The effect of crises on firm exit and the moderating effect of firm size

The liability of smallness assumption suggests that smaller firms face higher exit risks. However, does it apply during crises? We show that during downturns size reduces firms’ exit risk by less; the hazard rate increases more rapidly in size.     

Blackwell's ordering and public information

We characterize a precise comparative static on welfare and the amount of public information in an economy under uncertainty. Results dating to Hirshleifer (Amer. Econom. Rev. 61 (1971) 561) have suggested that information can have negative value in such a setting, but counterexamples using competitive equilibrium outcomes have suppressed general results to this effect. We show that under the solution concept of implementable allocations, the negative relationship between more public information in the sense of Blackwell and welfare is fully general. Furthermore, Blackwell's ranking is necessary as well as sufficient to obtain our ranking, and hence ours provides an equivalent characterization of his ordering.     

The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information

We consider the efficiency properties of exchange economies where privately informed traders behave strategically. Specifically, a competitive mechanism is any mapping of traders’ reports about their types to an equilibrium price vector and allocation of the reported economy. In our model, some traders may have non-vanishing impact on prices and allocations regardless of the size of the economy. Although truthful reporting by all traders cannot be achieved, we show that, given any desired level of approximation, there is such that any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of any competitive mechanism of any private information economy with or more traders leads, with high probability, to prices and allocations that are close to a competitive equilibrium of the true economy. In particular, allocations are approximately efficient. A key assumption is that there is small probability that traders behave non-strategically.     

How equilibrium prices reveal information in a time series model with disparately informed, competitive traders

Accommodating asymmetric information in a dynamic asset pricing model is technically challenging due to the problems associated with higher-order expectations. That is, rational investors are forced into a situation where they must forecast the forecasts of other agents. In a dynamic setting, this problem telescopes into the infinite future and the dimension of the relevant state space approaches infinity. By using the frequency domain approach of Whiteman [Linear Rational Expectations Models: A User's Guide, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1983] and Kasa [Forecasting the forecasts of others in the frequency domain, Rev. Econ. Dynam. 3 (2000) 726-756], this paper demonstrates how information structures previously believed to preserve asymmetric information in equilibrium, converge to a symmetric information, rational expectations equilibrium. The revealing aspect of the price process lies in the invertibility of the observed state space, which makes it possible for agents to infer the economically fundamental shocks and thus eliminating the need to forecast the forecasts of others.     

The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences—and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence.     

Are inefficient entrepreneurs driven out of the market?

This paper challenges the widespread belief that competitive markets favor entrepreneurs who operate efficient technologies. In the context of a dynamically incomplete markets model, I show that, ceteris paribus, entrepreneurs operating efficient technologies can be driven out of a competitive market by entrepreneurs operating inefficient technologies.     

On the nonexistence of universal information structures

This paper extends the nonexistence result of Heifetz and Samet (Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 260-273). They have shown that there exists no universal knowledge space to which every knowledge space can be mapped in a knowledge-preserving manner. We show that an analogous nonexistence result holds in the more general context of information structures. These structures can be viewed as generalizations of knowledge spaces that describe non-probabilistic beliefs.     

Global factor trade with differentiated factor prices and factor intensities

Abstract .  Relaxing the assumption of internationally identical factor intensity techniques in the HOV model creates two challenges. First, computing actual factor intensity techniques of different countries requires detailed input-output tables and factor usage data, which are not always available. Second, determinants of the factor intensity technique differences across countries need to be identified. This paper explores the role of relative factor price differences in the determination of factor intensity technique differences across countries and proposes an inferring method that infers factor intensity techniques of different countries based on relative factor price differences. The HOV model is then modified accordingly.     

The dynamics of risk-sensitive allocations

This paper describes Pareto optimal allocations when agents have risk-sensitive preferences as formulated by Hansen and Sargent (IEEE Trans. Automat. Control 40(5) (1995) 968-971). Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the existence and stability of steady states at which Pareto weights are time-invariant. When all agents are risk-sensitive with the same power reward function there is a unique interior steady state which is stable when the power is positive and unstable when the power is negative. When there is at least one agent with time-additive preferences eventually all risk-sensitive agents have zero Pareto weights.     

Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents

For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if agents' payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs. The contrary result of Neeman [Z. Neeman, The relevance of private information in mechanism design, J. Econ. Theory 117 (2004) 55-77] rests on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them.     

Renewable resource regulation and uncertain prices: The role of financial structure and bankruptcy

We analyze the interaction between regulatory policies and the financial structure of a fishery and show that firms with debts may respond differently to regulations than firms that have not accumulated debts. There are conditions where more stringent regulation is counterproductive, providing a perverse incentive to increase harvesting effort. We show that optimal regulation depends on the sector's financial structure, and demonstrate that there are cases when intervention is counterproductive, or too costly to implement. There are also cases where successful regulatory intervention can only be implemented when accompanied by a sufficiently large subsidy.     

The existence, uniqueness, and optimality of the terminal wealth depletion time in life-cycle models of saving under uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint

In life-cycle models of saving under uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint, the consumer's wealth must be depleted before the maximum lifetime. This paper investigates the existence, uniqueness, and optimality of the terminal wealth depletion time. It is proved that the optimal terminal wealth depletion time, if such exists, must be unique. If the equation that determines the optimal terminal wealth depletion has multiple solutions, then the location of the optimal solution will depend on the configuration of the solutions. An optimality test is developed to verify whether a candidate solution for the terminal wealth depletion time is indeed optimal. The paper introduces a method new to economics, the Dubovitskii-Milyutin adjoint equation, to analyze the properties of the optimal control problem.     

Understanding the size and profitability of firms: The role of a biological factor

In a large sample of entrepreneurs, 2D:4D (second-to-fourth digit) ratio and managerial performance are studied. Entrepreneurs with lower ratio manage larger firms, manage larger firms when acquire control and experience faster average growth. Firms run by high prenatal testosterone entrepreneurs have lower profitability as measured by return on assets and return on sales. Prenatal testosterone is correlated with elicited measures of entrepreneurial skills, like work effort and optimism and the latter are correlated with firm size. This evidence suggests entrepreneurial ability has a biological component and is consistent with models of the size distribution of firms based on entrepreneurial ability.     

The wisdom of the minority

We consider a simple variant of the canonical model of social learning and show that in many situations it is optimal for an agent to abandon her own information and follow the minority rather than the majority. This possibility depends on two economically meaningful requirements: agents are differentially informed and observe only the number of agents having chosen each option, such as consumers observing only market shares. We show that minority wisdom arises when information is sufficiently heterogeneous and the well informed are not overly abundant, yet the conditions necessary are not overly restrictive. In fact, it is possible for the minority to be wise even when the minority consists of a lone dissenter and a majority of citizens are well informed.     

Regret theory and the competitive firm

This paper examines the production decision of the competitive firm under uncertainty when the firm is not only risk averse but also regret averse. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a modified utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. The extent of regret depends on the difference between the actual profit and the maximum profit attained by making the optimal production decision had the firm observed the true realization of the random output price. If the firm is not too regret averse, we show that the conventional result that the optimal output level under uncertainty is less than that under certainty holds. Using a simple binary model wherein the random output price can take on either a low value or a high value with positive probability, we show the possibility that the firm may optimally produce more, not less, under uncertainty than under certainty, particularly when the firm is sufficiently regret averse and the low output price is very likely to prevail.     

Errors in self-reported earnings: The role of previous earnings volatility and individual characteristics

I report the measurement error in self-reported earnings for a developing country using a novel data set. The data set consists of two cross-sections of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) wage and salary sectors; additionally, a subset of the two cross-sections may be linked to create a panel. Administrative data from FSM Social Security office are matched to the FSM Census data for the wage and salary sectors. I find that the error in annual self-reported earnings is centered on zero. Additionally, I find strong evidence for mean reversion in the data suggesting non-classical measurement error. I identify the impact of prior years' earnings variability on the current reporting of earnings using administrative data on earnings histories. Prior earnings volatility strongly affects measurement error in current period. However, the effect of prior shocks diminish significantly over time—suggesting that first-differencing and fixed-effects techniques will not improve accuracy.     

Theory of the firm facing uncertain demand revisited

Summary. Empirical evidence shows that the Principle of Increasing Uncertainty (PIU) introduced by Leland is easily violated. Necessary and sufficient conditions, without relying on the PIU assumption, under which risk-averse monopolistic producers reduce their output levels upon the introduction of the Leland-type demand uncertainty are derived.Received: 12 August 2002, Revised: 10 July 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D81, D42.Financial support from the Academic Programme Research Grants (Business Programme) of Lingnan University Ref.# DB01A3 (Res201/Bus003) is gratefully acknowledged. The author would also like to thank the editor and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments that have led to substantial improvement of the paper.     

Investment under uncertainty: The nature of demand shocks and the expected profitability of capital

This paper analyses the disparity regarding the sign of the investment-uncertainty relationship in models of investment under symmetric adjustment costs. That sign is determined by the shape of the profit function, which is related to the nature of demand shocks.