Does the expectation or realization of a federal election precipitate Canadian output growth?

Abstract This paper asks whether Canadian data is consistent with the predicted effects of political opportunism, partisanship, and political competition on real output growth since Confederation. Using annual data from 1870 to 2005 we find new support for an opportunistic electoral cycle in Canadian data but only if the actual election date used in most studies is replaced by an estimate of the incumbent governing party's subjectively held likelihood of an election arising. In our case the estimate is generated from a Cox‐proportional hazard model. The paper explores in detail the issues raised by using a generated regressor to approximate a subjectively held expectation versus an observable proxy and argues that these conditions are met in our case. Finally we also find evidence consistent with partisan cycles in the data but much less evidence consistent with the hypothesis that changes in the degree of political competition have affected real output growth.     

The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in Israel: 1989–1998

We discuss the circumstances under which voters in local elections will reward fiscal responsibility and suggest that such circumstances evolved in Israel in the mid-1990s. We present empirical evidence that, indeed, fiscal performance of mayors substantially affected their reelection probability in the 1998 campaign but not in the 1989 and 1993 campaigns. Changes in the political environment, enforcement of audit and financial reporting requirements, tougher imposition of hard budget constraints and the development of local media are proposed as explanations. The hypotheses that the fiscal variables reflect the income level at the locality, or the mayor’s success in extracting resources from the central government are tested and rejected.     

Uncertainty and the United States’ election effect on the economy: some thoughts and empirical illustrations

This study discusses the general impact of Donald Trump’s election on the US and European economies as well as the effect of this political news on financial markets. To this end, we discuss different hypotheses from a theoretical view and empirically illustrate these thoughts when possible. Our analysis suggests that while the expected Trump measures might boost the US economy in the short term, these actions would have negative long-term consequences in the United States. Further, this new US policy will affect European economies and destabilize financial markets while increasing uncertainty, which could constrain growth and increase the downside risk.     

Independent electoral management bodies and international election observer missions: any impact on the observed level of democracy? A conceptual framework

What kind of institutions are needed to stabilize and foster democracy? Clearly elections are crucial and much of the institutional and legal surrounding of elections has been subject to research. Two institutional variables have been neglected though, specifically in empirical research: Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) and International Observer Missions (EOMs). Can EMBs and EOMs foster free and fair elections? If yes, under what conditions? And what kind of competences are needed for them? We hypothesize that both can become crucial institutions for free and fair elections. Whereas independent central banks or audit courts control special issue areas in order to take certain decision out of the realm of politics, EMBs control the moment of the set-up of government—the election, when conflicts of interest of politicians are at its peak. Although other kinds of independent administrative agencies have been the subject of political science and economic research, EMBs and EOMs have also been neglected here. This article undertakes to outline a conceptual framework for testing various hypotheses on the institutional set-up of EMBs. Hypothesizing that de iure and de facto independence of EMBs foster fair elections, the detailed institutional set-up of EMBs as independent variable is outlined in order to test for the level of democracy as a dependent variable. Furthermore, the importance of EOMs as well as their interaction effect with EMBs is analyzed. Although by now EOMs are sent to almost any country with elections, their impact has not been analyzed in an encompassing way in spite of that the mission have intensified in their work, have become more costly and their verdicts are gaining ever more publicity.