Why offer lower prices to past customers? Inducing favorable social price comparisons to enhance customer retention

Price discrimination policies vary widely across companies. Some firms offer new customers the lowest price; others give preferential prices to their past customers. We contribute to the literature on price discrimination in behavior-based pricing by exploring how customers’ social price comparisons, i.e., comparing one’s price to that received by similar peers, impact the optimal structure of price discrimination. Social price comparisons have a negative (positive) impact on customers’ transaction utility if the price charged to past customers is higher (lower) than a new customer’s price. Using an analytical model with vertically differentiated firms, we show that a firm with relatively large market share will reward its past customers with relatively low prices when social price comparisons have a sufficiently large impact on utility. Furthermore, we find that social price comparisons lead to a relaxation of the price competition for new customers. Thus, both firms can earn higher profits when such comparisons are made than when they are absent. We also examine how other factors, such as horizontal competition and strategic customers, interact with social price comparison concerns to impact pricing strategies. Finally, we show how pricing behavior differs when price comparisons are based on historic reference prices rather than on peers’ prices.     

人工智能时代个性化定价行为的反垄断规制--从大数据杀熟展开

人工智能时代,数据规模显著扩张,算法能力持续优化。科技实力雄厚、市场力量强大的经营者凭借大数据与算法工具的紧密结合,收集和分析能够反映消费者特征和行为的相关信息,以无限接近消费者购买能力和支付意愿上限的方式对消费者实施个性化定价。个性化定价行为涉及对条件相同的交易相对人在交易价格上实施差别化待遇,可能构成反垄断法所禁止的价格歧视行为。但与以往反垄断实施重点关注的排他性价格歧视不同,个性化定价突出表现为直接针对终端消费者实施的剥削性价格歧视,且在具体情形下呈现出不同的限制竞争效果,引发消费者选择能力与选择范围的双重限制。鉴于此,个性化定价行为的反垄断规制需要准确识别涉案行为,综合判断竞争效果,慎重选择福利标准。对于同时降低消费者剩余和社会总福利的个性化定价行为,可认定其具有限制竞争效果且不具备正当理由,从而构成违法价格歧视;对于降低消费者剩余却提高社会总福利的个性化定价行为,如果选择消费者福利标准则可认定其构成违法价格歧视,如果选择社会总福利标准则可认定其具备正当理由;对于同时提高消费者剩余与社会总福利的个性化定价行为,因涉及消费者之间的剩余转移,对其竞争效果的评价仍待反垄断实施予以明确。     

Price Intransparency,Consumer Decision Making and European Consumer Law

Price comparison is a basic element of competition. For comparison to work, at least prices need to be transparent. Moreover, price is usually a focal point in consumer thinking and deciding on transactions. Hence, obfuscating prices can be detrimental to consumers. Therefore, it is vital for policymakers to know how transparent pricing is in reality. Commercial practices involving price intransparency can be detrimental to consumer decision making and may be associated with market failure. So, legislative intervention to ensure price transparency is sometimes warranted. Suppliers may disclose and frame pricing information in such ways as to influence consumers. For some suppliers, advantages may be gained by obfuscating price—through practices ranging from the outright hiding of price terms in the small print to subtle ways of throwing in gifts or adding charges during the vending process. Do consumers appreciate the implications of the fact that by framing price in different ways suppliers actually try to influence their demand for products? And how does the law broadly speaking respond to problems of price intransparency? In this article, behavioural science insights are combined with a legal analysis of European consumer law in order to chart some of the detrimental influences of price intransparency on the consumer decision-making process and to answer whether and to what extent European consumer law addresses these issues. In doing so, this article first reviews research from consumer psychology, marketing, and behavioural law, and economics regarding the influence of presentation, framing, and transparency of price on the consumer decision-making process. Subsequently, it describes and evaluates the legal framework offered by European consumer law and how this framework responds to practices of price intransparency. Particular problematic pricing techniques are identified and discussed. In conclusion, attention is drawn to the disadvantages of the increasing full harmonization character of European consumer law for combating price intransparency at Member State level.     

Price Discrimination and the Cruise Line Industry: Implications for Market Definition,Competition, and Consumer Welfare

This article extends the price discrimination literature and applies it to market definition and competitive effects analysis in recent mergers in the cruise line industry. In that industry, short run output is fixed. If firms want to increase price and restrict output to price‐insensitive customers, they have to increase the output and lower price to the price‐sensitive customers. We show that with fixed output (1) it is in firms’ interest to engage in price discrimination, (2) firms have increased ability to engage profitably in price discrimination as the intensity of competition decreases, and (3) the average price of price‐sensitive and ‐insensitive consumers increase with reduced competition. Unlike the economists at the Federal Trade Commission, our analysis suggests that cruise lines engage in third‐degree price discrimination. Moreover, the cruise industry could be a separate market and a reduction in the number of competitors might raise average prices.     

Upgrade pricing, market growth, and social welfare

This paper studies the monopolist's dynamic pricing strategy when introducing successive generations of a durable product. We show that when consumers are semi-anonymous or exactly identified and the innovation is minor, the firm always offers an upgrade discount to former customers. However, the discount depends only on the quality of the old product. In contrast, for moderate and major innovations, the discount depends on the qualities and costs of both the old and the new products. The market growth rate affects the firm's pricing strategy only if consumers are anonymous; furthermore, the effect on prices depends on the discount rate and whether the market growth rate is high or low. For minor innovations, social welfare is maximized if consumers are anonymous. An interesting and paradoxical result is that, when innovations are moderate or major and consumers are semi-anonymous or exactly identified, price discrimination can actually lead to higher social welfare.     

数字经济时代算法价格歧视行为的法律规制

在数字经济时代,随着互联网经营者开始使用算法技术进行定价活动,凭借对海量消费数据的掌握,进行"用户画像"后以实现"千人千面千价格"的精准营销。其中,算法价格歧视行为存在损害消费者、排挤竞争对手以及破坏竞争秩序的风险,亟需予以法律规制。然而,当前我国现有相关法律在适用范围、违法性判定要件、责任规范等方面存在不足。鉴于此,应适当拓宽《反垄断法》的主体范围,使算法价格歧视行为难逃法网;确立"形式+实质"违法审查标准,让违法性算法价格歧视行为原形毕露;构建算法价格歧视行为的"双轨"责任规范,使相关责任主体难辞其咎。     

Is transparency a good thing? How online price transparency and variability can benefit firms and influence consumer decision making

The internet has empowered consumers and changed the way they search and shop for products and services by increasing the availability and transparency of pricing and other comparative information. However, what is less clear from a managerial perspective is just how transparent pricing information should be. While it might seem that increasing price transparency would reduce consumer search, we find that it may actually increase search and delay. In this article, we review the use of firms’ application of price transparency in practice and propose that specific types of information can influence how transparent prices are to consumers, and how such transparency can influence consumer decisions in a way that is beneficial for the firm. We focus on a specific form of transparency: whether or not the consumer knows the range of pricing. We also discuss whether a high variability pricing approach versus a low variability pricing approach influences consumer decision making—and whether this influence is moderated by transparency.     

EDITOR'S COMMENTS

ABSTRACT

The key to improving pricing methods lies in establishing a clear relationship between the price paid by customers and the value received. A company's understanding of how a decision in its pricing policy will affect the perceptions its potential consumers will have of these prices, is fundamental if it wishes to make sure that its offer is properly perceived. Thus, if companies identify the rules used by purchasers to price their products, they will be successful in getting the objective signal they send via their communication strategies to be perceived in the desired manner. This analysis shows that both monetary and non-monetary costs are considered by consumers when determining the final cost perception associated with the acquisition of a good, and that the understanding of the internal reference price is essential for determining the nominal price effect on the monetary component of total sacrifice.     

The promise and peril of dynamic targeted pricing

Dynamic pricing is widely adopted in many industries, such as travel and insurance. These industries are also gaining extensive capabilities in identifying and segmenting customers, partly fueled by the increasing availability of data. It is natural to ask whether firms should take advantage of such developments by charging different prices to different customer segments. If so, under what conditions? We seek answers to these highly managerially relevant questions.We consider a market with two customer segments served by a monopolist. The monopolist can choose among a set of pricing strategies to exploit consumers’ inter-temporal preferences and/or inter-segment variations. At one end of the spectrum, the firm can charge a constant price to all customers, which is called static pricing. At the other end of the spectrum, the firm can charge different prices to different customer segments and vary these prices over time, which is referred to as dynamic targeted pricing. We systematically compare these alternative pricing strategies. We show that dynamic pricing without targeting can be more effective than static targeted pricing when customers are not very forward looking, which corroborates the findings in the empirical literature. Interestingly, we find that the monopolist can be worse off when she adopts targeting in addition to dynamic pricing. We conduct laboratory experiments to test several key model predictions. The studies show that individuals behave in a manner consistent with the predictions of our model.     

How price complexity takes its toll: The neglected role of a simplicity bias and fairness in price evaluations

Marketing managers commonly employ complex price plans. Surprisingly, limited and conflicting evidence reports how customers perceive and react to complex prices. This study examines perceptions about price complexity and shows that customers tend to prefer simple prices. Two experimental studies show that perceived price complexity negatively affects customer perceptions of price fairness and influences product choice because customers negatively evaluate the transparency of the firm's pricing practices and infer higher total prices. Customers comparing alternate offerings may therefore prefer simple over complex prices, even when the latter are less expensive. Study results suggest limiting price plan variations positively affects customer inferences about transparency and fairness, and thus customer choice.     

Price Strategies and Compatibility in Digital Networks

We analyze competition between two horizontally differentiated network providers. New technologies help the providers to collect consumer‐specific information, and such technologies increase the providers’ ability to use price discrimination. One example is the mobile providers’ choice of investing into third generation mobile systems (3G). Compared to the current 2G systems (GSM), 3G gives the providers more accurate customer specific information (e.g. with respect to customers’ location at any time). Since new technologies give the opportunity to implement price discrimination, an interesting question is how the price strategies (price discrimination or not) affect the incentives to unilaterally establish a walled garden where the rival’s customers have imperfect access. The main message of the paper is that walled garden strategies are more likely when firms use price discrimination than when they all use linear pricing.     

Balancing Profitability and Customer Welfare in a Supermarket Chain

We investigate the impact of price discrimination by a large Chicago supermarket chain. First we measure the impact of the chain's current zone-pricing policy on shelf prices, variable profits and consumer welfare across its stores. Using the chain's database to simulate a finer store-specific micro-pricing policy, we study the implications of this policy on profits and welfare. We show how a store-pricing policy that is constrained to offer consumers at least as much surplus as a uniform chain wide pricing policy still enables the retailer to generate substantial incremental profits.To ensure our pricing problem exhibits a well-defined optimum, we use the parsimonious, mixed-logit demand function that allows for flexible substitution patterns across brands and also retains a link to consumer theory. We discuss the issue of price endogeneity when estimating the demand parameters with weekly store-level data. Standard instrumental variables techniques used to account for such endogeneity also seem to increase the magnitudes of own-price elasticities thereby offsetting the problem encountered by previous researchers of predicted prices from a demand model exceeding those in the actual data.     

Modeling price-related consequences of the brand origin cue: An empirical examination of the automobile market

Price-related consequences of the country-of-origin (COO) cue have been widely neglected in the literature. This paper applies hedonic price analysis to examine a brand’s COO effect on new car prices. The application of our models to an extensive dataset demonstrates that prices of new cars reflect not only implicit prices of performance and technological characteristics but also price distortions that arise out of COO heterogeneity. Moreover, by allowing model parameters to vary across car type segments, we are able to capture patterns of differential attribute and COO effects on prices, which are indicative of implicit price discrimination strategies. The paper provides new interesting insights into critical issues for pricing strategy and demonstrates the role of brand origin, segments, and observed product differences in the price structure of the automobile market. Our findings yield important implications for manufacturers and researchers.     

I guess that is fair: How the efforts of other customers influence buyer price fairness perceptions

Past research has demonstrated that consumers' price fairness judgments are influenced by comparisons between the offer price they receive and the prices paid by other consumers for the same product offering. In today's digital age, reference points for purchases are more prevalent than ever. However, investigations on how certain inputs of the transaction affect these judgments is lacking. Specifically, extant research has failed to account for how the purchase efforts of other consumers can influence one's own price fairness evaluations. Moreover, relatively little empirical research has endeavored to understand the simultaneous cognitive and affective processes that explain how consumers arrive at price fairness judgments. To address these gaps in the literature, we introduce two studies aimed at understanding the process through which the salient efforts of referent consumers serve to mitigate perceptions of price unfairness when two customers pay different prices for the same product. The findings support a dual‐process model whereby the efforts of other (referent) customers serve to simultaneously reduce buyer anger and increase buyer understanding of the price disparity, ultimately mitigating perceptions of price unfairness.     

Whether and to What Extent Consumers Demand Fair Pricing Behavior for Its Own Sake

This article contributes to scholarly understanding of the significance of procedural fairness in pricing contexts. It has been widely recognized that price fairness judgments concern both the outcome (fair price) and the procedure leading to the outcome (fair pricing). However, extant research has traditionally viewed procedural fairness as a means to outcome fairness. According to this instrumental view, procedural fairness is a component or antecedent of outcome fairness, but has no direct effects on consumers’ responses to prices. Building on the relational perspective on fairness, we develop and test a model of price procedural fairness as an end in itself. In three lab studies, we show that (1) when information regarding outcome (an unfavorable price difference) and procedure (the pricing practice underlying the price difference) is available simultaneously and unambiguously, procedural fairness has direct and stronger effects than outcome fairness on consumers’ responses and (2) procedural fairness mediates the effects of pricing practices on these responses. In all three studies, adding procedural fairness as a direct predictor of consumers’ responses increases the explanatory power of a model of price fairness significantly. Our model can explain peculiar real-world cases in which consumers reacted very strongly over relatively small price differences. The research findings point to the significance of the non-instrumental aspect of consumer’s demand for ethical (fair pricing) behavior and the need for companies to assess the fairness of their pricing practices from the consumer perspective.     

The market value for product attribute improvements under price personalization

Personalization of the marketing mix is a topic of much interest to marketing academics and practitioners. Using discrete choice demand theory, we investigate the aggregate market value for product attribute improvements when firms are engaged in personalized pricing. Our results provide a theoretically grounded rule for how to aggregate consumer valuations to assess the overall profitability of attribute improvements under price personalization. Under common pricing, each consumer contributes the same margin. Profitability of an attribute improvement is thus driven by inducing more consumers to buy. Consumers with high choice probabilities are given less weight in the market valuation under common pricing as they are less responsive to attribute improvements. Under personalized pricing, profitability of an attribute improvement is driven by extraction of consumer surplus from high valuation consumers. Consumers with higher valuations, and consequently higher choice probabilities, are given more weight in the market valuation under personalized pricing. Since individual consumers play a more central role in the market valuation under personalized pricing, estimation of consumer-level valuations is of increased importance. Under common pricing, the market valuation for an attribute improvement is robust to extreme estimates of the consumer-level valuations. Through our theoretical and empirical analyses, we demonstrate that this robustness does not hold under personalized pricing.     

Increasing Price Transparency: Implications of Consumer Price Posting for Consumers' Haggling Behavior and a Seller's Pricing Strategies

In an attempt to gain a better position in haggling, consumers often seek a seller's pricing information (e.g., whether the posted price is negotiable, the discount and transaction prices) before going to that seller. Although traditionally difficult to obtain, such information is becoming increasingly available due to consumer price posting (CPP), whereby consumers post and share their purchase price information on the Internet. In this analytical study, we consider a market in which a seller, who chooses between a fixed price policy and a haggling policy, serves two types of consumers who differ in their willingness to pay and haggling costs. We explore how CPP can affect consumers' behavior and the seller's pricing strategies (i.e., pricing policy and the associated prices). In the absence of CPP, our model features a two-sided uncertainty: the seller does not know individual consumer's type and thus may find it optimal to use a haggling policy to price discriminate consumers, whereas consumers do not readily observe the seller's cost type and pricing policy, and thus are uncertain whether their haggling will be fruitful. In the presence of CPP, consumers' uncertainty about the seller's pricing policy is resolved. Because CPP can improve price transparency, inhibit consumers' acceptance of a posted price and spur price haggling, it seems apparent that it should benefit consumers and hurt the seller. However, our analysis shows that CPP can lead to fewer purchases, higher prices and even a greater seller profit. It further shows that although CPP surely increases information accessibility, it can also reduce the amount of information available to consumers. These results are in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom in the literature.     

Price Knowledge During Grocery Shopping: What We Learn and What We Forget

Past research on consumer price knowledge has varied considerably partly due to differences in how and when price knowledge is measured. This paper applies a multi-point, multi-measure approach to reconcile differences in past price knowledge research by examining systematic relationships between time of measurement and type of measures applied. Examination of consumer price knowledge before, during, and after store visit sheds light on what is measured at the individual points in time: episodic price knowledge and/or reference prices? With a between-subjects design interviewing 1,204 respondents, the authors investigate three price knowledge measures (price recall, price recognition, and deal spotting) demonstrating that these are hierarchically related. Results suggest that reference prices dominate before store visit, but also that episodic price knowledge, surprisingly, is still accessible at the store exit. These findings enable the authors to reconcile diverging results from past research, showing how consumer price knowledge evolves and suggesting that the vast majority of consumers learn about prices, whether consciously or unconsciously, during grocery shopping. Thus, when applying a multi-point, multi-measure approach, consumers appear to know more about prices than suggested by past research. Determinants of price knowledge are also examined and the results indicate that price knowledge builds up not only because of active search but also due to accidental exposure to prices and with low degrees of conscious processing. Implications for managers are discussed.     

Competition and price discrimination in the market for mailing lists

This paper examines whether mailing list sellers, when faced with additional competitors, are more likely to try to segment consumers by offering additional choices at different prices (second-degree price discrimination) and/or offering different prices to readily identifiable groups of consumers (third-degree price discrimination). We utilize a dataset that includes information about all consumer response lists derived from mail order buyers (i.e. lists derived from catalogs) available for rental in 1997 and 2002. Our results indicate that increased competition leads to an increased propensity to price discriminate along each of the dimensions we investigate. These results hold for both second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. Further, list owners offer menus with more choices in more competitive markets. These results, taken together with results from other empirical studies, suggest that the connection between competition and increased price discrimination is a result that applies broadly.

Do Consumers Care about how Prices are Set?

Using a survey approach, we ask consumers to reveal their preferences over pricing schemes that may differ in terms of the average price of consumption, the amount of price variation, and the probability of being rationed. We find that consumers dislike pricing schemes that vary prices more but that they are willing to trade off price variation and rationing. Surprisingly, they are not willing to trade off an increase in price variation for a decrease in expected prices. We discuss the implications of these findings for firm pricing policies.