Collective Bargaining and the Evolution of Wage Inequality in Italy

Italian male wage inequality has increased at a relatively fast pace from the mid‐1980s until the early 2000s, while it has been persistently flat since then. We analyse this trend, focusing on the period of most rapid growth in pay dispersion. By accounting for worker and firm fixed effects, it is shown that workers' heterogeneity has been a major determinant of increased wage inequalities, while variability in firm wage policies has declined over time. We also show that the growth in pay dispersion has entirely occurred between livelli di inquadramento, that is, job titles defined by national industry‐wide collective bargaining institutions, for which specific minimum wages apply. We conclude that the underlying market forces determining wage inequality have been largely channelled into the tight tracks set by the centralized system of industrial relations.     

Productivity and Wage Effects of Firm-Level Collective Agreements: Evidence from Belgian Linked Panel Data

How do firm-level collective agreements affect firm performance in a multi-level bargaining system? Using detailed Belgian-linked employer–employee panel data, our findings show that firm-level agreements increase both wage costs and labour productivity (with respect to sector-level agreements). Relying on approaches developed by Bartolucci and Hellerstein et al., they also indicate that firm-level agreements exert a stronger impact on wages than on productivity, so that profitability is hampered. However, this rent-sharing effect mostly holds in sectors where firms are more concentrated or less exposed to international competition. Firm agreements are thus mainly found to raise wages beyond labour productivity when the rents to be shared between workers and firms are relatively big. Overall, this suggests that firm-level agreements benefit both employers and employees — through higher productivity and wages — without being very detrimental to firms’ performance.     

Collective Bargaining and Wage Dispersion in Europe

The level at which collective bargaining takes place is usually considered important in determining wage levels and wage inequalities. Two different situations are considered: a first in which bargaining is only ‘multi‐employer’, and a second in which it is ‘multi‐level’, in the sense that workers can be covered by both a ‘multi‐employer’ and a ‘single‐employer’ contract at the same time. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of these different institutional settings on pay dispersion. The study is carried out using the European Structure of Earnings Survey, which is a large dataset containing detailed matched employer–employee information for the year 1995. The countries analysed are Italy, Belgium and Spain. The empirical results generally show that wages of workers covered by only a ‘multi‐employer’ contract are no more compressed than those of workers covered by both ‘multi‐employer’ and ‘single‐employer’ contracts. This implies that where workers are not covered by single‐employer bargaining, they receive wage supplements paid unilaterally by their employers.     

Collective Bargaining and Within-firm Wage Dispersion in Spain

This paper analyses the effect of collective bargaining on within‐firm wage dispersion for the case of Spain. What is relevant in the Spanish case is to compare the effect of the two basic levels of bargaining (firm and sector) on wage dispersion. By using the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, this paper concludes that collective agreements at firm level have a negative effect on wage dispersion. At the same time, firms that have signed these types of agreements show greater wage dispersion than those covered by agreements at the sector level, owing to the positive and compensating effect of firms’ and workers’ features.     

The Impact of Collective Agreements on Working Time in Denmark

This article examines the impact of collective agreements on the working time patterns of private-sector employees in Denmark. The expected effect would be a reduction in working hours and overtime and an increase in overtime compensation. On the basis of an individual-level survey of 1720 employees, it is shown that there is a clear union impact on working time behaviour, but that it varies by subject area. While in some areas there is a near total spillover of rules from collective agreements (the collective agreement has become a social norm), in others there is a clear 'union mark-down', and in still others collective agreements seem to make no impact at all.     

Contesting Local Pay: The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining in the NHS

Local pay determination formed a key plank in the Conservative government's attempt to restructure industrial relations in the NHS, and to 'reassert managerial control' of the paybill at local (trust) level. This paper reports the findings of a national survey of Unison lead negotiators, complemented by case study interviews and documentary research, on the processes and outcomes of local pay determination, and its impact on industrial relations at both national and local levels. The paper strongly refutes recent suggestions that local pay leads to 'improved' industrial relations and greater pay equity. Moreover, and contrary to claims that Staff Side organizations are 'too weak' to challenge 'new managerial strategies', the study's findings show that the search for managerial control remains, as always, a contested terrain.     

Choices Within Collective Labour Agreements à la Carte in the Netherlands

In recent years European employers, unions and governments have developed initiatives that offer employees the right to exchange certain items within an agreed package of employment conditions. So far, the available evidence on the use of such ‘cafeteria systems’ is largely based on survey data rather than on actual choices. We analyse the actual choices made by the employees of Radboud University Nijmegen in the years 2002–2004. The results cast doubt on the efficiency and the effectiveness of employee choices within collective agreements, contradict the unions’ push for working time reduction and question wage moderation and policies on work–life balance.     

International Differences in Wage Inequality: A New Glance with European Matched Employer–Employee Data

Using international harmonized matched employer–employee micro data from the European Structure of Earnings Survey for nine European countries, this article examines the origin of international differences in wage inequality. Wage inequality is highly correlated with the magnitude of inter‐firm wage differentials. Workplace‐ and job‐related factors generally have a more significant impact on within‐country wage inequality than individual characteristics. European countries differ significantly not only in the extent of wage inequality but also in the relative influence of factors shaping wage inequality. Although cross‐country differences in labour force composition play a part in the explanation, differences in the distribution and in labour market prices attached to workplace and job characteristics are the primary factors contributing to international differences in wage inequality.     

What Caused Rising Earnings Inequality in Britain? Evidence from Time Series, 1970–1993

The paper reviews some of the competing explanations for the rising levels of earnings inequality in Britain, such as skill shortages, rising unemployment, globalization, demographic factors and inflation. These explanations are rejected in favour of the idea that it was the major changes in the institutional pay-setting arrangements that were largely responsible for rising inequality. Union density figures and strike data are explored in support of this thesis.     

Successful Wage Concertation: The Economic Effects of Wage Pacts and Their Alternatives

Recent debates on pacts have focused on the prerequisites for their emergence, whereas questions of their efficacy have receded into the background. In particular, systematic analyses of the effectiveness of pacts in terms of their capacity to enhance economic performance are missing. The aim of this article is therefore to assess the economic impact of pacts. As the majority of pacts concern wages, the assessment will concentrate on a comparison of the performance of pacts with alternative governance mechanisms for wage policies, that is, alternative pay‐setting modes. The findings show that when wage pacts are endowed with the ability to govern lower‐level pay determination, they are better at enhancing economic performance than other forms of coordination.     

The Institutional Context of an ‘Empirical Law’: The Wage Curve under Different Regimes of Collective Bargaining

The wage curve postulates that the wage level is a decreasing function of the regional unemployment rate. In testing this hypothesis, most studies have not taken into account that differences in the institutional framework may have an impact on the existence (or the slope) of a wage curve. Using a large‐scale linked employer–employee dataset for Western Germany, this article provides a first direct test of the relevance of different bargaining regimes (and of works councils) for the existence of a wage curve. In pooled regressions for the period 1998 to 2006, as well as in worker‐level or plant‐level fixed‐effects estimations, we obtain evidence for a wage curve for plants with a collective bargaining agreement at firm level. The point estimates for this group of plants are close to the ?0.1 elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment postulated by Blanchflower and Oswald. In this regime, we also find that works councils dampen the adjustment of wages to the regional unemployment situation. In the other regimes of plants that either do not make use of collective contracts or apply sectoral agreements, we do not find a wage curve.     

Maintaining the ‘Status Quo’? An Analysis of the Contents of British Collective Agreements, 1979–1990

Abstract : The contents of over 100 collective agreements, drawn from 50 bargaining units in both 1979 and 1990, are examined. Recognition clauses remain largely extant. Some extension and formalization of procedural provisions is recorded, particularly regarding time off work for shop-stewards. Closed-shop clauses are deleted from a number of mainly white-collar agreements but remain extant in the majority of manual agreements. More flexible working practices are recorded in many agreements. The form of flexibility agreement varies markedly, with some agreements demonstrating greater formalization and others shifting towards more general managerial prerogative clauses. Possible explanations for this pattern are considered.     

Public- and Private-Sector Wage Differentials in Canada Revisited

Using a variety of techniques, we estimate the wage premium for federal, provincial, and municipal public-sector employees in Canada. We find that females in the public sector are paid a wage premium, with federal government workers enjoying the highest rents, followed by local and provincial public-sector employees. Estimates for males suggest that rent payments are comparably less, but results are inconclusive.     

Wage Structure and Dynamics in the Electronics Industry

This study analyzes wage patterns over time among California electronics employers. While the range of wages paid is substantial, employers on average make only small departures from market wage that are not pervasive across occupations or persistent across time. Employers appear able to change employment levels without affecting wages. Internal wage relativities also appear flexible. Differences between administered wage scales and actual wages paid are used to distinguish wage policy from market outcomes.     

Inequality and Union Membership: The Influence of Relative Earnings and Inequality Attitudes

Using surveys from the International Social Survey Programme covering the period 1985–2002 for seven European countries (West and East Germany, Sweden, Norway, Italy, the Netherlands and Great Britain), we examine the effect of relative earnings on union membership and show that union density is higher among workers in the intermediate earnings group than among low or high earners. Next, we examine the association of inequality attitudes with union membership and demonstrate that union membership is not only motivated by instrumental considerations related to relative earnings, but also by normative concerns about inequality. We interpret our findings suggesting that rising earnings inequality is in itself a source of union decline.     

Earnings Inequality and Unions in Canada

This paper reports research examining differences in the earnings distributions of unionized and non–unionized workers and the impact of union status on the likelihood of a worker being in each region of the earnings distribution. Average earnings of unionized workers are shown to be higher than those of non–union workers in the first four quintiles, but lower than average earnings of non–unionized workers in the top quintile. Union effects are greatest among workers situated in the lower and middle regions of the distribution, and benefit workers who are typically disadvantaged in the labour market.     

节能自愿协议在国外的应用

自愿协议是目前国际上应用最多的一种非强制性节能措施,它可以有效弥补单纯行政手段的不足。自愿协议分为经磋商达成型、公众自愿参与型以及单方面承诺的自愿协议。自愿协议的内容不尽相同,但一般都包括两个方面：整个工业部门或单个企业承诺在一定时间内达到某一节能目标;政府给予工业部门或单个企业以某种激励。世界各国的实践表明,自愿协议在激励企业自觉节能和提高能效方面收到了极好的效果。