The European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency

This article compares the Recast European Insolvency Regulation of 2015 with the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency of 1997, focussed on their scope of application, international jurisdiction and the coordination of main and secondary proceedings. The scopes of both catalogues of norms and their rules on coordination of main and secondary insolvency proceedings reflect one another. However, the Recast EIR makes a significantly greater contribution to the unification of law and is also more fully differentiated and more precise, even if this comes at a price, namely, limited flexibility. The UNCITRAL Model Law made an important contribution to the harmonisation of international insolvency law but requires now modernisation. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reconsidering Procedural Consolidation for Multinational Corporate Groups in the Context of the Recast European Insolvency Regulation

Procedural consolidation, as a solution to the rescue of insolvent multinational corporate groups (‘MCGs’), is said to be able to preserve group value for creditors. This article explores the desirability of procedural consolidation in the EU in the light of theories of corporate rescue law, cross‐border insolvency law, multinational enterprises and relevant EU cases with reference to the European Insolvency Regulation. It argues that, based on current cross‐border insolvency rules in the EU, there is an inherent difficulty for procedural consolidation in balancing the goal of preservation of group value and the goal of certainty. The article also considers the new ‘group procedural coordination proceedings’ offered by the Recast European Insolvency Regulation and argues that it may help to supplement the gap left by the procedural consolidation in the EU. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The transaction avoidance regime in the recast European insolvency regulation: Limits and prospects

In the last decade, transaction avoidance in insolvency law has been in the limelight of the academic discussions. In particular, the scholarship has highlighted how the European Insolvency Regulation gives rise to several private international law issues. Moreover, the scholarship has explored solutions to these issues and proposed to harmonise the regime of transaction avoidance at European Union level. However, the recent legislative developments on the cross‐border insolvency law seem resistant to the proposed harmonisation. This article focuses on the transaction avoidance regime in the Recast European Insolvency Regulation. In particular, it seeks to evaluate whether the Recast has solved the issues arising within the original European Insolvency Regulation in relation to transaction avoidance. Secondly, it questions the suitability of the private international law approach to transaction avoidance in cross‐border insolvency within the European Union framework. The research suggests that the efforts required to the private international law framework to deal efficiently with transaction avoidance make the harmonisation of the regime of transaction avoidance at the European Union level a more appealing option.     

Grounds for Refusal of Recognition of (Quasi‐) Annex Judgements in the Recast European Insolvency Regulation

Insolvency‐related (annex) actions and judgements fall within the scope of the Recast European Insolvency Regulation (‘Recast EIR’). That instrument both determines international jurisdiction regarding annex actions and sets up a simplified recognition system for annex judgements. However, tension between the Recast EIR's provisions on jurisdiction and recognition arises when a court of a state different from the state of insolvency erroneously assumes jurisdiction for annex actions. Such ‘quasi‐annex’ judgements rendered by foreign courts erroneously assuming jurisdiction threaten the integrity of the insolvency proceedings. Besides, the quasi‐annex judgements may violate the effectiveness and efficiency of the insolvency proceedings as well as the principle of legal certainty. In this article, it is argued that even the current legal framework may offer some ways to avoid the recognition of such quasi‐annex judgements. First, the scope of the public policy exception may be extended in order to protect the integrity of the insolvency proceedings from the quasi‐annex judgements rendered by foreign courts erroneously assuming jurisdiction. Second, it may be argued that quasi‐annex judgements do not equal real annex judgements and therefore do not enjoy the automatic recognition system provided by the Recast EIR. At the same time, their close connection to the insolvency proceedings – disregarded by the forum erroneously assuming jurisdiction – may exclude quasi‐annex judgements from the scope of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, as well. As a consequence, those quasi‐annex judgements may fall within the gap between the two regulations, meaning that no European instrument instructs the courts of the member state addressed to recognise quasi‐annex judgements. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conflicts of interest,intra‐group financing and procedural coordination of group insolvencies

Modern insolvency law instruments recognise the specificity of enterprise group insolvencies, premised on the existence of close operational and financial links between group members. It is widely accepted that maximisation of insolvency estate value and procedural efficiency depend on coordination of insolvency proceedings opened with respect to group entities. Such coordination is prescribed in the European Insolvency Regulation (recast), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency and the recently reformed German insolvency law. Yet in insolvency, group members retain their own insolvency estates and pools of creditors. This is based on the traditional company law principle of entity shielding. Active communication and cooperation between insolvency practitioners and courts do not sit well with the separate (atomistic) nature of insolvency proceedings, as well as different and oftentimes conflicting interests of creditors in such proceedings. As a result, communication and cooperation may be restricted in a situation of conflicts of interest. This article explores how in the context of group distress the risks arising from conflicts of interest can be controlled and mitigated, while ensuring efficient cross‐border cooperation and communication to the maximum extent possible. It analyses three cutting‐edge coordination mechanisms, namely (a) cross‐border insolvency agreements or protocols, (b) special (group coordination and planning) proceedings and (c) the appointment of a single insolvency practitioner. It concludes that both the likelihood and significance of conflicts of interest correlate with the degree of procedural coordination. Therefore, conflict mitigation tools and strategies need to be tailor‐made and targeted at a specific level and coordination mechanism.     

Set‐off under the European insolvency regulation (and English law)

This paper addresses critically the meaning and effect of the set‐off provisions in the European Insolvency Regulation. The Regulation sets out the authority of EU Member States to open insolvency proceedings and provides that, subject to exceptions, the law of the State that opens insolvency proceedings shall apply to those proceedings. Setoff is one such exception for the opening of insolvency proceedings does not affect the rights of creditors to demand the set‐off of their claims against the insolvent debtor. Set‐off is intended to perform a guarantee type function for creditor claims. Nevertheless, the Regulation does not define what is meant by set‐off nor clarify whether set‐off rights under the law of a third country (such as English law) may be relied upon. The paper provides valuable clarification and critical analysis.     

Groups of companies in the Recast European Insolvency Regulation: Around and about the “group”

Regulation (EU) 2015/848 (Recast European Insolvency Regulation/Recast EIR) contains a set of articles dedicated to the insolvency proceedings relative to members of groups of companies. No substantial consolidation or any procedural nature is envisaged. Article 2(13) of Regulation 2015/848 clarifies that, for the purposes of the same, a “group of companies” must be understood as “a parent undertaking and all its subsidiary undertakings.” However, many doubts arise when one goes deeper into that definition. The author deals with some of those problems and gives some suggestions to overcome them.     

Defining groups of companies under the European Insolvency Regulation (recast): On the scope of EU group insolvency law

This article examines the general scope of application of the provisions on insolvency regarding members of a “group of companies”, as included in Chapter V of the European Insolvency Regulation (recast) (“Recast EIR”), in order to review whether that scope is appropriate to deal with the different group structures in which business may be conducted. With the definition for a “group of companies” playing a paramount role in determining the scope of these provisions, the article includes a thorough analysis of the current definition for a “group of companies” as included in the Recast EIR. Based upon a teleological approach, the article argues in favour of an independent, broad and flexible interpretation of “group of companies”, in order to include a large number of groups within the scope of the Recast EIR's provisions regarding group insolvencies.     

Rights in rem,Article 5 and the EC Insolvency Regulation: an English perspective

The treatment of security interests is central to any insolvency régime, national or transnational. Under Article 5 of the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (E.C. 1346/2000) extensive protection is given to a security interest—or right in rem—over assets of the debtor situate in a Member State other than one in which insolvency proceedings have been opened. The absence, thus far, of any significant body of European case law on Article 5, allows commentators to put forward a range of views on how Article 5 ought to be applied. This article aims to examine the scope of Article 5 protection both conceptually and in terms of illustrations drawn largely from English insolvency law and practice. Particular attention is given to the following issues: what is meant by the ‘opening of insolvency proceedings’ with reference to Article 5; when a liquidator may pay off the holder of a right in rem; whether the rules under the Regulation for determining the situs of an asset alter the English common law position; whether Article 5 prohibits the discharge of an underlying debt by way of a restructuring plan; the position of unsecured creditors who attempt to acquire rights in rem prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings; and whether the English court's equitable jurisdiction to enforce a charge which does not comply with the lex situs, survives the coming into force of the Regulation. Through the discussion of these topics, this article seeks to identify an approach to the interpretation of Article 5 which is consistent not only across the wide range of issues identified but also with the broad policy objectives underlying the treatment of in rem rights in the Regulation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Some Observations on the New Group Coordination Procedure of the Reformed European Insolvency Regulation

The recast of the European Insolvency Regulation introduces a new coordination procedure for handling insolvencies of groups of companies. The procedure relies on a group coordinator to create a helpful group insolvency plan while the individual insolvency proceedings remain independent. Albeit being a step into the right direction, the procedure has significant shortcomings such as the weak position of the coordinator, a liberal opt‐in and opt‐out mechanism and the problem of forum shopping. In the end, the new procedure can be a valuable tool in limited cases and should be merely seen as an addendum to a variety of possibilities to handle group insolvencies. Copyright © 2015 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Cross‐Border Debt Adjustment – Open Questions in European Insolvency Proceedings

At present, 18 European Union member states have some form of legislation on adjustment of the debts of a private individual. Only half of these debt adjustment proceedings are mentioned in Annex A of the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR) and therefore fall within the scope of it. As most of the debt adjustment proceedings are not included in the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, there is a regulatory gap in the European insolvency proceedings with unpleasant impacts on the free movement of labour. Fortunately, changes are coming, in the form of the EIR reform. In order to bring debt adjustment within the scope of the EIR, the Commission proposes to loosen the prerequisite concerning the legal effects, which the opening of the proceedings has on the debtor. Regarding the jurisdiction to open main proceedings, the Commission proposes that COMI (the debtor's centre of main interests) would be the place of habitual residence. The open question is, whether residency requires a certain continuity or stability. This issue is discussed in the paper taking into account recent Court of Justice of the European Union case law. The challenge of the EIR reform is that only provisions on scope and jurisdiction have been modified as to debt adjustment. One may ask, e.g. when the prerequisites concerning the opening of secondary proceedings are fulfilled if the debtor is a private individual. Copyright © 2013 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Universalism and the recognition of group proceedings under the UNCITRAL Model Law in Montenegro

Among the most topical insolvency issues in 2017 was the Croatian “Lex Agrokor”—a controversial “tailor‐made” law providing a unique restructuring opportunity for the largest Croatian conglomerate, the parent company of which was otherwise facing bankruptcy. Soon after the “extraordinary administration procedure” began, the appointed administrator started filing motions for the recognition of the alleged group insolvency as foreign insolvency proceedings in a number of neighbouring and other European countries, most of which have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency. It was an attempt to save the conglomerate's property from being seized in a disorderly fashion by various secured creditors, most noticeably, the largest Russian financial institution Sberbank, which contested these motions with varying success. This article, however, does not present an effort to comprehensively analyse the ongoing legal battle but rather adopts a broader approach to examining the Lex Agrokor to establish grounds for more general conclusions. More precisely, the purpose of this article is twofold. First, to offer strong arguments that, from the standpoint of typical insolvency legislation based on the Model Law, such as that of Montenegro, both the actual and future group proceedings initiated under the Lex Agrokor should fail to meet recognition requirements. Second, based on the preceding case study, to offer conclusions on how to further promote universal approach regarding group insolvencies by emphasizing exactly what the national laws regulating group insolvency should not feature so as to have the proceedings introduced therewith recognized in countries adopting the Model Law.     

Recognition of Debt Restructuring and Resolution Measures under the European Union Regulatory Framework

Under the proposed Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), member states will be required to provide for bail‐in powers to restructure failing financial institutions. At this moment, the Dutch, French, UK and German legislator already provide public authorities with resolution powers. In order to be effective in debt restructuring of failing (non‐)financial institutions, the measures taken by the resolution authorities need to be enforceable (before all courts) and effective in the entire European Union. Given the fact that not all the firm's debt is issued in the home jurisdiction, the question of recognition is critically important. In regard of non‐financial firms, the Dutch, UK, French and German jurisdictions provide for court proceedings to impose a collective settlement reached by the debtor and the majority of its creditors binding on the opposing minority. Out‐of‐insolvency plans approved by the court are recognised under the Brussels I Regulation. If the EU Insolvency Regulation reform proposal is adopted, these court‐approved debt restructuring plans in insolvency situations will be subject to the recognition regime of this regulation. Credit institutions, insurance undertakings, investment undertakings holding funds or securities for third parties and collective investment undertakings are excluded from the scope of the Insolvency Regulation whereas the scope of application of the Reorganisation and Winding Up Directive is limited to credit institutions. The regime under the future BRRD and the Single Resolution Mechanism is limited to credit institutions. National (private international) law determines the recognition of resolution measures taken by the authorities of another member state. Copyright © 2014 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

The legal responses of Canada and Poland to international bankruptcy and insolvency with a focus on cross‐border insolvency law

This article discusses and compares the respective legal responses of Canada and Poland to international bankruptcy and insolvency with a focus on cross‐border insolvency law. Specifically, the issues addressed herein concern jurisdiction, recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings, and co‐operation with foreign courts and foreign administrators. Notwithstanding some real differences between Canadian and Polish international insolvency proceedings, both legal regimes may be compared, since both countries have adopted many of the principles contained in the UNICTRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency. The major impetus behind the changes established by Canada in its bankruptcy and insolvency laws have been the economic realities produced by the North American Free Trade Agreement. Likewise, Poland's accession to the European Union (EU) has been a major catalyst for revising the Polish Insolvency and Restructuring Act. Part II of the said act is entirely devoted to international insolvencies. However, following Poland's adherence to the EU, those sections of the Polish Insolvency and Restructuring Act that deal with international or cross‐border insolvencies will be severely limited or constrained in scope. The article indicates that Poland, the EU and Canada are taking the necessary steps to meet the needs of debtors who would like to restructure in an international setting. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The ancillary insolvency proceeding

The main legal acts on International Insolvency Law (the European Regulation, the UNCITRAL Model Act and the European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy) lay down several local proceedings with substantive effects as regards the debtor, the distribution of proceeds and the ranking of claims. These—full—proceedings are characterized by a high degree of unpredictability and prove to be inadequate for creditors. These are the reasons why, as an immediate solution, the existing insolvency rules should be reinterpreted according to a certain logic of the market. However, such revision would only partially and provisionally solve the inconveniences of the current model. The true and ‘unsolvable’ problem is that even though the full local proceeding is based on international assistance, it alters the substantive insolvency rules. Therefore, in future it would be necessary to create a truly ancillary proceeding. Such a proceeding would not have any substantive effect as regards the debtor, the creditors and third parties, nor would it require any kind of distribution of proceeds and ranking of claims. However, this proceeding would enable to provide procedural assistance to foreign courts and procedural protection to local creditors. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The EU Insolvency Regulation,Revisited

After 10 years of use, the EU Insolvency Regulation was assessed and recast. The changes are intended to improve its functioning as market practice has moved on, and deal with, among other things, the processes subject to the Regulation, centre of main interests, secondary proceedings, co‐operation between courts and office‐holders, groups and interlinked insolvency registers. Copyright © 2015 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Retracted: The inter‐relationship between intellectual property and international insolvency

The following article from International Insolvency Review, “The inter‐relationship between intellectual property and international insolvency” by Bashar H. Malkawi, published online on 13 Jan 2010 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com), has been retracted by agreement between the author, the journal editor, and John Wiley & Sons. The retraction has been agreed due to significant overlap between this and another paper: “The fate of intellectual property assets in cross‐border insolvency proceedings” by Nadine Farid published in Gonzaga Law Review, 44(1). Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Brexit’ and International Insolvency Beyond the Realm of Mutual Trust

The outcome of the referendum held in the UK in June 2016 is of far‐reaching and unpredictable consequences. This article focuses on the particular field of international insolvency with a view to identifying some of them, all arising out of the fact that the UK will be leaving the EU area of justice and the strong cooperation based on mutual trust between member states. This will make UK–EU insolvency cases clearly less efficient and effective. The consequences of Brexit could be mitigated by the already existing coordination among the international instruments dealing with these matters, in particular the European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency. However, not all EU member states have in place rules dealing with these issues as regards to third states. In order to lessen the impact of Brexit in this sensitive area of law, the implementation of the Model Law in order to deal with extra‐EU cross‐border insolvency could be of avail. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

The effectiveness and efficiency of corporate insolvency law—part two

Little empirical research has been done in the Netherlands (or internationally) into the effect of corporate insolvency proceedings. The Dutch legislature has made several attempts in the past decades to revise the current Dutch Bankruptcy Act (Faillissementswet) of 1893, while almost nothing is known about the effectiveness and efficiency of the Dutch corporate insolvency law. I have studied the effectiveness of the current Dutch insolvency law and of European Directive 2001/23/EC which is incorporated in this law, on the basis of theoretical and large‐scale empirical research. The study concerned all 4167 of the corporate insolvencies that ended in 2004. In the first part of this Article (International Insolvency Review, Volume 17, 3, Winter 2008, pp. 189–209), the research results showed that the Dutch Bankruptcy Act achieved the goals set on it only to a limited degree and that the informal restructuring procedure is of great social importance. In this second part, I concentrate on the conditions imposed by European Directive 2001/23/EC on the European national legislatures to protect employees' rights: automatic transfer of employment contracts in the event of transfers as part of insolvency proceedings, together with measures to prevent misuse of insolvency proceedings in such a way as to deprive employees of the rights provided for in this European Directive. The study shows that, in the Netherlands, not applying automatic transfer of employment contracts when an undertaking or business is transferred as part of an insolvency proceeding does not result in large‐scale misuse of insolvency law. It appears that automatic transfer of employment contracts outside insolvency proceedings can actually impede the informal restructuring of financially unsound companies. These surprising results are interesting for corporate insolvency proceedings worldwide. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reorganizing Czech Businesses: A Bankruptcy Law Reform under a Recession Stress‐Test

The new Czech Insolvency Act, featuring a brand new reorganization option for business debtors, has now been in force for over 3 years—a period of a severe downturn in the Czech (and the global) economy. This presents an opportunity to observe the workings of the new insolvency law on a “recession‐loaded” empirical dataset extracted from the on‐line insolvency register also introduced as part of the reform. This is the goal of this article, the subject matter of which is an initial empirical look at insolvency proceedings conducted over debtors whose reorganization attempts had been allowed in the years 2008 and 2009. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.