Federal Home Loan Bank Advances and Bank and Thrift Holding Company Risk: Evidence from the Stock Market

Using bivariate GARCH models of stock portfolio returns and risk, we find that bank and thrift holding companies that relied the most on Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances exhibited less total risk and market risk than those that relied on them the least between 2001 and 2012. When we control for differences in holding company size, stock trading volume, residential mortgage lending, and holding company type (bank vs. thrift), the most FHLB‐reliant holding companies sustain the aforesaid risk advantages except during the crisis of 2007–2009, when they exhibit greater idiosyncratic risk. The latter finding suggests that investors perceived the high reliance of the borrowing institutions on advances as a sign of distress. Portfolios that consist of only bank holding companies show qualitatively similar results.     

Automated Underwriting and the Profitability of Mortgage Securitization

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of mortgage securitization, which is then used to examine a potential effect of automated underwriting. The paper's primary supposition is that automated underwriting lowers the costs to competitive mortgage originators and a monopolist securitizer of identifying mortgage applicants who are good credit risks. Faced with lower underwriting costs, originators will screen a larger number of mortgage applicants in the hopes of holding more good risks in their portfolios and passing through more bad risks to the securitizer. This mounting adverse-selection problem causes the securitizer's expected revenues to decline; this effect can outweigh the cost-saving benefit of automated underwriting, causing the securitizer's return on equity to fall.     

The Sources of Risk Spillovers among U.S. REITs: Financial Characteristics and Regional Proximity

In this article, we estimate the risk spillovers among 74 U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) using the state‐dependent sensitivity value‐at‐risk approach. This methodology allows for the quantification of the spillover size as a function of a company's financial condition. We show that the size of risk spillovers is more than twice as large when REITs are in financial distress and find evidence for the impact of geographical proximity. Our results provide new insights concerning the relevance of geographical diversification for REITs and have important implications for the investment and risk management decisions of real estate investors, mortgage lenders, home suppliers and policy makers.     

Mortgage Refinancing with Asymmetric Information

Information asymmetry exists between the lender and the borrower regarding the holding period of the mortgaged real estate; the lender does not know how long the borrower plans to own the house. This information asymmetry allows the cost of obtaining a mortgage to deviate from its value to the borrower. As a result, the exercise price of the option to refinance becomes the cost to the borrower of obtaining a new mortgage instead of the outstanding balance of the existing mortgage as used in previous models. The option to refinance is a sequential option; after the borrower refinances, a new option is obtained to refinance again in the future. A mortgage refinancing model is developed taking information asymmetry and sequential refinancing into account. The model is used to solve for (1) the value to the borrower of a callable mortgage and (2) the minimum interest rate differential between the contract rate of the existing mortgage and the market interest rate needed to justify refinancing.     

The Effect of Mortgage Payment Reduction on Default: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinance Program

This article evaluates the effect of payment reduction on mortgage default within the context of the Home Affordable Refinance Program. We find that mortgage default is sensitive to payment reduction using univariate, duration and hazard modeling approaches. A relative risk Cox model of default with time‐varying covariates estimates that a 10% reduction in mortgage payment is associated with about a 10–11% reduction in monthly default hazard for loans. This finding is robust to the inclusion of empirically important mortgage risk drivers (such as current loan‐to‐value and FICO score) as well as controlling for selection effects based on observables.     

How Does Mortgage Debt Affect Household Consumption? Micro Evidence from China

The high growth rate of mortgage debt in various emerging and developed economies has captured headlines following the financial crisis. In this article, we investigate how mortgage debt impacts household consumption behavior and various components of household consumption. Utilizing comprehensive household survey data from China, we show that households with a mortgage consume a higher portion of income than households without a mortgage. This is in line with the argument that having a mortgage reduces the uncertainty that the household faces regarding how much to save each month in order to be able to own a house, and this reduced uncertainty leads to lower monthly savings for the purpose of buying a house. We also find that among households with a mortgage, those who spend a larger share of their income on mortgage payments spend less on consumption, reflecting the crowding out effect of mortgage payments on household consumption. Furthermore, we show that a government policy of decreasing the maximum loan‐to‐value ratio has a significant impact on households’ consumption. The article offers the first evidence of the impact of growing mortgage debt on the consumption behavior of households, and will have implications for government policies that encourage mortgage borrowing.     

Immigrants and Mortgage Delinquency

This article studies the effect of immigrant status on mortgage delinquency. Due to their different social and economic background, immigrant households may not integrate well into the host society, and therefore are more likely to be delinquent on mortgages than otherwise identical native‐born households. We test this hypothesis by comparing the mortgage delinquency rate between immigrant and native‐born households in the 2009 PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) data, in which all the immigrant households have been in the United States for more than 10 years. We find that, after controlling for observables, those relatively recent immigrants who have been in the United States for 10 to 20 years have a higher mortgage delinquency rate than native‐born, while immigrants who have resided in the United States for more than 20 years are no different from native‐borns. In addition, there is no evidence that the second generation of immigrants is more likely to be delinquent than the third‐or‐higher generations. Our results are robust to potential sample‐selection bias and functional misspecifications.     

The Effects on Mortgage Repayments of Restrictions on the Enforcement of Due-on-Sale Clauses: The California Experience

Unexpected increases in the cost of mortgage funds have imposed substantial losses on mortgage lenders. The losses are compounded by the decline in mortgage repayments as homeowners hang on to their low-rate mortgages. The enforcement of due-on-sale clauses is one option lenders have had to inhibit reductions in the turnover of low-rate mortgages. Recently a California Supreme Court ruling restricted the use of due-on-sale clauses. As a result, California state-chartered associations can no longer use due-on-sale clauses to raise mortgage rates. At the same time, most federally chartered associations in California continued the unrestricted enforcement of due-on-sale clauses. This paper examines the behavior of repayment rates at restricted state and unrestricted federal associations in California. The results suggest that for each percentage point new mortgage interest rates exceeded rates on existing mortgages, repayment rates at federal associations declined by 1.532 percentage points. The inability to prevent mortgage assumptions caused repayment rates at state-chartered associations to fall 0.406 percentage points more than federal association repayment rates. The additional decline has added substantial income losses to California state associations.     

Thy Neighbor’s Mortgage: Does Living in a Subprime Neighborhood Affect One’s Probability of Default?

This article focuses on the potential externalities associated with subprime mortgage origination activity. Specifically, we examine whether negative spillover effects from subprime mortgage originations result in higher default rates in the surrounding area. Our empirical analysis controls for loan characteristics, house price changes and alternative loan products. Our results indicate that, after controlling for these characteristics, the concentration of subprime lending in a neighborhood does not lead to greater default risks for surrounding borrowers. However, we do find that more aggressive mortgage products (such as hybrid adjustable rate mortgages and low/no‐documentation loans) had significant negative spillovers on other borrowers. Stated differently, the aggressive alternative mortgage designs were more toxic to the housing and mortgage market than previously believed.     

Unobservable Risks in Mortgage Contract Choice

This study proposes a lifetime utility maximization model where borrowers choose optimal mortgage bundles including mortgage type, loan‐to‐value and loan size to maximize their allocation of limited budgets between housing and nonhousing consumptions. The model predicts that the mortgage bundle choices by borrowers of different income and risk attributes explain significant variations in the ex post default risks of the borrowers. The empirical tests using sampled mortgages pooled in nonagency residential mortgage backed securities support the hypothesis that the optimal choice of mortgage bundles reveals hidden risk factors of borrowers, which, if ignored, could lead to misjudgment of ex post default of borrowers.     

Choice of Mortgage Contracts: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances

This study revisits the empirical question of the determinants of the choice between fixed‐ and adjustable‐rate mortgages using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances that overcome some of the data limitations in previous studies. The results from a logit model of mortgage choice indicate that pricing variables and affordability are important considerations. We also find that factors, such as mobility expectations, income volatility and attitudes toward financial risk largely influence mortgage choice, with more risk‐averse borrowers preferring fixed‐rate mortgages. For households that are less risk averse, the mortgage type choice decision is less sensitive to pricing variables and income volatility, and affordability factors are not significant. These findings provide empirical support that underscores the importance of attitudes toward risks in mortgage choice.     

A Closed-Form,After-Tax,Net Present Value Solution to the Mortgage Refinancing Decision

Refinancing one's mortgage is often an attractive, wealth-enhancing option for homeowners in a declining mortgage rate environment. In some respects the decision is simple to analyze because future cash flows are relatively easy to define for fixed-rate mortgages. In other respects, however, the decision is nuanced by option pricing and tax considerations. The analysis must first begin with accurate after-tax, net present value solutions for varying potential holding periods. This study improves upon previous studies, which either ignore tax implications or address them iteratively in spreadsheet model solutions, by introducing a closed-form model that incorporates the ever-changing tax shield of the interest portion of each mortgage payment. Further, unlike many previous studies, our model does not assume that the current and replacement mortgages have equal remaining terms.     

How Does the Federal Reserve's Large‐Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs) Influence Mortgage‐Backed Securities (MBS) Yields and U.S. Mortgage Rates?

We conduct an empirical analysis of the Federal Reserve's large‐scale asset purchases (LSAPs) on mortgage‐backed securities (MBS) yields and mortgage rates. We estimate a cointergrated, error‐correction model that links Federal Reserve securities purchases and stocks of Treasury and MBS securities to equilibrium MBS yields and mortgage rates. The Federal Reserve's accumulation of MBS and Treasury securities lowered MBS yields and mortgage rates by more than what would have been suggested by changes in market expectations alone, suggesting that portfolio rebalancing effects of LSAPs are an important consideration for monetary policy transmission. Our estimates also suggest that the Federal Reserve must hold a substantial market share of agency MBS or of Treasury securities to significantly lower MBS yields and in turn significantly lower mortgage rates.     

Optimal Sharing of Interest‐Rate Risk in Mortgage Contracts: The Effects of Potential Prepayment and Default

Much of the literature on the economics of mortgage markets has studied the fixed vs. adjustable‐rate mortgage choice made by individual borrowers. However, to decide if the outcome of such a choice is efficient or approximately so, it is necessary to explore the question of optimal risk‐sharing in mortgage contracts. But because only a small literature has studied this question, more research is clearly warranted. The present article helps fill this gap by developing a simplified version of Arvan and Brueckner's model, using it to characterize optimal contracts in the absence of mortgage termination, and then exploring how termination via prepayment or default affects optimal risk‐sharing. The broad conclusion of the analysis is that potential mortgage termination makes higher risk exposure for borrowers optimal.     

Closed-Form Mortgage Valuation Using Reduced-Form Model

Valuing mortgage-related securities is more complicated than valuing regular defaultable claims due to the borrower's prepayment behavior as well as the possibility of default. Some researchers use a structural-form model to obtain the closed-form formulas for the mortgage value. With this method, however, it is difficult to identify the critical region of early exercise. As an alternative, the reduced-form model developed in this article is able to value the mortgage without setting boundary conditions, and it can thereby accurately handle the multidimensional space of correlated state variables. The purpose of this article is to derive a closed-form solution of the mortgage valuation equation under a general reduced-form model that embeds relevant economic variables. This new approach enables portfolio managers to undertake sophisticated portfolio optimization and hedging analyses. An implementation procedure for the model is also provided to demonstrate how the valuation framework can be utilized in practical applications.     

Mortgage Brokers,Origination Fees,Price Transparency and Competition

This article examines the dynamics between mortgage broker competition, origination fees and price transparency. A reverse first‐price sealed‐bid auction model is used to motivate broker pricing behavior. Confirming the model predictions, our empirical analysis shows that increased mortgage brokerage competition at the Metropolitan Statistical Area level leads to lower fees. The findings are robust to different measures of fees as well as different measures of competition. We also provide evidence that broker competition reduces mortgage origination fees on retail (nonbrokered) loans as well. In addition, our results indicate that pricing complexity is an important determinant of fees, and increased broker competition is associated with a higher probability of a loan being priced with transparency. Our results suggest that mortgage brokers increase competition and lower fees in the mortgage market.     

The Borrower's Perceived Risk in Mortgage Choice

We investigate how borrowers perceive the risk in the adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) versus fixed rate mortgage (FRM) choice. We develop a mortgage choice model where the coefficient on the long‐term bond risk premium is conditional on the borrower's perceived risk. We show that the perceived risk fluctuates over time according to the short‐term interest rate level and housing market conditions. We find that when the short‐term rate level is high (low), the borrowers perceive low (high) risk of a short‐term rate rise, thus opting for ARMs (FRMs). Also, during a down housing market they become more risk‐averse perceiving higher risk in choosing ARMs. The perceived risk level alters the borrowers’ sensitivity to the long‐term bond risk premium.     

Lender Steering in Residential Mortgage Markets

In this article, we examine the incentives for lenders to steer borrowers into piggyback loan structures to circumvent regulations requiring primary mortgage insurance (PMI) for loans with loan‐to‐value ratios (LTV) above 80%. Our empirical analysis focuses on propensity score‐matched portfolios of piggyback and single‐lien loans having the same combined LTV based on a full set of observed risk characteristics. Our results confirm that mortgages originated with the piggyback structure have much lower ex post default rates and faster prepayment speeds than corresponding PMI loans. We also find a significant causal effect of interstate banking deregulation on the growth of piggybacks in these years, confirming that the ex post performance gap is primarily driven by lender steering on the supply side and not by borrower self‐selection. We then perform a number of tests to explore different origination and execution channels of mortgage steering.     

Financial Literacy,Broker–Borrower Interaction and Mortgage Default

This article examines the relationship between broker–borrower interaction in the origination process and subsequent mortgage performance. I show that face‐to‐face interaction between a mortgage broker and borrower before the loan funds is associated with lower levels of ex post default. The relation between face‐to‐face broker–borrower interaction and mortgage performance holds only for borrowers that have characteristics associated with low levels of financial literacy. Specifically, face‐to‐face interaction is negatively related to default for minorities, borrowers located in areas with low levels of education, low‐income borrowers and borrowers with low FICO scores. My results suggest that face‐to‐face interaction between the mortgage broker and borrower may reduce problems associated with financial illiteracy.     

Servicer Contracts and the Design of Mortgage‐Backed Security Pools

We develop a unified model of mortgage and servicer contracts. Renegotiating mortgage contracts following default is strictly Pareto improving, if the lender gathers updated information. An incentive compatible servicer contract requires the servicer to hold a risk position that has a value strictly greater than the cost of exerting effort. This risk position cannot in general be approximated with a horizontal “first‐loss” position. An alternative, forming a nondiversified pool, preserves pool‐wide information, avoids the cost of an incentive compatible servicer contract, and may increase MBS value.