Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

Sell‐Side School Ties

We study the impact of social networks on agents’ ability to gather superior information about firms. Exploiting novel data on the educational background of sell‐side analysts and senior corporate officers, we find that analysts outperform by up to 6.60% per year on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link to the company. Pre‐Reg FD, this school‐tie return premium is 9.36% per year, while post‐Reg FD it is nearly zero. In contrast, in an environment that did not change selective disclosure regulation (the U.K.), the school‐tie premium is large and significant over the entire sample period.     

Sell‐Side Analyst Research and Stock Comovement

We document that a stock's price around a recommendation or forecast covaries with prices of other stocks the issuing analyst covers. The effect of shared analyst coverage on stock price comovement extends beyond analyst activity days. A stock's daily returns covary with the returns of other stocks with which it shares analyst coverage. These links between stock price comovement and shared analyst coverage are consistent with the coverage‐specific information we find in earnings forecasts; analysts who cover both stocks in a pair expect future earnings of the stocks to be more highly correlated than do analysts who cover only one stock from the pair. Collectively, our evidence indicates that analyst research produces coverage‐specific spillovers that raise price comovement among stocks that share analyst coverage. The strength of these spillovers is comparable to spillovers from broad industry and market information in analyst research.     

What Makes a Stock Risky? Evidence from Sell‐Side Analysts' Risk Ratings

We examine the determinants and the informativeness of financial analysts' risk ratings using a large sample of research reports issued by Salomon Smith Barney, now Citigroup, over the period 1997–2003. We find that the cross‐sectional variation in risk ratings is largely explained by variables commonly viewed as measures of risk, such as idiosyncratic risk, size, book‐to‐market, and leverage. In addition, earnings‐based measures of risk, such as earnings quality and accounting losses, also contribute to explaining the cross‐sectional variation in the risk ratings. Finally, we document that the risk ratings can be used to predict future return volatility after controlling for other predictors of future volatility. We conclude that analysts play an important role as providers of information about investment risk.     

Sell‐Side Analyst Bias When Investment Banks Have Privileged Access to the Board

Research on analyst bias typically identifies affiliation with reference to a subset of the mandates that could give rise to incentives for bias in a multifunction investment bank. This paper develops a new measure of affiliation based upon the UK practice of corporate broking. An advantage of this approach is that affiliation is no longer restricted to isolated equity issuance events as it is an ongoing activity. This research shows that prior US evidence regarding the “Global Settlement” is robust to this new measure and application in the United Kingdom rather than solely the United States. The paper uses a hazard rate methodology focusing on the timeliness of revisions to address selection bias concerns.     

Cross‐Firm Real Earnings Management

Our analysis is rooted in the notion that stockholders can learn about the fundamental value of any firm from observing the earnings reports of its rivals. We argue that such intraindustry information transfers, which have been broadly documented in the empirical literature, may motivate managers to alter stockholders’ beliefs about the value of their firm not only by manipulating their own earnings report but also by influencing the earnings reports of rival firms. Managers obviously do not have access to the accounting system of peer firms, but they can nevertheless influence the earnings reports of rival firms by distorting real transactions that relate to the product market competition. We demonstrate such managerial behavior, which we refer to as cross‐firm real earnings management, and explore its potential consequences and interrelation with the practice of accounting‐based earnings management within an industry setting with imperfect (nonproprietary) accounting information.     

私募股权投资与证券分析师新股关注

本文采用2009年至2011年新上市的281家创业板公司为研究样本,考察私募股权投资如何影响证券分析师对被投资企业上市的关注程度。结果发现私募股权投资支持的企业能够吸引到更多的证券分析师关注,并且证券分析师的预测也更加准确,这与私募股权投资的认证假说和市场能力假说相符。此外,相比非外资背景的私募股权投资,外资背景的私募股权投资支持的企业在上市时受到更多的证券分析师关注,并且分析师预测准度也更高。进一步研究发现,参与上市公司的私募股权投资机构越多,对该上市公司关注的证券分析师越多,但并未发现对分析师预测准度的显著影响。本文的研究不仅丰富了PE与证券分析师的文献,也为我国如何加强建设内资PE团队提供了重要的参考价值。     

Determinants of the Method of Payment in Asset Sell‐Off Transactions

Using a sample of asset sell‐off transactions from January 1990 to April 2010, we find that the method of payment used in asset sell‐off transactions is associated with several characteristics cited in the acquisitions research that reflect cash constraints of the bidder. Specifically, bidders facing more stringent cash constraints are more likely to use equity when purchasing assets, while sellers subjected to cash constraints prefer cash when selling assets. Second, we find that the variation in method of payment among asset sell‐off transactions also is partially explained by variables representing asymmetric information. Third, we apply our model to an expanded sample that includes non‐U.S. sellers of assets and find that an equity payment is more likely when sellers are based in countries that have relatively high country risk (more government restrictions), weak shareholder rights, and a weak legal system. Thus, it appears that bidders prefer that sellers share in the risk of the transaction under these conditions.     

Self‐Selection and the Forecasting Abilities of Female Equity Analysts

This paper investigates whether there are systematic differences between the forecasting style and abilities of female and male analysts, and whether market participants recognize these differences. My key conjecture is that only female analysts with superior forecasting abilities enter the profession due to a perception of discrimination in the analyst labor market. Consistent with this conjecture, I find that female analysts issue bolder and more accurate forecasts and their accuracy is higher in market segments in which their concentration is lower. Further, the stock market participants are aware of the male–female skill differences. They respond more strongly to the forecast revisions by female analysts even though those analysts get less media coverage. The short‐term market reaction is incomplete, however, because it is followed by a strong post‐revision drift. The perception of abilities is similar in the analyst labor market, where female analysts are more likely to move up to high‐status brokerage firms, while their downward career mobility is lower. Collectively, these results indicate that female analysts have better‐than‐average skill due to self‐selection and market participants are at least partially able to recognize their superior abilities.     

Over-Reaction by Security Market Analysts: The Impact of Broker Status and Firm Size

The aim of this study is to provide an examination of short-term earnings forecasts for evidence of systematic over-reaction. Analysts' predicted changes in earnings are compared with the realised changes to identify the contribution of systematic error (bias and generalised over-reaction) to the mean square error. A second analysis investigates whether analysts over-react to prior earnings changes. For both analyses, the impact of firm size and analysts' broker status are investigated.     

Governance Structure and Firm Performance in Private Family Firms

Although a large proportion of firms are family owned and most family firms are private, our understanding of private family firms is limited. Using confidential information on family relationships between board members, CEOs, and shareholders, this is the first study to provide large‐scale evidence on the association between governance structure and firm performance in family‐controlled private firms. Our sample is unique as it covers almost all private limited liability firms in Norway, spans 11 years, traces firm ownership to ultimate owners, and identifies family relationship using data on kinship, marriage, and adoption. The results show a U‐shaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance. Higher ownership of the second largest owner, higher percentage of family members on the board, stronger family power, and smaller boards are associated with higher firm performance. In addition, the positive association between the ownership of the second largest owner and firm performance also occurs when the second largest owner is a member of the controlling family, but the association is stronger when the second largest owner is a non‐family member. We further test the relative importance of these test variables and find that ownership structure is more associated with firm performance than board structure.     

Corporate Sell‐offs in the UK: Use of Proceeds,Financial Distress and Long‐run Impact on Shareholder Wealth

This study examines the long‐run return performance following UK corporate sell‐off announcements. We observe significant negative abnormal returns up to five years subsequent to sell‐off announcements. Our finding is robust to various specifications, irrespective of the intended use of proceeds. We also find a significantly positive association between long‐run abnormal returns and the magnitude of cash proceeds for sellers reducing corporate debt as well as for sellers with deeper financial distress or higher growth prospects. Overall, we find that UK corporate sell‐offs are associated with declines in subsequent shareholder wealth.     

定向增发中的会计业绩效应与财务分析师信息预示

本文以2007-2013年907家定向增发公司为研究样本,考察了定向增发对资源使用效益衡量指标净资产收益率(ROE)与用之于市场决策转化指标每股收益(EPS)之间逻辑关系的影响,以及考察了定向增发环境下财务分析师对增发公司业绩变化的预示能力。研究发现,定向增发存在"EPS业绩效应",即在ROE下降情形下,随着定向增发规模的增大,公司EPS会越来越高。这为解释定向增发存在短期正向宣告效应长期回报不佳现象提供了新思路。尽管定向增发通常意味着信息不对称程度更高,但我们研究发现财务分析师盈余预测调整与公司EPS变化基本一致,并且其预测向上调整预示了定向增发公司有一个更好的未来会计业绩,这表明财务分析师预测活动可作为公司管理层信息披露的替代。     

Large Shareholders,the Board of Directors and the Allocation of Cash Proceeds from Corporate Asset Sell‐offs

Recent finance literature suggests that managers of divesting firms may retain cash proceeds from corporate asset sell‐offs in order to pursue their own objectives, and, therefore, shareholders' gains due to these deals are linked to a distribution of proceeds to shareholders or to debtholders. We add to this literature by examining the role of various corporate governance mechanisms in the context of the allocation of sell‐off proceeds. Specifically, we examine the impact of directors' share‐ownership and stock options, board composition and external large shareholdings on (1) shareholders' abnormal returns around asset sell‐off announcements, and (2) managers' decision to either retain or distribute (to shareholders or to debtholders) sell‐off proceeds. We find that non‐executive directors' and CEO's share‐ownership and stock options are related to shareholders' gains from sell‐offs for firms that retain proceeds. However, corporate governance mechanisms are not significantly related to shareholders' gains for firms that distribute sell‐off proceeds. Furthermore, we find that the likelihood of a distribution of proceeds, relative to the retention decision, is increasing in large institutional shareholdings, executive and non‐executive directors' share‐ownership and non‐executive representation in the board.     

Risk Management in Public–Private Partnerships

This study investigates the risk management in long‐term concession contracts known as public–private partnerships (PPPs). The M4 is the first Australian PPP road concession to reach the end of its concession cycle. It provides a unique and timely opportunity to examine the risk management process over its contract term and the efficacy of PPP contractual structures in managing uncertainties. Our specific research interests focus on two questions. First, what risk management approach was implemented? Second, has the risk‐allocation strategy defined in the contract facilitated or hindered the risk management process? The findings of the study suggest that under the incomplete contract approach, the risk management practices rooted in a strong contractual framework, allied with good relationship skills, has contributed to a positive outcome for the M4 PPP. The study provides generalisable insights into risk management in inter‐organisational long‐term contracts.     

Understanding the Endogeneity Between Firm Value and Shareholder Rights

I explore the relation between firm value and the shareholder rights-based Governance Index "G," which has become a popular measure of governance quality among researchers and investors. I show that the relation is not spuriously driven by unobservable firm heterogeneity or an assortment of observable firm characteristics, such as firm growth potential and profitability. The causality seems to run from G to firm value, rather than from firm value to G. My results suggest that granting more rights to shareholders could be an effective way to reduce agency costs and enhance firm value.