Analysts’ stock recommendations,earnings growth and risk

A key output of sell‐side analysts is their recommendations to investors as to whether they should, buy, hold or sell a company's shares. However, relatively little is known regarding the determinants of those recommendations. This study considers this question, presenting results that suggest that recommendations are dependent on analysts’ short‐term and long‐term earnings growth forecasts, as well as on proxies for the analysts’ unobservable views on earnings growth in the more distant future and risk. Furthermore, analysts who appear to incorporate earnings growth beyond the long‐term growth forecast horizons and risk into their recommendation decisions make more profitable stock recommendations.     

Sell‐Side Analyst Research and Stock Comovement

We document that a stock's price around a recommendation or forecast covaries with prices of other stocks the issuing analyst covers. The effect of shared analyst coverage on stock price comovement extends beyond analyst activity days. A stock's daily returns covary with the returns of other stocks with which it shares analyst coverage. These links between stock price comovement and shared analyst coverage are consistent with the coverage‐specific information we find in earnings forecasts; analysts who cover both stocks in a pair expect future earnings of the stocks to be more highly correlated than do analysts who cover only one stock from the pair. Collectively, our evidence indicates that analyst research produces coverage‐specific spillovers that raise price comovement among stocks that share analyst coverage. The strength of these spillovers is comparable to spillovers from broad industry and market information in analyst research.     

The Client Is King: Do Mutual Fund Relationships Bias Analyst Recommendations?

This paper investigates whether the business relations between mutual funds and brokerage firms influence sell‐side analyst recommendations. Using a unique data set that discloses brokerage firms’ commission income derived from each mutual fund client as well as the share holdings of these mutual funds, we find that an analyst's recommendation on a stock relative to consensus is significantly higher if the stock is held by the mutual fund clients of the analyst's brokerage firm. The optimism in analyst recommendations increases with the weight of the stock in a mutual fund client's portfolio and the commission revenue generated from the mutual fund client. However, this favorable recommendation bias toward a client's existing portfolio stocks is mitigated if the stock in question is highly visible to other mutual fund investors. Abnormal stock returns are significantly greater both for the announcement period and, in the long run, for favorable stock recommendations from analysts not subject to client pressure than for equally favorable recommendations from business‐related analysts. In addition, we find that, subsequent to announcements of bad news from the covered firms, analysts are significantly less likely to downgrade a stock held by client mutual funds. Mutual funds increase their holdings in a stock that receives a favorable recommendation but this impact is significantly reduced if the recommendation comes from analysts subject to client pressure.     

Portfolio concentration and fund manager performance

This research examines the relationships among portfolio concentration, fund manager skills, and fund performance in Taiwan's equity mutual fund industry, yielding several empirical findings as follows. First, after controlling for other factors, concentrated equity funds tend to have smaller net asset values, larger fund flows, higher turnover rates, and a younger age and prevail in smaller fund families. Second, concentrated fund managers buy and sell stocks more smartly based on economic trends or market factors than do diversified fund managers, i.e., they have better market‐timing abilities. Third, only partial evidence supports the premise that concentrated equity funds have better next‐quarter risk‐adjusted performances than do diversified ones, as these fund managers' skills positively correlate to risk‐adjusted fund performance. Fourth, fund managers who have better stock‐picking abilities and intensively invest in certain industries generally exhibit better Carhart's alpha in the next quarter than do other fund managers. Fifth, fund managers' stock‐picking abilities more closely relate to long‐term performance than do their market‐timing abilities. Lastly, positive performance persistence is much stronger than negative performance persistence, but concentrated funds do not have stronger performance persistence than do diversified funds.     

Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices

We analyze the trading activity of the mutual fund industry from 1975 through 1994 to determine whether funds "herd" when they trade stocks and to investigate the impact of herding on stock prices. Although we find little herding by mutual funds in the average stock, we find much higher levels in trades of small stocks and in trading by growth-oriented funds. Stocks that herds buy outperform stocks that they sell by 4 percent during the following six months; this return difference is much more pronounced among small stocks. Our results are consistent with mutual fund herding speeding the price-adjustment process.     

Leading the herd: evidence from mutual funds’ buy and sell decisions

This article investigates whether a mutual fund’s performance is related to its herding behavior. Using the methodology of Sias (Rev Finance Stud 17:165–206, 2004), we develop a measure to capture the magnitude that a fund’s buy (sell) decisions are leading other funds’ buys (sells), and find that a fund’s performance is positively (negatively) related to its “buy leading” (“sell leading”). We interpret these findings as evidence that “buy leaders” (“sell leaders”)’ performance benefits (suffers) from the positive (negative) price effect associated with buy (sell) herds. Additionally, we find a positive relationship between fund performance and valuation-motivated “buy leading”, while we find weak evidence on the relationship between performance and valuation-motivated “sell leading”. We interpret these results as evidence that leading funds’ outperformance is due, in part, to their ability to value stocks.     

Hedge funds and their prime broker analysts

Are sell-side analysts reluctant to go against the investment views of their hedge funds when these hedge funds are their prime brokerage clients? We show that prime broker analysts tend to upgrade stocks recently bought by their clients. For stocks with upgraded recommendations, post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns are significantly lower for those purchased by the prime brokerage clients. Our results are stronger with high-dollar-turnover clients who generate more trading commissions. We also find that a hedge fund with a large bet on a stock has a stronger incentive to pressure the fund’s prime brokers to issue a favorable recommendation on the stock. Results are not driven by stocks of firms with low analyst coverage or small size.     

The Tax Consequences of Long‐Run Pension Policy*

A firm's pension fund is legally separate from the firm. But because pension benefits are normally independent of fund performance, pension assets impact the firm very much as if they were firm assets. Because they are worth more when times are good and less when times are bad, common stocks in the pension fund add to the sponsoring firm's leverage. They cause contributions to a pension fund to be high just when the firm can least afford to pay them. Conversely, bonds in the pension fund will make it easier for the firm to avoid default on its own bonds when times are bad all over: The more bonds a pension fund buys, the more the firm can borrow. The tax treatment accorded the pension fund differs notably from that accorded the firm. Some have argued that a firm can capitalize on the difference by accelerating the funding of its pension plan. The benefits of full funding are wasted, however, unless the added contributions to the fund are invested in bonds; higher pension contributions now mean lower contributions later, hence higher taxes later. The benefits come from earning, after taxes, the pretax interest rate on the bonds in the pension fund. If the firm wants to take advantage of the differing tax treatment of bonds without altering the level of its current pension contributions, it can (1) sell stocks in the pension fund and then buy bonds with the proceeds while (2) issuing debt in the firm and buying back its own shares with the proceeds. An investment in the firm's own stock creates no more tax liability than an investment in stocks through the pension fund.     

MUTUAL FUND TRADES: ASYMMETRIC LIQUIDITY PREFERENCES AND FUND PERFORMANCE

We investigate the role of the liquidity of stocks traded by mutual funds on the performance of funds experiencing substantial and sustained redemptions (outflows) or inflows. Accordingly, we identify 770 redeeming fund‐periods and 1,757 inflow fund‐periods and find a statistically significant relation between the liquidity of the stocks they trade and the quantity of the stock traded. Notably, when funds experience redemptions, those with low portfolio liquidity have an elevated preference for selling more‐liquid stocks. In the following period, such funds statistically and economically underperform funds that sell less‐liquid stocks. This is consistent with redemptions detrimentally affecting shareholders that remain in a fund.     

Morgan Stanley's Risk‐Reward Views: Unlocking the Full Potential of Fundamental Analysis

Since 2008, Risk‐Reward Views have been the basis for the recommendations on all the stocks covered by Morgan Stanley's equity research analysts globally. The firm's analysts use this systematic approach to communicate a broader range of fundamental insights about expected returns and risks, and to articulate more clearly the logic underlying their price targets and calls, and the level of conviction associated with them. The rationale for this approach is to align the firm's research product with its clients' thinking and investment discipline while also creating a link between traditional equity analysis and widely accepted principles of modern portfolio management. Too many sell‐side analysts still try to manifest expertise and conviction with one‐sided investment theses backed by single‐point estimates and “table pounding.” That does a disservice to investors who are looking to sell‐side analysts for an ongoing dialogue about the future with experts on company fundamentals. Risk‐Reward Views are designed to produce a more complete view of the risk‐reward trade‐off in a given stock. They are meant to supplement the use of quant‐only risk models that, while offering at least the illusion of precision, are also often opaque and backward looking. The approach aims to increase transparency while avoiding unnecessary complexity by focusing on a handful of critical uncertainties and modeling a manageable number of coherent scenarios that are relevant to investor debates and cover a full range of plausible outcomes. This article focuses on the theoretical underpinnings of the department's Risk‐Reward initiative. For a more detailed discussion of the institutional setting and the processes followed to implement these ideas, readers are referred to the recently published Harvard Business School case study, “The Risk‐Reward Framework at Morgan Stanley Research” (Harvard Business School Case N9–111–011).     

Insider Trading and Option Grant Timing in Response to Fire Sales (and Purchases) of Stocks by Mutual Funds

Mutual funds experiencing large outflows (inflows) tend to decrease (expand) their positions, creating downward (upward) price pressure in the stocks held in common by them ( Coval and Stafford [2007] ). This study shows that corporate insiders exploit the resulting mispricing by buying (selling) their company's stock if it is subject to such fire sales (purchases) by funds. We also show that the likelihood of option grants is greater for stocks that are subject to mutual fund fire sales. Finally, we show that both the insider trading and the option granting activities help speed up the correction of the flow‐driven mispricing. Overall, this study illustrates that insiders enhance personal benefits by trading on their personal account and influencing the timing of option grants in response to mispricing due to flow‐driven fund trading. Moreover, these activities help improve the informational efficiency of stock price.     

Small-cap equity mutual fund managers as liquidity providers

This paper examines the relation between the performance of small-cap equity mutual funds and the liquidity characteristics of their asset holdings. We study the trading behavior of fund managers and show that on average, they tend to buy less liquid stocks and sell more liquid stocks. We introduce the notion of net “liquidity creation” by fund managers and examine its role in explaining the cross section of small-cap equity mutual fund returns. Our empirical results show that on average, small-cap mutual fund managers are able to earn an additional 1.5% return per year as compensation for providing such liquidity services to the market.     

Are All Security Analysts Equal?

We examine the extent to which security analysts are homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation as measured by Tobin's Q. Earlier research documents a significant and positive relation between analyst coverage and firm valuation. We identify three classes of equity analysts and examine their differential effect on firm valuation associated with their coverage and their information production. We find that equity analysts are not homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation. The presence of analysts at national securities firms have the strongest effect on firm valuation followed by analysts at regional securities firms and finally analysts at nonbrokerage, or research, firms. We attribute this result to the differential monitoring and information dissemination function rendered by the analysts. Information produced by analysts, however, does not share the same credibility. Specifically, we find brokerage firms' buy recommendations are discounted by the market and have a weak effect on firm valuation. The results can be supported by arguments that brokerage firm analysts' recommendations are contaminated by their firms' investment banking relations with corporations.     

Sell‐Side School Ties

We study the impact of social networks on agents’ ability to gather superior information about firms. Exploiting novel data on the educational background of sell‐side analysts and senior corporate officers, we find that analysts outperform by up to 6.60% per year on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link to the company. Pre‐Reg FD, this school‐tie return premium is 9.36% per year, while post‐Reg FD it is nearly zero. In contrast, in an environment that did not change selective disclosure regulation (the U.K.), the school‐tie premium is large and significant over the entire sample period.     

Liquidity Dry-ups in equity markets

This paper examines how mutual fund investors’ demand for liquidity provision endogenously affects stock liquidity in the equity market. We find that actively managed funds in the US tend to hold less liquidity than their respective benchmarks, which leads them to rely on only a small fraction of liquid stocks when it comes to liquidity demand. Using mutual fund sell transactions, we further show that mutual funds tend to sell more liquid stocks in their holdings when experiencing outflows. Concentrated sales of liquid stocks, however, significantly reduce the liquidity of these stocks, resulting in liquidity deterioration or dry-up among highly liquid stocks in periods of high market-wide liquidity demand. Overall, the results indicate that mutual funds fail to predict the liquidity of the asset at purchase.     

Embedding Sustainability Performance and Long‐Term Strategy in the Earnings Call

The practice of disclosing corporate Environmental, Social and Governance performance information continues to evolve, and the frequency of ESG disclosures in investor‐facing discussions, including Investor Day presentations and non‐deal roadshows, continues to grow. But even with these developments, the corporate‐investor dialogue about ESG and long‐term strategy, and their expected effects on long‐run profitability and value, has continued to lag. This seems particularly evident in the quarterly earnings call. In this article, the authors review the work of NYU's Center for Sustainable Business, in collaboration with Chief Executives for Corporate Purpose (CECP), in encouraging companies to work ESG themes and performance into their quarterly earnings calls. After discussing the reasons for the relatively slow progress in this important disclosure venue, including interviews with sell‐side analysts, the authors propose practical approaches that can guide companies, regardless of industry or market cap, in delivering this content in a way that is valuable to both buy‐side and sell‐side equity analysts.     

Efficient partnership dissolution under buy‐sell clauses

Buy‐sell clauses are commonly used contractual provisions to determine the terms of dissolution of partnerships. Under them, one party offers a price for the partnership and the other party chooses whether to sell her share or buy her partner's share at this price. We point out that the selection of the proposing partner is essential for the performance of the clause. Moreover, if partners negotiate for the advantage of being the chooser, then buy‐sell clauses result in an ex post efficient outcome. Such endogenous selection is consistent with how buy‐sell clauses are drafted in practice.     

The Impact of NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 on Analyst Behavior: The Strategic Timing of Recommendations Issued on Weekends

Amendments to NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472, enacted in May 2002, mandate that sell‐side analysts disclose the distribution of their security recommendations by buy, hold and sell category. This regulation enhances the transparency of analysts’ information and mitigates the long‐recognized optimistic bias in their recommendations. However, we find that analysts are more likely to issue sell recommendations or downgrade revisions on weekends when investors have limited attention after these rule changes. This pattern is more pronounced for prestigious analysts, who are more likely to influence stock prices. Market reaction tests reveal an incomplete immediate response and a greater drift to unfavorable recommendations issued on weekends. Finally, analysts who are more likely to release unfavorable recommendations on weekends exhibit higher future forecast accuracy. Our findings suggest that, while these regulatory changes effectively reduce analysts’ optimistic bias, they are also associated with an increased prevalence of a different form of distortion in the capital market.