through the dynamic structure of the model. Our empirical analysis documents that tax shocks generate twin deficits, and that both channels play important roles in explaining the positive comovement between the budget and external deficits.     

Political,Institutional, and Economic Factors Underlying Deficit Volatility

It is well known that fiscal policy can counter‐cyclically smooth out the effect of unexpected shocks and public deficit volatility may reflect the (optimal) policy response to them. However, the welfare losses associated to fiscal instability are also an important challenge for many countries, as it typically implies an inefficient allocation of resources, higher sovereign risk premium and an inadequate provision of public services. In this paper, we empirically analyze the political, institutional, and economic sources of public deficit volatility. Using the system‐generalized method‐of‐moments (GMM) estimator for linear dynamic panel data models and a sample of 125 countries analyzed from 1980 to 2006, we show that higher public deficit volatility is typically associated with higher levels of political instability and less democracy. In addition, public deficit volatility tends to be magnified for small countries, in the outcome of hyper‐inflation episodes and for countries with a high degree of openness.