Power laws and comparative advantage

Using a comprehensive international trade data set we document empirical Power Laws (PLs) for the distribution of the interaction between countries as measured by revealed comparative advantage. Using the recently developed estimator by Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011), we find strong evidence in favour of PLs along the time, country and sector dimension for three different levels of data aggregation. This finding is not predicted by any of the existing trade theories. The estimated PL exponents characterizing the distribution of revealed comparative advantage are stable over time but differ between countries and sectors. These differences are related empirically to country and sector characteristics, including population size, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and factor intensities.     

Differences in the degree of unionization as a source of comparative advantage in open economies

This paper considers two integrated countries that differ only in their labour markets: one country hosts unions, whereas the other one pays competitive wages. These institutional differences are a source of comparative advantage, which crucially impact inter‐industry trade and welfare in the open economy. In this setting, deunionization exerts opposing welfare effects in the two economies. Increasing product market competition is beneficial for the unionized country and detrimental for its trading partner. Finally, we conduct an empirical analysis that provides strong support for the main hypotheses of our theoretical model.     

Access to credit and comparative advantage

Access to external funds is crucial for the entry and expansion of entrepreneurial firms and the sectors they predominantly arise in. This paper reports three important results. First, comparative advantage is shaped by factor endowments as well as fundamental determinants of corporate finance. In particular, a larger equity ratio of firms and tough governance standards relax financing constraints, lead to entry of firms at the lower bound of the productivity distribution and create an endogenous comparative advantage in sectors where entrepreneurial firms are clustered. Second, a small degree of protection in the constrained sector can raise a country's welfare by relaxing financing constraints if terms‐of‐trade effects are small. Third, a small degree of protection of the financially dependent industry in a financially underdeveloped country might even raise world welfare.     

Legal rules as a source of comparative advantage: A case study of telecommunication equipment interconnection

Legal rules governing the interconnection of customer-premises equipment (CPE) to the telephone network have economic implications for both producers and users of such equipment. The United States instituted a free-interconnection policy between 1968 and 1976; Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom adopted similar policies in the 1980s. A free-interconnection policy can impose costs on domestic producers as a result of increased competition among both foreign and domestic producers, but it can also provide benefits to domestic users who gain access to the world market in CPE. Interconnection rules can therefore provide a comparative advantage to countries that adopt the most favorable policy.It is shown here that free interconnection has been a favorable policy for the United States. Costs to domestic CPE producers have been small, and benefits to large users appear to have been large, both in terms of increased product diversity and in terms of price and quality of established products. The movement toward free interconnection in other countries appears to be based on the favorable experience in the countries that have already made this change.This CPE example suggests a generalization that can be expressed in terms of the “market for regulation” concept. It is suggested that an equilibrium in this market occurs at the point of maximum benefits minus costs, as experienced by the participants in this market. This equilibrium is a “rule equilibrium.” In the case of CPE, the old equilibrium was at the no interconnection point while the new equilibrium is at the free interconnection point toward which the world is presently moving.     

Convergence patterns and switchovers in comparative advantage

Although there exists a vast literature on convergence and divergence of income levels across countries or regions at the aggregate level, there is only little work on convergence and/or divergence processes of productivity and wage levels at the more disaggregated industrial level. These are especially important in the context of international trade as these determine the dynamics of comparative advantages and the resulting trade structures between developing and developed countries. In the first theoretical part, we discuss some theoretical aspects of uneven sectoral productivity and wage catching-up processes and their links to dynamic comparative advantages and trade structures. In the second part, we present an econometric study of catching-up of wages, productivity, and labour unit costs. The analysis is conducted at the industrial level (ISIC 3-digit) over the period 1965–1992 for a set of catching-up economies compared with more advanced countries.     

Technology and the dynamics of comparative advantage

This paper explores how trade affects innovation in a two‐country, two‐good, two‐factor Heckscher–Ohlin model with heterogeneous firms. Trade openness induces an increase in process innovation in both industries. The increase is stronger in the comparative advantage industry. Trade openness boosts prospective entrants' profits in that industry, which leads to further increases in product innovation. Trade liberalization generates a different relative impact on innovation across industries, depending on trade costs. When they are high (low), it increases process innovation relatively more in the comparative advantage (disadvantage) industry, leading to TFP divergence (convergence) across industries.     

Breaks in the chain of comparative advantage

The chain proposition of comparative advantage states that when factor prices differ between two countries producing many products with two factors, every export of the capital abundant country would be more capital intensive than any of its imports. The present note points out that an economy has the option to break the chain to reach full employment if its factor endowment is not spanned by the production cone of the more intensive products.     

Ricardo's discovery of comparative advantage revisited: a critique of Ruffin's account

Abstract

In an influential paper, Ruffin has attempted to reconstruct the circumstances of Ricardo's discovery of the law of comparative advantage. Ruffin's paper has inspired a number of further contributions on the precise nature, logical structure, and analytical significance of Ricardo's formulation of the law of comparative advantage. This paper re-examines Ruffin's reconstruction, and in particular his interpretation of Ricardo's three letters of October 1816 and suggests that it lacks textual and contextual support.     

Product quality and the theory of comparative advantage

We develop a simple model to investigate the possibility that two countries that differ significantly in income levels may be unable to gain from trading with each other. We consider two countries with identical preferences and different technologies. There are two types of goods: one homogeneous, and one quality-differentiated. We show that if one country has an absolute advantage in both types of goods, then no trade may be possible between the two countries, despite differences in relative autarky prices.     

Some issues in the measurement of comparative advantage

This paper examines measurement of ‘revealed comparative advantage’ in the light of recent evidence that such measures appear to yield poor results and of recent theoretical developments. Evidence is presented that the poor performance of these measures is not likely to be attributable to problems predominantly associated with measurement itself. Recent theoretical developments make clearer what can be expected of observed trade flows. A measure, based on theory's ex antepredictions measures. The behaviour of the measure is evaluated for a sample of UK industries in 1979.     

Clusters and comparative advantage: Implications for industrial policy

Cases of industrial agglomeration or “clusters” arise in the presence of industry-specific and local externalities, also called Marshallian externalities. The standard argument is that such externalities may justify a policy of infant-industry protection to allow and encourage clusters to emerge. In this paper I explore this carefully, and show that different policy implications emerge under a more realistic modeling of clusters. In particular, rather than distorting prices to promote clusters in “advanced sectors” that may exhibit strong clustering possibilities, countries should focus instead on promoting clustering in current sectors, which have revealed to have the strongest comparative advantage. Import substitution is not a proper way to achieve this.     

Property rights,mobile capital,and comparative advantage

Recent papers show that imperfect property rights to a natural resource – a sector-specific factor–can be a source of comparative advantage. In these models, weaker property rights attract labor–the only mobile factor – to the resource sector, increasing the country's comparative advantage for that sector. If capital in addition to labor is mobile, and if the benefits of capital are non-excludable or if the degree of property rights is endogenous, a deterioration of property rights has ambiguous effects on comparative advantage and on the equilibrium wage/rental ratio.     

Advantages of backwardness and forwardness with shifting comparative advantage

This paper develops a multi-sector endogenous innovation model that is able to account for the dynamics of comparative advantage of each sector within the economy. The model in this paper assumes that two kinds of learning effects exist in R&D: advantages of backwardness and forwardness. It is shown that if the economy is divided into advanced and backward sectors, in the latter sectors, the advantage of backwardness dominates, leading to cyclic repetition of comparative advantage. However, in the former sectors, the advantage of forwardness becomes more significant, so comparative advantage among these sectors stabilizes. Thus, the direction of learning spillovers has a critical effect on the dynamics of comparative advantage. Given this result, it is shown that only R&D policies for the marginal sector are effective in facilitating economic growth. If a decision is made to facilitate R&D investment within advanced sectors, R&D taxes, rather than subsidies, should be imposed on this marginal sector. Moreover, it is shown that trade liberalization does not affect the intrinsic dynamics of comparative advantage among surviving sectors in the economy if the locus of this marginal sector does not change significantly after trade liberalization.     

Country size,technology, and Ricardian comparative advantage

We develop a Ricardian model with heterogeneous firms in which country size and technology play a crucial role in the firm‐level variables. We show that a country with larger size and better technology exhibits higher productivity and lower price–cost margins even under assumptions of C.E.S. preferences and monopolistic competition. Welfare is higher in this country, not only due to the increased product variety but also due to increased competition in a domestic market. We also show that country size and technology impact critically on the intensive margin as well as the extensive margin in the gravity equation.     

The accidental agro-power: constructing comparative advantage in Brazil

Brazil has emerged as an agro-export powerhouse: from being a net-agricultural importer and food aid recipient as recently as the 1960s and 1970s, it has now become the world’s third largest agricultural exporter, after the US and EU. What is more, Brazil’s new role as a major agricultural trader has provided an important foundation for its enhanced status and influence in global economic governance, as an emerging power and one of the ‘BRICS’. This paper analyses how such a remarkable transformation was brought about. I argue that Brazil’s emergence as an agricultural powerhouse was the result not of its natural factor endowments, but extensive intervention on the part of the Brazilian state that had the effect of constructing a new comparative advantage. This transformation was propelled by state-driven innovation and related policies that opened up massive new areas of the country to agriculture, enabled it to shift to producing goods in direct competition with the world’s dominant agricultural exporters, and generated significant gains in productivity and competitiveness. The irony is that the intention of these policies, initiated in the 1970s, was to foster industrial development in Brazil as part of its import-substitution industrialisation programme, yet they wound up having precisely the opposite effect – transforming Brazil into one of the world’s dominant agricultural powers.     

更加严格的环境政策能否使得污染度较小的产品具有比较优势？

一、概述贸易自由化对环境的影响在今天是一个有广泛争论的议题。贸易在最近几十年间的飞速增长,导致了各种对生产专业化的提高可能会对环境产生有害的影响的担心,尤其是对发展中国家,这些国家对环境保护所做的努力充其量不过是微不足道的。贸易与环境这一议题已产生了许多的研     

Firm heterogeneity and Ricardian comparative advantage within and across sectors

This paper incorporates Melitz’s Econometrica (71:1695–1725, 2003) heterogeneous-firm trade model in the Ricardian model of comparative advantage with a continuum of sectors introduced by Dornbusch et al. (Am Econ Rev 67(5), 823–839, 1977). In particular, we characterise the equilibrium outcomes when neither sectors nor countries are symmetric. We find that trade patterns can follow Ricardian comparative advantage, while wage rates are proportional to market size due to a home market effect. Interestingly, trade liberalisation hurts the large country but benefits the small one by reducing the number of sectors with two-way trade and expanding those with specialised (one-way) trade. I would like to thank Mike Artis, Richard Baldwin, Frederic Robert-Nicoud, Matthias Helble, Giovanni Facchini, Thierry Verdier and a referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. Also I would like to thank Mike Artis for his excellent proof reading.