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1.
This paper concerns optimal nonlinear labor income taxation in an economy with union wage setting and endogenous hours of work. The purpose is to study the determinants of tax progression. We show that the optimal degree of progression of the labor income tax depends on the extent to which the government can influence the wage rate via tax policy as well as on its ability to redistribute income across individuals. In addition, the argument for progressive labor income taxation depends on whether hours of work are chosen by the employed themselves or the union. 相似文献
2.
Abstract . This paper analyzes optimal, time consistent taxation in a dynastic family model with human and physical capital and with a balanced government budget. When tax revenue is used for publicly provided consumption or lump-sum transfers, leisure would be higher than its social optimum. Pareto optimal taxation requires taxing capital income more heavily than labour income and subsidizing investment at the same rate of the tax. Also, it requires either subsidizing labour at the same rate as a consumption tax or subsidizing consumption at the same rate as a labour income tax, and hence it is not a practical guide to policy. Further, a consumption tax, or equivalently a uniform income tax with investment subsidies at the same rate, can be improved on by taxing capital income more heavily than labour income. 相似文献
3.
Berthold U. Wigger† 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2004,106(1):65-82
An optimal taxation framework is considered in which part of the population can take advantage of investment in higher education. It is shown that social welfare can sometimes be increased by supplementing linear income taxes with a subsidy to material investment in higher education, but that social welfare can never be increased by supplementing a non‐linear income tax with such a subsidy. 相似文献
4.
Gustavo A. Marrero 《Journal of Economics》2010,99(1):29-51
This paper characterizes optimal fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model whose policy implications are consistent with
the relationship between two stylized facts observed in a majority of OECD economies, namely the growth in the ratios of both
government consumption to public investment and of direct to indirect taxation from 1970 to 2004. Assuming a continuation
in the upward trend for the public consumption to output ratio consistent with that observed for this variable between 1970
and 2004 for most developed economies, we find that the optimal tax system becomes more intensive in income taxation relative
to consumption taxation, and that public disbursements become less intensive in public investment, which is consistent with
the co-evolution of these ratios over the last 40 years. 相似文献
5.
P.M. Pestieau 《Journal of public economics》1974,3(3):217-235
This paper studies the optimal policy of a government which maximizes intertemporal social welfare using such instruments as taxes on interest income and wages, and debt in conjunction with public investment. In doing so, it has to face a decentralized economy where in each generation individuals and firms are free to maximize their own objectives subject to their own private constraints. The welfare function is a sum of discounted generational utilities and its maximization is handled by using dynamic programming. From the first order conditions so derived, it appears that an optimal policy of taxation and public capital accumulation is that which sets the tax rates according to Ramsey's optimal taxation structure and which equates the rate of return on public investment to the rate of social time preference. 相似文献
6.
Abstract Income disparities and the intra‐family redistribution implied by a marriage may induce a high‐income earner to abstain from marrying a low‐income earner even though they would be a perfect match emotionally. Redistributive income taxation eases this problem, and the design of marriage matching institutions interacts with this role of redistributive taxation. Matching institutions that ensure that people largely from the same income groups meet each other can substitute for redistribution. Matching across income groups that focuses on emotional quality or preference congruence of the match may increase the efficiency‐enhancing role of taxation. 相似文献
7.
Matthew Doyle 《The Canadian journal of economics》2010,43(3):941-966
Abstract This paper examines optimal government policy when private investment generates information, but investors cannot internalize the informational value their actions have to others. Equilibrium exhibits inefficient delay, as investors adopt a wait‐and‐see approach. The government can alter incentives via an investment subsidy, but complications arise, since future subsidies may induce investors to disregard current policy initiatives. The paper shows that the government achieves its desired outcome only when the the investment subsidy is financed by a non‐distortionary, lump‐sum tax. When taxation is distortionary, the government faces a time inconsistency problem that may prevent effective policy. 相似文献
8.
What Should Optimal Income Taxes Smooth? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
According to the theory of tax smoothing, income tax rates should be kept constant so as to minimize the distortionary costs of taxation. By explicitly considering how labor supply is distorted by income taxes in a fully specified intertemporal model, we find that the optimal income tax policy should smoothen leisure. In the case of varying income (productivity changes) this is attained by a pro‐cyclical (progressive) tax rate. 相似文献
9.
Hannu Piekkola 《Journal of Economics》1995,62(3):295-322
In a two-period overlapping-generations model, residence criteria are shown to be optimal with lump-sum transfers to the younger generation in a dynamically efficient open economy even if all wage income, corresponding to rent income under exogenous labor supply, is not taxed away. When tax revenues are also distributed to the older generation — which indeed may be desirable for short-term intergenerational welfare distribution reasons — a weighted average rule is derived for optimal international taxation. The taxation of domestic savings income follows the inverse elasticity rule in respect to savings and, surprisingly, higher investment elasticity increases the tax level. Finally, for a small open economy and for large identical economies, tax competition with a mixed scheme of residence-based taxes and source-based subsidies yields the same tax policy as tax cooperation with no restrictions on the domestic and international capital income tax instruments. 相似文献
10.
Most recent studies on growth models with public investment in infrastructure (public capital) presume that public capital is financed by income taxation. However, in the model where money is demanded for transactions, this paper finds that optimal public capital financing in general involves utilizing both income taxation and seigniorage. In such a case, the optimal income tax rate is less than the output elasticity of public capital, a reasonable result compared with empirical evidence. 相似文献
11.
12.
Manuel A. Gómez 《Economic Theory》2003,22(4):917-925
Summary. This paper devises a fiscal policy by means of which the first-best optimum equilibrium is attained as a market equilibrium
in the Uzawa-Lucas model when average human capital has an external effect on productivity. The optimal policy requires the
use of a subsidy to investment in human capital which can be financed by a tax on labor income. Lump-sum taxation is not required
to balance the government budget either in the steady state or in the transitional phase. Physical capital income should not
be taxed. Alternatively, the optimal growth path can be attained by means of a subsidy to human capital.
Received: March 21, 2002; revised version: September 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology through PNICDYIT grant SEC2002-03663 is gratefully
acknowledged. 相似文献
13.
Robin Boadway 《The Canadian journal of economics》2011,44(4):1138-1183
Abstract We present a survey of key results from second‐best optimal redistribution theory and their implications for tax‐transfer policy. The core results include the Corlett‐Hague theorem, the Deaton conditions, the production‐efficiency theorem, the Atkinson‐Stiglitz theorem, and the Mirrlees‐Saez characterization of the optimal non‐linear income tax system. These have been augmented in recent years by optimal participation tax rates, the implications of involuntary unemployment, the use of unconventional instruments, such as minimum wages, in‐kind transfer, and workfare, and the optimal taxation of capital income and bequests. 相似文献
14.
This study examines the optimal income taxation for a two-earner household, where the couple bargains over their private goods consumption and time allocation between work and leisure. In the model, bargaining power is determined endogenously by the income gap between the two earners. Conventional studies have shown that the higher income tax rate should be imposed on the individual with the smaller wage elasticity, typically the individual with the higher productivity. In contrast to conventional argument, this study shows that the optimal tax rate on the household member with the higher productivity is lower than that of the individual with the lower productivity if the required tax revenue is relatively small and the influence of the gender income gap on the power balance of the couple is moderate. This is because such a tax structure encourages the labor supply of the individual with the higher productivity to mitigate the decrease in the household’s consumption induced by income taxation. 相似文献
15.
Thomas Gaube 《Journal of Economics》2005,86(1):1-18
This paper deals with government investment in a static two-type self-selection model of optimum income taxation. It is shown
that the second-best investment rule is consistent with efficient production, provided that public investment has no influence
on relative factor prices. Otherwise, however, redistributive income taxation implies that optimal investment expenditures
exceed (or fall below) the efficient level as long as they raise (or decrease) the wage rate of the unskilled individuals
relative to the wage rate of the skilled individuals. 相似文献
16.
Giacomo Corneo 《European Economic Review》2002,46(7):1359-1368
This paper examines allocative properties of progressive income taxation when individuals care about their relative income. It shows that introducing a progressive income tax can yield a Pareto improvement if pre-tax income is evenly distributed. Implementing undistorted choices of working hours requires a progressive tax schedule, and the optimal degree of progressivity decreases with pre-tax income inequality. 相似文献
17.
Dirk Schindler 《The German Economic Review》2011,12(1):59-84
Abstract. We examine the optimal tax and education policy in the case of a dual income tax. Incorporating an educational sector and endogenous capital taxation, we show that the results in Nielsen and Sørensen's study are vulnerable with respect to assumptions on the elasticity of unskilled labor supply. Tax progressivity results residually, whereas educational policy guarantees an optimal tax wedge on, but not necessarily efficiency in, educational investment. The less elastic are the unobservable educational investment and skilled labor (the latter relative to unskilled labor supply), and the more educational policy cares about the skilled labor supply, the more progressive the tax system will be. Education will be subsidized on a net basis if the complementarity effect on the skilled labor supply is strong and important; however, there is also an offsetting substitutability effect of the unskilled labor supply at play. 相似文献
18.
Robin Boadway Maurice Marchand Motohiro Sato 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》1998,100(3):545-564
The literatures on differential commodity taxes and on quantity controls to supplement income taxation have developed separately. This paper combines these two strands in the standard framework of optimal non-linear income taxation. We use a model with two types of households where the government has access to both subsidy policy and public provision of a good substitutable for leisure, and ouseholds can supplement the publicity provided good from the market. We present conditions under which policy should involve one or both of these two instruments alongside income taxation. The model is extended to many ability types. 相似文献
19.
Tolga Aksoy 《Bulletin of economic research》2019,71(3):313-341
In this paper, I examine the relationship between unionisation and total output in an economy with a dual labour market, heterogeneous agents, and human capital investment. My primary focus is the skill acquisition channel, through which unionization affects total output. I theoretically demonstrate that the skill premium, and thus human capital investment, is determined by the prevalence of unions in high‐ or low‐skill‐intensive sectors. In particular, if a low (high)‐skill sector is unionised, then the skill premium is higher (lower), ensuring a larger (smaller) high‐skill sector, irrespective of the unions bargaining power. To test this hypothesis, I also empirically investigate the effects of unionisation on total productivity. The results indicate that through the reallocation of labour, unionisation induces an expansion of high‐skill‐intensive sectors, while low‐skill‐intensive sectors contract. 相似文献
20.
Torben M. Andersen 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2020,22(5):1245-1261
Whether capital income should be taxed in overlapping generations economies is vividly discussed. It is shown that intergenerational lump‐sum taxes cannot implement the Golden Rule allocation when agents have private information on their earnings potential. Hence, the seminal Atkinson–Stiglitz result that optimal income taxation pre‐empts any role for indirect taxation cannot be interpreted to imply that capital income taxation (affecting intertemporal relative prices) should not be taxed. Specifically, capital income should unambiguously be taxed in small open economies, and the optimal tax rate depends inversely on the elasticity of total savings to disposable income and the after‐tax rate of return. 相似文献