Too much of a good thing? Why altruism can harm the environment?

Success of eco-labeling schemes, broadly defined, varies among products and across countries. Based on a simple theoretical framework, we show that the nature of environmental attributes among products (i.e., private versus public) and the consumer type (i.e., egoist versus altruist) shape the overall performance of such schemes. In addition, we demonstrate that altruistic consumers exhibiting a too high willingness to pay for the eco-labeled product can inadvertently prevent egoistic consumers from purchasing it, leading to a sub-optimal outcome in terms of environmental performance. Several policy and managerial implications are drawn.     

Does competition foster trust? The role of tournament incentives

Members of organizations are often called upon to trust others and to reciprocate trust while at the same time competing for bonuses or promotions. We suggest that competition affects trust not only within dyads including direct competitors, but also between individuals who do not compete against each other. We test this idea in a trust game where trustors and trustees are rewarded based either on their absolute performance or on how well they do relative to players from other dyads. In Experiment 1, we show that competition among trustors significantly increases trust. Competition among trustees decreases trustworthiness, but trustors do not anticipate this effect. In Experiment 2, we additionally show that the increase in trust under competition is caused by a combination of increased risk taking and lower sensitivity to non-financial concerns specific to trust interactions. Our results suggest that tournament incentives might have a “blinding effect” on considerations such as betrayal and inequality aversion.     

Why peg? The role of capital mobility and financial intermediation

Many economists argue that the growth of international capital mobility has made the maintenance of pegged exchange rates more costly, forcing developing states to choose alternative arrangements. But some states do not simply abandon pegged exchange rates as their exposure to capital mobility rises. Some states abandon pegs long before a crisis can erupt, while others maintain pegs until the speculative pressures became unbearable. Why, in an environment of growing capital mobility, do some states maintain pegs longer than others do? One reason is that the more that bank lending dominates investment in a country, the more likely that state is to hold on to a pegged exchange rate. When banks have accumulated significant amounts of foreign debt they lobby for exchange rate stability. In a bank‐dominated financial system, a concentrated banking sector can organize easily and use its crucial role in the economy to exert influence over economic policy. This article presents new evidence from statistical tests on 61 developing countries that confirm that states with deeper banking systems are more likely to peg their exchange rates, in spite of growing capital mobility.     

Region? Why Region? Security,Hermeneutics, and the Making of the Black Sea Region

In the context of post–Cold War European integration, ‘making’ regions has become commonplace. Far from reducing the significance of regional initiatives, inflationary regional labelling draws attention to the significant role played by ‘regions’ as legitimating political vectors. Why are political projects formulated in regional terms? Critically examining the Black Sea region project, this article suggests that region-making transcends the boundary between theoretical and political praxis. Regional entrepreneurs frequently use different conceptual categories in the formulation and justification of their initiatives. In order to understand why regional forms are preferred politically, it is necessary to scrutinise closely this contextual interaction between political praxis and conceptual logic. The article maps the various concepts of region which coexist in the Black Sea region project, and discusses their relationship with four political and hermeneutical strategies that link the regional project with its context, profoundly marked by the logic of European security integration. The ‘double hermeneutics’ of the Black Sea region highlights the contradictory security logics that structure European security in general and this regional project in particular. In the conclusion, the article draws attention to the significant epistemological and normative consequences of the double hermeneutics of the Black Sea region.     

Why Do the Rich Save More? A Theory and Australian Evidence*

We provide a theory to explain the existence of inequality in an economy where agents have identical preferences and have access to the same production technology. Agents consume a ‘health’ good which determines their subjective discount factor. Depending on initial distribution of capital the economy gets separated into different permanent‐income groups. This leads to a testable hypothesis: ‘The rich save a larger proportion of their permanent‐income’. We test this implication for savings behaviour in Australia. We find that even after controlling for lifecycle and health characteristics, higher permanent income is positively related with higher savings rates and better saving habits.     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field”*

This study explores the effect of bonus incentive mechanisms with a focus on how such a scheme influences aggregate production levels of teams of workers, specifically. We identify this using data from a highly competitive setting in professional sport, which involves a unique tournament design rule in an elite European rugby competition. The modelling results demonstrate qualified evidence that introducing bonuses to encourage teams to score via the most-difficult, highest-reward mode, incentivizes teams to increase effort to earn the bonus, and without reducing production after the bonus is achieved.     

In search of the good samaritan: estimating the impact of ‘altruism’ on voters' preferences

This paper continues the development of a theoretical foundation for measuring ‘altruistic’ behaviour with respect to tax versus expenditure preferences in three specific spheres: health, education and welfare payments. Particular emphasis is placed on analysing the choice theoretic calculus that underlies individual preferences. Using this theoretical foundation, econometric techniques allow progress to be made in measuring the characteristics of the underlying utility function. The empirical work relates to the UK and confirms that both self-interest and public interest (with a slight emphasis on the latter) determine overall preferences. The implications of this for the public choice school are then examined.     

Why should Southern economies stay in the Euro Zone? The role of labor markets

We assume a world of two countries in a fixed exchange rate system. These countries differ in the features of their labor markets. The home country is characterized by a dual labor market, with formal and informal sectors. In the foreign country, a nominal wage rigidity exists. In this context, the situation of the labor markets in each country is not optimal owing to a misallocation of workers between sectors in the domestic economy and unemployment in the foreign economy. We show that a devaluation of domestic currency implies a fall in production in each country and deterioration of labor markets in both countries.     

No education,no good jobs? Evidence on the relationship between education and labor market segmentation

This paper assesses labor market segmentation across formal and informal salaried jobs and self-employment in three Latin American and three transition countries. It looks separately at the markets for skilled and unskilled labor, inquiring if segmentation is an exclusive feature of the latter. Longitudinal data are used to assess wage differentials and mobility patterns across jobs. To study mobility, the paper compares observed transitions with a new benchmark measure of mobility under no segmentation. It finds evidence of a formal wage premium relative to informal salaried jobs in the three Latin American countries, but not in transition economies. It also finds evidence of extensive mobility across these two types of jobs in all countries, particularly from informal salaried to formal jobs. These patterns are suggestive of a preference for formal over informal salaried jobs in all countries. In contrast, there is little mobility between self-employment and formal salaried jobs, suggesting the existence of barriers to this type of mobility or a strong assortative matching according to workers’ individual preferences. Lastly, for both wage differentials and mobility, there is no statistical difference across skill levels, indicating that the markets for skilled and unskilled labor are similarly affected by segmentation.     

Does a sudden death liven up the game? Rules,incentives, and strategy in football

Summary. In an effort to stimulate more attractive football, the international football association FIFA, has recently introduced the "sudden death" or "golden goal" rule for games going into extra time play. This paper analyses under which conditions, if any, the introduction of the sudden death rule improves the attractiveness of the football game. Our results indicate that the new rule will not change the behavior of equally powerful teams.Received: 20 November 2002, Revised: 12 May 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, L83.A preliminary version of this paper was presented at Queens University of Belfast and University of Southampton. The authors would like to thank the seminar participants. Indraijt Ray and an anonymous reviewer for their useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. We specially thank Giulio Seccia for his constructive comments. We also acknowledge K.U. Leuven for providing research support.     

Does work pay in France? Monetary incentives, hours constraints, and the guaranteed minimum income

This paper uses a representative sample of individuals on France's main welfare program (the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion, or RMI) to estimate monetary incentives for employment among welfare recipients. Based on the estimated joint distribution of wages and hours potentially offered to each individual, we compute potential gains from working in a very detailed manner. Relating these gains to observed employment, we then estimate a simple structural labor supply model. We find that potential gains are almost always positive but very small on average, especially for single mothers, because of the high implicit marginal tax rates embedded in the system. Employment rates are sensitive to incentives with extensive margin elasticities for both men and women usually below one. Conditional on these elasticities, simulations indicate that existing policies devoted to reducing marginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution, such as the intéressement earnings top-up program, have little impact in this population due to their very limited scope. The negative income tax (Prime pour l'emploi), seems to be an exception.     

On the inauspicious incentives of the scholar-level h-index: an economist’s take on collusive and coercive citation

Faculty renewal, promotion, tenure, merit and awards are typically tied to scholarship performance, which is often measured in several ways, among them citation-based metrics like the scholar-level h-index. With the relatively recent developments of ‘one-touch’ Google Scholar citation tracking and Harzing’s Publish or Perish Software, it is simple to monitor and potentially game one’s personal h-index. This article explores this possibility by assessing the incentives embedded in the scholar-level h-index through the lens of cartels, uncertainty, insurance and game-theoretic best response.     

Generalizations that aren't? Evidence on education and growth

Several papers have suggested that the relationship between changes in average schooling and growth is weak in the cross-country data. This might call into question the relevance of micro estimates of returns to schooling, at least for developing countries. This paper examines the reliability of some of the aggregate evidence, and presents an alternative framework for analysing these questions.     

Caught in the Web? Addictive behavior in cyberspace and the role of goal-orientation

New online 3-D virtual worlds are complex and differ significantly from each other. In this study we examine whether the type of virtual world is likely to make a difference on how addictive behavior develops and its subsequent outcomes. We examine the effect of goal-orientation on the degree to which cognitive absorption within the virtual world results in addiction and in the impact of addiction on continuance and purchasing intentions. Using surveys conducted in World of Warcraft (goal-oriented) and Second Life (experience-oriented) virtual worlds and analysis via ANOVA, we find that while cognitive absorption contributes to the development of addiction, which subsequently leads to increased continuance and spending intentions in goal-oriented virtual worlds, none of these relationships hold in the case of the experience-oriented world. Goal-oriented virtual worlds provide a problematic conduit for addictive behavior and marketing manipulation and the authors believe that they would benefit from further attention by policy-makers. Experience-oriented virtual worlds do not appear to provide the same dangers and would appear to be more healthy avenues for marketing-consumer engagement.     

Does self-regulation work? Experimental evidence of the reputational incentives of Self-Regulatory Organizations

Self-regulation (SR) is a common way of enforcing quality in markets (such as banking, financial services and several professions) and in a variety of public and private organizations. We provide experimental evidence of the reputational incentives of self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to publicly disclose versus cover-up fraud in an incomplete information environment. We find that observed behaviour is generally consistent with Bayesian equilibrium when subjects are informed about the relative likelihood of fraud detection by a ‘vigilant’ versus a ‘lax’ SRO type. In particular, a fraud disclosure equilibrium is supported when subjects are informed that the ‘vigilant’ SRO is more likely to detect fraud; otherwise, a cover-up equilibrium is supported. However, when subjects are not informed about the relative likelihood of fraud detection by the SRO types (as expected in real SR situations), no equilibrium is strongly supported. Our results suggest that in practice, the reputation-based incentives for effective SR may be inherently ambiguous and weak.