Emission trading in Europe with an exchange rate

This paper explores the analytical and empirical properties of a new method for emission trading according to a fixed exchange rate. The exchange rate is based on the ratios of the marginal costs of abatement in the optimal solution in order to account for the impact of the location of emission sources on the deposition. It is shown that, generally, this system will not achieve the optimal solution and does not guarantee that environmental deposition constraints are not violated, although total abatement costs are always reduced. A routine was developed to mimic trading as a bilateral, sequential process, subject to an exchange rate. In the example used, results for SO₂ emissions in Europe show that, starting from a uniform reduction, exchange-rate trading achieves higher cost savings than one-to-one trading, without achieving the cost minimum. Sulfur deposition targets are not violated since the initial emission allocation overfulfilled targets at many places. The results are sensitive to: pre-trade emission levels, the transaction costs, the availability of information on potential cost savings and assumptions made on the behavior of trading partners.     

The U.S. allowance trading system for sulfur dioxide: An update on market experience

In 1990, the U.S. Congress passed legislation that amended the Clean Air Act to create a new program to mitigate the effects of acid deposition in the U.S. through emission reductions of sulfur dioxide (SO₂) and nitrogen oxides (NO_x) at electric utility plants across the country. The SO₂ reductions, totalling a 40% reduction nationally from 1980 levels or a 10 million ton reduction annually, are achieved largely through an emission trading system, the largest program of its kind designed to date. This trading system has the potential to save up to half of the compliance costs associated with more traditional source-by-source emission limit programs.This paper briefly discusses background on the acid rain issue in the United States, and the principal features of the program, including: a permanent cap on utility emissions of SO₂ beginning in 2010, decision to grant up-front allocation of emission credits to reduce individual approvals of trades, the use of continuous emission monitors and automatic penalties to ensure compliance, and integration of the Acid Rain program requirements with other Clean Air Act programs. The paper also discusses the development of the allowance trading market to date, including the types of compliance options chosen and quantity and type of emissions trading being conducted.The U.S. Government right to retain a non-exclusive, royalty free licence in and to any copyright is acknowledged.     

Creating Markets for Air Pollution Control in Europe and the USA

This paper surveys recent efforts to relax the rigid regulatory frameworks for air pollution control in Europe and the USA. European policies have mainly taken the form of bubbles and compensation or offset schemes. Emission trading has been limited to intra-firm solutions for various reasons: industry structure, absence of real scarcity, and too restrictive trading rules. Bubbles have been granted to homogenous sectors only and can be characterized as direct regulation for a group rather than tradable permit systems. By contrast, the sulphur allowance program in the USA has laid down the foundation for a pollution permit market with few formal restrictions. Problems that arise are mainly related to local environmental and public utility controls. Europe can learn from the USA that regular national permit markets could be installed, preferably for homogenous sectors. In designing the permit system, the differences between the USA and Europe in terms of ecosystem sensitivity, stringency of regulation and differentiation of regional environmental policy have to be taken into account.     

Trading Sulphur Emissions in Europe: `Guided Bilateral Trade'

In this paper a system of `guided permit trading' is developed for SO₂emissions reduction which considers permit trading as a bilateral andsequential process. This implies that in order to meet the deposition targetsat the end of the trading process, not every single trade transaction hasto meet the deposition targets. To ensure that the target is ultimately met,the number of permits traded should be controlled by a trade coordinatinginstitution. A simulation of the system of guided bilateral trading ofSO₂ permits among European countries on the basis of the SecondSO₂ Protocol indicates that some non-profitable trade transactionstake place. This prevents the cost effective emission allocation from beingfully achieved. However, the calculations show that guided bilateral permittrading may generate substantial cost savings while contributing toenvironmental protection.     

Home country bias in international emissions trading: Evidence from the EU ETS

We examine the pattern of allowance trades in the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) using highly disaggregated trading data and identify a significant and robust home market bias. Our results point to informational transactions costs that increase when trading across national borders. The existing trade pattern in goods and services explains two thirds of the home bias, with the remainder due to other causes. Our finding suggests that firms make use of existing trade networks to overcome search costs in bilateral allowance trade. Since the home bias differs across firms, it follows that marginal abatement costs are not equalized across market participants of the EU ETS.     

Tobin tax and trading volume tightening: a reassessment

This article extends the previous literature on the Tobin tax. We find that very roughly, a doubling in transaction costs would reduce trading volume by 25% to 40% in the Forex. Most importantly, this article is the first contribution to specify the trading volume of the Forex through different (low and high volatility) regimes. Our results show evidence of nonlinear patterns for trading volumes and transaction costs on the Forex. Thus, the Tobin tax would not have a monotonic impact on trading activity across market conditions. The change in elasticity between low and high volatility regimes would be slight but significantly different. We may suggest that the high-variance regime might be the fundamentalist regime and the low-variance regime might be the chartist regime. It is a first step towards understanding which categories of agents would react to the introduction of a tax. Our results seem consistent with Tobin’s underlying thinking; since a tax would penalize chartists more than fundamentalists, it could reduce exchange rate volatility.     

Time,trading and algorithms in financial sector security

This article examines the financial security issues raised by the rapid development of high-frequency trading (HFT). HFT involves automated algorithmic trading of financial instruments where the objective is to reduce the time scale between the initiation and execution of trades to microseconds (or even nanoseconds) so as to reap competitive advantage. After outlining the contours of a HFT world, the presentation goes on to discuss some of its important consequences and implications. Several matters are discussed in this context: market manipulation, hacking, index construction and violence. Of particular significance for the notion of financial security is the issue of time as embodied in algorithmic trading. In turn this raises concerns over the regulation and management of this new field of financial innovation and trading activity.     

Impacts of EU carbon emission trade directive on energy-intensive industries — Indicative micro-economic analyses

The cost impacts from the European emission trading system (ETS) on energy-intensive manufacturing industries have been investigated. The effects consist of direct costs associated to the CO₂ reduction requirements stated in the EU Directive, and of indirect costs of comparable magnitude that originate from a higher electricity price triggered by the ETS in the power sector. The total cost impacts remain below 2% of the production value for most industries within the ETS in the Kyoto period. In the post-Kyoto phase assuming a 30% CO₂ reduction, the total cost impact may raise up to 8% of production value in the heaviest industry sectors. In steel and cement industries the cost impacts are 3-4 fold compared to the least affected pulp and paper and oil refining. Electricity-intensive industries outside the ETS will also be affected, for example in aluminum and chlorine production the indirect cost impacts from ETS could come up to 10% of production value already in the Kyoto period. As industry sectors are affected differently by the ETS some correcting mechanisms may be worthwhile to consider in securing the operation of the most electricity-intensive sectors, e.g. balancing taxation schemes that may include as income source a levy on the wind-fall profits of the power sector due to ETS. A future improvement in ETS for industries within the scheme could be scaling of the emission reduction requirement so that the relative total emission reduction costs are at about the same level.     

Asset trading volume in a production economy

Judd et al. (J Finance 63: 2203–2217, 2003) show that the stationary Lucas tree model cannot generate nontrivial asset trading: Heterogenous agents will optimally choose a fixed portfolio after initial rebalancing. This paper explores asset trading volume in production economies with heterogeneous agents and dynamically complete market structures. We establish a recursive version of the Negishi approach to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Furthermore, we develop a general method to solve for equilibrium portfolios in production economies within a fairly general set of complete market structures. We thus establish the theoretical reasons why production economies in general generate a nontrivial volume of asset trading even if heterogeneity of the agents is kept to a minimum. We would like to thank W. Brock, D. DeJong and, especially, H. Ennis for comments and suggestions. We also thank seminar participants at Di Tella and San Andrés Universities (Argentina), the Institute for Advanced Studies (Austria), SED Meetings 2005 (Budapest) and SAET Conference 2005 (Vigo).     

Information asymmetry,cluster trading,and market efficiency: Evidence from the Chinese stock market

This study investigates the effect of asymmetry information and illiquidity related to cluster trading on information integration efficiency in the Chinese stock market. The results show that information asymmetry and illiquidity related to cluster trading both negatively affect market efficiency in the Chinese stock market. While the effect of information asymmetry on market efficiency dominates in the informational period, the effect of illiquidity related to cluster trading dominates in other periods, when trading is less concentrated. Noise trading has a positive effect on market efficiency by greatly reducing the illiquidity related to cluster trading; however, its effect on information asymmetry is not significant. Our results provide insight into investors’ trading strategies.     

Endogenous market power in an emissions trading scheme with auctioning

This paper contributes to the literature on market power in emissions permits markets, modeling an emissions trading scheme in which polluters differ with respect to their marginal abatement costs at the business-as-usual emissions. The polluters play a two-stage static complete information game in which their market power arises endogenously from their characteristics. In the first stage all polluters bid in an auction for the distribution of the fixed supply of permits issued by the regulator, and in the second stage they trade these permits in a secondary market. For compliance, they can also engage in abatement activity at a quadratic cost. Under the assumptions of the model, in equilibrium all polluters are successful in the auction. In the secondary market the low-cost emitters are net sellers and the high-cost emitters are net buyers. Moreover, the high-cost emitters are worse off as a result of the strategic behavior. In addition, the secondary market price is unambiguously above the auction clearing price. I find that the aggregate compliance cost when polluters act strategically increases in the heterogeneity of their marginal abatement costs at the business-as-usual emissions, but there exists a threshold of the fixed supply of permits above which strategic behavior is compliance cost-saving for the polluters. Finally, for a low enough variance of the marginal abatement cost at the business-as-usual emissions, strategic behavior is compliance cost-saving for the polluters, regardless of the level of the available supply of permits.     

Construction of legal system of carbon emissions trading in China

Countries in the world have taken a variety of means to control carbon emissions based on the serious situation of global warming,the concept of low-carbon economy and the provisions about emissions in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change（UNFCCC） and the Kyoto Protocol.With the measures of emissions reductions,the system of carbon emissions trading is taking shape.It is necessary for China as the big natural resources consumption country to establish its own carbon emissions trading system.By introducing the carbon emissions trading system of the European Union,America and Japan,and analyzing the market and policies been formed,the carbon emissions trading system in China can be established from the initial configuration of the emissions rights,the subject and object of carbon emissions trading,establishing the carbon emissions trading exchange and supervising and regulating the carbon emissions trading.     

Implications of CO<Subscript>2</Subscript> emissions trading for short-run electricity market outcomes in northwest Europe

We examine the short-run implications of CO₂ trading for power production, prices, emissions, and generator profits in northwest Europe in 2005. Simulation results from a transmission-constrained oligopoly model are compared with theoretical analyses to quantify price increases and windfall profits earned by generators. The analyses indicate that the rates at which CO₂ costs are passed through to wholesale prices are affected by market competitiveness, merit order changes, and elasticities of demand and supply. Emissions trading results in large windfall profits, much but not all of which is due to free allocation of allowances. Profits also increase for some generators because their generation mix has low emissions, and so they benefit from electricity price increases. Most emission reductions appear to be due to demand response not generation redispatch.      

The regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs

This paper addresses the following question: To achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-effectively, should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance, or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target? The total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs, monitoring costs, and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Under common assumptions, I show that allowing noncompliance is cost-effective only if violations are enforced with an increasing marginal penalty. However, one can design a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty that meets the aggregate emissions target with lower expected costs. This last result does not depend on setting an arbitrarily high constant marginal penalty. In fact, the marginal penalty need not be higher than the equilibrium marginal penalty under the policy with the increasing marginal penalty, and can actually be lower. Finally, tying the marginal penalty directly to the permit price allows the policy objective to be achieved without any knowledge of firms’ abatement costs.     

Joint Implementation under the Second Sulfur Protocol: Analysis and Simulation

The purpose of the paper is to analyze the possibility of introducing a system of transferable discharge permits (TDP) to develop the joint implementation procedure conceived in the Second Sulfur Protocol. The analysis is performed considering not only the European countries that have agreed emission reductions in the Protocol, but also a group of non-signing countries that could possibly abate their emissions and alleviate the reduction burden agreed by the former, presumably receiving certain compensation from them in return. The theoretic elements of the system are analyzed and then a simulation software – the program ATLAS – is developed and applied to study the effects of choosing among the possible implementation parameters. In contrast to other simulation programs developed with a similar aim, ATLAS can simulate multilateral permit trades, which are closer than bilateral ones to the concept of joint implementation conceived in the Protocol. The use of this program anticipates that the amount of feasible and profitable transfers would be much higher if a set of European countries which are not Parties to the Protocol were allowed to take part in the system as permit sellers.     

The anatomy of returns from moving average trading rules in the Russian stock market

This paper examines the profitability of index trading strategies that are based on dual moving average crossover (DMAC) rules in the Russian stock market over the 2003–2012 period. It contributes to the existing technical analysis (TA) literature by comparing for the first time in emerging markets the relative performance of individual stocks’ trading portfolios with that of trading strategies for the index that consists of the same stocks (i.e., the most liquid stocks of the Moscow Exchange). The results show that the best trading strategies of the in-sample period can outperform buy-and-hold strategy during the subsequent out-of-sample period, although with low statistical significance. In addition, we document the benefits of using DMAC combinations that are much longer than those employed in previous TA literature. Moreover, the decomposition of the full-sample-period performance into separate bull- and bear-period performances shows that the outperformance of the best past index trading strategies over is mostly attributable to the fact that they managed to stay mostly out of the stock market during a dramatic crash caused by the global financial crisis.     

中国电力行业排污权交易机制设计研究——基于欧美国家的相关经验

排污权交易对排污企业具有内在的调节激励作用,其较传统的行政管制能更有效地促进环境容量资源的有效配置。基于此,本文通过对排污权交易和欧美国家的相关经验进行简要介绍,同时结合我国电力行业的自身特征,构建了我国电力行业排污权交易市场的机制设计框架,并提出了相关的政策建议。     

Tradeable permits for pollution control when emission location matters: What have we learned?

Our knowledge about tradeable permit approaches to pollution control has grown rapidly in the two decades in which they have received serious analytical attention. Not only have the theoretical models become more focused and the empirical work more detailed, but we have now had over a decade of experience with them in the U.S. This article draws upon economic theory, empirical studies, and actual experience with implementation to summarize what we have learned about applying tradeable permits to air pollution control in the special circumstance where the spatial aspects of the problem are a prime consideration.     

Southeastern Europe,Transitions, and the EU – Is Ever-widening Desirable?

The paper addresses the issue of further widening of the EU, given theevident tensions between deepening and widening, in light of thecommitments made to southeastern Europe since the Kosovo intervention.After clarifying the portent of Kosovo for the EU's enlargement, themeaning of EU integration in its proper context is recalled. Mext thepaper sketches how the approach to southeastern Europe fits into therelations the EU has built up with transition economies. Thereafter itexamines the promises made to southeastern Europe, the nature of theagreements entertained for southeastern Europe, and what has since cometo the fore. Before concluding, the paper proposes a more realisticassistance approach, given the area's urgent need for economic, political,and social transformations prior to lodging a credible request for EUmembership.     

Comparing Care Regimes in Europe

Throughout Europe, the family is still an important provider of care, but welfare state policies of individual countries may support and/or supplement the family in different ways, generating different social and economic outcomes. This article compares and categorizes care strategies for children and elderly persons in different member states of the European Union, while also taking into account the varied modalities for providing care, like leave arrangements, financial provisions, and social services. In EU countries, care regimes function as “social joins” ensuring complementarity between economic and demographic institutions and processes. As these processes and institutions change, they provide impetus for care regimes to change as well. However, because ideas and ideals about care are at the core of individual national identities, care regimes also act as independent incentive structures that impinge on patterns of women's labor market participation and fertility.