Do Political Factors Cause the Regional Inequality in the Reform‐Era China?

We construct a political variable—the number of ministers of all national government departments born in each province weighted by provincial population—to examine its effect on economic growth in China during 1981–2010. We find that the lagged per capita political variable has a significant, positive effect on economic growth in both ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation. We also find that the lagged per capita political variable has a significant, positive effect on financial deregulation policies distributed across provinces, which offers a possible mechanism for the political variable to impact growth.     

新兴市场经济国家腐败对经济影响研究:基于1995-2008年实证分析

当学术界观点一致强调腐败将为国家经济发展带来巨大不良后果的同时,新兴市场经济国家却以经济快速增长且腐败较为严重的情况展现于世人。本文拟透过实证分析,以人均GDP增长率作为因变量,探讨可能影响经济发展的变量,如实际国内固定资产增长率、就业人口增长率、中学入学率、政治稳定程度、腐败程度等,探究在新兴市场经济国家中,这些因素,特别是腐败对经济增长有何影响。     

Level of economic development and political democracy revisited

This article reassesses a democracy-economic development linkage for the period 1972 to 1990. The results show that economic development has a significant effect on democratic performance in the semiperiphery and periphery, yet in an opposite direction. For the core, there is no linkage from economic development to political performance. Moreover, the finding also suggests that democracy enhances economic development only in the core and semiperiphery. This finding thus contradicts Barro's [1996] contention that more democracy enhances economic growth at low levels of political freedom, but it depresses economic growth when a moderate level of freedom has already been attained.     

Growth volatility and the interaction between economic and political development

Research on the effect of democracy on economic growth has not reached a definitive conclusion. Yet, research on the effect of democracy on economic growth volatility has consistently found that higher levels of democracy reduce volatility. Similarly, research has found that higher levels of economic development retard volatility. Using a novel empirical approach, this article presents evidence of an interactive effect between higher levels of democratization and economic development on growth volatility. Specifically, the marginal effect of political development on volatility is negative until countries reach per capita income levels of about $2,700, depending on the conditioning set. The marginal effect is insignificant for countries with higher levels of income. This implies that at a minimum, nearly 50% of the countries in our sample could enjoy less volatile economies with greater political development.     

Political stability and growth: An application of dynamic GMM and quantile regression

This paper studies the effect of political stability on economic growth by taking 120 developing countries over the period of 1996–2014. We apply relatively advanced dynamic two step system-GMM and quantile regression. Political stability is found to be a key determinant of economic growth. More importantly, political instability (or risk) is found to be higher in the OIC countries and is a deterrent to economic growth. Also, for the lower and middle income OIC countries, political instability appears to affect economic growth more severely perhaps due to the absence of strong economic and political institutions. Moreover, political instability is also found to be significantly higher in the oil-dependent OIC countries. Notably, political instability is likely to affect growth through the channels of investment and human capital accumulation in the developing countries. Finally, the impact of political stability and political instability on growth is found to be equally distributed across the OIC countries with higher or lower growth level. Therefore, the development of political and economic institutions along with human capital development is recommended for all the developing countries in general and the OIC countries in particular.     

Borders and Growth

This paper presents a framework to understand and measure the effects of political borders on economic growth and per capita income levels. In our model, political integration between two countries results in a positive country size effect and a negative effect through reduced openness vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Additional effects stem from possible changes in other growth determinants, besides country size and openness, when countries are merged. We estimate the growth effects that would have resulted from the hypothetical removal of national borders between pairs of adjacent countries under various scenarios. We identify country pairs where political integration would have been mutually beneficial. We find that full political integration would have slightly reduced an average country's growth rate, while most countries would benefit from a more limited form of merger, involving higher economic integration with their neighbors.     

The effect of democracy on different categories of economic freedom

Many empirical studies conclude that democracy increases economic freedom. However, these studies use highly aggregated indices of economic freedom, which eliminates interesting information. The purpose of this paper is to study empirically how in developing countries different categories of economic freedom are affected by democracy, measured either as political rights or civil liberties. Democracy appears to have a positive effect on the economic freedom categories Government Operations and Regulations and Restraints on International Exchange, but no effect on the categories Money and Inflation and Takings and Discriminatory Taxation. That a high level of democracy would have a negative effect on economic freedom reform receives no support in this study. The robustness of the results to the model specification and extreme points is tested.     

Political democratization, economic liberalization, and growth volatility

This study empirically investigates the effects of political and economic liberalization on growth volatility using a difference-in-difference method for a sample of 158 countries over the 1970-2005 period. The results show that, when examined separately, economic liberalization leads to a significant reduction in volatility while democratization is not followed by a decrease in growth volatility. For countries that undertake only one liberalization, opening up the economy to international trade reduces volatility in growth; becoming a democracy, on the other hand, seems to increase macroeconomic instability. For countries that implement both political and economic liberalizations, no statistically significant effect on volatility is detected. These results serve to provide additional support for the policy recommendation that developing countries should liberalize their economy first and then consider political liberalization.     

Does democracy cause growth? A meta-analysis (of 2000 regressions)

The relationship between democracy and economic growth has been widely debated in the social sciences with contrasting results. We apply a meta-analytical framework surveying 188 studies (2047 models) covering 36 years of research in the field. We also compare the effect of democracy on growth with the effect of human capital on growth in a sub-sample of 111 studies (875 models). Our findings suggest that democracy has a positive and direct effect on economic growth beyond the reach of publication bias, albeit weaker (about one third) of that of human capital. Further, the growth effect of democracy appears to be stronger in more recent papers not surveyed in Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu (2008). Finally, we show that the heterogeneity in the reported results is mainly driven by spatial and temporal differences in the samples, indicating that the democracy and growth nexus is not homogeneous across world regions and decades.     

Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance

The paper investigates the effects of ethnic diversity on economic performance. Previous studies have found that diversity has various detrimental microeconomic effects, tending to reduce public sector performance, and has large detrimental effects on the overall growth rate. I develop a simple model of the effect of ethnic diversity on a government decision problem in which there is a tradeoff between growth and distribution, in the contexts of democracy and dictatorship. I find that in democracy ethnic diversity has no effect upon the decision, whereas in dictatorship ethnic diversity leads to a government choice which reduces the growth rate. I then test these propositions on two data sets. The first is for 94 countries over the period 1960–1990. I find that whether diversity adversely affects overall economic growth depends upon the political environment. Diversity is highly damaging to growth in the context of limited political rights, but is not damaging in democracies. The second is for World Bank projects in 89 countries. I find that the same relationship between diversity and democracy affects the proportion of projects which are successful.     

Democracy and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: a panel data approach

This paper studies the link between democracy and economic development for 28 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1980–2005 in a panel data framework. A democracy index constructed from the Freedom House indices. A variety of panel data unit root and cointegration tests are applied. The variables are found to be integrated of order one and cointegrated. The Blundell–Bond system generalized methods-of-moments is employed to conduct a panel error-correction mechanism based causality test within a vector autoregressive structure. Economic growth is found to cause democracy in the short-run, while bidirectionality is uncovered in the long-run. In addition, the long-run coefficients are estimated through the panel fully modified ordinary least squares and dynamic ordinary least squares methods. Democracy has a positive impact on GDP and vice versa. These results lend support to the virtuous cycle hypothesis.     

A sensitivity analysis of the impact of democracy on economic growth

Often it is maintained that democracy is a luxury which comes at a price in terms of subsequent slower increases in national living standards. However, various recent cross-section studies on economic growth have found evidence that lack of civil and political liberties is negatively correlated with economic growth. Using various measures of democracy the robustness of previous research is examined. Both direct and indirect effects of lack of civil and political liberties are analysed. Our main conclusion is that the relationship between democracy and economic growth is not robust.     

The Middle Class Consensus and Economic Development

A middle class consensus is defined as a high share of income for the middle class and a low degree of ethnic divisons. The paper links a middle class consensus to resource endowments, along the lines of the provocative thesis of Engerman and Sokoloff (1997 and 2000). This paper exploits this association using tropical resource endowments as instruments for inequality. A higher share of income for the middle class and lower ethnic divisions are associated with higher income and higher growth, as well as with more education, better health, better infrastructure, better economic policies, less political instability, less civil war and ethnic minorities at risk, more social modernization and more democracy.     

A curse or a blessing? Natural resources in a multiple growth regimes analysis

The literature on the impact of an abundance of natural resources on economic performance remains inconclusive. In this article we consider the possibility that countries may follow different growth regimes, and test the hypothesis that whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing depends on the growth regime to which an economy belongs. We follow recent work that has used a mixture-of-regressions method to identify different growth regimes, and find two regimes such that in one regime resources have a positive impact on growth, while in the other they have a negative impact or at best have no impact on growth. Our analysis of the determinants of whether a country belongs or not to the blessed resources regime indicates that the level of democracy plays an important role while education and economic institutions have no effect.     

Income Shocks,Inequality, and Democracy*

In this paper, motivated by contradictory evidence on the effect of income on democracy, we investigate the hypothesis that it is income shocks – major income fluctuations relative to the trend – rather than marginal year‐on‐year variation in income levels that lead to non‐trivial changes in the quality of political institutions. Empirical results provide support for this hypothesis, and show how income inequality plays a crucial role in the effects of economic shocks on democracy. In particular, negative income shocks reveal a positive effect on democracy in countries with high inequality, and vice versa.     

Political openness and the growth of small and medium enterprises: empirical evidence from transition economies

This paper examines the growth determinants of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in transition and emerging economies, with a specific focus on the growth effects of political openness. Our findings indicate that product and process innovation, foreign market exposure through exports, providing training programs for employees, and the education level of employees are important growth factors for SMEs in transition economies. We also find that democracy and political openness have an adverse impact on the growth prospect of SMEs in transition economies. On the other hand, the negative effect of political openness on firm growth is decreasing as the proportion of the firm’s labor force with a university degree increases—a finding suggesting that the collective bargaining of low-skilled workers may hinder the growth of small firms in transition economies.     

Democracy-growth nexus and its interaction effect on human development: A cross-national analysis

This paper examines the democracy-growth nexus and its interactive effect on human development by using cross-national panel data spanning over 20 years incorporating the effect of democratization process. We find evidence that the effect from democracy to human development is nonlinear and varies depending on the levels of growth and democracy. The results confirm that the interaction effect of democracy-growth nexus has a positive impact on human development but the effect is sensitive to democratization process and the level of a country's economic development. It is established that democracy is more crucial in developed countries, whereas economic growth is vital in developing countries. The findings imply that the role of democracy in enhancing human development should not be overemphasized as economic growth is vital in the developing countries.     

Income,inequality, and the stability of democracy — Another look at the Lipset hypothesis

This paper studies the endogenous emergence of political regimes, in particular democracy, oligarchy and mass dictatorship, in societies in which productive resources are distributed unequally and institutions do not ensure political commitments. The political regime is shown to depend not only on income levels, but also, in particular, on resource inequality. The main results imply that under any economic environment a distribution of resources exists such that democracy is the political outcome. This distribution is independent of the particular income level if the income share generated by the poor is sufficiently large. On the other hand, there are distributions of resources for which democracy is infeasible in equilibrium regardless of the level of economic development. The model also delivers results on the stability of democracy. Variations in inequality across several dimensions due to unbalanced technological change, immigration or changes in the demographic structure affect the scope for democracy or may even lead to its breakdown. Among other historical examples, the results are consistent with the different political regimes that emerged in Germany after its unification in 1871.     

Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income

We estimate the interrelationships among economic institutions, political institutions, openness, and income levels, using identification through heteroskedasticity (IH). We split our cross‐national dataset into two sub‐samples: (i) colonies versus non‐colonies; and (ii) continents aligned on an East–West versus those aligned on a North–South axis. We exploit the difference in the structural variances in these two sub‐samples to gain identification. We find that democracy and the rule of law are both good for economic performance, but the latter has a much stronger impact on incomes. Openness (trade/GDP) has a negative impact on income levels and democracy, but a positive effect on rule of law. Higher income produces greater openness and better institutions, but these effects are not very strong. Rule of law and democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing.     

Political institutions and economic volatility

We examine the effect of political ‘institutions’ on economic growth volatility, using data from more than 100 countries over the period 1960 to 2005, taking into account various control variables as suggested in previous studies. Our indicator of volatility is the relative standard deviation of the growth rate of GDP per capita. The results of a dynamic panel model indicate that democracy reduces economic volatility. We also find that some dimensions of political instability and policy uncertainty increase economic volatility.