Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game

We study the voluntary provision of a discrete public good via the contribution game. Players independently and simultaneously make nonrefundable contributions to fund a discrete public good, which is provided if and only if contributions cover the cost of production. We characterize nonconstant continuous symmetric equilibria, giving sufficient conditions for their existence. We show the common normalization by which players’ values are distributed over [0, 1] is not without loss of generality: if the distribution over this interval has continuous density f with f(0) >  0, then no (nonconstant) continuous symmetric equilibrium exists. We study in detail the case in which players’ private values are uniformly distributed, showing that, generically, when one continuous equilibrium exists, a continuum of continuous equilibria exists. For any given cost of the good, multiple continuous equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. Nevertheless, not all continuous equilibria are interim incentive efficient. The set of interim incentive efficient equilibria is exactly determined. The authors thank Manfred Dix, George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, and an anonymous referee for their comments.     

Preemption in a real option game with a first mover advantage and player-specific uncertainty

In this paper a two-player real option game with a first-mover advantage is analyzed, where payoffs are driven by a player-specific stochastic state variable. It is shown that there exists an equilibrium which has qualitatively different properties from those in standard real option games driven by common stochastic shocks. The properties of the equilibrium are four-fold: (i) preemption does not necessarily occur, (ii) if preemption takes place, the rent-equalization property holds, (iii) for almost all sample paths it is clear ex-ante which player invests first, and (iv) it is possible that both players invest simultaneously, even if that is not optimal. It is argued from simulations that real option games with a common one-dimensional shock do not provide a good approximation for games with player-specific uncertainty, even if these are highly correlated.     

The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game

We utilise results from a human-subjects experiment to examine the connection between strategic uncertainty and outcomes in games. Our basic game is a Nash demand game where one player has an outside option available. A “chat” treatment allows bargainers to send cheap-talk messages prior to playing the basic game, and in a “contracts” treatment, they can additionally propose and accept binding contracts. We propose that strategic uncertainty comprises at least two facets: “coordination-type”, which is lower in the chat game than in the basic game, and “rationality-type”, which is lower in the contracts game than in the chat game. We find that both types of strategic uncertainty impact bargaining outcomes: moving from the basic game to the chat game, and thence to contracts, improves several aspects of outcomes, such as higher efficiency, less opting out and less under-demanding. Other results include a treatment effect on the types of agreements that are reached.     

Income inequality in the trust game

This paper presents an experiment measuring how lab-induced income inequality affects trust and trustworthiness. Low endowment subjects paired with high endowment subjects showed more trust than subjects in other pairs; this trust was reciprocated with high trustworthiness.     

Anonymity in the dictator game revisited

Giving in the dictator game has often been interpreted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. We suspect that giving is determined by subjects’ attempts to appear fair in the eyes of recipients and the experimenter. Therefore, we investigate behavior in the dictator game by using the randomized response technique to increase anonymity. Overall, 290 subjects participated in two experiments. The results demonstrate that the randomized response technique reduces giving to negligible amounts compared to the standard double blind condition. Thus, our results suggest that individuals closely follow egoistic motives in the dictator game when anonymity is convincingly implemented.     

Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game

We report results from standard minimum-effort experiments conducted in Copenhagen (Denmark). Our subjects frequently coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium even in groups of six. This is in stark contrast to the previous literature, as we show in a detailed analysis of experiments which had the same design but were held in different countries. The subject-pool effect is substantiated by the finding that, the higher the share of Danish subjects in a group, the higher the minimum-effort levels. These findings suggest that the prevalent coordination failures previously observed are affected by significant subject-pool effects.     

Incomplete information in the acid rain game

This paper provides a model that attempts to deal with the transboundary nature of the acid rain problem, using a game theoretic approach consistent with mainstream economic theory. The general forms of cooperative and non cooperative equilibria in explicit and implicit set-up of the model are presented under the assumptions of complete and incomplete information.     

Strategic bargaining in the variable threat game

Summary. In this paper the alternating offer model with an exogenous risk of breakdown is taken to explicitly model the bargaining process underlying the variable threat game (Nash, Econometrica, 1953). A modified version of the variable threat game without commitment is also analysed within a dynamic context. The limit set of subgame perfect equilibria is characterized in both dynamic versions. The analysis gives rise to different results than in the two standard models. By making additional assumptions the original results can be regained, indicating that these are implicitly present in the standard analysis.Received: August 29, 1995; revised version: November 11, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.     

Efficient communication in the electronic mail game

The literature on the electronic mail game shows that players' mutual expectations may lock them into requiring an inefficiently large number of confirmations and confirmations of confirmations from one another. This paper shows that this result hinges on the assumption that, with the exception of the first message, each player can only send a message when receiving an immediately preceding message. We show that, once this assumption is lifted, equilibria involving confirmations of confirmations no longer pass standard refinements of the Nash equilibrium, and are no longer evolutionary stable.     

上市公司会计信息披露民事责任的认定

目前我国上市公司生产和披露会计信息，主要遵循了程序理性原则。会计信息的低质量加上其他因素综合作用导致会计信息含量低下，会计信息对证券价格变动的解释功能微乎其撮，会计信息与投资者决策之间的相关性十分微小。因此，在认定上市公司因会计信息虚假陈述引发的民事责任时，应充分考虑会计信息生产和披露的特殊性及会计信息在证券市场中的作用极其有限这一现实，给予上市公司合理的免责事由。     

Population uncertainty in contests

Summary. We study contests where the set of players is a random variable. If it is known for certain that there will be at least one participant, then aggregate contest expenditure in equilibrium is strictly lower in a contest with population uncertainty than in a non-uncertain contest with the same expected number of players. This suggests an explanation of, for example, why empirical studies show rent-seeking expenditures to be much lower than predicted by other theories.Received: 29 June 2003, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D72, D82, K41. Correspondence to: Karl Wärneryd     

Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game

We use a limited information environment to assess the role of confusion in the repeated voluntary contributions game. A comparison with play in a standard version of the game suggests, that the common claim that decision errors due to confused subjects biases estimates of cooperation upwards, is not necessarily correct. Furthermore, we find that simple learning cannot generate the kind of contribution dynamics commonly attributed to the existence of conditional cooperators. We conclude that cooperative behavior and its decay observed in public goods games is not a pure artefact of confusion and learning.     

Inflation uncertainty, growth uncertainty, oil prices, and output growth in the UK

This study examines the transmission and response of inflation uncertainty and output uncertainty on inflation and output growth in the UK using a bi-variate EGARCH model. Results suggest that inflation uncertainty has positive and significant effects on inflation before the inflation-targeting period, but that the effect is significantly negative after the inflation-targeting period. On the other hand, output uncertainty has a negative and significant effect on inflation and a positive effect on growth, while oil price rises significantly increase inflation for the UK. Results also indicate that inflation uncertainty significantly reduces output growth before and after the inflation-targeting period. These findings are robust and the Generalized impulse response functions corroborate the conclusions. These results have important implications for an inflation-targeting monetary policy, and for stabilization policy in general.     

Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered

While most papers on team decision-making find that teams behave more selfishly, less trustingly and less altruistically than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various explanations for the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.      

Counter-intuitive results in game theory

General comparative game statics results are derived in order to provide testable hypotheses in game-like situations. These results run counter to ordinary economic intuition. It becomes necessary to initially define whether a situation represents perfect competition or monopoly on the one hand or a game-like situation on the other hand because these different assumptions lead to greatly differing results. Several empirical applications of the theory are suggested.     

Risk attitudes and the stag-hunt game

A stag-hunt game (with the risky and safe actions) has two pure Nash equilibria that are Pareto-rankable. The risky action leads either to the Pareto-superior equilibrium (high payoff) or to out of equilibrium (low payoff) depending on the opponent’s action. Both players may want to obtain high payoff but uncertainty about the opponent’s action may prevent them to take such strategic risk. This paper investigates how information about the risk attitude of an opponent affects a player’s action choice in the stag-hunt game. I find that although a subject’s propensity to choose the risky action depends on her opponent’s risk attitude, it does not depend on her own risk attitude.     

Manipulating uncertainty

Uncertainty about the distributional incidence of policy reforms may, if it impinges selectively on particular subsets of voters, alter the direction of the majority vote. This possibility should be a matter of special concern when subject to potential manipulation by a purposeful agent such as a Leviathan-like bureaucracy. This paper discusses a constitutional defense against such prospect. This paper was prepared for a conference on “Constitutional Status Quo and Prospects for Change” held at George Mason University in April, 1994. I am grateful to participants in that conference and to my colleagues at Nova, especially to Mário Páscoa, for their comments and criticisms. I also benefited from comments of an anonymous referee. Responsibility for errors remains with me.     

考研过程中的博弈现象分析

从博弈论角度出发,对学生考研过程中的是否考研、是否上专业课、是否上名校这三个博弈现象进行分析.通过分析可知,考研过程中每一次选择都需要对自身情况和考研的宏观信息进行全面分析,才可能实现自身最优化选择.     

房地产投资决策的期权博弈分析

近年来随着房地产行业竞争的日益加剧,基于房地产企业核心竞争力的战略投资越来越引起房地产企业的重视。在一些资产雄厚的企业中,一家房地产公司可以同时对几个项目进行投资,这就需要企业充分考虑内部资金的合理分配,项目的投资顺序等系列投资决策问题,以使企业获得的综合效益最大。引用期权博弈理论对房地产企业内部的项目投资决策进行研究,在深入剖析房地产开发项目所具有的期权特性的基础上,建立房地产企业内部双项目投资期权博弈模型。此外,我们还将利用变分法对模型的最优解进行讨论,从而为房地产企业内部多项目投资提供最优化策略建议。     

Two-sided uncertainty in the monopoly agenda setter model

We extend the Romer-Rosenthal model of representative democracy to a signaling environment, in which (i) only the representatives knows the ‘status quo’ outcome resulting if her take-it-or-leave-it policy proposal is rejected by the voters, while (ii) only the voters know their true preferences over policies. A separating sequential equilibrium is shown to exist, and to uniquely satisfy a common equilibrium refinement. Furthermore, this equilibrium has the property that, relative to the environment where the status quo is known to the voter, there is a downward bias in the setter's proposal, and an associated upward bias in the probability of the proposal's acceptance by the voter.