Discount Brokerage in Residential Real Estate Markets

Transaction costs are thought to affect asset prices and market liquidity, but the direction and magnitude of these effects continue to be the subject of debate. In the single‐family residential market, discount brokers offer to list a house for a lower price and thus reduce the transaction costs associated with obtaining a match. In this article we obtain empirical estimates of the price and liquidity impact of a seller selecting a discount broker to market a single‐family residential property. The unique data set allows for the identification of residential properties that were listed by a discount brokerage firm. The empirical results confirm the predictions of our theoretical model. Using a sample of 318,221 listings and 243,625 sales, we find that houses listed by discount brokers sell at prices similar to non‐discount brokerage listings, but are less likely to sell, and when they do sell, take approximately three days longer to sell. The results indicate that lower transaction costs do not impact housing prices in this market, but that they are related to asset liquidity.     

Why Do Vacant Houses Sell for Less: Holding Costs,Bargaining Power or Stigma?

This article introduces Nash bargaining into a search model to identify various channels through which vacancy affects selling price and liquidity in the resale market for houses. The model shows the various vacancy effects in the form of greater seller holding cost, lower seller bargaining power and unobserved negative attributes or stigma. We use a 20‐year data series on house transactions to test for these effects in a simultaneous model of price and liquidity, using the long data series to allow for variation across market phases. The robust vacancy effects on price and liquidity across all market phases primarily reflect greater seller holding cost and diminished bargaining power. Repeatedly, vacant houses also exhibit significant stigma effects in the rising market but not in stable or declining market phases. At the same time, vacant houses enjoy stronger shopping externality effects from surrounding houses for sale than do their occupied counterparts.     

Unpacking functional alliance portfolios: How signals of viability affect young firms' outcomes

This article investigates how alliance portfolio composition affects young firms' outcomes. Drawing on signaling theory, we propose how alliance portfolio composition—number, functional domains (R&D, manufacturing, and marketing), and single‐purpose or multi‐purpose nature of alliances within the portfolio—may affect a firm's likelihood of achieving a liquidity event (IPO or acquisition). We study 8,600 U.S.‐based, VC‐backed firms during the period of 1990 to 2002 from 10 industry sectors. We find that alliance portfolios (to a certain extent) increase a firm's liquidity event likelihood. Further, firms with heterogeneous alliance portfolios, including portfolios emitting greater efficiency signals versus endorsement signals, are more likely to experience an IPO versus acquisition. Our findings lend support to the value of multi‐function alliances within portfolios. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competition and Price Discrimination: Evidence from the Parking Garage Industry

We study the relationship between competition and price discrimination through an empirical examination of hourly price schedules in the parking garage industry. We find that the degree of price schedule curvature decreases with competition, implying a greater proportionate drop in low‐end prices than in high‐end prices when competition intensifies. Our findings suggest that competition constrains a firm's capacity to exercise price discrimination, confirming the classic textbook theory. We also offer possible explanations for our findings, including a search cost explanation, for which we find some support in the data.     

Mergers when firms compete by choosing both price and promotion

We analyze the bias from predicting merger effects using structural models of price competition when firms actually compete using both price and promotion. We extend the standard merger simulation framework to allow for competition over both price and promotion and ask what happens if we ignore promotional competition. This model is applied to the super-premium ice cream industry, where a merger between Nestlé and Dreyer's was challenged by the Federal Trade Commission. We find that ignoring promotional competition significantly biases the predicted price effects of a merger to monopoly (5% instead of 12%). About three-fourths of the difference can be attributed to estimation bias (estimated demand is too elastic), with the remainder due to extrapolation bias from assuming post-merger promotional activity stays constant (instead it declines by 31%).     

Price Dispersion Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from the Airline Industry

This study provides empirical evidence documenting how price dispersion moves with the business cycle in the airline industry. Performing a fixed‐effects panel analysis on seventeen years of data covering two business cycles, we find that price dispersion is highly pro‐cyclical. This effect is especially pronounced for legacy carriers relative to low‐cost carriers. We show that our empirical result is consistent with firms' implementing second‐degree price‐discrimination tactics.     

Competition,Prices and Quality in the Market for Physician Consultations

Prices for consultations with General Practitioners (GP's) in Australia are unregulated, and patients pay the difference between the price set by the GP and a fixed reimbursement from the national tax‐funded Medicare insurance scheme. We construct a Vickrey‐Salop model of GP price and quality competition and test its predictions using individual GP‐level data on prices, the proportion of patients who are charged no out‐of‐pocket fee, average consultation length, and characteristics of the GP's, their practices and their local areas. We measure the competition to which the GP is exposed by the distance to other GP practices and allow for the endogeneity of GP location decisions with measures of area characteristics and area fixed‐effects. Within areas, GP's with more distant competitors charge higher prices and a smaller proportion of their patients make no out‐of‐pocket payment. GP's with more distant competitors also have shorter consultations, though the effect is small and statistically insignificant.     

List Prices,Sale Prices and Marketing Time: An Application to U.S. Housing Markets

Many goods are marketed after first stating a list price, with the expectation that the eventual sales price will differ. In this article, we first present a simple model of search behavior that includes the seller setting a list price. Holding constant the mean of the buyers’ distribution of potential offers for a good, we assume that the greater the list price, the slower the arrival rate of offers but the greater is the maximal offer. This trade‐off determines the optimal list price, which is set simultaneously with the seller's reservation price. Comparative statics are derived through a set of numerical sensitivity tests, where we show that the greater the variance of the distribution of buyers’ potential offers, the greater is the ratio of the list price to expected sales price. Thus, sellers of atypical goods will tend to set a relatively high list price compared with standard goods. We test this hypothesis using data from the Columbus, Ohio, housing market and find substantial support. We also find empirical support for another hypothesis of the model: atypical dwellings take longer to sell.     

PRICES AND ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURE IN OFFICE SUPPLY SUPERSTORES*

We consider the relationship between prices and market structure for office supply superstores in the U.S. which was central to the Federal Trade Commission's opposition to the merger of Staples and Office Depot. Due to potential biases in a standard regression, we employ a two‐stage approach in which a model of endogenous market structure provides correction terms for a second stage price regression. Using a cross‐section of data on market structures and Staples' prices, we find that excluding the correction term substantially distorts the importance of competitors as the two‐stage model yields stronger negative relationships between prices and market structure variables.     

Payment Card Interchange Fees and Price Discrimination

We consider the implications of platform price discrimination in the context of card platforms. Despite the platform's ability to price discriminate, we show that it will set fees for card usage that are too low, resulting in excessive usage of cards. We show this bias remains even if card fees (or rewards) can be conditioned on each type of retailer that the cardholder transacts with. We use our model to consider the European Commission's objection to the rules card platforms have used to sustain differential interchange fees across European countries.     

Asymmetric Price Effects of Competition

When price dispersion is prevalent, a relevant question is what happens to the whole distribution of equilibrium prices when the number of firms changes. Using data from the gasoline market in the Netherlands, we find, first, that markets with N competitors have price distributions that first‐order stochastically dominate the price distributions in markets with N+1 firms. Second, the effect of competition is stronger for the medium to upper percentiles of the price distribution. Finally, consumer gains from competition are larger for relatively well‐informed consumers. To account for these empirical patterns, we extend Varian's [1980] model by allowing for richer heterogeneity in consumer price information.     

Entry into platform‐based markets

This paper examines the relative importance of platform quality, indirect network effects, and consumer expectations on the success of entrants in platform‐based markets. We develop a theoretical model and find that an entrant's success depends on the strength of indirect network effects and on the consumers' discount factor for future applications. We then illustrate the model's applicability by examining Xbox's entry into the video game industry. We find that Xbox had a small quality advantage over the incumbent, PlayStation 2, and the strength of indirect network effects and the consumers' discount factor, while statistically significant, fall in the region where PlayStation 2's position is unsustainable. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revisiting the firm,industry, and country effects on profitability under recessionary and expansion periods: A multilevel analysis

Research summary: Despite voluminous past research, the relevance of firm, industry, and country effects on profitability, particularly under adverse contexts, is still unclear. We reconcile institutional theory with the resource‐based view and industrial organization economics to investigate the effects of economic adversity, such as the 2008 global economic crisis. Using a three‐level random coefficient model, we examine 15,008 firms across 10 emerging and 10 developed countries for the 2005–2011 period. We find that firm effects become stronger under adversity, whereas industry effects become weaker, as well as country main and interaction effects, particularly among the emerging economies. These findings confirm our assumptions that the firm's own fate is, to a great extent, self‐determined; a reality that is even more pronounced during periods of extreme economic hardship. Managerial summary: In this research, we examine how generalized economic adversity affects the balance across the firm‐, industry‐, and country‐specific factors determining firm profitability. We specifically examine 15,008 firms from 10 emerging and 10 developed countries during the 2005–2011 period to investigate the effects of the 2008 global economic crisis on firm performance. We find that in such adverse conditions, the role of the industry and the country are reduced and the firm's own resources and capabilities become more pertinent for firm performance. This phenomenon is more pronounced across emerging markets. We conclude that the firm's own fate is, to a great extent, self‐determined, a reality that is markedly more evident during periods of extreme economic hardship. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Insider trading as a vehicle to appropriate rent from R&D

While most insider trading is routine and legal, investors still treat it as new information about the firm's prospects—they assume that trades reflect managers' attempts to profit from their private information. This article explores insider trading as a mechanism to appropriate rent from R&D advances. We analyze stock price reactions to over 134,000 insider‐trading events and find that insider purchases generate larger positive stock price reactions for R&D‐intensive firms. Investors seem to assume that managers use insider trading to appropriate rent from R&D breakthroughs. We discuss how shareholders may prefer this rent appropriation mechanism over other forms of compensation that directly reduce the firm's income. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The double‐edged effect of knowledge acquisition: How contracts safeguard pre‐existing resources

Research summary : Acquiring knowledge on a partner's pre‐existing resources plays an important yet ambiguous role in collaborative relationships. We formally model how contracts trade off productive and destructive uses of knowledge in a buyer‐supplier relationship. We show that, when the buyer's pre‐existing resources are vulnerable to the revelation of sensitive knowledge, the supplier overinvests in knowledge acquisition as it expects to use the knowledge as a threat in price negotiations. A non‐renegotiable closed‐price contract prevents such overinvestment and reduces the supplier's ability to expropriate the buyer ex post. Our results extend to the cases of renegotiable closed‐price contracts, repeated interactions between a buyer and a supplier, and the use of nondisclosure policies. We draw theoretical, empirical, and managerial implications from our model. Managerial summary : This study yields new insights regarding the use of contract design in protecting pre‐existing, nonrelationship specific assets in buyer‐supplier arrangements. Anecdotal examples illustrate the “dark side” of these arrangements where opportunistic suppliers exploit knowledge of buyers' pre‐existing resources to seek rent and appropriate value. When a supplier is likely to act harmfully, a closed‐price contract that specifies the price of the supplier's component upfront may reduce the supplier's incentives to overinvest in acquiring and exploiting knowledge of the buyer's pre‐existing resources. As such, when a buyer's pre‐existing resources are highly valuable, and thus more vulnerable to use by the supplier outside of the arrangement, a non‐renegotiable closed‐price contract is more efficient. Additionally, limited disclosure policies and informal agreements based on repeated interactions complement indirect governance via price contracts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Network effects and competition: an empirical analysis of the home video game industry

Building on the resource‐based view of the firm, we advance the idea that a firm's customer network can be a strategic asset. We suggest that network effects are a function of network size (i.e., installed customer base) and network strength (i.e., the marginal impact of a unit increase in network size on demand). We empirically study these network effects in the 16‐bit home video game industry in which the dominant competitors were Nintendo and Sega. In the spirit of the new empirical IO framework, we estimate a structural econometric model assuming the data are equilibrium outcomes of the best fitting noncooperative game in price and advertising. After controlling for other effects, we find strong evidence that network effects are asymmetric between the competitors in the home video game industry. Specifically, we find that the firm with a smaller customer network (Nintendo) has higher network strength than the firm with the larger customer base (Sega). Thus, our results provide a possible explanation for this situation in which the firm with a smaller customer network (Nintendo) was able to overtake the sales of a firm with a larger network size (Sega). Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts

We consider contracts for public transport services between a public authority and a transport operator. We build a structural endogenous switching model where the contract choice results from the combined effects of the incentivization scheme aimed at monitoring the operator's efficiency and the political agenda followed by the regulator to account for the voice of private interests. Our results support theoretical predictions as they suggest that cost‐plus contracts entail a higher cost for society than fixed‐price contracts but allow the public authority to leave a rent to a subset of individuals. Accounting for transfers to interest groups in welfare computations reduces the welfare gap between cost‐plus and fixed‐price regimes.     

Integrating Illiquid Assets into the Portfolio Decision Process

We consider the issues associated with modeling the decision to invest in an illiquid asset, such as real estate, over an extended period of time. Markets for illiquid assets tend to display certain characteristics: for example, significant time‐till‐sale and correlation in the rates of return over time. More importantly, as the liquidity of a market cannot be an issue if an investor never needs to liquidate an asset, we focus on how the liquidity of a market interacts with an individual's uncertain need to liquidate. We show that the optimal strategy is state contingent, if possible. We also show that the penalty associated with an illiquid investment depends on the characteristics of other assets being held in the portfolio, on the characteristics of liquidity shocks and on the interaction between time and behavior. We show that borrowing to pay for a liquidity shock cannot overcome all of the costs of owning an illiquid asset. In contrast, borrowing at t = 0 benefits from the complementarity in the assets. In a simpler model, we show that the portfolio perspective makes illiquid assets more valuable to an investor with a longer time horizon.     

The component procurement problem for the loss-averse manufacturer with spot purchase

This paper studies the purchasing behaviour of a loss-averse engineer-to-order manufacturer, who purchases a key component for his final product from a supplier under a single-wholesale-price contract with spot purchase opportunities, where both the product demand and the component spot price are uncertain. Through newsvendor type of models, we analyze several key issues, including the effects of the manufacturer's loss aversion, and the effects of demand and spot price uncertainties on the manufacturer's decision behaviour. We find that the purchasing behaviour of the loss-averse manufacturer differs from those of the risk-neutral and risk-averse ones. Specifically, we identify some sufficient conditions under which the loss-averse manufacturer may purchase a larger order quantity in advance when demand becomes more uncertain or when the price becomes more uncertain. We also discuss the two-wholesale-price contract and show that fixing the emergency supply price may lead to a smaller order quantity.     

Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the U.K.

We develop a calibrated simulation model of the U.K. mobile telephony market and use it to analyze the effects of reducing mobile termination rates (MTR's) as recommended by the European Commission. We find that reducing MTR's is likely to increase both consumer surplus and networks' profits. Depending on the strength of call externalities (i.e., benefits to the recipient of a call), social welfare may increase by as much as £1 billion to £4.6 billion per year. We also use the model to estimate the welfare effects of the 2010 merger between Orange and T‐Mobile and find that the merger led to a substantial reduction in consumer surplus.