Do Borrowers Make Rational Choices on Points and Refinancing?

Utilizing individual mortgage data, we find that borrowers with points are less likely to refinance, and when they do, they take longer to refinance. This finding supports the separating equilibrium prediction of earlier studies that borrowers with higher (lower) refinancing costs self‐select into mortgages with higher‐point/lower‐rate (lower‐point/higher‐rate) loans.     

Movers and Shuckers: Interdependent Prepayment Decisions

We model competing risks of mortgage termination where the borrower faces a repeated choice to continue to pay, refinance the loan, move or default. Most previous empirical work on mortgage prepayment has ignored the distinction between prepayments triggered by refinancing and moving, combining them into a single prepayment rate. We show that financial considerations are the primary drivers of the refinance choice while homeowner characteristics have more influence on the move decision. We demonstrate that these differences are statistically significant and that combining these two distinct choices into a single measure of prepayment shifts coefficients toward zero and produces inaccurate predictions of aggregate termination rates. For example, a combined model underestimates the effect of the market price of the loan on refinancing; it misses entirely the opposite effects of borrower income on moving and refinancing. Our results suggest that existing prepayment models are inconsistent predictors of mobility-driven prepayment and underestimate the effect of market conditions and borrower characteristics on refinancing and housing decisions. Our findings have great significance to mortgage investors because mobility-driven prepayments are likely to be a more significant source of prepayments in thenext decade.     

Mortgage Refinancing with Asymmetric Information

Information asymmetry exists between the lender and the borrower regarding the holding period of the mortgaged real estate; the lender does not know how long the borrower plans to own the house. This information asymmetry allows the cost of obtaining a mortgage to deviate from its value to the borrower. As a result, the exercise price of the option to refinance becomes the cost to the borrower of obtaining a new mortgage instead of the outstanding balance of the existing mortgage as used in previous models. The option to refinance is a sequential option; after the borrower refinances, a new option is obtained to refinance again in the future. A mortgage refinancing model is developed taking information asymmetry and sequential refinancing into account. The model is used to solve for (1) the value to the borrower of a callable mortgage and (2) the minimum interest rate differential between the contract rate of the existing mortgage and the market interest rate needed to justify refinancing.     

Reversing the Trend: The Recent Expansion of the Reverse Mortgage Market

Reverse mortgages allow elderly homeowners to tap into their housing wealth without having to sell or move out of their homes. However, very few eligible homeowners used reverse mortgages to achieve consumption smoothing until recently, when the reverse mortgage market in the United States witnessed substantial growth. In this article, I examine 1989–2007 loan‐level reverse mortgage data and conduct three sets of analyses to better understand the demand for reverse mortgages among elderly homeowners. First, I study the ZIP code characteristics correlated with reverse mortgage originations. Second, I show that recent reverse mortgage borrowers are significantly different from earlier borrowers in many respects. Third, I investigate the reasons why the reverse mortgage market experienced substantial growth in the mid‐2000s. Combining the reverse mortgage data with county‐level house price data, I find that higher house prices lead to more reverse mortgage originations. Specifically, the increases in house prices account for about one‐third of the overall growth in the reverse mortgage market from 2003 to 2007.     

Borrower Credit and the Valuation of Mortgage-Backed Securities

We study the valuation of mortgage-backed securities when borrowers may have to refinance at premium rates because of their credit. The optimal refinancing strategy often results in prepayment being delayed significantly relative to traditional models. Furthermore, mortgage values can exceed par by much more than the cost of refinancing. Applying the model to an extensive sample of mortgage-backed security prices, we find that the implied credit spreads that match these prices closely parallel borrowers' actual spreads at the origination of the mortgage. These results suggest that models that incorporate borrower credit into the analysis may provide a promising alternative to the reduced-form prepayment models widely used in practice.     

Spatial Heterogeneity in Mortgage Terminations by Refinance, Sale and Default

This article investigates the impact of spatially correlated unobservable variables on the refinancing, selling and default decisions of mortgage borrowers. Virtually the entire mortgage literature acknowledges that borrower-specific characteristics, such as culture, education or access to information, play an important role in mortgage termination decisions. While we do not observe these variables directly, we note that borrowers of similar background tend to cluster together in neighborhoods. We estimate a competing risks hazard model with random effects using a three-stage maximum likelihood estimation approach. We utilize the space-varying coefficient method to modify the covariance structure according to the spatial distribution of the observations. Beyond a significant improvement of the model performance, this yields a number of insightful implications for mortgage termination behavior. For instance, borrowers of the affluent "West Side" of Los Angeles County both refinance and move at a higher rate than predicted by the standard maximum likelihood estimation method. At the same time, borrowers from some lower-valued neighborhoods tend to stay longer than expected with their mortgages and properties.     

Subprime Refinancing: Equity Extraction and Mortgage Termination

This article examines the choice of borrowers to extract wealth from housing in the high-cost (subprime) segment of the mortgage market and assesses the prepayment and default performance of these cash-out refinance loans relative to the rate of refinance loans. Consistent with survey evidence, the propensity to extract equity is sensitive to the relative interest rates of other forms of consumer debt. After the loan is originated, our results indicate that cash-out refinances perform differently from non–cash-out refinances. For example, cash-outs are less likely to default or prepay, and the termination of cash-outs is more sensitive to changing interest rates and house prices.     

Do Homeowners Mark to Market? A Comparison of Self‐Reported and Estimated Market Home Values During the Housing Boom and Bust

This article examines homeowners’ self‐reported values in the American Housing Survey and the Health and Retirement Study from the start of the recent housing price run‐ups through recent price declines. We compare ZIP‐Code‐level market‐based estimates of housing prices to those derived from homeowners’ self‐reported values. We show that there are systematic differences which vary with market conditions and the amount of equity owners hold in their homes. When prices have fallen, homeowners systematically state that their homes are worth more than market estimates suggest, and homeowners with little or no equity in their homes state values above the market estimates to a greater degree. Over time, homeowners appear to adjust their assessments to be more in line with past market trends, but only slowly. Our results suggest that underwater borrowers are likely to understate their losses and either may not be aware that their mortgages are underwater or underestimate the degree to which they are.     

Implied Mortgage Refinancing Thresholds

The optimal prepayment model asserts that rational homeowners will refinance if they can reduce the current value of their liabilities by an amount greater than the refinancing threshold, defined as the cost of carrying the transaction plus the time value of the embedded call option. To compute the notional value of the refinancing threshold, researchers have traditionally relied on discrete- or continuous-time option-pricing models. Using a unique loan level database that links homeowner attributes with property and loan characteristics, this study proposes an alternative approach for estimating the implied value of the refinancing threshold. This empirical method enables us to measure the minimum interest-rate differential needed to justify refinancing conditional on the borrower's creditworthiness, loan-to-value ratio and other observable characteristics.     

Government Policies,Residential Mortgage Defaults and the Boom and Bust Cycle of Housing Prices

We develop a micro‐based macromodel for residential home prices in an economy where defaults on residential mortgages negatively affect housing prices. Our model enables us to study the impact of subprime defaults on prime borrowers and the impact of various government policies on the housing market boom and bust cycle. In this regard, our key conclusions are that (i) there is a contagion effect from subprime defaults to prime defaults due to the negative impact of subprime defaults and (ii) monetary policy is the most effective tool for decreasing mortgage defaults and increasing aggregate home prices in contrast to alternative government fiscal policies designed to loosen mortgage credit.     

The Borrower's Perceived Risk in Mortgage Choice

We investigate how borrowers perceive the risk in the adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) versus fixed rate mortgage (FRM) choice. We develop a mortgage choice model where the coefficient on the long‐term bond risk premium is conditional on the borrower's perceived risk. We show that the perceived risk fluctuates over time according to the short‐term interest rate level and housing market conditions. We find that when the short‐term rate level is high (low), the borrowers perceive low (high) risk of a short‐term rate rise, thus opting for ARMs (FRMs). Also, during a down housing market they become more risk‐averse perceiving higher risk in choosing ARMs. The perceived risk level alters the borrowers’ sensitivity to the long‐term bond risk premium.     

The Effect of Refinancing Costs and Market Imperfections on the Optimal Call Strategy and the Pricing of Debt Contracts

This article, which was originally written in 1986, develops a methodology for valuing mortgage-backed securities with refinancing costs. We solve simultaneously for the valuation of the mortgage-backed security (loan) and the borrower's refinancing strategy, pricing all coupon levels simultaneously. Because the borrower may refinance his or her loan and incur costs at many times in the future, the optimal refinancing decisions arise from an optimal dynamic strategy that reflects the costs of all potential future refinancings. Though the borrower faces multiple rounds of refinancing costs, the market value of the loan cannot exceed the call price plus a single round of refinancing costs.     

Differential Access to and Pricing of Home Mortgages: 2004 through 2009

This article documents trends and drivers of the residential mortgage market during the years 2004 through 2009, specifically focusing on the access to and pricing of mortgages originated by African‐American and Hispanic borrowers, and by borrowers living in low‐income and minority communities. Our analysis relies on a rich set of proprietary data that allow more expanded insights than can be obtained from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) alone. We show that access to mortgage credit increased between 2004 and 2006 for the borrowers we focus on in our study and declined dramatically thereafter. Trends in access to credit were driven primarily by the changing credit mix of mortgage applicants and secondarily by the replacement of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) for subprime as the dominant mode of nonprime originations and tighter underwriting standards. Throughout our entire period of study, these borrowers also consistently paid higher prices for their mortgages; however, the extent of this differential varied considerably over time and across groups. These pricing trends were driven primarily by changes in the FHA and subprime shares as well as by the market's increasingly aggressive pricing of credit risk.     

A Tale of Two Tensions: Balancing Access to Credit and Credit Risk in Mortgage Underwriting

Over the years 2000–2007, mortgage market underwriting conditions eased in response to public policy demands for increased homeownership. This easing of acceptable credit risk in order to accommodate increased access to credit, when coupled with the unanticipated house price declines during the Great Recession, resulted in substantial increases in delinquencies and foreclosures. The response to this mortgage market crisis led to myriad changes in the industry, including tightened underwriting standards and new market regulations. The result is a growing concern that credit standards are now too tight, restricting the recovery of the housing market. Faced with this history, policy analysts, regulators and industry participants have been forced to consider how best to balance the tension inherent in managing mortgage credit risk without unduly restricting access to credit. Our research is unique in providing explicit consideration of this trade‐off in the context of mortgage underwriting. Using recent mortgage market data, we explore whether modern automated underwriting systems (AUS) can be used to extend credit to borrowers responsibly, with a particular focus on target populations that include minorities and those with low and moderate incomes. We find that modern AUS do offer a potentially valuable tool for balancing the tensions of extending credit at acceptable risks, either by using scorecards that mix through‐the‐cycle and stress scorecard approaches or by adjusting the cutpoint—more relaxed cutpoints allow for higher levels of default while providing more access, tighter cutpoints accept fewer borrowers while allowing less credit risk.     

Optimal Mortgage Refinancing with Stochastic Interest Rates

The purpose of this paper is to develop a dynamic model of mortgage refinancing in a contingent claim framework that simultaneously solves for the borrower's optimal mortgage refinancing strategy, the value of the refinancing call option, the value of the mortgage liability to the borrower, and the market (lender) value of the fixed-rate contract. We also calculate the minimum differential between the contract rate on the existing mortgage and the current interest rate that is required to trigger an optimal mortgage refinancing.     

Self‐Reported vs. Market Estimated House Values: Are Homeowners Misinformed or Are They Purposely Misreporting?

Extant research finds significant gaps between a homeowner's self‐reported house value and market estimates, and that the gap is largest for underwater homeowners. Prior studies, however, have largely overlooked the possibility that homeowners’ self‐reported house value may be more accurate due to private information. Previous research has also neglected the possibility that there could be discordance between what homeowners know and what they report as their house value. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, this study examines how the choices of households reveal their knowledge of the true home value. In so doing, we find that that post move housing choices reveal that market estimates are accurate assessments of the housing value. Further, we find evidence that these underwater homeowners are aware of the actual house value, but are reporting them incorrectly. The results show that misreporting underwater homeowners are as likely to be late on their mortgage payments as homeowners that are reporting negative equity. Underwater homeowners’ reluctance to admit their losses accords with the theory of loss aversion.     

Financial Literacy,Broker–Borrower Interaction and Mortgage Default

This article examines the relationship between broker–borrower interaction in the origination process and subsequent mortgage performance. I show that face‐to‐face interaction between a mortgage broker and borrower before the loan funds is associated with lower levels of ex post default. The relation between face‐to‐face broker–borrower interaction and mortgage performance holds only for borrowers that have characteristics associated with low levels of financial literacy. Specifically, face‐to‐face interaction is negatively related to default for minorities, borrowers located in areas with low levels of education, low‐income borrowers and borrowers with low FICO scores. My results suggest that face‐to‐face interaction between the mortgage broker and borrower may reduce problems associated with financial illiteracy.     

The Performance of Low-Income and Minority Mortgages

This article analyzes the performance of low-income and minority mortgages (LIMMs) from a large sample of fixed-rate conventional conforming mortgages. We find that low-income borrowers are less likely to prepay when it is optimal, whereas black and Hispanic borrowers prepay more slowly than other borrowers, regardless of the option's value. After controlling for equity, credit history and some other variables, LIMMs default slightly more frequently and have about the same loss severity as other loans. Our results suggest that, for most yield curve situations, differences in LIMM prepayment behavior have little effect on pricing.     

Unobservable Risks in Mortgage Contract Choice

This study proposes a lifetime utility maximization model where borrowers choose optimal mortgage bundles including mortgage type, loan‐to‐value and loan size to maximize their allocation of limited budgets between housing and nonhousing consumptions. The model predicts that the mortgage bundle choices by borrowers of different income and risk attributes explain significant variations in the ex post default risks of the borrowers. The empirical tests using sampled mortgages pooled in nonagency residential mortgage backed securities support the hypothesis that the optimal choice of mortgage bundles reveals hidden risk factors of borrowers, which, if ignored, could lead to misjudgment of ex post default of borrowers.     

Thy Neighbor’s Mortgage: Does Living in a Subprime Neighborhood Affect One’s Probability of Default?

This article focuses on the potential externalities associated with subprime mortgage origination activity. Specifically, we examine whether negative spillover effects from subprime mortgage originations result in higher default rates in the surrounding area. Our empirical analysis controls for loan characteristics, house price changes and alternative loan products. Our results indicate that, after controlling for these characteristics, the concentration of subprime lending in a neighborhood does not lead to greater default risks for surrounding borrowers. However, we do find that more aggressive mortgage products (such as hybrid adjustable rate mortgages and low/no‐documentation loans) had significant negative spillovers on other borrowers. Stated differently, the aggressive alternative mortgage designs were more toxic to the housing and mortgage market than previously believed.