MIMICKING THE WINNER LEADS TO WAR: AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT AND COOPERATION*

This note applies an evolutionary analysis to Skaperdas's (1992) static model of conflict and cooperation, in which agents are faced with trade‐offs between joint production and share competition. We adopt the stochastic evolution approach, and assume that each agent occasionally mimics the action of the winner of the stage. In contrast to Skaperdas's results that justify full or partial cooperation in productive activity, the long‐run equilibrium must exhibit total conflict; nobody engages in production at all.     

Estimating efficiency spillovers with state level evidence for manufacturing in the US

Unit specific effects are often used to estimate non-spatial efficiency. We extend such estimators to the case where there is spatial autoregressive dependence and introduce the concept of spillover efficiency. Intuitively, we present an approach to benchmark how successful units are at exporting and importing productive performance to and from other units.     

Employment changes, the structure of adjustment costs, and plant size

In this paper, we analyze the pattern of employment adjustment using a rich panel of Norwegian plants. The data suggest that the frequency of episodes of zero net employment changes is inversely related to plant size. We develop and estimate a simple “q” model of labor demand, allowing for the presence of fixed, linear and quadratic components of adjustment costs. The econometric evidence supports the existence of purely fixed components, unrelated to plant size. As a result, the range of inaction is wider for smaller plants. The quadratic component of costs is also always important. In most specifications fixed costs are higher for employment contractions. The quadratic component is higher during employment contractions compared to expansions for small plants, while this is not true for larger plants.     

Continuing Vocational Training Forms and Establishment Productivity in Germany

Abstract. This paper provides evidence of the productivity effects of different continuing vocational training forms in Germany. Using the waves 1997–2001 of the IAB establishment panel, it is found that formal external courses have the largest positive impact on productivity. Formal internal courses and quality circles have a smaller positive impact. Self‐induced learning, participation at seminars and talks and job rotation do not enhance productivity while training on the job has a negative productivity impact. Establishments with an inefficient production structure decide to offer training in order to boost productivity. This paper also shows that taking into account selectivity of the training decision, unobserved time‐invariant heterogeneity, human resource practices, as well as establishment and employee characteristics has an important impact on the measurement results.     

Reference technology sets,Free Disposal Hulls and productivity decompositions

Diewert and Fox (2013) proposed decompositions of a Malmquist-type productivity index into explanatory factors, with a focus on extracting technical progress, technical efficiency change and returns to scale components. A major problem with their decompositions is that it may be difficult to determine the appropriate reference technologies. Using relatively unrestrictive regularity conditions, the paper develops a data envelopment type approach for decomposing productivity growth for a panel of production units into explanatory factors based on the Free Disposal Hull methods pioneered by Tulkens and his co-authors.     

Modelling cost complementarities in terms of joint production

Cost complementarities arise from synergies in the production of heterogeneous goods. It is shown that synergies can be accounted for in terms of shared public inputs (roughly) if and only if synergies decrease as the scope of production increases. This case of “substitutive” synergies is argued to be typical. The key technical tool is a novel interpretation of conjugate Moebius inversion in terms of higher-order differences.     

Heterogeneous technology and panel data: The case of the agricultural production function

Economic growth involves reallocating resources from traditional to new techniques of production, creating new relationships between particular resources and productivity. The paper analyzes the implications of this process on the estimation of agricultural production functions using a panel of countries. The data includes a measure of capital in agriculture absent from most studies. We employ a heterogeneous technology framework where implemented technology is chosen jointly with inputs to interpret information obtained in the empirical analysis of panel data. In this framework, estimates depend upon the economic environment, which is represented by state variables. It turns out that the old problem of identifying the production function cannot be resolved through the use of instrumental variables, but can be resolved using the allocation error. The paper discusses the scope for replacing country and time effects by observed state variables. The empirical results differ from those reported in the literature for cross-country studies, largely in augmenting the elasticities of capital and land and reducing those of fertilizer and labor. The evaluation of the marginal value productivity accounts for the flow of capital and fertilizer to agriculture and the flow of labor to other sectors, thereby contributing to overall economic growth.     

Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome and a disagreement outcome: the disagreement outcome may serve as a reference point for the compromise outcome, but other interpretations are given as well. For this framework we propose and study an extension of the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We identify the (large) domain on which this solution is single-valued, and present two axiomatic characterizations on subsets of this domain.     

Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims

We consider the problem of allocating some amount of an infinitely divisible and homogeneous resource among agents having claims on this resource that cannot be jointly honored. A “rule” associates with each such problem a feasible division. Our goal is to uncover the structure of the space of rules. For that purpose, we study “operators” on the space, that is, mappings that associate to each rule another one. Duality, claims truncation, and attribution of minimal rights are the operators we consider. We first establish a number of results linking them. Then, we determine which properties of rules are preserved under each of these operators, and which are not.     

Contest success functions

Summary Tournaments, conflict, and rent-seeking have been modelled as contests in which participants exert effort to increase their probability of winning a prize. A Contest Success Function (CSF) provides each player's probability of winning as a function of all players' efforts. In this paper the additive CSF employed in most contests is axiomatized, with an independence from irrelevant alternatives property as the key axiom. Two frequently used functional forms are also axiomatized: one in which winning probabilities depend on the ratio of players' efforts and the other in which winning probabilities depend on the difference in efforts.I am grateful to three anonymous referees, Jack Hirshleifer, Guillermo Owen, and especially Duncan Luce for their helpful comments, and to the UC Irvine Academic Senate and the NSF for financial support.     

The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game

This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking activities in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking game between two groups of different size. We first investigate Nash reversion strategies to support cooperative behavior in both groups, before analyzing double-edge trigger strategies which support cooperation in one group only. These last strategies have the property that cheating on the agreement in the cooperative group is followed by non-cooperation in this group and cooperation in the rival group. The main conclusion is that the set of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained within the larger group as a subgame perfect outcome is as large as that for which cooperation can be sustained in the smaller group. Hence, in contrast to Olson?s (1965) celebrated thesis, but in accordance with many informal and formal observations, larger groups can be as effective as smaller groups in furthering their interests.     

Dynamics of regional unemployment rates in Brazil: Fractional behavior,structural breaks,and Markov switching

This paper investigates unemployment dynamics in Brazil and in its major metropolitan regions using a fractional integration model. Aspects regarding structural breaks and regime switches are discussed as well. To do that, the methods proposed by Hassler and Meller (2009) and Tsay and Härdle (2009) are used. The major results indicate that unemployment rates have two different levels of persistence. The first one is nonstationary whereas the second one is nonstationary but mean-reverting. Based on these findings, the convergence hypothesis of regional unemployment rates was tested. Following the fractional stochastic convergence criterion put forward by Mello and Guimaraes-Filho (2007), it was concluded that regional unemployment rates are convergent.     

Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.     

PANEL DATA ANALYSIS OF JAPANESE RESIDENTIAL WATER DEMAND USING A DISCRETE/CONTINUOUS CHOICE APPROACH*

Block rate pricing is often applied to income taxation, telecommunication services, and brand marketing, in addition to its best‐known application in public utility services. Under block rate pricing, consumers face piecewise‐linear budget constraints. A discrete/continuous choice approach is usually used to account for piecewise‐linear budget constraints in demand and price endogeneity. A recent study proposed a method to incorporate a separability condition ignored by previous studies, by implementing a Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation based on a hierarchical Bayesian approach. To extend this approach to panel data, our study proposes Bayesian hierarchical models incorporating random and fixed individual effects.     

Overseas business costs and firm export performance

Abstract.  The recent microeconomic literature on international trade has highlighted the importance of firm characteristics and trade costs for exports. This study provides evidence on one type of those costs, the costs of doing business overseas, from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Controlling for firm- and industry-level covariates, we find that improvements in the business environment of foreign countries lead to an increase in the export intensity of exporters in the UK manufacturing sector and additional export market entry. Further investigation suggests that important determinants of foreign business costs include factors relating to legal structure, property rights, and business regulation.     

Offshoring along the production chain

Abstract In this paper, we analyze the offshoring decision of firms whose production process is characterized by a particular sequence of steps. International cost differences vary non‐monotonically along the production chain, and moving unfinished goods across borders incurs transport costs. We show that, in such a setting, firms may refrain from offshoring even if relocating individual steps would be advantageous in terms of offshoring costs, or they may offshore (almost) the entire production chain to save transport costs. Small variations in model parameters may thus have a substantial impact on offshoring activities.     

Optimal environmental taxes and standards: Implications of the materials balance

This paper investigates the implications of the materials balance for optimal environmental policy. We find that neglecting the materials-emissions relationship - as is common in models of optimal environmental regulation - implies biases, whose sign depends on the regulatory instrument chosen. When emissions are regulated through an emission tax, the seemingly optimal tax is too high. When regulation proceeds through the use of an emission standard, the seemingly optimal standard is too lax.     

Technology and outsourcing: An explanation to the rising wage gap

The recent phenomenon of widening skilled–unskilled wage gap in both North and South has been either explained by a technological change or by increasing trade or globalization. The paper provides a new explanation and emphasizes that it is neither technology nor trade alone but both that have contributed to the widening wage inequality. It argues, using a two-country occupational choice model, that any technological improvement in North results in a rise in the skilled–unskilled wage gap in North via an increase in the productivity of skilled labor followed by a rise in the same in South via trade or the outsourcing activities of the northern firms. The extent of outsourcing or the number of northern firms that outsource jobs to South is endogenously determined in the model. The paper also analyzes some major economic impacts of such a technological upgradation in North on the southern economy.     

Termination restrictions and investment in general training

Conditional separation payments efficiently increase firms’ investment in general training if the latter is not directly contractible. Since training is vested in the worker on separation, a firm's return to training is zero when a match ends or, more generally, when the firm's outside return is binding. Large enough conditional separation penalties ensure that, independently from outside opportunities, the ex post situation is one of bilateral monopoly. This allows the firm to capture a positive share of the return to the general component of training in all states of nature. A fixed wage contract and large enough separation penalties ensure that the firm's investment decision is fully efficient if training is general in Becker's (1964) sense.     

On Okun’s law in OECD countries: An analysis by age cohorts

This study investigates Okun’s law in OECD countries by examining estimates for male and female age cohorts for the period 1998–2012. We find that the estimated Okun coefficients are not always statistically significant for each subgroup of the population. Our results also highlight a general common pattern of higher Okun coefficients for the youngest cohorts. This suggests that the young population, and particularly the young male population, tends to be most exposed to the business cycle in both developed and emerging OECD countries.