The Seven Deadly Sins of Performance Auditing: Implications for Monitoring Public Audit Institutions

Performance auditing is a longstanding feature of democratic government in many countries. It aims to lift the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector organisations, but numerous authors have voiced scepticism about its ability to do so. From three decades of performance auditing literature, this paper distils seven critiques of performance auditing: ‘anti‐innovation’, ‘nit‐picking’, ‘expectations gap’, ‘lapdog’, ‘headline hunting’, ‘unnecessary systems’ and ‘hollow ritual’. The paper concludes that the critiques are not valid in all cases, but serve to categorise risks to be managed in the design of performance audit programs and associated institutional arrangements. In light of the critiques, the paper proposes desirable elements of frameworks for monitoring and reporting the performance of institutions with performance audit mandates.     

Commentary: Where You Sit Is What You See: The Seven Deadly Sins of Performance Auditing. Implications for Monitoring Public Audit Institutions

It has to be observed at the outset that performance auditing has been a contentious issue for much of the three decades it has been pursued in Australia. That said, there is clear evidence of its growth and acceptance in that period. Nevertheless, there are still apparent differences in views and perceptions across the main stakeholders, not least related to the performance and results achieved by the Audit Offices involved. In these respects, Stuart Kells highlights deficiencies that need to be addressed to instill greater confidence in such auditing. In my view, many of these deficiencies (Sins) have been addressed, particularly in the last decade or so, and we may be better employed in focusing more on the achievement of identifiable outcomes as a result of such auditing. Do performance audits actually make a ‘difference’? Such a focus does not ignore questions about how performance audits are selected, conducted and reported, nor their quality and relevance. Rather, a major challenge is to put in place a robust review framework that would markedly add to accountability for implementation of agreed audit outcomes.     

Volume 7 2000

Authors Index

Volume 7 2000     

7 transformations of leadership

Most developmental psychologists agree that what differentiates one leader from another is not so much philosophy of leadership, personality, or style of management. Rather, it's internal "action logic"--how a leader interprets the surroundings and reacts when his or her power or safety is challenged. Relatively few leaders, however, try to understand their action logic, and fewer still have explored the possibility of changing it. They should, because leaders who undertake this voyage of personal understanding and development can transform not only their own capabilities but also those of their companies. The authors draw on 25 years of consulting experience and collaboration with psychologist Susanne Cook-Greuter to present a typology of leadership based on the way managers personally make sense of the world around them. Rooke and Torbert classify leaders into seven distinct actionlogic categories: Opportunists, Diplomats, Experts, Achievers, Individualists, Strategists, and Alchemists-the first three associated with below-average performance, the latter four with medium to high performance. These leadership styles are not fixed, the authors say, and executives who are willing to work at developing themselves and becoming more self-aware can almost certainly move toward one of the more effective action logics. A Diplomat, for instance, can succeed through hard work and self-reflection at transforming himself into a Strategist. Few people may become Alchemists, but many will have the desire and potential to become Individualists and Strategists. Corporations that help their executives and leadership teams to examine their action logics can reap rich rewards.     

The non-7% solution

While the vast majority of underwriters charge a gross spread of exactly 7%, as documented in Chen and Ritter (2000), more than a third charge something other than 7%. Among offerings of $50 million and below where underwriters charge the firm other than 7%, two-thirds of issuers pay more than published NASD¹ compensation guidelines. When underwriters charge less than expected, they do not trade-off IPO compensation with underpricing. However, our evidence suggests a trade-off between IPO compensation and future SEO business among underwriters that charge something other than 7% and less than expected. Underwriters that overcharge may provide a signal to investors about future underperformance.