Econometrics for Evaluations: An Introduction to Recent Developments

There has recently been a rapid expansion of interest in the econometrics of program evaluation, both within Australia and around the world. We provide a review of the key issues and recent developments in this field. A central feature of recent developments is the attempt to allow for program impacts that vary across individuals. This contrasts with earlier econometric approaches that implicitly assumed a homogeneous treatment effect. We survey alternative nonexperimental estimation strategies and note that they can be characterised by (1) an assumption about how untreated outcomes vary across individuals: this assumption in turn suggests how the counter-factual untreated outcomes of program participants should be estimated, and (2) the way in which the estimator aggregates or weights the program impacts of different individuals in the treatment group. We also emphasise the importance of good data.     

How should the use of nonrenewables be taxed under a public budget constraint?

Most developed countries will be facing severe public budget constraints. We examine how extraction or use of nonrenewable resources should be taxed when governments need to collect commodity tax revenues. Moreover, we show how our results can be directly used to indicate how carbon taxation of nonrenewable energy sources should be increased in the presence of public-revenue needs. The obtained tax formula is an augmented, dynamic version of the standard Ramsey taxation rule. It distorts developed reserves, which are reduced, and their depletion, which is slowed down, going further in the direction prescribed for the resolution of the climate externality. We present a simple calibrated application of our results to illustrate how carbon taxation of oil should be strongly augmented, and the incidence of this adjustment on oil use and tax revenues.     

Optimal taxation of flow pollutants when firms may also inflict catastrophic environmental damage

In many industries firms affect the environment in two distinct types of ways. Firstly they emit routine, anticipated volumes of “flow pollutants”, secondly they can potentially inflict catastrophic environmental damage, liability for which may be overhanging or limited by the law. Operaters of chemical plants, nuclear power stations and oil tankers are three examples. If an emissions tax or charge is to be levied on the flow pollutants in these cases how should it be set? We use simple dynamic-programming techniques to characterise second-best optimality. We identify contexts in which the tax should be raised above its Pigovian level to take account of the catastrophic potential, and others where it should be set below that level. The analysis has significant implications for how policymakers should go about calibrating “ecological taxes” in a number of high profile industries.     

PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF EDUCATION IN A R&D-BASED GROWTH MODEL

We develop a R&D‐based growth model with endogenous accumulation of human capital. We investigate the idea that education is a good entering in the preferences of individuals. We seek to analyse how the decisions of individuals to invest in human capital can be altered by changes in economic policies and how they can be reflected on the level of growth in the long run. We show that policy changes affect growth through their effect on the decision of individuals to invest in human capital. The effects obtained depend whether individuals enjoy to acquire education or if they consider it as a ‘bad’. In the absence of any policy intervention, the level of growth can be excessive or insufficient compared with the optimum.     

Making Partner*

Associates need reputation and financial resources to make partner at law firms, consultancies, and venture capital organizations. We provide a theory for how this prospect influences the business risk strategy they pursue and their execution effort. In our model, business risk affects how reputation evolves and the benchmark reputation for making partner through the impact of execution effort on the financial resources accumulated. We show that when business risk is observable, associates with good reputation take on high business risk, as opposed to low business risk, in order to protect their reputation. We also show that opening partner positions decreases the effort incentives of the associates with the best reputation. Finally, we conjecture that wage dispersion at the associate level should be higher when business risk is unobservable.     

The Time‐Consistent Public Goods Provision

In this study, we reconsider the optimal nonlinear tax problem with the public good from the perspective of the commitment issue and examine how it affects the condition of the public good provision. We show that the Samuelson rule should be modified when the government cannot commit and the skill types of taxpayers are revealed in the first period. This is true even if the preference of the taxpayers is separable and additive with respect to consumption and leisure. Our analysis also shows how the lack of commitment affects the formula of the marginal cost of public funds and the level of public good provision. Our findings imply that the level of the public good may be excessive in comparison to the case where the government can commit to its tax policy.     

Collective Risk Control and Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion

We provide an analysis of odds‐improving self‐protection for when it yields collective benefits to groups, such as alliances of nations, for whom risks of loss are public bads and prevention of loss is a public good. Our analysis of common risk reduction shows how diminishing returns in risk improvement can be folded into income effects. These income effects then imply that whether protection is inferior or normal depends on the risk aversion characteristics of underlying utility functions, and on the interaction between these, the level of risk, and marginal effectiveness of risk abatement. We demonstrate how public good inferiority is highly likely when the good is “group risk reduction.” In fact, we discover a natural or endogenous limit on the size of a group and of the amount of risk controlling outlay it will provide under Nash behavior. We call this limit an “Inferior Goods Barrier” to voluntary risk reduction. For the paradigm case of declining risk aversion, increases in group size(wealth) will cause provision of more safety to change from a normal to an inferior good thereby creating such a barrier.     

Coordination of sectoral climate policies and life cycle emissions

Drastically reducing greenhouse gas emissions involves numerous specific actions in each sector of the economy. The costs and abatement potential of these measures are interdependent because of sectoral linkages. For instance, the carbon footprint of electric vehicles depends on the electricity mix. This issue has received large attention in the literature on Life Cycle Assessments (LCA). This paper analyzes how life cycle considerations should be integrated into policy design. We model a partial equilibrium with two vertically connected sectors, an upstream (e.g. electricity) and a downstream (e.g. transportation) one. In each sector, a dirty and a clean technology are available. The clean downstream technology consumes the upstream good and may thus shift emissions to the upstream sector. Our main contribution is to detail how optimal subsidies on clean technologies should incorporate life cycle emissions when carbon pricing is limited. The optimal downstream subsidy should be corrected for all external costs generated in the upstream sector, not only unpriced pollution but also the fiscal externality due to the subsidy to the clean upstream technology. We also analyze the joint optimization of upstream and downstream policies. The upstream subsidy should not incorporate features of the downstream sector, whereas the downstream optimal subsidy depends upon the upstream sector characteristics. All results are illustrated using a calibrated example of the electrification of passenger cars.     

Choosing between imperfect proxies for a corrective tax

Choices are sometimes distorted by internalities or externalities. This paper considers a setting in which the distortion cannot be taxed directly, and asks how a policymaker should choose a proxy variable to tax instead. We derive a criterion for when one proxy should be preferred to another, and consider a range of factors with implications for this criterion. These factors are (i) sensitivity to the tax rate, (ii) how accurately the taxed variable approximates the distorted variable, (iii) susceptibility to offsetting behavior, and (iv) consumer heterogeneity. Our analysis is illustrated with a comparison between ad valorem and volumetric taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages.     

MECHANISM AND IMPACTS OF EMBEZZLEMENT IN A DUOPOLISTIC MARKET*

We consider the case in which a corruptible manager contemplates to embezzle his/her firm's revenues by overstating the production costs in a duopolistic market. In order to embezzle more, the manager chooses to increase the firm's output. This partially corrects the market failures associated with the oligopoly distortion. Nevertheless, pervasive and large‐scale embezzlement is detrimental and should be addressed, although moderate embezzlement might be socially good. We also consider how the length of tenure affects the manager's behaviours: extending the tenure cannot eradicate embezzlement, and an insufficient rise of the reward rate may only defer embezzlement.     

Ordering effects in contingent valuation surveys

This paper focuses on ordering effects in CVM surveys; how the expressed value of a particular good valued in a sequence of several goods depends on where in the sequence the good is valued. We use data from a Norwegian CVM survey focusing on WTP for a 50% reduction in air pollution from car traffic to test for the existence of ordering effects and to apply a test for internal consistency. We found considerable and significant ordering effects in our data, but were not able to reject the hypothesis of internal consistency. Based on our survey, we argue that ordering effects may be a result of rational choice. These effects are problematic if a sequential valuation procedure is applied to a simultaneous problem, and/or the respondents are given imperfect information about the decision problem.     

Price-raising drug enforcement and property crime: a dynamic model

Price-raising drug enforcement suppresses drug use, but it is expensive and may increase property crime. This has led to contradictory recommendations concerning how drug enforcement should or should not be used. We reconcile these recommendations by incorporating the enforcement's effects on both drug use and on property crime within an optimal-control model that recognizes whether convicted drug-involved property offenders are merely incarcerated or whether they receive some form of drug treatment.     

Imitation and the Incentive to Contribute Early in a Sequential Public Good Game

Whether motivated by reciprocity or conformity, imitation is common in public good contexts. We consider the incentive for an agent to contribute to a public good if he expects imitation from others. Using a sequential public good game with exogenous ordering, we show that agents early enough in the sequence who believe imitation to be sufficiently likely would want to contribute. By contributing, they expect total contributions to increase significantly. We also show that preferences determine how early an agent need be, that the observed share of imitators in experiments is sufficiently high to warrant contribution and that an increase in group size reduces the incentive to contribute.     

The Political Economy of Tax-Based Incomes Policy: Wealth Effects of Post Keynesian TIP

This paper explores the economics of electoral democracy, an almost entirely neglected subject. Running for office necessitates resources. But students of democracy have had almost nothing to say about how much money should be spent by candidates or where that money should come from. As a result, there is a gaping void in the theory of democracy. Joseph A. Schumpeter used a market analogy in his discussion of the electoral process, but even he did not discuss how electoral campaigns are to be paid for. In fact, the few citizens who largely fund campaigns for office in the United States purchase non-rivalrous influence. They obtain the ability to shape the policies that affect all citizens. In this way, political equality is undermined. The paper concludes that achieving a more representative political system can best be attained by treating political campaigns as a public good.     

OPTIMAL ADJUSTMENT OF THE COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This paper analyses how the composition of public expenditure should be adjusted to maximize the economic growth rate in developing countries. We first apply a theoretical framework to empirical data from 50 countries. We then demonstrate how each country should adjust public expenditure for the purpose of maximizing growth. Results show that developing countries in Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe have generally misallocated public expenditures in favour of defence, at the expense of public services. Other region‐specific results suggest that Asian developing countries should increase expenditure on education, and that Middle Eastern countries should decrease expenditure on education in favour of health.     

The effects of insider trading on insiders effort in good and bad times

We analyze the effects of insider trading on insiders' effort decisions and on the value of firms. We consider a situation in which the final output of a firm and the productivity of managerial effort will depend on whether the firm is in a good or a bad state. When the state is not verifiable, the managerial contract cannot be made explicitly contingent on it: consequently, a contract that does not allow for insider trading would lead to the insiders' facing the same incentive scheme in good and bad times. Under a contract that allows for insider trading, however, insiders will buy shares on receiving (ahead of the market) good news and will sell shares on receiving bad news; consequently, they will end up facing different incentive scheme in good and bad times. Whether this effect is desirable depends on how the marginal productivity of managerial effort in good times compares with that in bad times. In particular, we show that allowing insider trading may improve managers' effort decisions and consequently may increase corporate value and benefit shareholders.     

当前我国财政农业补贴中存在的问题及对策

财政补贴农业是农村经济发展的有效途径,但如何把好的政策用好却是一个难题.我国当前的财政农业补贴就存在这样那样的问题,如补贴总量小、稳定增长机制尚未形成、补贴标准混乱等.要解决这些问题需要遵循一定的原则,在遵循这些原则的基础上,确定合适的目标,进而采取相应的改进措施.     

Interrogating inclusive growth: Implications for conceptualisation,measurement and policy practice

The idea that economic growth ought to be inclusive—that governments and economic policy makers should concern themselves with not just the “pace but also the pattern” of growth—has gained considerable traction in recent years. Actors ranging from local, state, regional and national governments to civic or non-government actors to multinational corporations have embraced the rhetoric of inclusive growth, with many also developing their own suite of corresponding policy, strategy, or measurement approaches. Despite—or perhaps even because of—its popularity and proliferation, there is very little agreement around what inclusive growth actually is, how and at what spatial scale it should be pursued, and how outcomes ought to be measured. In this paper, we provide a conceptual synopsis of how and where inclusive growth emerged, what its aims are, and how it is understood and measured by its many different practitioners. We conclude with an assessment of whether this potentially valuable concept can be refined and incorporated into a unified and useful framework to inform policy and decision making.     

Some thoughts about referendums, representative democracy, and separation of powers

Referendums have experienced some sort of a comeback. Citizen involvement in political decisions is seen increasingly as a healthy add-on in democratic polities. While earlier writers on democratic theory often saw a danger in increased participation of citizens, more recently several authors suggest that this participation should be fostered. I argue in this paper that both sides in the debate neglect important aspects of referendums. Discussing whether direct participation by the citizens is a good or bad thing addresses only half the story. More precisely, we have to get a better idea about how referendums interact with the traditional institutions of representative democracy.     

Policy Design and Rent Seeking: Targeted versus Broad Based Intervention

The present paper analyzes how policy intervention should be designed so as to create industrialization. We focus on whether intervention should be targeted, promoting investment in specific firms or industries, or broad based, increasing the profitability of investment in general. Our main argument is that in areas with weak institutions, broad based policies should be chosen, while in areas with strong institutions, targeted policies may be less costly in moving the economy out of a poverty trap. The targeted policy is attractive because it internalized a demand externality, but is also more exposed to rent seeking, since “picking a winner” involves a greater measure of discretion in policy formulation and implementation. The broad based policy does not discriminate between industries and is, hence, less likely to be captured by rent seekers, but also does not take advantage of the demand externality.