China Bashing: Does Trade Drive the “Bad” News about China in the USA?

A monthly index of “bad” news about China as reported in the USA from January 1990 to December 2008 is developed in this paper. “Bad” is defined as news touching on the following issues: human rights, Tibet, child labor, democracy, and repression. Using this bad news index, this paper documents a peculiar finding: 3–4 months after a trade deficit shock to the US–China bilateral trade balance, the frequency of bad news published about China by US media outlets rises sharply, then dies off slowly. Statistical analysis reveals that the likelihood that this finding is just a coincidence is relatively small—about 1%. In addition, this paper finds a robust association between the annual number of Congressional hearings on China and the US–China bilateral trade deficit. These results suggest that “China bashing” may be endogenous to fluctuations in the US–China bilateral trade balance.     

Trade,finance or policies: What drives the cross-border spill-over of business cycles?

In this paper we investigate how income growth rates in one country are affected by growth rates in partner countries, testing for the importance of pairwise country links as well as characteristics of the receiving country (trade and financial openness, exchange rate regime, fiscal variables). We find that trade integration fosters the spill-over of business cycles, both bilaterally and as a country characteristic (trade openness). Results for financial integration are mixed; financial links as pairwise country characteristic are either insignificant or negatively signed (indicating a dampening of cross country spill-overs), but financial openness as characteristic of the receiving country amplifies spill-overs. We find no evidence for a role of the exchange rate regime. Finally, we find that higher government spending and debt reduces countries’ vulnerability to foreign business cycles, presumably through the effect of automatic stabilizers.     

Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’?* Expert Knowledge and Affective Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Policy

A key battle has been fought within the UK cabinet on the direction of post-Brexit trade policy. The opposing sides have favoured either continued alignment or a ‘hard’ break with the European Union’s (EU’s) regulatory and customs regime, in the latter case to allow the UK to pursue an independent and ambitious trade policy agenda. Contrary to much commentary on ‘post-truth’ politics, both sides have relied on rival forms of expertise to support their claims. I argue for the need to not only re-emphasise the malleability and political nature of expert knowledge, but also appreciate its emotional bases. The Treasury has led the charge in favour of a softer Brexit by drawing on econometric (‘gravity’) models that emphasise the economic costs of looser association with the EU. In contrast to this attempt at technocratic legitimation, the specific legal expertise drawn upon by cabinet advocates of ‘hard’ Brexit has appealed to an emotive political economy of bringing the UK, and its (in this imaginary) overly regulated economy, closer to its ‘kith and kin’ in the Anglosphere, deepening the UK ‘national business model’. I conclude by calling for more explicitly emotive and values-based argumentation in the public debate on the UK’s future trade policy to improve the quality of democratic deliberation.     

Bilateral capital flows and the exchange rate: The case of the U.S.A. vis-à-vis Canada,France, West Germany and the U.K.

After a preliminary test (with generally negative results) of the interest parity assumption, an eclectic portfolio adjustment approach, which determines an exchange pressures variable (under a régime of a managed float) is constructed, for bilateral comparisons between the United States and its major trading partners taken individually. This approach to bilateral capital flows and managed exchange rate determination appears to function reasonably well, as judged by the empirical results. Interestingly, factors specific to individual exchange markets appear to play important roles in explaining bilateral capital flows and cross exchange rates, which would not occur in a Walrasian world, with global market clearing.