The effectiveness and efficiency of corporate insolvency law—part two

Little empirical research has been done in the Netherlands (or internationally) into the effect of corporate insolvency proceedings. The Dutch legislature has made several attempts in the past decades to revise the current Dutch Bankruptcy Act (Faillissementswet) of 1893, while almost nothing is known about the effectiveness and efficiency of the Dutch corporate insolvency law. I have studied the effectiveness of the current Dutch insolvency law and of European Directive 2001/23/EC which is incorporated in this law, on the basis of theoretical and large‐scale empirical research. The study concerned all 4167 of the corporate insolvencies that ended in 2004. In the first part of this Article (International Insolvency Review, Volume 17, 3, Winter 2008, pp. 189–209), the research results showed that the Dutch Bankruptcy Act achieved the goals set on it only to a limited degree and that the informal restructuring procedure is of great social importance. In this second part, I concentrate on the conditions imposed by European Directive 2001/23/EC on the European national legislatures to protect employees' rights: automatic transfer of employment contracts in the event of transfers as part of insolvency proceedings, together with measures to prevent misuse of insolvency proceedings in such a way as to deprive employees of the rights provided for in this European Directive. The study shows that, in the Netherlands, not applying automatic transfer of employment contracts when an undertaking or business is transferred as part of an insolvency proceeding does not result in large‐scale misuse of insolvency law. It appears that automatic transfer of employment contracts outside insolvency proceedings can actually impede the informal restructuring of financially unsound companies. These surprising results are interesting for corporate insolvency proceedings worldwide. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rights in rem,Article 5 and the EC Insolvency Regulation: an English perspective

The treatment of security interests is central to any insolvency régime, national or transnational. Under Article 5 of the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (E.C. 1346/2000) extensive protection is given to a security interest—or right in rem—over assets of the debtor situate in a Member State other than one in which insolvency proceedings have been opened. The absence, thus far, of any significant body of European case law on Article 5, allows commentators to put forward a range of views on how Article 5 ought to be applied. This article aims to examine the scope of Article 5 protection both conceptually and in terms of illustrations drawn largely from English insolvency law and practice. Particular attention is given to the following issues: what is meant by the ‘opening of insolvency proceedings’ with reference to Article 5; when a liquidator may pay off the holder of a right in rem; whether the rules under the Regulation for determining the situs of an asset alter the English common law position; whether Article 5 prohibits the discharge of an underlying debt by way of a restructuring plan; the position of unsecured creditors who attempt to acquire rights in rem prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings; and whether the English court's equitable jurisdiction to enforce a charge which does not comply with the lex situs, survives the coming into force of the Regulation. Through the discussion of these topics, this article seeks to identify an approach to the interpretation of Article 5 which is consistent not only across the wide range of issues identified but also with the broad policy objectives underlying the treatment of in rem rights in the Regulation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conflicts of interest,intra‐group financing and procedural coordination of group insolvencies

Modern insolvency law instruments recognise the specificity of enterprise group insolvencies, premised on the existence of close operational and financial links between group members. It is widely accepted that maximisation of insolvency estate value and procedural efficiency depend on coordination of insolvency proceedings opened with respect to group entities. Such coordination is prescribed in the European Insolvency Regulation (recast), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency and the recently reformed German insolvency law. Yet in insolvency, group members retain their own insolvency estates and pools of creditors. This is based on the traditional company law principle of entity shielding. Active communication and cooperation between insolvency practitioners and courts do not sit well with the separate (atomistic) nature of insolvency proceedings, as well as different and oftentimes conflicting interests of creditors in such proceedings. As a result, communication and cooperation may be restricted in a situation of conflicts of interest. This article explores how in the context of group distress the risks arising from conflicts of interest can be controlled and mitigated, while ensuring efficient cross‐border cooperation and communication to the maximum extent possible. It analyses three cutting‐edge coordination mechanisms, namely (a) cross‐border insolvency agreements or protocols, (b) special (group coordination and planning) proceedings and (c) the appointment of a single insolvency practitioner. It concludes that both the likelihood and significance of conflicts of interest correlate with the degree of procedural coordination. Therefore, conflict mitigation tools and strategies need to be tailor‐made and targeted at a specific level and coordination mechanism.     

Jurisdiction concerning annex actions in the context of the insolvency and Brussels Ibis regulations

The legislation of the European Union has addressed the private international law aspects of civil and commercial matters and those of insolvency cases separately. While the Brussels Ibis Regulation (and its predecessors) focuses on “classic” civil of commercial cases, insolvency proceedings are subject to the (recast) Insolvency Regulation. However, the close interference between the two related areas of law—commercial and insolvency—results in a category of cases that are commercial and contentious in nature, and so they would tend to gravitate towards the Brussels regime, but yet they are so closely connected to the insolvency proceedings that justifies a special approach. This article focuses on the question of international jurisdiction regarding these “annex actions” in the context of the EU law. It will attempt to explore the historical roots of the current provisions and the evolution of both the European legislation and the relevant case law. The examination of this progression provides a better understanding of the current legislation and answers some questions apparently left open in the recast Insolvency Regulation.     

From subordination to parity: an international comparison of equity securities law claims in insolvency proceedings

Securities law claims in insolvency proceedings raise important questions of allocation of risk and remedies. In the ordinary course of business, equity claims come last in the hierarchy of claims during insolvency. What is less clear is whether this should encompass claims arising from the violation of public statutes designed to protect equity investors. Discerning the optimal allocation of risk is a complex challenge if one is trying to maximize the simultaneous advancement of securities law and insolvency law public policy goals. From a securities law perspective, there must be confidence in meaningful remedies for capital markets violations if investors are to continue to invest. From an insolvency perspective, creditors make their pricing and credit availability choices based on certainty regarding their claims and shifting those priorities may affect the availability of credit. The critical question is the nature of the claim advanced by the securities holder and whether subordination of securities law claims gives rise to inappropriate incentives for corporate officers within the insolvency law regime. A comparative analysis reveals that the U.S. has provided a limited statutory exception to complete subordination through the fair funds provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by allowing SEC claims for penalties and disgorgement to rank equally with unsecured claims even though the funds are distributed to shareholders. The U.K. and Australian schemes permit shareholders to claim directly as unsecured creditors for fraudulent acts and misrepresentation by the issuer. In contrast, Canadian law is underdeveloped in its treatment of such claims. The paper canvasses the policy options available to reconcile securities law and insolvency law claims, including a discussion of the appropriate gatekeeping role for regulatory authorities and the courts, and the need for a framework that offers fair and expeditious resolution of such claims. If the public policy goal of both securities law and insolvency law is to foster efficient and cost-effective capital markets, it seems that the systems need to be better reconciled than currently. The paper also examines the codified response to the time and resources consumed in various common law tracing claims by customers in a securities firm insolvency. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Grounds for Refusal of Recognition of (Quasi‐) Annex Judgements in the Recast European Insolvency Regulation

Insolvency‐related (annex) actions and judgements fall within the scope of the Recast European Insolvency Regulation (‘Recast EIR’). That instrument both determines international jurisdiction regarding annex actions and sets up a simplified recognition system for annex judgements. However, tension between the Recast EIR's provisions on jurisdiction and recognition arises when a court of a state different from the state of insolvency erroneously assumes jurisdiction for annex actions. Such ‘quasi‐annex’ judgements rendered by foreign courts erroneously assuming jurisdiction threaten the integrity of the insolvency proceedings. Besides, the quasi‐annex judgements may violate the effectiveness and efficiency of the insolvency proceedings as well as the principle of legal certainty. In this article, it is argued that even the current legal framework may offer some ways to avoid the recognition of such quasi‐annex judgements. First, the scope of the public policy exception may be extended in order to protect the integrity of the insolvency proceedings from the quasi‐annex judgements rendered by foreign courts erroneously assuming jurisdiction. Second, it may be argued that quasi‐annex judgements do not equal real annex judgements and therefore do not enjoy the automatic recognition system provided by the Recast EIR. At the same time, their close connection to the insolvency proceedings – disregarded by the forum erroneously assuming jurisdiction – may exclude quasi‐annex judgements from the scope of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, as well. As a consequence, those quasi‐annex judgements may fall within the gap between the two regulations, meaning that no European instrument instructs the courts of the member state addressed to recognise quasi‐annex judgements. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reconsidering Procedural Consolidation for Multinational Corporate Groups in the Context of the Recast European Insolvency Regulation

Procedural consolidation, as a solution to the rescue of insolvent multinational corporate groups (‘MCGs’), is said to be able to preserve group value for creditors. This article explores the desirability of procedural consolidation in the EU in the light of theories of corporate rescue law, cross‐border insolvency law, multinational enterprises and relevant EU cases with reference to the European Insolvency Regulation. It argues that, based on current cross‐border insolvency rules in the EU, there is an inherent difficulty for procedural consolidation in balancing the goal of preservation of group value and the goal of certainty. The article also considers the new ‘group procedural coordination proceedings’ offered by the Recast European Insolvency Regulation and argues that it may help to supplement the gap left by the procedural consolidation in the EU. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency

This article compares the Recast European Insolvency Regulation of 2015 with the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency of 1997, focussed on their scope of application, international jurisdiction and the coordination of main and secondary proceedings. The scopes of both catalogues of norms and their rules on coordination of main and secondary insolvency proceedings reflect one another. However, the Recast EIR makes a significantly greater contribution to the unification of law and is also more fully differentiated and more precise, even if this comes at a price, namely, limited flexibility. The UNCITRAL Model Law made an important contribution to the harmonisation of international insolvency law but requires now modernisation. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cross-border insolvency law in India: Are the principles of comity of courts and inherent common law jurisdiction relevant?

Deliberations are in the final stages for enacting a cross-border insolvency law in India based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency 1997 (‘Model Law’). The cross-border insolvency regime in India will provide an avenue for recognising foreign insolvency proceedings in India. Although it is a matter of time before India adopts the Model Law, it is important to examine whether there remains an independent basis in addition to the Model Law for recognising and providing assistance to cross-border insolvency proceedings in India. This is crucial on account of the following reasons: first, the Model Law does not provide that it is the exclusive pathway for foreign creditors to seek remedies under domestic law. The Model Law, as reflected in Article 7, was intended by its drafters to be an additional gateway to those provided under local laws. The proposed Indian law in Article 5 of Draft Part Z of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 also does not depart expressly from this principle. Second, there may be instances where neither the ‘Centre of Main Interests’ nor an establishment of a corporate debtor is situated in India; therefore, assistance and cooperation in respect of such cross-border insolvency proceeding can only be based on the inherent common law jurisdiction, if available. Third, the cross-border insolvency framework in India will be premised on the requirement for reciprocity and, therefore, countries that do not meet the reciprocity requirement may find it beneficial if such an independent basis for recognition exists in India. This article argues that foreign representatives should be encouraged to explore the possibility of seeking assistance from the commercial courts in India under the common law principles governing cross-border insolvency and that the courts in India should be open to this possibility.     

Cross‐border assistance in insolvency under Jersey law

As an off‐shore financial centre, Jersey has not been immune from the global recession, which has brought consideration of cross‐border insolvencies and whether the right tools exist in domestic law to manage proceedings of this nature. It is the purpose of this article to outline the Jersey law relating to cross‐border assistance in insolvency. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A case of constitutional apples and oranges: a functional comparison of pension priority and benefit guarantees in U.S., U.K. and Canadian insolvency and pension law regimes

Canada's insolvency law reform increased the priority granted to employer‐sponsored pension claims. The article compares the treatment of such claims in the U.S., the U.K. and Canada. A comparison of the legislative provisions concerning pension funding shortfalls from contribution arrears or economic underperformance in relation to the assumptions used for investment income or liability valuations finds that insolvency law has been used to address contribution arrears, but risks from economic underperformance have been addressed by pension benefit insurance. Post‐insolvency priority for contribution arrears provides appropriate incentives to discourage pre‐insolvency preferences for payments to other creditors, while shortfalls from economic underperformance do not involve issues of preference between creditors. The absence of any insolvency rationale for changing priority for shortfalls from economic underperformance and the likely disparity between the assets available to satisfy clams and the much larger amounts of such shortfalls makes the use of insolvency law to address this risk much less effective than insurance. Canada, however, has not adopted the insurance policy instrument used in the U.S. and U.K. to mitigate the impact of pension funding shortfalls. The constitutional inability of Canada to legislate in respect of matters of pension regulation that would allow it to control the well‐known insurance problems of moral hazard and adverse selection may explain why it has only chosen to adopt an insolvency policy instrument. However, a change in priorities in insolvency may generate incentives for secured creditors that either undermine or reinforce this policy choice. Secured creditors could attempt to circumvent the new priority scheme through private arrangements with the debtor or to increase their monitoring activities to ensure the debtor is current in its pension contributions. Secured creditors choices will be influenced by the bankruptcy courts' interpretation of the preference provisions in the insolvency legislation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reconsidering the Shareholder's Role in Corporate Reorganisations under Insolvency Law

A corporate reorganisation under insolvency law is commonly achieved by virtue of a reorganisation plan that provides for the distribution and sacrifice of value among all stakeholders in an insolvent company. Although the creditors' right to vote on such plans and to participate in the wealth distribution according to such plans is universally accepted, the role of old equity in a corporate reorganisation remains a topic that jurisdictions all over the world define very differently. This article first explores possible approaches to shareholders' treatment under insolvency law and supports their inclusion in insolvency proceedings that pursue corporate reorganisations. It then argues that equity interest should not solely be treated according to its economic value and consequently that no absolute priority rule should be applied against them as such treatment would ignore the fundamental difference between liquidation and reorganisation. Finally, it proposes a new cram‐down rule for a class of equity holders. Copyright © 2013 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The ancillary insolvency proceeding

The main legal acts on International Insolvency Law (the European Regulation, the UNCITRAL Model Act and the European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy) lay down several local proceedings with substantive effects as regards the debtor, the distribution of proceeds and the ranking of claims. These—full—proceedings are characterized by a high degree of unpredictability and prove to be inadequate for creditors. These are the reasons why, as an immediate solution, the existing insolvency rules should be reinterpreted according to a certain logic of the market. However, such revision would only partially and provisionally solve the inconveniences of the current model. The true and ‘unsolvable’ problem is that even though the full local proceeding is based on international assistance, it alters the substantive insolvency rules. Therefore, in future it would be necessary to create a truly ancillary proceeding. Such a proceeding would not have any substantive effect as regards the debtor, the creditors and third parties, nor would it require any kind of distribution of proceeds and ranking of claims. However, this proceeding would enable to provide procedural assistance to foreign courts and procedural protection to local creditors. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Universalism and the recognition of group proceedings under the UNCITRAL Model Law in Montenegro

Among the most topical insolvency issues in 2017 was the Croatian “Lex Agrokor”—a controversial “tailor‐made” law providing a unique restructuring opportunity for the largest Croatian conglomerate, the parent company of which was otherwise facing bankruptcy. Soon after the “extraordinary administration procedure” began, the appointed administrator started filing motions for the recognition of the alleged group insolvency as foreign insolvency proceedings in a number of neighbouring and other European countries, most of which have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency. It was an attempt to save the conglomerate's property from being seized in a disorderly fashion by various secured creditors, most noticeably, the largest Russian financial institution Sberbank, which contested these motions with varying success. This article, however, does not present an effort to comprehensively analyse the ongoing legal battle but rather adopts a broader approach to examining the Lex Agrokor to establish grounds for more general conclusions. More precisely, the purpose of this article is twofold. First, to offer strong arguments that, from the standpoint of typical insolvency legislation based on the Model Law, such as that of Montenegro, both the actual and future group proceedings initiated under the Lex Agrokor should fail to meet recognition requirements. Second, based on the preceding case study, to offer conclusions on how to further promote universal approach regarding group insolvencies by emphasizing exactly what the national laws regulating group insolvency should not feature so as to have the proceedings introduced therewith recognized in countries adopting the Model Law.     

What is in a Name? Group Coordination or Consolidation Plan—What is Allowed Under the EIR Recast?

The European Insolvency Regulation Recast allows for group coordination proceedings if insolvency proceedings have been opened against different companies belonging to a single group. Group coordination proceedings imply the drafting of a group coordination plan in order to define an integrated solution to the group's problems. This plan shall not include recommendations as to any consolidation of proceedings or insolvency estates. Against the backdrop of the evolving notion of ‘procedural consolidation’ and the fact the insolvency practitioners and courts concerned have to cooperate and communicate with each other, this prohibition is misplaced and should be interpreted to mean only that main or secondary proceedings opened in a member state cannot be transferred to another jurisdiction. The effective administration of insolvency proceedings of related group companies often demands an integrated solution to the group's problems, which will inevitably lead to some form of consolidation. Copyright © 2016 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does pre‐packed bankruptcy create value? An empirical study of postbankruptcy employment retention in The Netherlands

In recent years, there has been growing interest in whether pre‐packed bankruptcy can be a mechanism through which firms facing imminent insolvency can preserve value. Although an extensive body of literature exists on “pre‐packs,” whether such techniques really preserve value remains ambiguous. By analysing bankruptcy proceedings filed with Dutch courts in the period 2012–2018 through the lenses of real options and debt overhang theory, we examined employment retention postbankruptcy as a consequence of the type of bankruptcy proceeding (pre‐packed bankruptcy and conventional bankruptcy) and the severity of prebankruptcy financial distress. The results show that in the Netherlands, a pre‐packed bankruptcy, when compared with a conventional bankruptcy proceeding, positively impacts employment retention rates after bankruptcy. The severity of financial distress before bankruptcy does not affect employment retention rates postbankruptcy. This implies that despite the amount of resource slack, the preservation of employee value is better served under a pre‐packed bankruptcy than a conventional bankruptcy proceeding. This finding is important for insolvency practice, as up to 22 June 2017, employee rights in the Netherlands (including redundancy) were not considered to be automatically transferred to the firm acquiring the bankrupt debtor's assets when a pre‐packed bankruptcy was applied. Implications for insolvency regulation and practice are discussed.     

Recognition of Debt Restructuring and Resolution Measures under the European Union Regulatory Framework

Under the proposed Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), member states will be required to provide for bail‐in powers to restructure failing financial institutions. At this moment, the Dutch, French, UK and German legislator already provide public authorities with resolution powers. In order to be effective in debt restructuring of failing (non‐)financial institutions, the measures taken by the resolution authorities need to be enforceable (before all courts) and effective in the entire European Union. Given the fact that not all the firm's debt is issued in the home jurisdiction, the question of recognition is critically important. In regard of non‐financial firms, the Dutch, UK, French and German jurisdictions provide for court proceedings to impose a collective settlement reached by the debtor and the majority of its creditors binding on the opposing minority. Out‐of‐insolvency plans approved by the court are recognised under the Brussels I Regulation. If the EU Insolvency Regulation reform proposal is adopted, these court‐approved debt restructuring plans in insolvency situations will be subject to the recognition regime of this regulation. Credit institutions, insurance undertakings, investment undertakings holding funds or securities for third parties and collective investment undertakings are excluded from the scope of the Insolvency Regulation whereas the scope of application of the Reorganisation and Winding Up Directive is limited to credit institutions. The regime under the future BRRD and the Single Resolution Mechanism is limited to credit institutions. National (private international) law determines the recognition of resolution measures taken by the authorities of another member state. Copyright © 2014 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Valuation of cryptoassets in EU insolvency: Challenges and prospects

How and when to determine the value of cryptoassets in insolvency proceedings? This question becomes more topical with the increasing adoption of volatile cryptoassets such as Bitcoin. As many of these assets do not have an ‘apparent’ value that may be readily ascertainable, it is not always clear how their value may be established. This presents significant challenges to their proper valuation in the context of insolvency proceedings and requires certain attention to efficiently confront the implications on the assessment of claims, the calculation of their value and the determination of the recoverable amount. Accordingly, this Article exposes the arising challenges and implications from an EU insolvency perspective, with the aim to trigger considerations for legislative interventions at EU level.     

Chinese cross-border insolvency laws: Recent developments and international implications

The present Chinese insolvency law is under the process of legislative reform, and one focus point among legislators and academics is cross-border issues. China is slowly opening up its market to foreign insolvency proceedings, as demonstrated by the 2021 Chinese Mainland-Hong Kong cross-border insolvency cooperation mechanism. This first attempt, however, is only available in three trial cities in the Mainland and does not apply to jurisdictions other than Hong Kong. Nevertheless, it does not undermine the intention of the Mainland to advance its cross-border insolvency framework. Based on a thorough examination of Chinese legislation and judicial practices, this article submits that China would be willing to accept international standards and be a more active player in international insolvencies.     

The Future Direction of China's Cross‐border Insolvency Laws,Related Issues and Potential Problems

The enactment of bankruptcy laws by the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) in 2006 was a necessary step in the development of its economy. This law represented a significant modernisation of the insolvency framework, supporting the transforming economy, but it was also a law of political expediency, for the enhancement of external relations. One aspect of the enhancement of external relations was the provision of cross‐border insolvency rules. However, this complex area of law was addressed in only one article, which was only a starting point, leaving many details unaddressed, and further reforms are required. In particular, it is desirable that the law provides a greater level of predictability as to the likely outcomes of cross‐border insolvencies, to encourage inward trade and investment, as well as encourage external trade. Both inbound and outbound business dealings are important to China's continued economic development. It is clear also, however, that insolvency law and practice is still a developing area for China. The establishment of a modern and unified system of insolvency laws was a big step for China, representing a sacrifice of tight controls on insolvencies, but the impact of this law in practice is only recently developing, with a loosening of state controls, after a very slow start. 1 The establishment of a cross‐border insolvency framework represents a further challenge; one that is likely to beset with considerable difficulties, as any further development of this law would potentially entail some further loss of control over proceedings, not least in outbound cases, and resistance may be anticipated. In keeping with China's historical approach to lawmaking in the area of bankruptcy law, it is likely that the cross‐border insolvency framework will develop gradually and with caution. This article assesses the way forward in respect of cross‐border insolvency laws, contending that an incremental approach over a period of years, in three broad stages, is required, with more developed and country‐specific approaches providing a link, or interim stage, between the clarification of the Article 5 and the formal adoption of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency Proceedings 1997 (Model Law) in China. Copyright © 2018 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.