Induced-Value Tests of Contingent Valuation Elicitation Mechanisms

Using an induced-value experimental design that varies whether values for a “good” are certain or uncertain and whether payment is real or hypothetical, this study investigates issues of demand revelation, hypothetical bias, and value uncertainty for four elicitation mechanisms used in contingent valuation surveys: dichotomous choice, dichotomous choice with follow-up certainty question, payment card, and multiple-bounded discrete choice. For all elicitation mechanisms, we find no evidence of hypothetical bias: voting decisions do not vary systematically when payment is hypothetical versus when it is real. Under all design conditions we find the fewest deviations between stated and induced values and the strongest evidence of demand revelation with dichotomous choice. Stated uncertainty in dichotomous choice follow-up and multiple-bounded discrete choice questions does correlate with uncertain induced values, but the signal is noisy. We discuss the implications of our findings for the design of contingent valuation surveys.     

A Comparison of Induced Value and Home-Grown Value Experiments to Test for Hypothetical Bias in Contingent Valuation

This study tests the hypothesis that hypothetical bias may not be related to value elicitation; rather it may be a value formation problem. When participants are asked to indicate their willingness to pay for an induced value good, we find no evidence of hypothetical bias for three different commodity types (public good, private good, and publicly provided private good). However, when these same subjects are asked to value homegrown goods with no pre-assigned induced value using the same elicitation mechanism, hypothetical values are roughly double actual payments in all three cases. These results support the hypothesis that the process of forming values in a homegrown setting may be a key contributor to hypothetical bias.     

Hypothetical Bias Reconsidered: Payment and Provision Uncertainties in a Threshold Provision Mechanism

We extend research on the consequentiality of stated preference choices to a threshold provision mechanism for public goods. We develop a simple theoretical model of option price to analyze how option price varies with payment and provision uncertainty. We explore whether threshold provision contributions are similarly influenced by payment and provision uncertainty using an induced value contribution experiment. Results suggest that: (1) the probability of payment has a negative effect on contributions; (2) the probability of provision has a positive effect on contributions. We offer subjective beliefs regarding payment and provision as a plausible systematic explanation for hypothetical bias.     

Using Random nth Price Auctions to Value Non-Market Goods and Services

Public policy decision making often requires balancing the benefits of a policy with the costs. While regulators in the United States and abroad rely heavily on benefit-cost analysis, critics contend that hypothetical bias precludes one of the most popular benefit estimation techniques—contingent surveys—from providing reliable economic values for nonmarket goods and services. This paper explores a new methodology to obtain the total value of nonmarket goods and services—random nth price auctions. The empirical work revolves around examining behavior of 360 participants in a competitive marketplace, where subjects naturally buy, sell, and trade commodities. The field experiment provides some preliminary evidence that hypothetical random nth price auctions can, in certain situations, reveal demand truthfully.     

Contingent valuation and actual payment for voluntarily provided passive-use values: Assessing the effect of an induced truth-telling mechanism and elicitation formats

A fundamental question about the contingent valuation (CV) method is to what degree it predicts actual payments (AP). This has particularly been an intriguing matter related to voluntary provision of public goods representing primarily passive-use values. This paper reports the results from such a CV–AP comparison. Applying a voluntary payment mechanism there exists a theoretical expectation of upward bias in CV estimates and downward bias in AP. This study applied an induced truth-telling mechanism in one treatment group to assess the hypothetical bias effect in CV. The CV estimates in this treatment group were significantly lower than in the group that did not face this mechanism. But this effect was limited to those responding/acting to dichotomous choice, not affecting those responding to open-ended questions about willingness to pay.     

A Learning Design for Reducing Hypothetical Bias in the Contingent Valuation Method

Over the last few years a great deal of research has focussed on hypothetical bias in value estimates obtained with the contingent valuation (CV) method and on means for ameliorating if not eliminating such bias. To date, efforts to eliminate hypothetical bias have relied on calibration techniques or on word-smithing of one kind or another to induce subjects to provide responses to hypothetical questions that mimic responses made by subjects facing actual payments in the valuation experiment. This paper introduces a different approach for eliminating hypothetical bias. A design for a CV survey format is presented which provides subjects with the opportunity to learn how the CV institution works. Sequential referenda are conducted where respondents gain experience in CV settings by participating in both hypothetical and real referenda. The logic of this Learning Design is a straightforward application of the trials process used in experimental economics. We demonstrate that the Learning Design is effective in eliminating hypothetical bias in surveys concerning donations to two different public goods.     

Social context,financial stakes and hypothetical bias: an induced value referendum experiment

This article investigates the effect of social context in an induced value, public good referendum experiment. In a split-sample treatment, social context is simulated by requiring participants to potentially have to disclose their vote to the group (voting disclosure) across both hypothetical and real settings. The experimental design also varies the cost (a coercive tax), and includes an uncertain level of benefit from the public good. The design allows investigation of the role of social context in both hypothetical and real referenda and its interaction with changes in the financial stakes involved (costs and potential benefits). Results show evidence of hypothetical bias, but also a social context effect that occurs in both real and hypothetical settings. This social context effect is larger than the effect of hypothetical bias, but is muted by the magnitude of costs and potential benefits. Hypothetical cases are also shown to be more prone to the social context effect.     

Reparations for African‐Americans as a Transfer Problem: A Cautionary Tale

We examine how different methods of reparations payments to African‐Americans affect both the black and nonblack populations of the United States using the framework of the transfer‐problem from international trade theory as a theoretical foundation. We find that reparations payments that provide incentives for blacks to use the payment toward purchases of goods and services produced by nonblacks might expand the income gap. Also a reparations payment in the absence of productive capacity owned by blacks is found to have no final positive impact on black income. These results indicate that a reparations payment strategy must be carefully and cautiously conceived in order to achieve the desired effects.     

A Meta-analysis of Hypothetical Bias in Stated Preference Valuation

Individuals are widely believed to overstate their economic valuation of a good by a factor of two or three. This paper reports the results of a meta-analysis of hypothetical bias in 28 stated preference valuation studies that report monetary willingness-to-pay and used the same mechanism for eliciting both hypothetical and actual values. The papers generated 83 observations with a median ratio of hypothetical to actual value of only 1.35, and the distribution has severe positive skewness. We find that a choice-based elicitation mechanism is important in reducing bias. We provide some evidence that the use of student subjects may be a source of bias, but since this variable is highly correlated with group experimental settings, firm conclusions cannot be drawn. There is some weak evidence that bias increases when public goods are being valued, and that some calibration methods may be effective at reducing bias. However, results are quite sensitive to model specification, which will remain a problem until a comprehensive theory of hypothetical bias is developed.JEL classifications: C9, H41, Q26, Q28     

A Field Experiment Involving Cash and Hypothetical Charitable Donations

An important focus for concern about Contingent Valuation (CV) is that hypothetical payments for non-market goods are biased upwards in comparison to cash payments. Lack of realism, through its influence on incentives to mis-report payments, may explain the divergence. This paper reports on a study which attempts to overcome this problem by emulating a real fund-raising solicitation by the Isle of Eigg Trust for both real and hypothetical donations. In contrast to previous results, the mean cash donation was higher (£3.71) than the man CV donation (£3.41). A third survey, which used a neutral CV design, implemented by a research organization, obtained a mean donation which was much higher (£6.21) than the cash equivalent.     

The role of risk aversion in public goods dilemmas with environmental uncertainty: an experimental analysis

The purpose of this study is to extend earlier research on environmental uncertainty in public goods dilemmas. The present paper reports the results of an experiment designed to examine the effect of risk aversion on public goods provision. A von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function with constant coefficient of relative risk aversion is used to investigate the impact of risk attitudes within a threshold public goods environment. The outcome of the threshold public goods experiment shows that subjects are indifferent to the changes in environmental conditions. Additionally, the analysis indicates that risk aversion is a significant determinant of voluntary public goods contribution level.     

Demand for different types of public goods: evidence from Nigeria

Preferences of Nigerian households vary across different types of public goods. For example, some prefer roads while others favor education even after controlling for the existing supply of these goods. What explains this variation? We argue that the perceived distributional consequences of specific public goods differ conditional on the personal characteristics of households. In particular, households demand the type of public good that (a) increases the utility of assets they already own and (b) resonates with their past experiences involving the lack of particular public goods. We test our argument with data on 123,000 Nigerian households. We find strong evidence for our argument across six types of public goods.     

Hypothetical Bias in Risk Preferences as a Driver of Hypothetical Bias in Willingness to Pay: Experimental Evidence

This study provides new insight on the established issue of elicitation bias in hypothetical choice settings. In particular, using an experiment that elicits real and hypothetical willingness to pay for the protection of otters, we provide evidence that the observed bias is driven by those who are both uncertain about their value and exhibit hypothetical bias in risk attitudes. This finding provides a reason why calibration approaches based on follow-up certainty questions have proven useful, but also suggests a degree of caution in applying the approach. Our results favour combining uncertainty calibration with CVM-X in which hypothetical bias in risk attitudes is also taken account to correct for hypothetical bias in WTP.     

Laboratory Testbeds and Non-Market Valuation: The Case of Bidding Behavior in a Second-Price Auction with an Outside Option

Researchers now use the lab to examine the behavioral underpinnings of valuation before the field application which some argue has less experimental control. But lab valuation work raises its own set of concerns when it uses private goods to explore non-market valuation behavior because private goods have substitutes often unaccounted for in the lab. Therefore, the lab as a tool to testbed field valuation work may be limited. Herein we design an induced valuation experiment to explore bidding behavior in a second-price auction with an outside option that is a perfect substitute for the auction commodity. Theory predicts that rational bidders will consider the prices of outside options when formulating bidding strategies, and will reduce their bids whenever their resale value exceeds the price of the outside option. Our results suggest that bidders account for outside options when formulating bids with behavior following comparative static predictions. In addition, we provide evidence concerning hypothetical versus actual behavior with induced values – the data suggesting a hypothetical bias in the level of bids but not in bid shaving.     

A penny for your thoughts: Inducing truth-telling in stated preference elicitation

Contingent valuation often induces hypothetical bias. In a laboratory experiment, we test three calibration mechanisms: cheap-talk, consequentialism, and a new mechanism, the Bayesian truth serum (“BTS”). We apply the BTS in a “faith-based” format: subjects are informed about the purpose and potential efficacy of the BTS, but not its theoretical foundations. We find that real and hypothetical responses differ significantly; real and consequentialist responses are statistically indistinguishable; cheap-talk and the BTS eliminate bias inconsistently; subject characteristics interact significantly with treatment.     

THE OPTIMAL DIVISION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BETWEEN PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER PAYMENTS

This paper examines the optimal ratio of transfer payments to expenditure on public goods, for a given income tax rate. The transfer payment is then determined by the government's budget constraint. The optimal ratio of transfers to public good expenditure per person is expressed as a function of the ratio of the median to the arithmetic mean wage, and of the tax rate. Reductions in the skewness of the wage rate distribution are associated with reductions in transfer payments relative to public goods expenditure, at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, increases in the tax rate, from relatively low levels, are associated with increases in the relative importance of transfer payments. But beyond a certain level, further tax rate increases are associated with a lower ratio of transfers to public goods, because of adverse incentive effects.     

Who votes for public environmental goods in California?: Evidence from a spatial analysis of voting for environmental ballot measures

Voting referenda provide direct evidence of the demand for public goods. A number of previous studies have used referenda to analyze the support for public environmental goods. These studies have used aggregate data from large jurisdictional units (usually counties) and summary income measures such as the mean or median, and have usually found that higher income areas offer greater support for environmental propositions. We examine environmental referenda voting in California using census block group data, spatial dependence controls, and detailed income distribution data. We find that household income has a negative marginal effect on environmental referenda voting for most of the income range when using census block data. In addition, controls for spatial dependence significantly reduce the magnitude of most coefficients. This suggests that OLS estimates of referenda determinants are biased. We also show that county level data may be subject to severe aggregation bias and might not be appropriate for referenda studies.     

Do People Always Pay Less Than They Say? Testbed Laboratory Experiments with IV and HG Values

Hypothetical bias is a long‐standing issue in stated preference and contingent valuation studies—people tend to overstate their preferences when they do not experience the real monetary consequences of their decision. This view, however, has been challenged by recent evidence based on the elicitation of induced values (IV) in the lab and homegrown (HG) demand function from different countries. This paper uses an experimental design to assess the extent and relevance of hypothetical bias in demand elicitation exercises for both induced (IV) and homegrown (HG) values. For testbed purpose, we use a classic second‐price auction to elicit preferences. Comparing the demand curve we elicit in both, hypothetical bias unambiguously (i) vanishes in an IV, private good context and (ii) persists in HG values elicitation context. This suggests hypothetical bias in preference elicitation appears to be driven by “preference formation” rather than “preference elicitation.” In addition, companion treatments highlight two sources of the discrepancy observed in the HG setting: the hypothetical context leads bidders to underestimate the constraints imposed by their budget limitations, whereas the real context creates pressure leading them to bid “zero” to opt out from the elicitation mechanism. As a result, there is a need for a demand elicitation procedure that helps subjects take the valuation exercise sincerely, but without putting extra pressure on them.