Does Price Stability Exacerbate Labour Market Rigidities in the EMU?

How will the commitment to price stability affect labour market rigidities in the European Monetary Union? I explore a model where firms choose between fixed wage contracts (where the employer cannot lay off the worker, and the wage can only be changed by mutual consent), or contracts where employment is at will, so that either party may terminate employment (with strong similarities to temporary jobs). A fixed wage contract provides better incentives for investment and training, while employment at will facilitates efficient mobility. Inflation erodes the real value of a fixed contract wage over time, and badly matched workers are more likely to quit for other jobs. Disinflation has opposing effects on labour market rigidity: fixed wage contracts become more rigid in real terms, but fewer firms will choose fixed wage contracts.     

Fixed-term contracts as a source of labour demand fluctuations

Employment fluctuations are one of the central issues in the business cycle literature. The fluctuations depend crucially not only on the economic conditions but also on the labour market institutions. Since most previous studies have assumed indefinite-term contracts (ITC) implicitly, the implications of fixed-term contracts (FTC) on dynamic labour demand have been rather overlooked. This article investigates dynamic labour demand of a firm with FTC to show that the employment fluctuations under FTC can be totally different from those under ITC. In particular, a productivity shock that takes place at a future date generates the current fluctuations in employment under FTC, while it does not under ITC.     

Limited observability as a constraint in contract design

Limited observability is the assumption that economic agents can only observe a finite amount of information. Given this constraint, contracts among agents are necessarily finite and incomplete in comparison to the ideal complete contract that we model as infinite in detail. We consider the extent that finite contracts can approximate a complete contract. The objectives of the paper are: (i) to identify properties of agents’ preferences that determine whether or not finiteness of contracts causes significant inefficiency; (ii) to evaluate the performance of finite contracts against the ideal optimal contract in a bilateral bargaining model.     

Strategic market games with a finite horizon and incomplete markets

Summary. We study a strategic market game associated to an intertemporal economy with a finite horizon and incomplete markets. We demonstrate that generically, for any finite number of players, every sequentially strictly individually rational and default-free stream of allocations can be approximated by a full subgame-perfect equilibrium. As a consequence, imperfect competition may Pareto-dominate perfect competition when markets are incomplete. Moreover - and this contrasts with the main message conveyed by the market games literature - there exists a large open set of initial endowments for which full subgame-perfect equilibria do not converge to -efficient allocations when the number of players tends to infinity. Finally, strategic speculative bubbles may survive at full subgame-perfect equilibria.Received: 24 January 2002, Revised: 21 February 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D43, D52. Correspondence to: Gaël GiraudWe thank Tim Van Zandt for his comments.     

Strategic Research Partnerships: A Managerial Perspective

Private sector incentives to participate in research partnerships can be grouped roughly into two categories: cost-economizing incentives and strategic incentives. This paper summarizes the argument in two streams of thought that are often identified with these two sides: the transaction-cost/incomplete contracts approach and the strategic management approach. The paper recounts business motives to engage in research partnerships in each and points out that differentiating between more traditional economic perspectives (transaction costs, incomplete contracts) and strategic management/organizational theory perspectives (strategic networks, resource-dependent view, dynamic capabilities, knowledge-based view, organizational learning, options approach) may not be as sharp as one might suppose at first. The complementary nature of these perspectives should be encouraging for theoreticians looking for a more integrated model of collaboration.     

Strategic Research Partnerships: A Managerial Perspective

Private sector incentives to participate in research partnerships can be grouped roughly into two categories: cost-economizing incentives and strategic incentives. This paper summarizes the argument in two streams of thought that are often identified with these two sides: the transaction-cost/incomplete contracts approach and the strategic management approach. The paper recounts business motives to engage in research partnerships in each and points out that differentiating between more traditional economic perspectives (transaction costs, incomplete contracts) and strategic management/organizational theory perspectives (strategic networks, resource-dependent view, dynamic capabilities, knowledge-based view, organizational learning, options approach) may not be as sharp as one might suppose at first. The complementary nature of these perspectives should be encouraging for theoreticians looking for a more integrated model of collaboration.     

Endogenous market structures and contract theory: Delegation, principal-agent contracts, screening, franchising and tying

I study the role of unilateral strategic contracts for firms active in markets with price competition and endogenous entry. Traditional results change substantially when the market structure is endogenous rather than exogenous. They concern (1) contracts of managerial delegation to non-profit maximizers, (2) incentive principal-agent contracts in the presence of moral hazard on cost-reducing activities, (3) screening contracts in case of asymmetric information on the productivity of the managers, (4) vertical contracts of franchising in case of hold-up problems and (5) tying contracts by monopolists competing also in secondary markets. Firms use always these contracts to strengthen price competition and manage to obtain positive profits in spite of free entry.     

Welfare reducing licensing

In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous.     

LIMITED COMMITMENT MODELS OF THE LABOUR MARKET

We present an overview of models of long-term self-enforcing labour contracts in which risk-sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed that is sufficiently general to encompass the two-agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable hours. We consider two-sided limited commitment and look at its implications for aggregate labour market variables. We consider the implications for empirical testing and the available empirical evidence. We also consider the one-sided limited commitment problem for which there exists a considerable amount of empirical support.     

Firm Heterogeneity,Contract Enforcement,and the Industry Dynamics of Offshoring*

We develop an endogenous growth model with R&D spillovers to study the long‐run consequences of offshoring with firm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. In so doing, we model offshoring as the geographical fragmentation of a firm's production chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream division. While there is always a positive correlation between upstream bargaining weight and offshoring activities, there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between these and growth. Whether offshoring with incomplete contracts also increases consumption depends on firm heterogeneity. As for welfare, whereas with complete contracts an R&D subsidy is enough to solve the inefficiency due to R&D spillovers, with incomplete contracts a production subsidy is also needed.     

Information, bilateral negotiations, and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how firms choose between using a centralized market and bilateral negotiations to recruit new personnel. In the market firms interact with several workers but do not have information about workers’ behavior in the past. In the bilateral negotiations firms negotiate bilaterally with prospective workers and learn about workers’ performance in previous jobs. We show that the interaction between social preferences, the incompleteness of contracts and the existence of information about a worker’s past performance provides an explanation for firms forgoing market opportunities and bilaterally negotiating with a worker. We observe that approximately 30% of all job contracts were bilaterally negotiated when these contracts are incomplete as opposed to only 10% when contracts were complete. The surplus from trade is higher when incomplete contracts can be bilaterally negotiated, which can be attributed to the presence of information.     

Moral hazard contracts: Does one size fit all?

We show that firms' practice of anonymous contracts (“one-size-fits-all”) can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.     

Political change and informality

This paper examines informality during the political and economic turmoil that accompanied the Arab Spring revolution in Egypt. The paper focuses on unprotected employment and the extent to which it changed by educational level immediately after the January Uprising of 2011. We find that over time and particularly after the revolution, informal employment has increased for both high‐ and low‐educated workers, albeit through different paths: high‐educated workers were more likely to be stuck in informality, while low‐educated formal workers were more likely to lose their contracts. The increase in informal employment in the wake of the Arab Spring is more pronounced for the high‐educated. The results suggest a high level of rigidity in the Egyptian labour market, even in the wake of the Arab Spring.     

The Displacement Effect of Labour‐Market Programs: MONASH Analysis*

A key question concerning labour‐market programs is the extent to which they generate jobs for their target group at the expense of others. This effect is measured by displacement percentages. We describe a version of the MONASH model designed to quantify the effects of labour‐market programs. Our simulation results suggest that: (i) labour‐market programs can generate significant long‐run increases in employment; (ii) displacement percentages depend on how a labour‐market program affects the income trade‐off faced by target and non‐target groups between work and non‐work; and (iii) displacement percentages are larger in the short run than in the long run.     

Starting Your Career With a Fixed-Term Job: Stepping-Stone or “Dead End”?

This paper uses panel data from the UK and Germany to investigate the difference in the learning effect between workers who enter the labour market with a fixed term and a permanent job. Our results verify the existence of a wage penalty for entering the labour market with a fixed-term contract for the British males (7.1%) and especially for the British females (21.2%). British females also have a very strong learning effect that is especially large for temporary starters. In Germany, the initial wage penalty for temporary starters is smaller than in the UK—4.5% for the males and 3% for the females—and is persistent only for the males. Although initial wage differences are mitigated through the accumulation of skills on the job, this process differs between temporary and permanent starters. This suggests that the type of the starting contract may be a feature of labour market segmentation.     

Growth,selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates a trade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships and institutions. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificing managerial selection may prevail at early stages of economic development and when heterogeneity in ability is low. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increases the return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, where managerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Measures of investor protection aimed at limiting the bargaining power of managers improve selection under short-term contracts. Given that knowledge accumulation raises the value of selection, the optimal level of investor protection increases with development.     

The Emergence of the Law of Value in a Dynamic Simple Commodity Economy

Abstract

A dynamic computational model of a simple commodity economy is examined and a theory of the relationship between commodity values, market prices and the efficient division of social labour is developed. The main conclusions are: (i) the labour value of a commodity is an attractor for its market price; (ii) market prices are error signals that function to allocate the available social labour between sectors of production; and (iii) the tendency of prices to approach labour values is the monetary expression of the tendency of a simple commodity economy to allocate social labour efficiently. The model demonstrates that, in the special case of simple commodity production, Marx's law of value can naturally emerge from multiple local exchanges and operate ‘behind the backs’ of actors solely via money flows that place budget constraints on their local evaluations of commodity prices, which are otherwise subjective and unconstrained.     

Chasing the carrot – actual working hours of fixed-term employees

Fixed-term contracts can serve as a screening device to reveal the true ability of workers. To achieve promotion to a permanent position, fixed-term employees have an incentive to prove themselves by providing higher effort than competing co-workers by means of longer working hours. Applying fixed effects estimation to the German register data, we find that employees work longer hours on fixed-term contracts. This effect is stronger for labour market entrants and employees that are newly hired. We further show that actual hours of work are particularly large when there is competition among co-workers to receive promotion to a permanent position.     

The Impact of Company Human Resource Policies on Social Skills: Implications for Training Sponsorship, Quit Rates and Efficiency Wages

The concept of a firm's human capital is reconsidered to include both the technical and the social skills of its workforce. Technical skills are defined by the ability to turn inputs into outputs, and measured by the productivity of unit labour effort. Social skills are defined by the propensity to behave in a manner conducive to the firm's objectives. In other words, social skills are constituted as the norm of effort contribution to which an individual assents, and are measured by observed motivation and behaviour. The existence for firms of a labour management function is proposed and supported, relating social skills to human resource policies. Implications for the labour market are that: (i) firms pay for general training and, at the same time, wages do not necessarily increase with training; (ii) human capital acquisition may not lead to an increase in quitting, even controlling for wages; (iii) human resource policies substitute for efficiency wages or for employee monitoring; and (iv) economies with high organisational commitment have low equilibrium unemployment rates.     

Screening in a Matching Market

Contract design under incomplete information is often analysed in a bilaterally monopolistic setting. If the informed party's reservation value does not depend on its private information (its type), it is a standard result that the uninformed side offers "low" types distorted contracts to reduce the information rent left to "high7rdquo; types.
We challenge this result by embedding contract design in a matching market environment. We consider a market where players meet pairwise and where, in each match, either side may be chosen to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. As frictions become sufficiently low, we find that the set of equilibria is independent of whether there is complete or incomplete information. In particular, all contracts are free of distortions.