Pareto-improving firing costs?

We examine self-enforcing contracts between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms (the ‘invisible handshake’) in a labor market with search frictions. Employers promise as much wage-smoothing as they can, consistent with incentive conditions that ensure they will not renege during low-profitability times. Equilibrium is inefficient if these incentive constraints bind, with risky wages for workers and a risk premium that employers must pay. Mandatory firing costs can help, by making it easier for employers to promise credibly not to cut wages in low-profitability periods. We show that firing costs are more likely to be Pareto-improving if they are not severance payments.     

The Austrian Severance Pay Reform: Toward a Funded Pension Pillar

With the beginning of 2003 a new severance pay scheme was introduced in Austria. The reform extends the coverage of the scheme to all employees, and moves it to full and enterprise external funding, but average payments will be lower than previously. This paper provides some evidence on two explicit aims of the reform, namely to generate more fairness in the distribution of severance payments among employees and the creation of a basis of the underdeveloped second pillar of the Austrian pension system. The empirical analysis based on a cross section of completed job spells of different durations indicates that differences in payments among groups will be stronger in the new scheme compared to the old system. Based on retirement income projections and simulations of a multi-pillar pension reform for the blue and white collar workers’ pension system, we conclude that, an increase of the contribution rate would be necessary to achieve a sufficient second pillar retirement income. Helpful comments by Milan Vodopivec and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged.     

Severance payments in equilibrium unemployment

Under the insider wage model of Mortensen and Pissarides [Mortensen, D.T., Pissarides, C.A., 1994. Job creation and job destruction in the theory of unemployment. Review of Economic Studies 61, 397–415], this paper shows that (1) severance pay negatively affects market tightness (vacancy to unemployment ratio) and (2) the amount of severance pay is limited thereby insuring the employer a rational bargaining outcome.     

Wage-shifting effects of severance payments savings accounts in Colombia

In 1990, Colombia replaced its traditional system of severance payments with a new system of severance payments savings accounts (SPSAs). Although severance payments are often justified on the grounds that they provide insurance against earnings loss, they also increase costs for employers and distort employment decisions. The extent of these distortions depends largely on how much of the costs of severance pay can be shifted from employers to workers. One reason why the effects of severance pay may not be completely shifted is that workers may fear the firm will “take the money and run” by declaring bankruptcy. A system of SPSAs eliminates this moral hazard problem, so it should facilitate the shifting of severance payments' costs to workers in the form of lower wages. Empirical results using the Colombian National Household Surveys (NHS) indicate that the introduction of SPSAs lowered wages by between 60% and 80% of total severance payment contributions. These results are consistent with increased shifting after SPSAs were introduced.     

Understanding the Determination of Severance Pay: Mandates,Bargaining, and Unions*

A substantial share of severance payments derives from private contracts or collective agreements. In this paper, we study the determination of these payments. We analyze joint bargaining over wages and severance payments in a search-and-matching model with risk-averse workers. Individual bargaining results in levels of severance pay that provide full insurance, but also depend on unemployment benefits and job-finding rates. Unions also choose full insurance. Because their higher wage demands reduce job creation, this requires higher severance pay. Severance pay observed in eight European countries, to which we calibrate the model, lies between predictions from the bargaining and union scenarios.     

What Have We Learned about the Employment Effects of Severance Pay? Further Iterations of Lazear Et al.

In this study we examine the effect of severance pay on employment and unemployment, using data on industrialized OECD countries. Our starting point is Lazear’s [(1990) Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 699–726] dictum that severance payment requirements unfavorably impact the labor market. We extend his sample period and add to his parsimonious specification a variety of fixed and time-varying labor market institutions. While the positive effect of severance pay on unemployment garners some support, there is no real indication of adverse effects in respect of the other employment outcomes identified here, namely, the employment-population ratio, the labor force participation rate, and long-term unemployment. Moreover, with the possible exception of collective bargaining coordination, the role of institutions is also more muted than suggested in the literature. We thank, without implicating, an anonymous referee for most helpful comments on the first draft of this paper.     

Managerial compensation and the underinvestment problem

This paper studies the effect of managerial compensation terms on the well-known “underinvestment” incentive. We extend the Mauer and Ott (2000) real-option model of corporate expansion, and show that, when the manager maximizes the value of his compensation package (rather than equity value), the underinvestment problem can be substantially mitigated. Further, by designing an appropriate compensation contract, it is possible to eliminate the underinvestment incentive altogether. This managerial contract, consisting of fixed salary and equity ownership, is explicitly derived in the model. The equity ownership level is found to be an increasing function of the manager's fixed salary and the company's earnings growth rate, and a decreasing function of leverage ratio, earnings volatility, tax rate, bankruptcy costs, and the manager's severance pay at bankruptcy.     

Dividend taxes,corporate investment,and ‘Q’

Taxes on corporate distributions have traditionally been regarded as a ‘double tax’ on corporate income. This view implies that while the total effective tax rate on corporate source income affects real economic decisions, the distribution of this tax burden between the shareholders and the corporation is irrelevant. Recent research has suggested an alternative to this traditional view. One explanation of why firms in the United States pay dividends in spite of the heavy tax liabilities associated with this form of distribution is that the stock market capitalizes the tax payments associated with corporate distributions. This capitalization leaves investors indifferent at the margin between a corporation's decision to pay out dividends or to retain earnings. This alternative view holds that while changes in the dividend tax rate will affect shareholder wealth, they will have no impact on corporate investment decisions.This paper develops econometric tests which distinguish between these two views of dividend taxation. By extending Tobin's ‘q’ theory of investment to incorporate taxes at both the corporate and personal levels, the implications of each view for corporate investment decisions can be derived. The competing views may be tested by comparing the performance of investment equations estimated under each theory's predictions. British time series data are particularly appropriate for testing hypotheses about dividend taxes because of the substantial postwar variation in effective tax rates on corporate distributions. The econometric results suggest that dividend taxes have important effects on investment decisions.     

中国公司债券的信用利差与流动性风险

利用主成分分析法构造公司债券流动性风险测度指标,引入M-Copula函数和Markov机制转换模型实证分析中国公司债券的流动性风险与信用利差的关系。结果表明,M-Copula函数与Markov机制转换模型的实证结果一致。具体如下:公司债券的流动性风险对信用利差的影响是一个动态的非线性过程;两者之间存在显著的非对称尾部相关性,其中上尾相关性较高,即熊市时期流动性风险和信用利差同时增大的概率高于牛市时期,且熊市时期流动性风险对信用利差的影响程度显著高于其他时期。     

An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China

This paper empirically studies the relationship between the governance mechanisms and the market valuation of publicly listed firms in China. The authors construct measures for corporate governance mechanisms and measures of market valuation for all publicly listed firms on the two stock markets in China by using data from the firm’s annual reports. They then investigate how the market-valuation variables are affected by the corporate governance variables while controlling for a number of factors commonly considered in market valuation analysis. A corporate governance index is also constructed to summarize the information contained in the corporate governance variables. The index is found to have statistically and economically significant effects on market valuation. The analysis indicates that investors pay a significant premium for well-governed firms in China, benefiting firms that improve their governance mechanisms. Translated from Economic Research Journal, 2005, 2 (in Chinese)     

Social Security and Old Age Unemployment Risk with Efficient Wage Bargaining

I analyze a life‐cycle economy with old age productivity risk where wages, employment, and severance payments are set through efficient bargaining between risk averse unions and risk neutral firms. Allocations with limited union membership are second‐best inefficient as they generate too little labor supply in young age, too much consumption before retirement, too little employment of older workers (early retirement), and too little insurance against old age unemployment. Providing public transfers to early retirees (disability benefits or early pensions) might help to increase the degree of risk sharing at the cost of lower old age employment. Depending on whether absolute risk aversion is increasing or decreasing in consumption, these policies might or might not produce efficiency gains at equilibrium.     

机构投资者如何影响企业创新——兼论机构投资者与企业异质性

机构投资者作为我国资本市场的重要组成部分,在公司治理外部监管等方面发挥着不可小觑的作用。将公司治理传导效应纳入机构持股与企业创新关系及作用机理分析框架,基于2007—2018年A股上市公司数据进行实证检验。结果发现,机构投资者持股显著促进企业创新,内部控制有效性、核心技术人员股权激励和管理费用控制是机构投资者促进企业创新的3个重要传导路径。另外,战略型机构投资者对企业创新的影响相较于财务型机构投资者更为突出;同时,机构投资者对非国有企业创新存在显著促进作用,但对国有企业整体创新的影响不显著。     

中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究

我国上市公司的市场价值与其治理结构有无联系?投资者愿为治理良好的公司付出多大的溢价?本文旨在对上述两大问题进行全面和系统的实证研究,揭示当前上市公司存在的治理弊病,为建立具有中国特色的公司治理体系提供依据。为此,我们充分考虑了公司治理的内外部机制,并结合中国的市场环境,归纳出一系列变量来描述公司治理在我国的具体实践。基于这个变量体系,我们运用主元因素分析法编制了一个可反映上市公司治理水平的综合指标——G指标。我们的实证研究发现:( 1 )治理水平高的企业其市场价值也高;( 2 )投资者愿为治理良好的公司付出相当可观的溢价。     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EXPERIENCE RATING: INSURANCE VERSUS EFFICIENCY*

Unemployment insurance (UI) distorts firms' layoff decisions by reducing the cost of laying off workers. To dampen this increase, it has been suggested that UI should be financed with an experience‐rated tax. Despite the fact that increasing the level of experience rating can reduce unemployment, it can reduce the insurance coverage workers receive. With high experience rating, firms may reduce their severance payments by more than the UI benefit. We build a model where competitive firms offer contracts with severance payments to risk‐averse workers. Frictions in the labor market lead to incomplete insurance. This article shows that less than full‐experience rating enables the government to increase the insurance coverage workers receive. Welfare implications are also investigated.     

管理层权力配置下上市公司创新决策动因研究

选取2013—2016年我国民营上市公司经营数据作为研究样本，基于管理层权力配置视角探索企业创新决策动因及其规律性，结果表明：①基于研发与营销的职能区别，随着管理层权力配置程度增加，技术创新和市场创新两类创新行为的决策倾向呈现差异化演变，具体表现为管理层权力与技术创新行为正相关，与市场创新行为负相关；②公司成长状态对管理层权力与技术创新行为的关系具有显著调节作用，具体表现为：公司经营风险水平较高时，管理层权力对技术创新行为的促进作用会被弱化，公司盈利能力较强时，管理层权力对技术创新行为的促进作用会被强化；③公司成长状态对管理层权力与市场创新行为关系的调节作用不显著，即管理层权力对创新行为的影响机理不会因公司经营风险水平和盈利水平的差异而发生改变。     

中国公司债券的发展现状和对策研究

公司债市场作为一种重要的融资渠道,在中国经济发展过程中处于重要的地位.中国公司债市场起步虽然较晚,但发展空间巨大、面临良好的发展机遇.发展中国的公司债券应着重注意以下几方面问题:充分发挥市场机制作用、强化信用评级和信用定价,规范信用评级机制,发展债券基金机构投资者,完善受托管理人制度,不断对公司债券条款设计进行创新.     

内部人自利行为与职工股上市的市场效应

文章利用中国职工股上市的数据对上市公司内部人在其股份上市交易中的自利行为及其市场影响进行了研究。结果发现,因为存在承销商支持,公司职工股公司上市后短期表现强势;内部职工股公司未发现承销商支持的证据,但是倾向于通过盈余管理和送股除权等方式对二级市场股价进行支持。不同的上市时间安排是造成两类职工股公司自利行为差异的主要因素。     

保险资金持股与股价崩盘风险——市场“稳定器”还是崩盘“加速器”?

现阶段,有关保险资金持股与资本市场稳定相互关系的讨论多止于推测,少有学者以大样本数据进行实证考察。在理论上,保险资金持股上市公司,一方面可以抑制经理人负面信息隐藏,作为市场“稳定器”降低股价暴跌风险;另一方面,也能引发投资者跟风炒作,导致市场情绪高涨和股价高估,成为股价崩盘风险的“加速器”。本文基于2007—2016年中国沪深两市A股上市公司的数据,实证分析保险资金持股上市公司是否加剧市场暴跌及其作用机制。结果显示:保险资金持股加剧了股价崩盘风险,是公司股价崩盘的“加速器”。这一结论在经过DID模型、工具变量回归、PSM+OLS等内生性分析,以及稳健性检验之后依然成立。进一步研究表明,相比于民营、小型和财产保险公司,在股市投资规模更大的国有、大型和人寿保险公司更能引发市场跟风炒作,加剧股价崩盘风险;不过,当保险资金作为前十大股东参与公司治理时则能够降低股价崩盘风险。本文不仅为保险资金持股与资本市场稳定相互关系的讨论提供了经验证据,也为规范保险资金股权投资,维护资本市场稳定提供有益借鉴。     

中国公司债券交易量与价格波动的关系

使用中国沪深证券交易所的公司债数据,检验了债券交易量与价格波动的线性关系和非线性尾部相关性,分析了债券流动性水平对量价关系的影响,研究了债券量价关系的时变特征。结果表明:中国公司债市场中债券交易量与价格波动之间存在显著的线性关系;债券流动性水平对量价关系有显著影响,债券流动性水平越高(低),则量价关系越弱(强);债券交易量与价格波动存在非对称的下尾相关性;债券量价关系具有时变性,市场低风险时期量价关系较弱,市场高风险时期量价关系较强。     

公司债券的违约风险度量技术及应用

随着我国资本市场的进一步发展,公司债券已经成为我国资本市场重要的金融工具。因此,公司债券的违约风险已经成为投资者关注的重要因素。本文系统地论述了度量公司债券违约风险的三类主要方法：信用评级法、数理模型法和保险思想法。在此基础上,论述了我国发展债券市场提高公司债券违约风险度量技术的基本思路是重点利用信用评级方法,积极开发数理模型方法,创造条件利用保险思想模型。