业绩预告披露与盈余管理研究

盈余管理存在的根本原因在于投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称。业绩预告作为上市公司未来经营成果、财务状况与现金流量的预测,在很大程度上会影响投资者对上市公司的评估及其投资决策。从业绩预告披露的特征方面出发,研究业绩预告披露与盈余管理之间的关系,包括业绩预告的性质、预告精确度、预告误差分别与盈余管理程度的关系,结果发现：发布业绩预告的公司,盈余管理水平更高。预告精确度以及预告期间与预测当期盈余管理水平正相关,预测误差与盈余管理水平负相关。当消息类型不同的时候,预测的强制性与否以及＂变脸＂对盈余管理水平的影响不同。结论支持了上市公司财务报告迎合业绩预告披露的说法。     

A Comparison of Earnings Management Between KSE Firms and KOSDAQ Firms

Abstract:   This study investigates differences in earnings management practices of Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) firms and KOSDAQ (a Korean version of the NASDAQ market) firms during the period of 1996–1997. A sample of 1,256 KSE and 577 KOSDAQ firm‐year observations is used to compare earnings management practices of firms listed in the two different stock exchanges. The results of the study reveal that KOSDAQ firms tend to more actively manipulate earnings to avoid losses than KSE firms. KOSDAQ firms generally tend to increase reported earnings more aggressively than KSE firms when their operating cash flows are poor, and play down their reported earnings more when their operating cash flows are exceptionally good. The results of the study are quite robust in the sense that more aggressive earnings management practices of KOSDAQ firms persist even when operating cash flows are controlled.     

盈余管理的“度”

马靖昊：企业内部会计文化的缺失也助长了财务造假的风气目前盈余管理已成为众多上市公司为实现利益最大化所惯用的操作手法。虽然它的存在具有一定的合理性,但对众多上市公司而言,盈余管理质变后所带来的后果同样不可小觑。＂如果操作不当,质变后的盈余管理就是财务造假。＂畅捷通信息技术股份有限公司首席会计专家、中央财经大学研究生客座导师马靖昊在接受《新理财》专访时表示。操纵利润是企业盈余管理的普遍现象。在马靖昊看来,企业利润可以分为五种。     

The Effect of Earnings Forecasts on Earnings Management

We develop a theory of the association between earnings management and voluntary management forecasts in an agency setting. Earnings management is modeled as a "window dressing" action that can increase the firm's reported accounting earnings but has no impact on the firm's real cash flows. Earnings forecasts are modeled as the manager's communication of the firm's future cash flows. We show that it is easier to prevent the manager from managing earnings if he is asked to forecast earnings. We also show that earnings management is more likely to follow high earnings forecasts than low earnings forecasts. Finally, our analysis shows that shareholders may not find it optimal to prohibit earnings management. Earlier results rationalize earnings management by violating some assumption underlying the Revelation Principle. By contrast, in our model the principal can make full commitments and communication is unrestricted. Nonetheless, earnings management can be beneficial as it reduces the cost of eliciting truthful forecasts.     

盈余管理策略

虽然盈余管理在西方国家已产生多年,但是对于盈余管理的定义,一直以来都没有一个统一的说法,威廉姆·R·斯科特认为,盈余管理就是在会计准则的许可权限之内,利用不同的会计政策,最大的实现企业的社会利益和经济利益;凯瑟琳？雪柏则认为,所谓的盈余管理指的就是企业的经营者对外界有选择性的公布企业信息,以达到企业利益的最大化。以笔者的观点来看,盈余管理就是在不违反相关的会计法规下,管理者的对会计收益报告进行操控。     

Insider Trading and Earnings Management

Abstract:  This paper analyzes the relationship between earnings management and insider trading, specifically investigating whether discretionary accruals are related to insider trading and valuation. We find strong evidence of insiders managing earnings downward when buying and managing earnings upward when selling. On the marginal basis, value (high book-to-market value) firms manage their earnings upward compared to growth (low book-to-market value) firms, consistent with a signaling hypothesis. However, the opposite is true on the average basis, consistent with an opportunistic hypothesis.     

盈余管理与会计域秩序

盈余管理是目前会计学研究的核心问题之一。本文首先对已有盈余管理研究进行评述,在此基础上,认为已有研究仅仅局限于已有会计规则的框架下来研究会计规则执行过程中的盈余管理,而会计规则的执行在很大程度上决定于会计规则的制定。本文认为,会计规则的制定与执行是两个相互影响的环节,会计域秩序是会计信息质量的基本评价标准;盈余管理研究的目的之一是为会计规则的制定提供依据,它除了关注会计规则的执行行为以外,还应将会计规则的制定作为一个重要的变量,即研究在采用不同原则、方式和程序所制定而成的会计规则下的不同盈余管理行为。     

资产减值与盈余管理——论《资产减值》准则的政策涵义

2006年2月15日我国颁布了《资产减值》准则,规定已确认的资产减值不得转回。本文研究了上市公司的资产减值与盈余管理之间的关系,发现减值前亏损的公司存在以转回和计提资产减值进行盈余管理的行为, 一方面是为了避免亏损,另一方面是为了进行大洗澡(big bath);同时有较弱的证据说明减值前盈利的公司也存在以转回和计提资产减值进行盈余管理的行为,一方面是为了利润平滑化,另一方面是为了达到盈余增长。     

Ex Ante Incentives for Earnings Management and the Informativeness of Earnings

This study examines the relation between ex ante incentives of insurance managers to engage in earnings management to meet regulatory standards and the informativeness of earnings. This study extends prior research by simultaneously examining the effects of earnings management and uncertainty about earnings as suggested by Collins and DeAngelo (1990) and Imhoff and Lobo (1992). Results from a sample of 375 quarterly earnings announcements of 41 property and liability insurers during the period 1989 to 1992 support the hypothesis that when managers' incentives for earnings management are high, earnings announcements are less informative to investors (even after controlling for uncertainty associated with exposure to large-scale catastrophes). Robustness tests suggest that our results are not attributable to firm size, time period effects, firm effects, accounting estimation error, or financial distress risk. These results are consistent with investors using publicly available information to predict P-L insurance managers' ex ante incentives to manage earnings to meet regulatory standards, and that they use this information in forming their beliefs about earnings quality.     

问诊盈余管理

盈余管理是企业精心筹划的结果,具有合法、隐蔽的外衣.诊断一个企业是否进行了盈余管理不能仅从某一方面入手,不能根据单一指标进行判断,而要综合、全面的分析,才能得出正确的结论.     

盈余管理本质探析

本文从报表“真实性”的相对性、盈余管理的合法性、盈余管理对公司价值的影响、盈余管理下的财富转移的合理性和盈余管理的增值性等五个方面对盈余管理的本质进行了讨论。     

Top Management Team Characteristics and Accrual-Based Earnings Management

This study examines how top management team (TMT) knowledge and average tenure affect accrual-based earnings management by investigating 4791 Taiwanese listed companies from 2006 to 2010. TMT members with more knowledge (higher education level, more accounting expertise, and greater prior top management experience) and longer average tenure have better performances and higher reputations, and are more aware of the litigation costs of earnings manipulations; therefore, they reduce managers' incentives to manage earnings (incentive-reduction effect). On the other hand, these TMT members are also likely to become entrenched and engage in more earnings manipulations (entrenchment-enhancing effect). The empirical results show that firms' TMT knowledge and average tenure are negatively associated with discretionary accruals, suggesting that the incentive-reduction effect is stronger than the entrenchment-enhancing effect, which makes TMT members less likely to engage in earnings management. Moreover, the above results are robust when employing different earnings management measures and suspect firm analyses, as well as considering endogeneity issues. Finally, the study suggests that the presence of a founding family may reduce the influences of TMT knowledge and average tenure on earnings management.     

Confirming Management Earnings Forecasts, Earnings Uncertainty, and Stock Returns

In this study we examine the association among confirming management forecasts, stock prices, and analyst expectations. Confirming management forecasts are voluntary disclosures by management that corroborate existing market expectations about future earnings. This study provides evidence that these voluntary disclosures affect stock prices and the dispersion of analyst expectations. Specifically, we find that the market's reaction to confirming forecasts is significantly positive, indicating that benefits accrue to firms that disclose such forecasts. In addition, although we find no significant change in the mean consensus forecasts (a proxy for earnings expectations) around the confirming forecast date, evidence indicates a significant reduction in the mean and median consensus analyst dispersion (a proxy for earnings uncertainty). Finally, we document a positive association between the reduction of dispersion of analysts' forecasts and the magnitude of the stock market response. Overall, the evidence suggests that confirming forecasts reduce uncertainty about future earnings and that investors price this reduction of uncertainty.     

盈余管理真相

盈余管理是公司管理层实施战略管理的重要工具之一,合格的CF0并不一定必须去做盈余管理,但盈余管理却是CFO工作的重要组成部分。如果把盈余管理当作粉饰报表的工具,那就危险了。     

杠杆操纵:不为盈余的盈余管理动机

本文以我国A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了杠杆操纵与盈余管理之间的关系.研究发现,企业杠杆操纵压力越大(或曰杠杆操纵动机越强),其有利于控制账面杠杆率的盈余管理程度越大,且这一效应在非国有企业中更强,表明杠杆操纵动机确实是企业盈余管理的一种特殊动机.本文的研究不仅丰富和拓展了盈余管理动机方面的研究文献,从资产负债表信息出发研究盈余管理动机,揭示了出于杠杆操纵目的进行盈余管理的这种特殊动机;而且提示公司内外部治理主体尤其是投资者关注资产负债表信息质量,尽力甄别可能存在的杠杆操纵,准确认识企业债务风险水平和收益质量.     

Performance, Growth and Earnings Management

We study the relationship between the amount of managed earnings and firms’ earnings performance and expected growth in a reporting model, where managers manipulate earnings to influence the valuation of firms’ equity while bearing a cost that is increasing and convex in the amount of managed earnings. In the unique revealing equilibrium to the model, firms with higher performance and growth over-report earnings by a larger amount because price responsiveness increases with earnings performance and growth. And earnings quality, defined as the proportion of true economic earnings in total reported earnings, increases with earnings performance but decreases with earnings growth. We conduct empirical tests on a large sample and a restatement sample using different proxies for earnings management. Results from the large sample tests support our predictions while results from the restatement sample tests are mixed. Our study provides an alternative explanation to the positive relationship between discretionary accruals estimated from the Jones model and firms’ performance and growth.     

管理者过度自信与企业盈余管理行为研究

本文以我国上市公司作为研究样本,依据行为金融理论,从管理者过度自信角度研究了企业盈余管理行为。研究发现,管理者过度自信既会导致公司正向盈余管理行为的发生,也会导致负向盈余管理行为的发生。进一步研究发现,女性比例越高的管理团队越有可能进行盈余管理,管理团队的年龄越小越有可能进行正向盈余管理,管理团队学历越低越有可能进行负向盈余管理行为。本文对研究公司选择会计政策行为,治理公司盈余管理行为乃至完善公司治理结构均具有一定的启示。     

Earnings Management Constraints and Classification Shifting

Prior literature has investigated three forms of earnings management: real earnings management (REM), accruals earnings management (AEM) and classification shifting. Managers make trade‐off decisions among these methods based on the costs, constraints and timing of each strategy. This study investigates whether managers use classification shifting when their ability to use other forms of earnings management is constrained. We find that when REM is constrained by poor financial condition, high levels of institutional ownership and low industry market share, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. Further, we find that when AEM is constrained by low accounting system flexibility and the provision of a cash flow forecast, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. In addition, when we limit our sample to firms that are most likely to have manipulated earnings, we continue to find support for constraints of both REM and AEM leading to higher levels of classification shifting. We also find support for the hypothesis that the timing of each earnings management strategy influences managers’ trade‐off decision. Our results indicate that managers use classification shifting as substitute form of earnings management for both AEM and REM.     

新会计准则与盈余管理

本文以狭义的盈余管理为出发点,结合今年开始实施的新会计准则体系,全面分析了会计准则与盈余管理的关系,澄清了理论与实务界对二者关系的模糊认识;深入分析了新会计准则对企业盈余管理的时空影响及新形势下企业盈余管理的新特点,从博弈、法治和德治等视角提出了治理盈余管理的若干合理化建议。     

盈余管理方式与信贷资源配置

本文以2006—2013年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,从真实盈余管理和应计盈余管理双重视角,考察了盈余管理行为对信贷资源配置的影响。研究发现:企业通过盈余管理上调利润越多,获取了更多的信贷资源;国有企业通过应计盈余管理获取信贷资源的现象更明显,非国有企业通过真实盈余管理获取信贷资源的现象更明显。研究表明:一方面,企业通过盈余管理满足银行对自身盈利能力的要求,获取了更多的信贷资源;另一方面,我国银行无法识别贷款企业的盈余管理行为,盈余管理加大了银行的信贷风险。本文从贷款企业的盈余管理行为出发,为优化信贷资源配置提供了一个全新的视角,弥补了现有文献较为片面的认识。