共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Sven Stöwhase 《Journal of Economics》2005,85(2):175-196
This paper analyses capital tax competition between jurisdictions of different size when multinational firms can shift some fraction of their tax base between them. For the case of revenue maximizing governments, we show that introducing profit shifting will not generally increase downward pressure on tax rates. We find that profit shifting decreases the tax-base sensitivity of the low tax jurisdiction while increasing the sensitivity of the high tax jurisdiction. Tax rates will converge as a result of additional profit shifting opportunities. This will be the case even though in general equilibrium tax rates in both jurisdictions may decrease or increase. 相似文献
2.
We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D. 相似文献
3.
REMY ODDOU 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2016,18(1):67-83
This paper analyzes the effect of interjurisdictional spillovers and congestion of local public services on the segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions. Households choosing to live at the same place form a jurisdiction which produces congested local public services, which generates positive spillovers to other jurisdictions. In every jurisdiction, the production of the local public services is financed through a local tax based on households' wealth. Local wealth tax rates are democratically determined in every jurisdiction. Households consume the available amount of public services in their jurisdiction and a composite private good. Any household is free to leave its jurisdiction for another that would increase its utility. A necessary and sufficient condition to have every stable jurisdiction structure segregated by wealth is identified: the public services must be either a gross substitute or a gross complement to the private good. 相似文献
4.
This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a non-cooperative locational model of public goods provision choices, where the levels of taxation and the local public good varieties provided within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting, and where equilibrium jurisdictions consist of consumers with similar tastes. We show that interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries, and, even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers, can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdiction. 相似文献
5.
SUSANA PERALTA 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2007,9(6):1013-1030
We present a spatial model of a city with two unequally productive jurisdictions. City residents bear a commuting cost to work in either of the two jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction must finance a public budget with a wage and a head tax. We compare the first best optimum to tax decentralization. From the total welfare viewpoint, tax competition is always inefficient. However, majoritarian local governments may prefer the inefficient tax decentralization to the first best. 相似文献
6.
Mobility and Redistributive Politics 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Jean Hindriks 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2001,3(1):95-120
There is widespread concern that greater mobility of individuals can undermine any attempt to redistribute income at the local level. In this paper we derive the equilibrium level of redistribution when both the rich and the poor are imperfectly mobile and when each jurisdiction chooses its redistributive policy by majority voting. This leads to a fundamental interaction whereby the policy choices of jurisdictions determine whom they attract and where whom they attract determines their policy choices. Our main findings are twofold. First, we show that greater mobility of the poor can increase the equilibrium amount of redistribution. Second, we find that some jurisdictions can be in equilibrium on the "wrong" side of their Laffer curve. The reason is that the poor are in a majority in these jurisdictions and they are opposed to a potentially Pareto-improving tax reduction because it would attract the rich and shift the majority. The analysis also reveals how the interplay between policy choices and membership leads to multiple equilibria. 相似文献
7.
In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic environmental policy. We consider a timing game in which two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves before setting emission tax rates. We show that whether the policymakers implement emission tax policies simultaneously or sequentially crucially depends on the magnitude of environmental damages. When the damages are insignificant, the tax rates are strategic substitutes, and the simultaneous-move policymaking emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when the damages are significant, the tax rates are strategic complements, and sequential-move policymaking emerges. We also extend the model by allowing for differences in the vulnerability to environmental damages between countries. When the differences are large, the unique equilibrium of the game is the situation where the less vulnerable country acts as a leader. In the case where multiple equilibrium emerges, the risk-dominant equilibrium is also that where the less vulnerable country leads. 相似文献
8.
Taxation of Mobile Factors as Insurance under Uncertainty 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Kangoh Lee 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2004,106(2):253-271
This paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors, i.e., capital, under uncertainty. The wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks. Since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction, and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed, taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages. In particular, the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages, thereby providing insurance. For this reason, jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump‐sum taxation is available. In addition, this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition, and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition. 相似文献
9.
Remy Oddou 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2020,22(5):1705-1712
This paper analyzes the effect of a progressive taxation scheme on the segregative properties of the endogenous formation of jurisdictions. Households living in the same place form a jurisdiction which aims to produce a local public good and implement a redistribution policy by granting every household a demogrant of an amount determined by the jurisdiction. In every jurisdiction, production of local public services and the demogrant are financed with a local tax based upon the households wealth. Local wealth tax rates and the level of the demogrant are exogenously determined in every jurisdiction. Households are free to leave their jurisdiction for another jurisdiction that would provide them with their highest utility. We found that the existence of a demogrant seems to mitigate the segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction formation, because the condition identified by Gravel and Thoron to ensure segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure remains necessary, but is no longer sufficient. 相似文献
10.
Factor Ownership and Governmental Strategic Interaction 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Kangoh Lee 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2003,5(2):345-361
A fiscal policy of a jurisdiction alters the allocation of mobile factors among jurisdictions, affecting other jurisdictions and creating an externality. Since each jurisdiction does not take into account the externality, the equilibrium fiscal policy on mobile factors is inefficient. However, individuals of a jurisdiction may own immobile factors located in other jurisdictions. The government for the jurisdiction then considers the effects of its policy on the returns to the immobile factor located in other jurisdictions. The cross–ownership of immobile factors thus affects the efficiency of fiscal policies. The present paper considers capital tax competition as an example to illustrate the effects of the ownership structure of immobile factors on the equilibrium fiscal policy, and extends the analysis to other types of fiscal competition. 相似文献
11.
This paper argues that electoral competition may hinder rather than foster political accountability, especially when elected officers can choose among a number of tax instruments. We develop a political agency model showing that politicians in more competitive jurisdictions use less salient tax instruments more intensely. Defining salience as visibility or, analogously, as voters' awareness of the costs associated with specific government revenue sources, we argue that voters are less likely to hold politicians to account for the associated tax burden of a less salient instrument. This in turn implies that strategic politicians will more heavily rely on less salient revenue sources when electoral competition is stronger. Using data on Italian municipal elections and taxes over a 10-year period, we determine the degree of salience of various tax instruments, including property taxes (high salience) and government fees for official documents (low salience). We then show that mayors facing stronger competition for re-election use less salient tax instruments more intensely. 相似文献
12.
We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries, and these countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenue from capital taxation to the havens. We demonstrate that the full or partial elimination of tax havens would improve welfare in non-haven countries. We also demonstrate that the smaller countries choose to become tax havens, and we show that the abolition of a sufficiently small number of the relatively large havens leaves all countries better off, including the remaining havens. We argue that these results extend to the case where there are also taxes on wage income that involve administrative and compliance costs. 相似文献
13.
《Journal of public economics》2005,89(9-10):1789-1821
This paper presents a theoretical model with tax exporting due to external ownership of a fraction θ of the land in each local jurisdiction. There are n local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area (n≥1) and many metropolitan areas in a world economy. The paper examines the usage of business property taxes and source-based wage taxes by local jurisdictions, first in the presence of and then in the absence of residence-based lump-sum taxes, and how this depends on θ and n. The paper then examines the choice of a world, national or state government as to whether to allow local (metropolitan or sub-metropolitan) governments to use business property taxes, wage taxes or both, assuming that the local governments choose the actual tax rates. 相似文献
14.
《European Journal of Political Economy》1987,3(3):407-411
Increased taxation in a single, local jurisdiction changes the tax base of the national as well as the local government. Changes in national-government tax revenue then affect citizens in other jurisdictions. Local fiscal decisions, which neglect such national spillovers, are suboptimal. If factor supply decreases with the local tax rate, a reduction in tax-financed spending on local-government goods increases welfare. A reduction in tax-financed local-government redistributions increases welfare generally. 相似文献
15.
Ralph M. Braid 《Journal of public economics》2010,94(11-12):890-897
This paper examines the provision of a pure local public good in jurisdictions that are spaced evenly along an infinite line. Each jurisdiction either supplies the local public good, or else its residents travel to another jurisdiction to consume the local public good. The equilibrium spacing between jurisdictions which supply the local public good, which can be uneven (varying between a minimum spacing and a maximum spacing for given exogenous parameters), can be greater than, equal to, or less than the socially optimal spacing. 相似文献
16.
In a dynamic model of a risk-neutral competitive firm that can lower its pollution emissions per unit of output by building up abatement capital stock, we examine the effect of a higher pollution tax rate on abatement investment both under full certainty and when the timing or the size of the tax increase is uncertain. We show that a higher pollution tax encourages abatement investment if it does not exceed a certain threshold rate. However, akin to the Diamond-Mirrlees tax anomaly, it is possible that a higher pollution tax rate results in more pollution. The magnitude uncertainty discourages abatement investment, but at the time of the actual tax increase the abatement investment path may shift either upward or downward. On the other hand, when the timing is uncertain, the abatement investment path always jumps upward, thus suggesting that the effect of magnitude uncertainty on the optimal investment path may be more pronounced than that of timing uncertainty. Further, we show that the ad hoc practice of raising the discount rate to account for the uncertainty leads to underinvestment in abatement capital. We show how the size of this underinvestment bias varies with the future tax increase. Finally, we show that a credible threat to accelerate the tax increase can induce more abatement investment. 相似文献
17.
Klaus Conrad 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2001,19(4):361-381
The purpose of the paper is to narrow the gap between the widespread use of voluntary agreements and research on the rationale of such approaches. A topical example are voluntary agreements of many industries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions because of global warming. If the industry anticipates that taxes and fees will be introduced in the coming years, it seems rational to act in advance in order to mitigate the tax levels.The conventional approach in strategic trade and tax models was to look at a two-stage game where governments set taxes first and then firms react. In such a policy regime the government is concerned about the international competitiveness of its firms and sets taxes below marginal damages. In this paper, we consider a policy regime with a reversed timing. Firms commit themselves in the face of emission taxes to abatement efforts and to lower levels of the environmentally intensive output. Then the government introduces the tax. Under this timing of strategies the tax is equal to marginal damage. Firms waive profit and reduce output in order to use less of the polluting input. The reward for this behavior will be a less strict use of policy instruments and hence lower abatement costs in the near future. 相似文献
18.
We study the impact of E‐commerce across state lines in the United States on tax revenue, public good provision, and real income. In particular, in light of the unenforceable nature of interstate taxation, we evaluate the potential gains from coordinating sales and income state taxes among sovereign jurisdictions. We find that the revenue at risk is small and that the welfare gains or losses of any countervailing policy measures, in particular those associated with the Streamlined Sales Tax Project, are even smaller. 相似文献
19.
辖区间竞争、策略性财政政策与FDI增长绩效的区域特征 总被引:32,自引:3,他引:29
本文基于财政视角,利用省际数据实证分析了为获取竞争的相对优势,辖区政府所采取的竞争策略及其随时间的转换特征,以及策略选择对FDI增长绩效的影响。研究显示:竞争的外部性使辖区间财政政策的选择表现出明显的策略性,其中,粗放式的税价竞争一直是我国辖区间竞争的主要特征,但随着时间的变化,竞争策略正在由单纯的税价竞争向财政支出领域扩展。不仅如此,由于经济发展水平的差异,辖区在竞争对象的选择上较竞争初期有了更强的针对性。辖区间激烈的财政竞争一方面使辖区内财政支出对非税收入的依赖程度出现不同程度的上升,另一方面也使财政支出结构表现出不同程度的扭曲。辖区间财政竞争不仅使辖区吸收FDI溢出效应的能力下降,降低了FDI的增长绩效,而且也使FDI的增长绩效在辖区间表现出明显的差异性。 相似文献
20.
This paper focuses on the design of a consumption tax in a world of capital risk. The certainty literature discusses two standard options, namely the cash flow method and the pre-payment method (i.e., the wage tax), and finds the two approaches to be equivalent. Models that consider capital risk (via asset choice) reach different conclusions. This discrepancy arises in part due to a different choice of the social discount rate. In light of the failure of the discount-rate argument to resolve the issue at hand, we explore the market certainty equivalence of risky government revenue. We let revenue risks stay in the private sector, and examine the market value of the feasible transfer (e.g., in the form of a public good) back to households. We reach three broad conclusions. First, we find that if the state returns to each household its own tax-revenue risks, equivalence will be re-established as in certainty models. Next, we show that if the state engages in intergenerational risk sharing (e.g., through a system of stochastic tax transfers), the wage tax cannot be construed to be a valid pre-payment alternative to the cash flow or a modified wage-tax-ation system. Efficient risk allocation across generations under a cash flow tax (or, one that includes future capital gains as well as wages in the tax base) leads to a Pareto improvement over the simple wage tax. Finally, a major policy implication follows; in order to be practicable, a consumption tax would have to be implemented via registered savings accounts much in the fashion of the Canadian registered retirement savings plans program rather than through the pre-payment route. 相似文献