Aging and Productivity Among Judges: Some Empirical Evidence from the High Court of Australia

A number of studies have shown that productivity declines with age in a wide range of activities. Based on United States experience, it has been argued that one profession that might be an exception to this phenomenon is the judiciary. This study explores the relationship between aging and productivity for a sample of retired judges of the High Court of Australia. The High Court provides a useful test for the hypothesis that older judges are more productive because, in contrast to the United States, most, if not all, judges write their own judgments. Thus, ghostwriting does not cloud the issue of judicial productivity. The findings support the life-cycle hypothesis, which suggests the age-citation profile should increase, reach a peak and then decline as judges get closer to retirement. Thus, the results are consistent with the view that the productivity of judges over their working lives follows a similar pattern to other professions such as academia.     

法官异地交流与司法效率-来自高院院长的经验证据

在理论上,法官异地交流是把"双刃剑",它对司法效率的提高同时具有促增和抑制两种效应,因而,定量识别法官异地交流对司法效率的净影响就具有重要意义。本文以2008年中国各省高级人民法院院长异地交流轮岗活动为样本,采用双重差分法系统评估了法官异地交流对司法效率的净影响。研究发现,中国的法官异地交流显著地提高了以结案率来度量的司法效率,由异地交流来的法官任院长的地区,当地的结案率在平均意义上要比其他地区的结案率高出2个百分点左右;但是,法官异地交流对司法效率的正向影响存在1年左右的政策时滞。除此之外,法官的籍贯、学历、年龄、任期等个人特征也显著地影响了当地的司法效率。     

Economic growth and judicial independence,a dozen years on: Cross-country evidence using an updated Set of indicators

Over 10 years ago, Feld and Voigt (2003) introduced an indicator for objectively measuring the actual independence of the judiciary and demonstrated its utility in a large cross-section of countries. The indicator has been widely used, but also criticized. Many new indicators for judicial independence have been developed since. Yet, all of them are based on subjective evaluations by experts or confined to measuring the legally prescribed level of independence. This paper presents more recent objective data on de jure and de facto judicial independence (JI) and strongly confirms previous results that de jure JI is not systematically related to economic growth, whereas de facto JI is highly significantly and robustly correlated with growth. In addition, we show that the effect of de facto JI depends on the institutional environment, but not on a country’s initial per capita income.     

审判独立与市场繁荣——以高院院长异地交流为实验的研究

司法部门享有独立的审判权不仅有助于约束和监督政府行为,避免政府对市场的过度管制和干预,而且有助于约束市场主体在事后的机会主义行为,进而有益于市场经济的成长和繁荣.本文以2008年中国各省高院院长异地交流作为刻画地方法院审判独立性提升的一次自然实验,倍差法估计发现高院院长异地交流显著促进了经济的市场化进程,一系列安慰剂及...     

The effects of lay participation in courts — A cross-country analysis

Legal philosophers like Montesquieu, Hegel and Tocqueville have argued that lay participation in judicial decision-making would have benefits reaching far beyond the realm of the legal system narrowly understood. From an economic point of view, lay participation in judicial decision-making can be interpreted as a renunciation of an additional division of labor, which is expected to cause foregone benefits in terms of the costs as well as the quality of judicial decision-making. In order to be justified, these foregone benefits need to be overcompensated by other – actually realized – benefits of at least the same magnitude. This paper discusses pros and cons of lay participation, presents a new database and tests some of the theoretically derived hypotheses empirically. The effects of lay participation on the judicial system, a number of governance variables but also on economic performance indicators are rather modest. A proxy representing historic experiences with any kind of lay participation is the single most robust variable.     

Quality of judicial institutions,crimes, misdemeanors,and dishonesty

We investigate the extent to which quality of judicial institutions has an impact on individuals’ propensity for criminal and dishonest behavior and on their views regarding the acceptability of dishonesty and law-breaking. We use micro data on residents of 25 European countries and employ alternative measures of judicial quality as perceived by the residents of these countries. As an instrument for judicial quality we employ the procedures with which prosecutors and judges are appointed to their posts in each country. As alternative instruments, we employ an index of de jure institutional quality as well as its components, which provide similar results. The findings show that an increase in the perception of the quality of judicial institutions, such as an improvement in judicial independence or the impartiality of the courts, has a deterrent effect on dishonest and criminal acts. A higher perceived quality of the judicial system also makes individuals less likely to find acceptable a variety of dishonest and illicit behaviors, suggesting that institutions help shape the beliefs of the society. We obtain the same results when we analyze the sample of immigrants, whose cultural attributes should be (more) related to their countries of origin, rather than their countries of residence, and thus should be arguably uncorrelated with the factors that can impact the instrument. We show that people’s beliefs in the importance of the family, in the fairness of others, and the importance of being rich are not impacted by judicial quality, suggesting that judicial quality is not a blanket representation of underlying cultural norms and beliefs in the society.     

Resurrecting Lochner: A Defense of Unprincipled Judicial Activism

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), stands as one of theSupreme Court's most reviled decisions. We challenge the criticalconsensus against Lochner and provide a defense, albeit a contingentdefense, of "unprincipled" judicial activism. To do so, we developa game-theoretic model of judicial–legislative interaction.We use the model to compare outcomes generated in a system oflegislative supremacy to outcomes generated in a system in whichjudicial review is provided by a legally unprincipled, activistjudiciary. We show that judicial review, even when providedby an activist, politicized judiciary, can promote importantconstitutional values and improve legislative quality relativeto a deferential judiciary. In doing so, we identify an important"passive" component to the effect that judicial review has onlegislatures and on legislation. Finally, we demonstrate thatthe addition of other institutions and constraints on judicialbehavior amplify the beneficial effects that judicial reviewprovides to the legislative process.     

An empirical analysis of constitutional review voting in the polish constitutional tribunal, 2003–2014

Different theories have been developed, mainly in the context of the United States, to explain judicial decision-making. In this respect, there is an important ongoing debate over whether judges are guided by the law or by personal ideology. The analysis of the decision-making in the Polish Constitutional Tribunal seems to support the existence of some party alignment. It is to say that judicial behavior is influenced by the ideology, either because judges’ preferences coincide with the interests of a specific party or because the judges are incentivized to show their loyalty to a party. Party alignment exists but subject to institutional influences. These results are in line with previous findings for other constitutional courts in Europe.     

POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS ON CORRUPTION: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS

This paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself.     

THE ROLE OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

Recently enacted sentencing guidelines were designed to reduce disparity and to increase the average sanction for white-collar offenders. Whether these outcomes will be achieved, however, depends on how closely judges adhere to the new guidelines. We cannot yet determine how the guidelines will be implemented but can learn much about judicial behavior by studying past sentencing practice.
This paper examines sentences imposed on criminal antitrust offenders from 1955 to 1980. Judges are appointed for life and ostensibly are "independent" of the political process. The data suggest, however, that judges do not operate in apolitical vacuum. When Congress increased the status of antitrust violations from misdemeanor to felony in 1974, judges responded by doling out higher penalties–even for offenders not subject to new higher statutory maximums. In addition, the paper shows that Republican judges tend to impose harsher antitrust penalties than do Democratic judges, and that sentencing behavior apparently is influenced by a judge's prospect of promotion to a higher court position. These findings have important policy implications both for the judicial selection process and for ensuring that the judicial branch follows congressional wishes.     

司法者激励对司法公正影响的模型分析

司法公正与法官激励是当前司法领域中所面临的最为紧迫而关键的问题.本研究运用博弈论来模拟现实的审判过程.通过分析基于个人效用最大化的法官最优选择的基础上来研究法官的法律遵从度、工作勤勉程度、工资收入、外部干预(如贿赂)、司法权的有效配置等重要因素对法官裁判的影响,进而解决社会所获得的公正执法水平.对于不同法律遵从度的法官而言,贿赂、工资等因素的影响是不同的.提高法官法律遵从度并调整法官与社会之间的效用关系,从制度上实现司法权的有效配置,对于实现司法公正至关重要.这为解决当前司法领域所存在的问题提供了理论依据和方法.     

It's easier to contract than to pay: Judicial independence and US municipal default in the 19th century

It is well established in the literature that an independent judiciary can act as a signal of credibility by a sovereign state and as a guarantor of creditor rights. However, to date there has been little systematic work analyzing how an independent judiciary reacts to fiscal stress and public-sector default. This article addresses that very question by evaluating how and if judicial independence affects default rates using US municipal data through the nineteenth century. Overall, the results do indicate that greater judicial independence is associated with a significantly lower likelihood of default. This channel largely occurs through the method by which a member of a state's court of last resort is selected (either appointment or popular election) and term length.     

Judicial Branch, Checks and Balances and Political Accountability

This paper attempts to combine the political economics models on separation of powers between the legislature and the executive with public choice theories on the behavior of the judicial branch. We obtain a model of political accountability and checks and balances with up to three government branches: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. We conclude that an independent judiciary improves the political accountability of democratic systems relative to the political economics models with two government branches. An accommodating judiciary, however, changes the distribution of political rents without improving accountability.     

Directing Retribution: On the Political Control of Lower Court Judges

The sentencing decisions of trial judges are constrained bystatutory limits imposed by legislatures. At the same time,judges in many states face periodic review, often by the electorate.We develop a model in which the effects of these features ofa judge's political landscape on judicial behavior interact.The model yields several intriguing results: First, if legislatorscare about the proportionality of punishment, judicial discretionincreases with their punitiveness. Second, voters are limitedby two factors in their ability to make inferences about judicialpreferences based on observed sentences: the extent to whichjudges are willing to pander to retain office and the rangeof judicial discretion mandated by the legislature. Finally,legislators can sometimes manipulate judicial discretion toaid sufficiently like-minded voters in their efforts to replaceideologically dissimilar judges.     

Judicial review and the power of the executive and legislative branches

The legal system can affect what policies a government can implement. In particular, when there is separation of powers, the strength of the judiciary to review and overturn actions of the executive and legislative branches can affect such things as how much redistribution these policy-making branches can do. Surprisingly, having judicial review helps the policy-making branches—the stronger is the judiciary, the more redistribution they are able to do. This occurs because the policy-making branches must make promises on and off the equilibrium path to individuals in order to make redistribution possible. However, in many circumstances, the government wants to renege on these promises, either to do more redistribution than promised or to not carry out severe threats against any individuals who lied. Judicial review can prevent reneging on these promises, thus making them credible.We develop this in the context of an optimal income tax model with a finite number of individuals where the government knows the exact distribution of types but not which individual is of which type. In this finite model, the government can detect misrevelation by even a single individual so that an individual׳s taxes can depend not just on one׳s own actions but also on others’ actions. Piketty (JET, 1993) showed that the government could implement any full-information Pareto optimal allocation if the government could commit to its announcements, even to infeasible allocations in circumstances after some individuals misreveal. We derive the sequential equilibrium allocations when individuals reveal their types by simple announcements when feasibility on and off the equilibrium path is imposed. Increasing the degree of judicial review expands the set of achievable allocations on the full-information utility possibility frontier. We also relate the different possible legal rules to different solution concepts in game theory.     

电子废弃物回收处理系统环境绩效评估方法及应用

基于生命周期工具,从物质代谢效率和生态环境效益两方面建立了电子废弃物回收处理系统的环境绩效评估指标与方法,并以废弃手机为研究对象,分析现阶段我国回收处理系统的环境绩效水平及其改进潜力。结果显示,废弃手机回收处理系统在物质代谢效率指标方面表现出较好的绩效水平,但在生态环境效益方面尚存进一步优化的空间。通过情景设置开展优化分析结果表明:生产者主导回收情景在各项环境绩效指标上均略有改进;区域产业链配套情景下运输距离的减少仅对人体健康改善指标起到优化效果;鼓励部件再使用情景和先进资源化技术情景可显著提升废弃手机回收处理系统的环境绩效,前者优化效果主要表现在生态环境效益指标上,后者优化效果更均衡。     

Law, legislation, and local minima: Solving a problem in Hayek��s theory of common law judging, with historical examples

Friedrich Hayek??s Law, Legislation, and Liberty noted a problem in the common law system: Sometimes, following judicial precedent would lead to unforeseen bad outcomes over time. No judge can anticipate all possible implications of a precedent-setting decision, and sometimes later judges, bound by precedent, will be forced despite themselves to elaborate the law in ever more inefficient or unjust ways. Hayek proposed that one role of the legislator was to correct such ??dead ends?? in the common law. This paper proposes that judges working within the constraints of the common law and given only the tools Hayek himself allowed them are capable of escaping such binds on their own. It uses historical examples from the era of coverture to support this claim. Not only were judges willing to identify exceptions to coverture, these exceptions helped pave the way for coverture??s eventual abolition. This process is examined and found to be otherwise consonant with Hayek??s larger theory of the common law as a rule-finding process.     

专利权保护如何精准激励创新——以美国专利法中政策杠杆理论为切入点

专利权保护的发明创造所涉及行业日益复杂，精准激励不同行业的创新显得至关重要。美国学者主张法院应当灵活适用司法政策杠杆调节不同行业的激励机制，以避免激励不足或者激励过度。以政策杠杆理论为分析工具，研究发现：我国专利法中存在类似于美国的司法政策杠杆，还存在明确规定了特定于某些行业而适用的法定政策杠杆。司法政策杠杆的适用具有不确定性，可通过合理的法定化路径实现适用的确定性与可预见性，从而使我国专利法中的政策杠杆发挥精准激励不同行业创新的功能。     

A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ENLARGING THE JAPANESE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

This article presents a cost-benefit analysis of enlarging the Japanese judicial system, especially the civil section of District Courts (CSDC). Constructing a simple econometric model of CSDC, the effects of increase of judges on the supply of judicial services and the trial time are analyzed. Then a cost and benefit calculation is done. The basic assumption is that the total benefit of the judicial system is the aggregate of monetary value of a suit (MVS). The main conclusions are: (1) The demand elasticity for a civil trial with respect to trial time is – 1.3 to about – 1.4 , and its income elasticity is 0.95. (2) The supply of civil trials is proportional to the number of judges. (3) Ten-percent increase of judges will shorten the average trial time by 5.2%. (4) The net benefit of CSDC is estimated to be ¥466 billion per year if the annual discount rate is 10%. (5) Judging from the demand and supply relation, if CSDC is doubled, the net increase of total benefit per year will be ¥543 billion. (6) If the benefit of the external effect on lawyers' market is added, the total net benefit will reach almost ¥1 trillion, which is 0.22% of gross domestic product.