Adam Smith's Problems and Ours

The paper contrasts what modern economists, reflecting the priorities of general equilibrium theory, expect to find in the Wealth of Nations with Smith's own much broader theoretical and policy concerns. A theory of growth in which increasing returns are pervasive conflicts not only with neo-classical expectations but with the emphasis on diminishing returns to be found in Smith's classical successors. Smith's assumptions on rationality, technology, firms, 'projectors', and the incompleteness of markets do not square with post-Walrasian criteria. In advancing practical solutions Smith also shows more concern for the problems of living in a second-best world than is common in pure theories of the invisible hand and the thinking of some of his free-market admirers.     

Modelling research and development: How do firms solve design problems?

One way of thinking about research and development is to recognise that firms are trying to solve particular design problems. We often build these design problems into our models, but are forced to oversimplify them in order to make the models solvable. The approach taken in this paper is to acknowledge that design problems are often insoluble using standard techniques and to model instead the process by which firms solve them. Two such processes are simulated in detail. The first, individual experimental search, is based on a problem-solving technique known as simulated annealing. The second, partial imitation, involves learning at a social level and is based on a problem-solving technique known as the genetic algorithm. Some economic implications of these processes are explored, including their application to stochastic learning curves, patent design and the importance of `technodiversity' in the introduction of new technology to developing countries.     

Does the invisible hand hold or lead? Market adjustment in an entrepreneurial economy

Adam Smith's “invisible hand” is one of the best-known phrases in economics, but its meaning is somewhat ambiguous. The invisible hand might be viewed as holding the economy close to equilibrium, yet Smith actually says that individuals are led by an invisible hand. Entrepreneurial forces lead an economy along a path that generates economic progress, and that path is determined by the disruptive forces of entrepreneurship. Rather than viewing an economy as tending toward an equilibrium, it is more accurate to view an economy as characterized by continuing progress, led by the invisible hand of entrepreneurial activity. JEL Code B53, D21, E32, O31     

Capitalism and democracy at a crossroads: the civilizational dimension

This paper evaluates Schumpeter's grand vision as reflected in his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, and elaborates it in conjunction with the so-called “globalization” trends characteristic of the wake of the twenty-first century. In addition to the evolutionary nature of his methodology, the institutionalist dimension of Schumpeter's definitions are brought to light. A case is made for a fundamental process of “uncreative destruction” as far as the institutional setup of the economy is concerned. The contention of this paper is that there is ample support in Schumpeterian analysis for a counterpoint to the liberal thesis that envisages the worldwide spread of individualism, market economies, and democratic forms of government.     

Schumpeter and the `Schmollerprogramm': integrating theory and history in the analysis of economic development

This essay addresses the historical and institutional aspects of Schumpeter's thought. It suggests that Schumpeter prepared a pluralist research agenda, formulated in accordance with the conceptual perspective of the German Historical School, as presented by major scholars such as Schmoller, Sombart, Spiethoff and Max Weber. Schumpeter's notion of development, with its emphasis on the correspondence of economic and socio-cultural evolution, is therefore to be viewed in the context of the comprehensive Schmollerian approach. Moreover the ethical-evolutionary components of Schmoller's ideas point at the vital role of the German Historical School in the elaboration of a modern evolutionary economics in Schumpeterian terms. The essay concludes that the Schmollerprogramm is going to inspire further developments in Schumpeterian economics, as the integration of theory and history continuously marks the research agenda of evolutionary approaches to economic development.     

Persistent unemployment and co-ordination issues: an evolutionary perspective

Abstract. In this paper we look at unemployment as a phenomenon which reflects the co-ordination problems that characterize out-of-equilibrium processes of adjustment. The analysis carried out shifts the focus from structural factors to the economic process. It shows that unemployment cannot be satisfactorily explained – and policy interventions devised – by focusing only on specific characters of the technology or confining the analysis to structural factors concerning the labour market. The co-ordination mechanisms of adjustment processes rather than the fundamentals of the economy appear, in this light, as the main determinants of differences in unemployment trends in different economies; and monetary policy comes back to the center of the stage as an essential element of the working of these mechanisms. RID="*" ID="*" We thank anonymous referees for their very useful comments, and Elena Lega for the helpful support to the simulation analysis carried out. Correspondence to: J.-L. Gaffard     

Evolution of harvesting strategies: replicator and resource dynamics

Abstract. Economic theories of managing renewable resources, such as fisheries and forestry, traditionally assume that individual harvesters are perfectly rational and thus able to compute the harvesting strategy that maximizes their discounted profits. The current paper presents an alternative approach based on bounded rationality and evolutionary mechanisms. It is assumed that individual harvesters face a choice between two harvesting strategies. The evolution of the distribution of strategies in the population is modeled through a replicator dynamics equation. The latter captures the idea that strategies yielding above average profits are demanded more than strategies yielding below average profits, so that the first type ends up accounting for a larger part in the population. From a mathematical perspective, the combination of resource and evolutionary processes leads to complex dynamics. The paper presents the existence and stability conditions for each steady-state of the system and analyzes dynamic paths to the equilibrium. In addition, effects of changes in prices are analyzed. A main result of the paper is that under certain conditions both strategies can survive in the long-run. Correspondence to: J. Noailly     

Religion and economic growth: was Weber right?

Evidence of falling wages in Catholic cities and rising wages in Protestant cities between 1500 and 1750, during the spread of literacy in the vernacular, is inconsistent with most theoretical models of economic growth. In The Protestant Ethic, Weber suggested an alternative explanation based on culture. Here, a theoretical model confirms that a small change in the subjective cost of cooperating with strangers can generate a profound transformation in trading networks. In explaining urban growth in early-modern Europe, specifications compatible with human-capital versions of the neoclassical model and endogenous-growth theory are rejected in favor of a “small-world” formulation based on the Weber thesis.     

Evolutionary economics and economic geography

This article attempts to explore how key notions from Evolutionary Economics, such as selection, path-dependency, chance and increasing returns, may be applied to two key topics in Economic Geography. The first issue is the problem of how to specify the (potential) impact of the spatial environment on new variety in terms of technological change. Evolutionary thinking may be useful to describe and explain: (1) the process of localized `collective' learning in a regional context, (2) the adjustment problems that regions may be confronted with in a world of increasing variation, and (3) the spatial formation of newly emerging industries as an evolutionary process, in which the spatial connotation of increasing returns (that is, agglomeration economies) may result in a spatial lock-in. The second issue is the problem of how new variety may affect the long-term evolution of the spatial system. We distinguish three approaches that, each in a different way, apply evolutionary notions to the nature of spatial evolution. This is strongly related to the issue whether mechanisms of chance and increasing returns, rather than selection and path-dependency, lay at the root of the spatial evolution of new technology.     

The learning economy and embodied knowledge flows in Great Britain

This paper examines the `learning economy' from the perspective of occupational characteristics and changes in the British labour market between 1980 and 1992. Following a discussion of the learning and knowledge economy, cross-sectional employment data are analysed to ascertain which occupations can be classified as knowledge-based. Longitudinal career history data are then used to trace the flows of these `knowledge workers' over time. Sectoral shifts are examined, with a particular focus on the knowledge-intensive service sectors. The data come from the Employment in Britain survey: a large-scale employee survey from 1992. The approach used allows us to measure somewhat intangible aspects of economic behaviour such as learning and tacit knowledge and attempt to trace their flows. Shifts in knowledge from the manufacturing to the service sector are shown to be important and related to previous work which demonstrated the importance of knowledge intensive business services for both output and productivity in manufacturing.     

Routines and incentives in group tasks*

The artificial context “Target the Two” has been used in experiments to explore some of the features of routinization and learning. Two agents must learn to coordinate their actions to achieve a common goal, without being allowed to use verbal communication. This article reports an experiment, in which we compare the degree of routinization and the performance of players in two treatments. Each treatment submits players to the same sequence of starting configurations, but differs in terms of the payoff function. In the first treatment (A), the payoff is based on the number of moves required to achieve the goal, whereas in the second treatment (B) the payoff depends on the time required for completion. We observe that (1) in treatment B subjects tend to play in a more “routinized” way and (2) treatment B reduces the time spent on play, but does not decrease the resources (the number of moves) used, relative to treatment A.     

Productive activities and the wealth of nations: some reasons for Quesnay's failure and Smith's success

The opposition between productive activity (agriculture) and unproductive ones (the others) underlies the Tableau économique. Smith borrows Quesnay's theory of production but deeply transforms it into a distinction between productive and unproductive labour. In any case, it seems quite natural to relate the increase of the wealth of a nation to the relative importance of productive activities vis-à-vis unproductive ones. Quesnay and Smith both share this view. However, if Smith is perfectly right in doing so, Quesnay has failed to prove a definite relation between the fraction of the revenue spent with respect to the productive sector, on the one hand, and the level or growth of the revenue, on the other. Differences in political philosophy may account for this unequal analytical performance.     

Endogenous fluctuations in the demand for education

Abstract. Enrollment rates to higher education reveal a quite large variation over time which cannot be explained by productivity shocks alone. We develop a human capital investment model in an overlapping generations framework that features endogenous fluctuations in the demand for education. Agents are heterogeneous in their beliefs about future wage differentials. An evolutionary competition between the heterogeneous beliefs determines the fraction of the newborn generation having a certain belief. Costly access to information on the returns to education induces agents to use potentially destabilizing backward looking prediction rules. Only if previous generations experience regret about their human capital investment decisions, will agents choose a more sophisticated prediction rule that dampens the cycle. Access to information becomes key for stable flows to higher education. RID="*" ID="*"We would like to thank Cars Hommes, Florian Wagener, seminar participants at the University of Amsterdam, participants of the workshop on ‘Skill Needs and Labor Market Dynamics’ at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) for helpful discussions, and an editor of this Journal and three anonymous referees for their comments. Tuinstra's research is supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) under a MaG-Pionier grant. Neugart acknowledges financial support from the German Ministry of Education. Parts of the research were done while Tuinstra was visiting the WZB and when Neugart was visiting CeNDEF. Correspondence to: The research for this paper was done while the first author was affiliated with the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.     

Capitalism and democracy in the 21st century: a Kaleckian interpretation of a Schumpeterian problem

The paper reinterprets Schumpeter's views on the dynamic effects of taxation, as originally expressed in Crisis of the Tax State, from a Kaleckian perspective. In light of Schumpeter's rejection of Keynesian and Marshallian approaches to taxation, the paper argues that a recently developed Kaleckian approach provides an appropriate basis from which to analyse the effects on the business cycle of balanced changes in the structure of taxation. It is shown that, under certain shifting assumptions, increases in the taxation of wages or profits will stimulate investment and attenuate the amplitude of the business cycle. Ultimately, the shifting of taxes reduces to a conflict over income shares. The changing distribution of income in the United Kingdom in recent years suggests that investment is likely to remain sluggish unless there is a significant reversal of income shares. This may give rise to increasing economic and political tensions into the 21st century.     

Actions influenced by a social network

A simple framework is presented in which, each period, each of N individuals chooses among K alternatives. Individual actions are interrelated through a social network which arrays the strength of influence of each person on each other person. Emphasis is on the role of the network. The framework accommodates a variety of particular contexts, suggests theorems, and unifies a sizable part of the fragmented literature on network interaction.     

Adam Smith versus Sima Qian: Comment on the Tao of markets

In contrast with Professor Young's views ( Pacific Economic Review , 1, 137–45), this paper argues (1) that Adam Smith came to his conclusion about the "invisible hand" before 1766, and hence the intellectual debt, if any, of Smith to the great Chinese historian Sima Qian via the agency of Turgot and the two Chinese visitors is minimal; and (2) that the allocative function of the price mechanism is explicit not only in The Wealth of Nations but also in Adam Smith's lecture notes and other writings from his years at Glasgow University before he left for Europe in 1764.     

The power of ESS: An experimental study

Abstract. Our experimental design mimics a traditional evolutionary game framework where players are matched pairwise to play a symmetric 33 bimatrix game that has two Nash equilibria. One equilibrium is an evolutionary stable state, or ESS; the other is an equilibrium in dominated strategies. Our primary experimental result is the observation that the ESS becomes extremely attractive when subjects have minimal information about the payoff functions, although the dominated equilibrium assures the highest equilibrium payoff. The attractiveness of the ESS is only moderate when players are completely informed about the 33 payoff matrix. Correspondence to: S.K. Berninghaus     

Growth and equilibrium indeterminacy: the role of capital mobility

Summary. The paper presents a human capital driven endogenous growth model which, in general, permits a multiplicity of equilibrium balanced growth paths. It is shown that allowing for perfect capital mobility across countries increases the range of parameter values for which the model permits equilibrium indeterminacy. As opposed to the closed capital markets case, simple restrictions on preferences are no longer sufficient to eliminate the indeterminacy. Intuitively, under perfect capital mobility agents are able to smooth consumption completely. This induces an economy with open capital markets to behave like a closed economy with linear preferences thereby increasing the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy. Received: 18 November 1998; revised version: 10 August 1999     

A spectre is haunting the world – the spectre of global capitalism

Individual property rights are fruitful for economic development because they civilise self-interest by forcing it to serve the common good. The history of previous property rights “cycles,” however, shows that their ability to do this deterioriates over time because the laws of property fall under the control of those whom property is meant to discipline. Irresponsible ownership then intensifies inequality until a breaking point is reached. The present cycle is no exception, but its breaking point has been postponed by the growth of the democratically-inspired welfare state. Globalisation is now eroding the financial basis of this, because mobile capital can escape taxation, leaving labour to carry the burden. The main thrust of this movement is now found in the World Trade Organisation, whose control of intellectual property and commitment to free trade in money as well as goods, can only increase inequality between countries as well as within them. It represents individual property rights which are out of any form of social control, since there is no global mechanism for civilising self-interest. Schumpeter's sense of the impending demise of capitalism, if not of its replacement by socialism, may yet be vindicated.     

Could institutional reform have saved Easter Island?

This paper extends the Brander and Taylor general-equilibrium model of population and resource management dynamics to a variety of institutional settings. The authors simulate the economic history of Easter Island, modifying the model to examine the impact of market institutions and different property-rights structures. The major finding of the paper is that modification of the economic institutions on Easter Island could have damped the feast-and-famine cycles that plagued its later history.