Industrial Real Estate Mortgage Default Experience of the New York State Job Development Authority Second Loan Program: A Preliminary Investigation

This paper explores the loan loss experience of a public industrial lending authority, employing contemporaneous borrower net equity as a link to mortgage loan default. The relationship between default, net equity and bankruptcy is tested on a small longitudinal data set of loans using nonparametric statistics and a proportional hazard model. Results show that negative net equity and firm bankruptcy are strongly associated with default among the study population. Further, the borrowers studied did not exercise the put option promptly, suggesting potential benefits from monitoring net equity one year or more prior to default.     

Predicting Commercial Mortgage Foreclosure Experience

This study has two objectives: (1) it directly evaluates the relationship between commercial mortgage default incidence and characteristics of the mortgage, borrower, property, market, and general economic conditions, and (2) it uses this relationship to predict the exposure of life insurers to future mortgage defaults and to examine the relative importance of various causes of current and past credit quality problems. A theoretical model of the default decision predicts that the decision would be expected to be driven primarily by the borrower's current equity stake in the property, or the ratio of the market value of the loan to property value (M_t/V_t), but that the presence and magnitude of transaction costs associated with default would be expected to result in underexercise of the default option. Empirical estimation making use of American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) and National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) data confirms both expectations. A high proportion of the longitudinal variation in foreclosure incidence is explained by variations in M_t/V_t, but even at high ratios M_t/V_t in excess of 1.1. only 5% to 8% of mortgagors default, although this magnitude of underexercise is probably overstated because of problems in measuring M^t and for other reasons. Simulations using the model provide a pessimistic outlook for future defaults. Default rates are predicted to double in the five-year period 1988–93. Other simulations examine the relative importance of interest rate fluctuations, property value declines, and geographic or temporal correlations in lending during the 1976–88 period on current default experience.     

The 1989–92 Credit Crunch for Real Estate: A Retrospective

This study surveys a broad range of information to establish the degree to which real estate lending and construction activity decreased in the 1989–92 period owing to a "credit crunch." It reviews the conditions that led up to the contraction in mortgage lending and construction and then documents the extent to which the evidence is consistent with a credit crunch in lending for residential and nonresidential construction, permanent financing of income properties, and residential mortgage lending. Also, this study weighs the relative importance of the credit crunch and other factors that contributed to the falloff in real estate lending and contrasts the recent period with earlier credit crunch episodes.     

Mortgage Default and Prepayment Risks among Moderate‐ and Low‐Income Households

Using a unique sample of community reinvestment loans, we study the propensity of very low‐income households to terminate a mortgage and compare it to the outcomes for low‐income and moderate‐income households. The results indicate that, even within moderate‐ and low‐income segments, lower or very low income is associated with higher default and lower prepayment probabilities. In addition, depending on how low the borrower's income is, classic determinants of loan termination such as credit scores, the amount of equity in the home and local labor market conditions can have different impacts on default and prepayment probabilities.     

Mortgage Borrower Repayment Behavior: A Microeconomic Analysis with Canadian Adjustable Rate Mortgage Data

In this paper we estimate a model of mortgage borrower behavior using micro-level data on Canadian borrowers with rollover mortgages—a form of adjustable-rate mortgage. Our results suggest that the probability of default rises with a decrease in housing equity and an increase in the mortgage contract rate; however the size of these changes is relatively small. They also show that partial prepayment is sensitive to fluctuations in the rates of return from investing in housing versus other assets. For the United States experience, our results suggest that, relative to fixed-rate mortgage borrowers, adjustable-rate mortgage borrowers are more likely to default and less likely to prepay.     

Strategic Mortgage Default: The Effect of Neighborhood Factors

This article studies strategic default—the willingness of a borrower to walk away from a mortgage when the value of the home falls below the unpaid principal balance despite an ability to pay. This study differs from the literature in two fundamental ways. First, we use unique data assets describing the household's equity position and capacity to carry the debt in addition to credit performance to identify strategic defaulters accurately. Second, we address externalities from local foreclosures and other strategic defaults and find that the incidence of strategic default is sensitive to the presence of other nearby strategic defaulters. These results have significant implications for foreclosure and loss mitigation policies employed by servicers and investors.     

A Tale of Two Tensions: Balancing Access to Credit and Credit Risk in Mortgage Underwriting

Over the years 2000–2007, mortgage market underwriting conditions eased in response to public policy demands for increased homeownership. This easing of acceptable credit risk in order to accommodate increased access to credit, when coupled with the unanticipated house price declines during the Great Recession, resulted in substantial increases in delinquencies and foreclosures. The response to this mortgage market crisis led to myriad changes in the industry, including tightened underwriting standards and new market regulations. The result is a growing concern that credit standards are now too tight, restricting the recovery of the housing market. Faced with this history, policy analysts, regulators and industry participants have been forced to consider how best to balance the tension inherent in managing mortgage credit risk without unduly restricting access to credit. Our research is unique in providing explicit consideration of this trade‐off in the context of mortgage underwriting. Using recent mortgage market data, we explore whether modern automated underwriting systems (AUS) can be used to extend credit to borrowers responsibly, with a particular focus on target populations that include minorities and those with low and moderate incomes. We find that modern AUS do offer a potentially valuable tool for balancing the tensions of extending credit at acceptable risks, either by using scorecards that mix through‐the‐cycle and stress scorecard approaches or by adjusting the cutpoint—more relaxed cutpoints allow for higher levels of default while providing more access, tighter cutpoints accept fewer borrowers while allowing less credit risk.     

Modelling Mortgage Terminations in Turbulent Times

Techniques used to predict mortgage defaults during a relatively stable period proved less successful during the turbulent financial cycle of the early 1980s. An alternative specification of the relationship between defaults, homeowner equity, and interest-rate movements better captures the effect of interest rates on default probability. Results confirm the powerful effect of equity on mortgage defaults and the strong, but asymmetric, influence of interest rates on both defaults and prepayments. The new specification allows direct measurement of the interest-rate effect on defaults, distinguishing the effect when rates rise or fall.     

Thy Neighbor’s Mortgage: Does Living in a Subprime Neighborhood Affect One’s Probability of Default?

This article focuses on the potential externalities associated with subprime mortgage origination activity. Specifically, we examine whether negative spillover effects from subprime mortgage originations result in higher default rates in the surrounding area. Our empirical analysis controls for loan characteristics, house price changes and alternative loan products. Our results indicate that, after controlling for these characteristics, the concentration of subprime lending in a neighborhood does not lead to greater default risks for surrounding borrowers. However, we do find that more aggressive mortgage products (such as hybrid adjustable rate mortgages and low/no‐documentation loans) had significant negative spillovers on other borrowers. Stated differently, the aggressive alternative mortgage designs were more toxic to the housing and mortgage market than previously believed.     

On the Assessment of Default Risk in Commercial Mortgage Lending

This paper takes an initial step toward the development of an empirically-based model of default risk assessment in the commercial mortgage market. A review of existing empirical studies of residential mortgage and commercial loan default provides evidence for appropriate model specification and estimation. A simple default risk model for commercial mortgages is then developed based upon the generalized default risk models of Jackson and Kaserman [1980] and Vandell [1981]. The model is then examined for its ability to successfully handle a variety of situations and used to test the validity of traditional ratio analysis "rules-of-thumb" employed in commercial lending. Ratio tests are found generally to be inconsistent with an objective of constraining default risk below some maximum. Finally, a modified ratio analysis consistent with the model and with a constrained default risk strategy is introduced.     

Relocation Opportunities and Mortgage Default

This paper presents a theoretical model of residential mortgage default when borrowers face beneficial as well as costly relocation opportunities. It amplifies and extends previous work by providing explicit conditions leading to default. The model also establishes when a borrower's relocation decision and default decision are dependent and when they are not.
A central result is that there is a range of book equity wherein the decision to default is not determined solely by the current level of equity or the borrower's ability to continue the mortgage payments. Rather, various costs and benefits, both tangible and intangible, enter into the decision. Specific conditions are identified that lead to relocation without default, default and relocation, and no default or relocation. The effects of changes in the variables upon default probability are presented.
Assuming that the borrower does not wish to retain ownership in the property, the model also predicts whether an individual borrower will choose prepayment or default when a relocation is made. The choice depends on the value of the relocation opportunity faced by the borrower, as well as financial variables such as house value, mortgage balance, and transaction costs. This finding suggests that existing empirical analyses of default may have omitted explanatory variables.     

Throwing Good Money After Bad? Cash Infusions and Distressed Real Estate

When a leveraged real estate project experience cash-flow problems, the owner must either inject additional cash or default on the mortgage. We show that it is not optimal for the owner to default as soon as net cash flow becomes negative. Surprisingly, the owner can expropriate some of the mortgage lender's wealth by injecting cash and continuing to pay interest. When the owner has cash constraints, outside investors may be able to extract significant economic rents by financing distressed real estate projects. These results have interesting implications for mortgage lending and the pattern of real estate transaction volume.     

The Termination of Subprime Hybrid and Fixed‐Rate Mortgages

Adjustable‐rate and hybrid loans have been a larger component of subprime mortgage lending in the mortgage market than prime lending. The typical adjustable‐rate loan in subprime is a hybrid of fixed and adjustable characteristics in which the first 2 years are fixed and the remaining 28 years adjustable. Hybrid loans terminate at elevated probabilities even before the first adjustment date. Hybrid loan terminations are sensitive to interest rates and teaser rates (payment shocks). Default probabilities increase dramatically when payment shocks are mixed with low or no equity in the home. This is the mixture of events that helped to trigger the 2007/2008 subprime mortgage crisis.     

Evaluating the Costs of Increased Lending in Low and Negative Growth Local Housing Markets

The literatures on default and the evaluation of low downpayment mortgage programs are extended by showing within an options pricing framework how differences in expected price appreciation trends across housing markets can influence default and, thereby, the cost of programs designed to increase mortgage liquidity. An equilibrium mortgage rate reflecting the risk premium required to compensate for expected default-related losses is endogenously determined within the model. Evaluating the entire process by which program losses arise strictly within a rigorous asset pricing framework has potentially important implications for policy evaluation, as the estimated present value of program losses in declining markets where expected default is high is quite sensitive to the choice of the discount rate. The implications of increased lending in low and negative price appreciation local markets are also investigated.     

Estimation of Mortgage Defaults Using Disaggregate Loan History Data

This paper addresses, theoretically and empirically, the structure of influences affecting the default option in mortgage contracts. A formal theoretical model recognizes that a number of loan and non-loan related effects beyond equity in the unit could influence the default decision. These include 1) payment levels relative to income, which could displace other investment opportunities or cause a need for borrowing or sale to meet mortgage obligations; 2) current and expected neighborhood and housing market conditions, in particular the expected relative rate of appreciation of the unit and the relative cost of homeownership; 3) economic conditions; 4) wealth; 5) borrower characteristics proxying for variability in income or "crisis" events; as well as 6) transactions costs incurred upon default. Estimates of the model making use of a micro-level sample of individual loan histories over a twelve year period, supplemented by longitudinal census and economic information, find a number of these "other" effects important. Simulations find several of them to dominate the equity effect on default and to help explain why some households with zero or negative equity may not default, while others with positive equity may. The implications of these results for appropriate specification of the pricing model describing the default option and for appropriate underwriting of AMIs are noted.     

Equity Dilution: An Alternative Perspective on Mortgage Default

Empirical research on mortgage default in the single-family market has focused on the value of the borrower's put option using house price indices to estimate contemporaneous loan-to-value ratio or the probability of negative equity. But since the borrower possesses the option to increase leverage by taking on additional debt secured by junior liens subsequent to loan origination (a phenomenon termed here equity dilution ), even a perfect house price adjustment cannot be expected to accurately measure changes in borrower equity over time. Since junior liens are generally unobservable to senior debt holders, proxies are required in empirical applications. This paper employs an independent estimate of junior lien probability developed from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances combined with loan level mortgage performance data to examine the role junior liens play in increasing default risk.     

Predatory Lending Laws and the Cost of Credit

Various states and other local jurisdictions have enacted laws intending to reduce predatory and abusive lending in the subprime mortgage market. These laws have created substantial geographic variation in the regulation of mortgage credit. This article examines whether these laws are associated with a higher or lower cost of credit. Empirical results indicate that the laws are associated with at most a modest increase in cost. However, the impact depends on the product type. In particular, loans with fixed (adjustable) rates are associated with a modest increase (decrease) in cost.     

Emergence of subprime lending in minority neighborhoods

Subprime lending is concentrated in minority neighborhoods. However, the literature provides little evidence for what led to this concentration. We use the endorsement of credit scores in mortgage underwriting by the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) in 1995 to answer this question. We show that prime lenders were substituted by subprime lenders in minority neighborhoods. As a result, the share of subprime lending increased by 5 percentage points in minority neighborhoods, relative to nonminority neighborhoods. Prime lenders with a stronger relationship with the GSEs reduced their lending in minority neighborhoods more, and the level of securitization by the GSEs in minority neighborhoods also decreased.     

The Termination of Commercial Mortgage Contracts through Prepayment and Default: A Proportional Hazard Approach with Competing Risks

This article examines the factors driving the borrower's decision to terminate commercial mortgage contracts with the lender through either prepayment or default. Using loan–level data, we estimate prepayment and default functions in a proportional hazard framework with competing risks, allowing us to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Under a strict definition of mortgage default, we do not find evidence to support the existence of unobserved heterogeneity. However, when the definition of mortgage default is relaxed, we do find some evidence of two distinctive borrower groups. Our results suggest that the values of implicit put and call options drive default and prepayment actions in a nonlinear and interactive fashion. Prepayment and default risks are found to be convex in the intrinsic value of call and put options, respectively. Consistent with the joint nature of the two underlying options, high value of the put/call option is found to significantly reduce the call/put risk since the borrower forfeits both options by exercising one. Variables that proxy for cash flow and credit conditions as well as ex post bargaining powers are also found to have significant influence upon the borrower's mortgage termination decision.     

A Dynamic Double-Trigger Model of Multifamily Mortgage Default

This study advances the commercial mortgage literature by providing theory and methods for incorporating both equity and cash-flow considerations in default models. We use local market conditions to compute a (joint) probability that default is in-the-money, based on both equity and cash-flow considerations. Statistical analysis is performed using data on multifamily mortgages originated in the 1980s and early 1990s. Simulations based on statistical modeling show advantages of the probabilistic double-trigger approach over other measures of equity and cash flow.