The curse of natural resources

This paper summarizes and extends previous research that has shown evidence of a “curse of natural resources” – countries with great natural resource wealth tend nevertheless to grow more slowly than resource-poor countries. This result is not easily explained by other variables, or by alternative ways to measure resource abundance. This paper shows that there is little direct evidence that omitted geographical or climate variables explain the curse, or that there is a bias resulting from some other unobserved growth deterrent. Resource-abundant countries tended to be high-price economies and, perhaps as a consequence, these countries tended to miss-out on export-led growth.     

Initial conditions and privatisation as causes of post-communist corruption

This article investigates the economic determinants of corruption in post-communist countries. We conduct an empirical verification of two research hypotheses using EBRD and World Bank data on 27 post-communist economies over the 1996–2014 period. The first hypothesis suggests that corruption is rooted in the communist past, when these countries embraced communist institutions, social norms, as well as low-development structural factors broadly defined as initial conditions. The second hypothesis is that the flawed transition process led corruption to increase because politics and business were never separated. The elites pushed measures that preserved their status while obstructing reform policies that might endanger their interests. Our empirical results demonstrate that both hypotheses are valid to a limited extent, while revealing a more complex view of the reforms and initial conditions. Corruption seems to be related to the natural resource curse, to the lack of small-scale privatisation and to a long history of underdevelopment that could have preceded communism.     

Do Natural Resources Depress Income Per Capita?

Most evidence for the resource curse comes from cross‐country growth regressions suffers from bias originating from the high and ever‐evolving volatility in commodity prices. These issues are addressed by providing new cross‐country empirical evidence for the effect of resources in income per capita. Natural resource dependence (resource exports) has a significant negative effect on income per capita, especially in countries with bad rule of law or bad policies, but these results weaken substantially once we allow for endogeneity. However, the more exogenous measure of resource abundance (stock of natural capital) has a significant negative effect on income per capita even after controlling for geography, rule of law and de facto or de jure trade openness. Furthermore, this effect is more severe for countries that have little de jure trade openness. These results are robust to using alternative measures of institutional quality (expropriation and corruption instead of rule of law).     

资源诅咒传导机制的研究述评

资源诅咒是开发自然资源引起的一系列经济、社会问题的统称,比如经济增长缓慢、贸易保护、教育投资不足、物质资本积累下降、创新不足、不平等、寻租、腐败、体制不健全、内战等问题。因其明显的政策含义,资源诅咒传导机制成为研究的重点。本文以经济增长源泉为线索,区分经济学和政治学,从理论和实证两方面给出资源诅咒传导机制的全面说明,以帮助找出我国资源诅咒的关键因素,制定相应政策提高资源开发绩效。     

Regime types,ideological leanings,and the natural resource curse

While many consider institutional quality as a central explanatory variable when finding what causes the variance in per capita GDP growth performance of resource-abundant countries, this paper attempts to focus on more structural factors: regime type and its ideological approaches to economic policy. Several joint effects of natural resource abundance and regime type on growth are found. The natural resource curse is likely to be more severe in authoritarian regimes than democratic regimes. Among democracies, it is found that the natural resource curse is more salient in presidential regimes than in parliamentary regimes. This paper also suggests that the natural resource curse is more likely when a certain type of democratic regime coincides with a particular ideological orientation of the regime with respect to economic policy. Presidential democracies with left-wing economic policy are found to be least growth enhancing among the combinations between regime type and its economic ideology offered, given similar levels of natural resource abundance.     

Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability*

Whether natural resources are good or bad for a country's development are shown to depend on the interaction between institutional setting and, crucially, the types of resources possessed by the country. Some natural resources are, for economical and technical reasons, more likely to cause problems such as rent‐seeking and conflicts than others. This potential problem can, however, be countered by good institutional quality. In contrast to the traditional resource curse hypothesis, we show the impact of natural resources on economic growth to be non‐monotonic in institutional quality, and increasingly so for certain types of resources. In particular, countries rich in minerals are cursed only if they have low‐quality institutions, while the curse is reversed if institutions are sufficiently good. Furthermore, if countries are rich in diamonds and precious metals, these effects—both positive and negative—are larger.     

Corruption and natural resource rents: evidence from quantile regression

This study examines the impacts of oil rents on corruption for 157 countries. While existing studies have primarily focused on average effects, we employ quantile regression to estimate the effects of natural resource abundance for different corruption levels. We consider the effects of natural resource rents, mainly oil rents and then compare them with those of total and non-oil natural resources rents. The estimation results show that, generally, more oil rents increase corruption. Specifically, impacts are larger in countries with an intermediate level of corruption and smaller in highly corrupt countries. While total resource rents increase corruption significantly, non-oil resource rents do not. This may be due to non-oil resource rent management (mainly inland) being more subject to public scrutiny. Non-oil natural resources are concentrated in the less-developed sub-Saharan African countries, where corruption is prevalent; therefore, the impacts of natural resource rents are unremarkable.     

Transmission channels of the resource curse in Africa: A time perspective

Most sub-Saharan African countries share the following characteristics: a strong dependence on natural resources, weak institutions, and relatively low growth levels preventing them to catch up with the rest of the developing world. This paper aims to unfold the natural resource curse by introducing a time perspective: long-term versus short-term effects. Following the two-step Engle and Granger procedure, an error-correction model is performed after a cointegration estimation. In addition, the paper clusters the countries to differentiate the natural resource curse mechanisms by level of institutional quality. Results are three-fold. On the long run, the negative impact of the dependence is confirmed for all categories. Countries with weak institutions are more vulnerable to the curse because the resource dependence not only negatively impacts long-term growth but also adversely impacts the recovery process. Finally, in a strong institutional environment, results point towards a potential positive impact of natural resources during recovery process.     

Corruption and the Political Economy of Resource-Based Development: A Comparison of Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

We model how the “supply and demand” for bribes affects resource use by an economy, and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets. This requires adjusting the World Bank’s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption. The impacts of corruption on long-run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across African and Asian economies from 1970 to 2003. Corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of African countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term, but for Asian countries, corruption is less important than point resources. Corruption influences long-run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries, and is also the “pathway” through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use, trade and abundance.     

Poverty and the resource curse: Evidence from a global panel of countries

This paper contributes to the literature in an attempt to shed further light on the mixed evidence about the link between poverty and the abundance of natural resources, i.e. the resource curse hypothesis effect. It makes use of a large country sample, the Headcount Poverty Index, and a number of panel data methodological approaches, spanning the period 1992–2014. The findings document that fossil energy resources exacerbate poverty, while both democracy and economic freedom alleviate it, with corruption increasing it. These results highlight the need these economies to reinvestment their energy revenues in social programmes.     

The Role of Natural Resources in Economic Development

Economists now recognize that, along with physical and human capital, environmental resources should be viewed as important economic assets, which can be called natural capital. Three recent debates have emerged over the role of natural capital in economic development. First, as many ecological services are unique, does the environment have an “essential” role in sustaining human welfare, and if so, are special “compensation rules” required to ensure that future welfare is not worsened by natural capital depletion today? Second, the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis has fostered empirical estimations of an “inverted U” shaped relationship between a variety of indicators of environmental pollution or resource depletion and the level of per capita income. Does the existence of such EKC relationships suggest that environmental degradation will eventually decline with growth? Finally, recent economic theories and empirical evidence have questioned whether lower income economies that are endowed with abundant natural resources develop more rapidly than economies that are relatively resource poor. Is it possible that resource abundant economies are not reinvesting the rents generated from natural resource exploitation into productive assets, or that resource booms actually divert economic resources from more productive and innovative sectors?     

“资源诅咒”悖论国外实证研究的最新进展及其争论

许多文献证明,自然资源缺乏的国家往往依靠技术和制度创新,实现了更快的经济增长,而自然资源丰裕的国家却容易陷入资源依赖型增长陷阱,经济学家用资源诅咒来描述这一经济增长中的悖论。资源诅咒的出现激起了学者们的广泛研究兴趣,产生了大量实证研究成果。本文将从荷兰病、制度和暴力冲突三个维度,对资源诅咒的国外最新实证文献进行系统梳理,并对目前学术界存在的争论进行述评。     

Constitutions and the resource curse

Utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called ‘resource curse’ is present in democratic presidential countries—but not in democratic parliamentary countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and (iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects appear very robust, the last effect less so.     

The Financial Resource Curse*

In this paper, we present a model of the financial resource curse (i.e., episodes of abundant access to foreign capital coupled with weak productivity growth). We study a two‐sector (i.e., tradable and non‐tradable) small open economy. The tradable sector is the engine of growth, and productivity growth is increasing with the amount of labor employed by firms in the tradable sector. A period of large capital inflows, triggered by a fall in the interest rate, is associated with a consumption boom. While the increase in tradable consumption is financed through foreign borrowing, the increase in non‐tradable consumption requires a shift of productive resources toward the non‐tradable sector at the expenses of the tradable sector. The result is stagnant productivity growth. We show that capital controls can be welfare‐enhancing and can be used as a second‐best policy tool to mitigate the misallocation of resources during an episode of financial resource curse.     

Natural Resource Dependence and Economic Performance in the 1970–2000 Period

We look at the type of natural resource dependence and growth in developing countries. Certain natural resources called point‐source, such as oil and minerals, exhibit concentrated and capturable revenue patterns, while revenue flows from resources such as agriculture are more diffused. Developing countries that export the former type of products are regarded prone to growth failure due to institutional failure. We present an explicit model of growth collapse with micro‐foundations in rent‐seeking contests with increasing returns. Our econometric analysis is among the few in this literature with a panel data dimension. Point‐source‐type natural resource dependence does retard institutional development in both governance and democracy, which hampers growth. The resource curse, however, is more general and not simply confined to mineral exporters.     

自然资源禀赋与经济增长：资源诅咒还是资源福音?--基于劳动力结构的一个理论与实证分析框架

文章构建了一个包含自然资源存量和劳动力结构因素的经济增长理论模型，探索劳动力结构是否是引起“资源诅咒”或“资源福音”的一个原因。理论研究发现，在不同限制条件下，自然资源开发部门劳动力数量的增加对经济增长的作用不同，而劳动者素质的提高对缓解“资源诅咒”效应而言始终是一个有利因素。实证研究进一步表明：从总体上讲，我国省域层面的“资源诅咒”现象是存在的，但在一定条件下并非没有逆转的可能，避免“资源诅咒”问题的发生，使丰裕的自然资源成为地区发展的“福音”，关键在于劳动者素质的提高，因为资源开发部门劳动力数量的增加所起的作用有限；分地区讲，“资源诅咒”效应在经济发展水平不同的地区存在差异，而劳动力结构的异质性主导着这种差异。     

“资源诅咒”的实证分析及破解

自然禀赋与一些国家或地区的经济增长之间存在显著的负相关关系,由此形成所谓的"资源诅咒"效应.从中心一外围论、贸易条件恶化论、荷兰病到资源诅咒等也均揭示出资源禀赋与经济发展之间的悖论.以此现实问题为背景,深入讨论了资源诅咒的成因及破解途径.     

Institution building and growth in transition economies

Drawing on the recent literature on economic institutions and the origins of economic development, we offer a political economy explanation of why institution building has varied so much across transition economies. We identify dependence on natural resources and the historical experience of these countries during socialism as major determinants of institution building during transition. Using natural resource reliance and the years under socialism to extract the exogenous component of institution building, we also show the importance of institutions in explaining the variation in economic development and growth across transition economies during the first decade of transition.     

Resource Curse: New Evidence on the Role of Institutions

This paper attempts to provide a probable answer to a longstanding resource curse puzzle; i.e., why resource-rich nations grow at a slower rate compared with less fortunate ones. Using an innovative threshold estimation technique, the empirical results reveal that there is a threshold effect in the natural resources–economic growth relationship. We find that the impact of natural resources is meaningful to economic growth only after a certain threshold point of institutional quality has been attained. The results also shed light on the fact that the nations that have low institutional quality depend heavily on natural resources while countries with high quality institutions are relatively less dependent on natural resources to generate growth.     

Capital markets and capital allocation: Implications for economies in transition*

Recent work showing that a sounder financial system is associated with faster economic growth has important implications for transition economies. Stock prices in developed economies move in highly firm‐specific ways that convey information about changes in firms’ marginal value of investment. This information facilitates the rapid flow of capital to its highest value uses. In contrast, stock prices in low‐income countries tend to move up and down en masse, and thus are of scant use for microeconomic capital allocation. Some transition economy markets are coming to resemble those of developed economies, others those of low‐income countries. Stock return asynchronicity is highly correlated with the strength of private property rights in general and public shareholders’ rights in particular. Other recent work suggests that small entrenched elites in low‐income countries preserve their sweeping control over the corporate sectors of their economies by using political influence to undermine the financial system and deprive entrants of capital. The lack of cross‐sectional independence in some transition economies’ stock returns may be a warning of such economic entrenchment. Sound property rights, solid shareholder rights, stock market transparency, and capital account openness appear to check this, and thus contribute to efficient capital allocation and economic growth.