Disclosure versus recognition: the case of expensing stock options

The SFAS 123R comment process generated over 6,500 comment letters, most of which were against the standard’s enactment. This outpouring of emotion indicates that many believe that disclosure versus recognition matters. Our paper provides evidence for the debate whether managers’ discretion, motivation, and accuracy of stock option estimates differ under the recognition and disclosure reporting regimes. We compare firms that are mandatorily forced to recognize stock options expense with those voluntarily choosing to do so. First we find that mandatory firms (versus voluntary) with more intensive stock option granting tend to understate option estimates, especially in the post SFAS123R period. Our results suggest that a higher recognition cost motivates firms for doing so. Second, we find that mandatory firms with lower future operating risk have better accuracy in the post SFAS123R period, as compared to themselves in the pre SFAS123R period and voluntary firms in the post SFAS123 period. Our results support the notion that the informativeness of option estimates explains the level of accuracy. The findings of this paper add to the debate on the benefits of recognizing stock option expenses.     

Stock option grant vesting terms: economic and financial reporting determinants

Option grant vesting terms are a contractual provision that is shaped by accounting standards and other economic factors. We examine the effect of accounting standards, specifically SFAS 123(R), on the vesting terms of stock option grants while also modeling other economic determinants of this contract feature. We document significant variation in stock option grant vesting periods and patterns suggesting that firms actively choose vesting terms. Consistent with financial reporting incentives influencing contract design, we find that firms simultaneously lengthen vesting periods and alter vesting patterns after the adoption of SFAS 123(R). The changes in vesting patterns are consistent with firms trying to defer recognition of the option expense, while limiting the incremental risk imposed on the CEO. In addition, we find that vesting schedules are longer in growth firms where lengthening the executive’s investment horizon is more important and that firms with more powerful CEOs and weaker governance grant options with shorter vesting periods.     

Why do pro forma and Street earnings not reflect changes in GAAP? Evidence from SFAS 123R

This study examines how key market participants??managers and analysts??responded to SFAS 123R??s controversial requirement that firms recognize stock-based compensation expense. Despite mandated recognition of the expense, some firms?? managers exclude it from pro forma earnings and some firms?? analysts exclude it from Street earnings. We find evidence consistent with managers opportunistically excluding the expense to increase earnings, smooth earnings, and meet earnings benchmarks but no evidence that these exclusions result in an earnings measure that better predicts future firm performance. In contrast, we find that analysts exclude the expense from earnings forecasts when exclusion increases earnings?? predictive ability for future performance and that opportunism generally does not explain exclusion by analysts incremental to exclusion by managers. Thus our findings indicate that opportunism is the primary explanation for exclusion of the expense from pro forma earnings and predictive ability is the primary explanation for exclusion from Street earnings. Our findings suggest the controversy surrounding the recognition of stock-based compensation expense may be attributable to cross-sectional variation in the relevance of the expense for equity valuation, as well as to differing incentives of market participants.     

Accounting for inventory costs and real earnings management behavior

Prior research finds that managers engage in inventory overproduction to inflate current earnings despite the fact that overproduction is associated with significant economic costs. Additionally, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 151 (SFAS 151) limited the fixed costs that can be capitalized to inventory in periods of low production, thereby introducing a penalty for underproduction by requiring firms to expense unallocated overhead in the current period. Because periods of underproduction often follow periods of overproduction, and because SFAS 151's emphasis on the subjective determination of normal capacity can erroneously categorize overproducing firms as underproducers in subsequent years, we posit that SFAS 151 makes overproduction less desirable than before. Therefore, we posit that management's propensity to use overproduction to meet earnings benchmarks should decrease after the adoption of SFAS 151. Consistent with expectations, we find a lower propensity to use overproduction to meet benchmarks following SFAS 151. These results challenge the view that SFAS 151 inadvertently encouraged overproduction.     

Earnings Management through Transaction Structuring: Contingent Convertible Debt and Diluted Earnings per Share

In this article we examine whether firms structure their convertible bond transactions to manage diluted earnings per share (EPS). We find that the likelihood of firms issuing contingent convertible bonds (COCOs), which are often excluded from diluted EPS calculations under Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 128, is significantly associated with the reduction that would occur in diluted EPS if the bonds were traditionally structured. We also document that firms' use of EPS‐based compensation contracts significantly affects the likelihood of COCO issuance and find weak evidence that reputation costs, measured using earnings restatement data, play a role in the structuring decision. These results are robust to controlling for alternative motivations for issuing COCOs, including tax and dilution arguments. In addition, an examination of announcement returns reveals that investors view the net benefits and costs of COCOs as offsetting one another. Our results contribute to the literature on earnings management, diluted EPS, financial reporting costs, and financial innovation.     

The impact of SFAS No. 123(R) on financial statement conservatism

SFAS No. 123(R) requires firms to recognize the fair value of stock options as compensation expense over the vesting period of the options. Thus, SFAS No. 123(R) leads to an overall increase in financial statement conservatism. However, it is not known whether SFAS No. 123(R) increases conditional and/or unconditional conservatism. Because the different forms of conservatism have different implications for the quality of earnings, I investigate which types of conservatism are impacted by SFAS No. 123(R) to gain insight into the ramifications of the Standard. I find that SFAS No. 123(R) leads to an increase in both unconditional and conditional conservatism. I additionally find that the Standard causes an increased negative relation between contemporaneous economic gains and income. These findings hold outside of the sample period and under a non-priced based model of conservatism.     

The association between financially expert independent directors and the accounting for employee stock options

This study investigates how the financial expertise of independent directors is associated with voluntary accounting policy decisions. As representatives of a company’s shareholders, financially-expert independent directors are more likely to cause management to pursue higher quality accounting policy decisions. The policy decision investigated involves the expense/non-expense policy choice for employee stock options as previously permitted under SFAS No. 123. Using a sample of 174 option-expensing firms and a matched control sample of 174 non-expensing firms, the results indicate a significant, positive association between the decision to expense employee stock options and the financial expertise of a company’s independent directors. Further, a significant, negative association was found between the option-expensing decision and whether the chief executive officer was the largest internal blockholder.     

Executive Stock Options: To Expense or Not?

In analyzing the decision to expense stock options, we find a greater likelihood of options expensing for firms with greater transparency and a closer alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. These results provide indirect evidence that expensing is more likely in firms that practice good corporate governance. We show that firms are less likely to expense when option usage is higher and that this negative relation is stronger for firms that are smaller, have high growth, and are less profitable. We also find that the announcement period returns are not significantly different from zero.     

Using Real Activities to Avoid Goodwill Impairment Losses: Evidence and Effect on Future Performance

We examine whether managers postpone the recognition of goodwill impairment by manipulating cash flows and the consequences of such a strategy on future performance. According to SFAS 142, an impairment loss must be recognized if the reporting unit's total fair value to which goodwill has been allocated is less than its book value. A growing body of empirical evidence shows that managers delay the recognition of goodwill impairment in accounting books. However, past literature is silent on how managers convince various gatekeepers (e.g., auditors, financial analysts) that recognizing an impairment loss is unnecessary although it seems economically justified. SFAS 142 requires managers to forecast future cash flows to justify the decision to recognize, or not, an impairment loss. Therefore, we predict that managers manipulate upward current cash flows to support their choice to avoid reporting an impairment loss. We also test whether or not this real earnings management is detrimental to future performance. Based on a sample of US firms over the period 2003–2011, we document that firms suspected of postponing goodwill impairment losses exhibit significantly positive discretionary cash flows compared to various control groups. We also find that this real activities manipulation is detrimental to future performance.     

Do firms understate stock option-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123?

Focusing on the four key option pricing model inputs—expected option life, expected stock price volatility, expected dividend yield, and the risk-free interest rate for the expected life of the option—this study finds that firms understate option value estimates and, thus, stock-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123. As predicted based on incentives and opportunities for management to understate SFAS 123 expense, the understatement of option value estimates is increasing in proxies for the magnitude of the expense, is greater for firms with weaker corporate governance, and, to a lesser extent, is increasing in the excessiveness of executive pay. The findings are strongest for the expected option life and expected stock price volatility input assumptions, consistent with firms’ greater latitude in determining these inputs. We find weaker evidence of understatement associated with the expected dividend yield assumption, and none for the interest rate assumption, consistent with these inputs being less amenable to discretion. Taken together, our findings raise some concern that the exercise of management discretion adversely affects the overall reliability of SFAS 123 expense.

Expensing stock-based payments: A material concern?

Using SFAS 123 disclosures, Botosan and Plumlee [Botosan, C., & Plumlee, M. (2001). Stock option expense: The sword of Damocles Revealed. Accounting Horizons, 15, 311-327] find that if stock-based compensation were to be expensed rather than not recognised on the face of financial statements, the impact on key measures used to assess the performance of the fastest growing US firms would be material. Street and Cereola [Street, D. L., & Cereola, S. (2004). Stock option compensation: impact of expense recognition on performance indicators of non-domestic companies listed in the U.S. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 13, 21-37] subsequently also use SFAS 123 disclosures to determine that the average impact of expensing stock-based compensation on diluted EPS for non-US domiciled firms listed on US exchanges will be material and approximately 40%. In this paper, we examine whether these findings apply across international borders to firms that are required from 2005 to adopt IFRS 2 Share-Based Payment to expense stock-based payments, and across a broad range of industries and firms’ growth phases. Based on Australian Stock Exchange-listed firms’ 2002 stock-based compensation disclosures of the value of options granted to directors and the top 5 executives, the expensing of options will have a significant negative effect on approximately 20% of our sample firms’ financial performance ratios. It appears that the materiality of the impact is neither industry specific nor restricted to high growth firms. As the IFRS 2 expensing requirement extends to stock-based compensation issued to all employees, our findings are conservative estimates of the impact. The findings suggest that a stock-based compensation accounting policy change will affect recognised financial numbers and could have consequential ramifications for contractual specifications and valuations of firms across a range of industries and growth phases. Our sample of Australian firms provides an interesting context for the study, since these firms have neither traditionally expensed nor necessarily disclosed stock-based payments but from 2005, all stock-exchange listed Australian firms will be at the forefront of IFRS 2 adoption.     

CEO Compensation Risk and Timely Loss Recognition

Prior studies demonstrate that high CEO compensation risk encourages managers to engage in risk‐seeking behavior, thus intensifying agency conflicts between creditors and borrowers. We argue and document that accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating debt holder and shareholder conflicts over asset substitution arising from high CEO compensation risk. Our empirical results show that firms with high CEO compensation risk tend to use more timely loss recognition and this positive relationship is more pronounced for firms with high leverage. Additional results show that the positive relationship between CEO compensation risk and borrowing costs is reduced for firms using timely loss recognition, suggesting that creditors perceive timely loss recognition as a risk‐reducing mechanism. Using the passage of FAS 123R as a quasi‐natural experiment on managerial compensation risk, we find a significant reduction in the use of timely loss recognition for firms experiencing a decrease in CEO compensation risk after the passage of FAS 123R. Lastly, we show that timely loss recognition is positively associated only with the compensation risk of the firm's primary decision maker (i.e., its CEO) and not with the compensation risk of subordinates.     

Location of Decision Rights Within Multinational Firms

Using U.S.‐based multinational firm data gathered over more than two decades, we examine factors associated with the location of decision rights within these firms, whether the inappropriate assignment of decision rights is associated with poor firm performance, and whether these firms relocate decision rights in response to their evolving environments. We find that a mismatch between the location of decision rights and a firm's environment is associated with weak firm performance. We also show that the likelihood a parent company will alter the assignment of decision rights to a subsidiary is increasing in the extent of a mismatch although this likelihood is decreasing in the strength of the subsidiary's performance.     

Financial reporting changes and the internal information environment: Evidence from SFAS 142

Using the adoption of SFAS 142 as an exogenous shock, we examine the effect of changes in financial reporting on firms’ internal information environment. We argue that complying with SFAS 142 induces managers to acquire new information and therefore improves their information sets. Interviews with executives and auditors confirm this argument. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that firms affected by SFAS 142 (i.e., treatment firms) experience an improvement in management forecast accuracy in the post-SFAS 142 period. The increase is smaller for those with stronger monitoring in the pre-SFAS 142 period and greater for those with a higher likelihood of goodwill impairment. Furthermore, treatment firms with improvements in management forecast accuracy have higher M&A quality, internal capital allocation efficiency, and performance in the post-SFAS142 period. Overall, our findings indicate that changes in external financial reporting can lead to better corporate decisions via their impact on the internal information environment.     

Good disclosure doesn't cure bad accounting—Or does it?: Evaluating the case for SFAS 158

This paper investigates whether the newly required recognition of the funded status of defined benefit (DB) plans under SFAS 158 is incrementally value relevant in its adoption year (2006) relative to the corresponding amounts which were previously disclosed from both equity investor and credit rating perspectives. In equity valuation models, we use a sample of 878 firms (1756 firm years) offering DB plans in 2005 (disclosure year) and 2006 (recognition year), and find no incrementally significant association with market prices of newly recognized amounts under SFAS 158 over the same information that was disclosed pre-SFAS 158. Our credit rating tests, using a sample of 428 DB firms (856 firm years) for 2005 and 2006 also show no differential impact of recognition over disclosure. Overall, we find that equity investors price the SFAS 158-imposed pension differential while credit rating agencies do not, regardless of whether such information is recognized or disclosed in the financial statements. Our results are consistent with efficiency in both equity and credit markets with respect to pension information and suggest that SFAS 158 has not changed the way market participants in aggregate use pension-related financial statement information.     

Executive compensation and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from private loan contracts

We examine how management stock options affect corporate risk taking. We exploit exogenous variation in stock option grants generated by FAS 123R and use loan spreads to infer risk taking. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the spreads of loans taken by firms that did not expense options before FAS 123R (treated firms) significantly decrease after FAS 123R relative to firms that either did not issue stock options or voluntarily expensed stock options before 123R (control firms). We also find that the effect is stronger for firms with high agency conflicts associated with risk-shifting. Furthermore, loans taken by the treated firms are less likely to contain collateral requirements and are less likely to have covenants restricting capital investment post FAS 123R.     

Accelerated Vesting of Employee Stock Options in Anticipation of FAS 123-R

In December 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) mandated the use of a fair value–based measurement attribute to value employee stock options (ESOs) via Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123-R. In anticipation of FAS 123-R, between March 2004 and November 2005, several firms accelerate the vesting of ESOs to avoid recognizing existing unvested ESO grants at fair value in future financial statements. We find that the likelihood of accelerated vesting is higher if (1) acceleration has a greater effect on future ESO compensation expense, especially related to underwater options, and (2) firms suffer greater agency problems, proxied by fewer blockholders, lower pension fund ownership, and top five officers holding a greater share of ESOs. We also find a negative stock price reaction around the announcement of the acceleration decision. Furthermore, stock returns are significantly negative before the new vesting dates and positive afterward, suggesting that vesting dates could have been backdated.     

Market Valuation of Research and Development Spending under Canadian GAAP*

Section 3450 of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) Handbook requires Canadian firms to capitalize development costs that meet certain criteria and to expense those that relate to research. International Accounting Standard (IAS) No. 38 favours a similar approach. In the United States, Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 2 recommends the immediate expensing of all research and development (R&D) spending. The only exception is SFAS No. 86, which requires software development costs to be capitalized when a product successfully passes a technological feasibility test. Consequently, the Canadian financial disclosure regime provides a rich setting for testing the market valuation of capitalized R&D. Our primary research question asks whether capitalized R&D provides useful information to market participants investing in Canadian firms. We use price‐level and return models to assess the value relevance of capitalized R&D disclosed in the financial statements under Canadian GAAP. In line with expectations, using a price‐level model, we find that capitalized R&D and R&D expense as disclosed in the financial statements provide information that is value relevant to market participants. However, we find that R&D capitalized during the year helps explain returns while R&D expense does not. Thus we conclude that the application of section 3450 of the CICA Handbook produces value‐relevant information.     

Disclosure versus recognition: Evidence from lobbying behavior in response to SFAS No. 158

This study examines the lobbying behavior of firms following the release of the SFAS No. 158 exposure draft. SFAS No. 158 requires the recognition of previously disclosed net pension and postretirement benefit obligations on the balance sheet. The study documents that firms that lobbied against the pronouncement had large, underfunded plans and the decision to lobby was related to the magnitude of the SFAS No. 158 balance sheet adjustment. The findings have important implications for the recognition versus disclosure debate because they document management’s reaction to the relocation of information disclosed in the financial statement footnotes to its recognition on the balance sheet.     

Materiality Judgments and Disclosure of Retiree Health Care Costs Under SFAS No. 81

Generally, researchers have difficulty empirically examining materiality judgments because amounts designated as immaterial are not disclosed. However, reporting requirements under SFAS No. 106 provide a unique opportunity to evaluate expense amounts designated immaterial under SFAS No. 81. We use the cumulative effect associated with the adoption of SFAS No. 106 to evaluate prior management materiality judgments. Univariate and logistic regression results suggest that the decision to disclose SFAS No. 81 costs is positively related to our measures of plan materiality. However, our results also suggest that voluntary disclosure factors may have influenced the disclosure decision.