Labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions

This paper presents evidence that firms choose conservative financial policies partly to mitigate workers' exposure to unemployment risk. We exploit changes in state unemployment insurance laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells. We find that higher unemployment benefits lead to increased corporate leverage, particularly for labor-intensive and financially constrained firms. We estimate the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress due to unemployment risk to be about 60 basis points of firm value for a typical BBB-rated firm. The findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions.     

How does uncertainty influence target capital structure?

This study investigates how uncertainty affects firms’ target capital structure using a panel data set of U.S. public manufacturers between 2003 and 2018 and finds that high-uncertainty firms have 10.1 (8.1) percentage points lower mean book (market) targets than low-uncertainty firms. This study also shows that the uncertainty effect on leverage targets is greater than the impact of firm size, market-to-book ratio, assets tangibility, R&D intensity, and industry median leverage, making uncertainty the most critical among all time-varying determinants of leverage targets. Further, this study finds that heightened uncertainty decreases debt tax shields, increases potential financial distress costs, and exacerbates debtholder–shareholder conflicts, thereby leading to a lower optimal or target leverage ratio.     

Financial Distress and Corporate Performance

This study finds that highly leveraged firms lose substantial market share to their more conservatively financed competitors in industry downturns. Specifically, firms in the top leverage decile in industries that experience output contractions see their sales decline by 26 percent more than do firms in the bottom leverage decile. A similar decline takes place in the market value of equity. These findings are consistent with the view that the indirect costs of financial distress are significant and positive. Consistent with the theory that firms with specialized products are especially vulnerable to financial distress, we find that highly leveraged firms that engage in research and development suffer the most in economically distressed periods. We also find that the adverse consequences of leverage are more pronounced in concentrated industries.     

Estimating Risk‐Adjusted Costs of Financial Distress

The search for the optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure involves weighing the expected benefits of higher leverage against the expected “costs of financial distress.” These costs include not only the direct costs of reorganization, but less quantifiable effects of financial trouble such as damage to the firm's reputation, the loss of key employees and customers, and the loss of value from forgone investment opportunities. This article proposes a new method for valuing expected financial distress costs. While researchers have provided estimates of the costs associated with financial distress when it takes place, whether or when these costs will be incurred is, of course, unknown at the time the financing decision. As a result, the “correct” discount rate for valuing expected distress costs is difficult to derive. Instead of adjusting the discount rate to reflect historical default rate probabilities, the authors' method uses “risk‐neutral” probabilities of encountering distress that allow for discounting at the risk‐free rate. The risk‐neutral probabilities of default are derived by incorporating the systematic risk premia implicit in corporate bond yield spreads. This method results in a significant increase in estimates of financial distress costs. In a simple example presented by the authors, distress costs estimated at about 1.6% of firm value using the conventional method turn out to run about 5% after adjusting for the increased systematic risk associated with financial distress.     

Why Have Debt Ratios Increased for Firms in Emerging Markets?

I study trends in capital structure between 1980 and 2004 in a sample of over 11,000 firms from 34 emerging markets. The average firm's market‐value debt ratio rose by 15 percentage points over this quarter century. I study how this rise in leverage was influenced by firm‐level factors and by the availability of debt financing at the country level. The central finding is that the increase in debt ratios can largely be attributed to changes in the characteristics of emerging market firms over this period. For the average firm, the most prominent determinants of capital structure – size, profitability, asset tangibility, and growth opportunities – all shifted in the direction implying a higher optimal level of debt. At the country level, increased financial development within the country is associated with lower debt ratios, but increased financial openness to foreign markets is associated with higher debt ratios.     

Measuring the value of intangibles

We propose a new earnings-based measure for the value of intangibles. To validate this measure, we compare it to commonly used proxies for intangible intensity, such as R&D expenses. While R&D expenses measure the investment in new intangibles, our new measure gauges the productivity of already existing intangibles. We show that our new measure serves as an additional factor to explain firm value, measured either as market capitalization or acquisition prices in M&A transactions. Moreover, it captures the increasing importance of intangibles over time. Finally, we present a specific application of our intangible-intensity measure in the context of capital structure. We find that more intangible-intensive firms have lower leverage.     

Convex costs and the hedging paradox

Financial theory suggests that hedging can increase shareholder value in the presence of capital market imperfections, including direct and indirect costs of financial distress, costly external financing, and convex tax exposure. The influence of these costs, which are high when profits are low and low or negligible when profits are large, on the extent of firm hedging has not been consistently addressed in the finance literature. In Brown and Toft's (2002) model, more convex costs imply that a firm will decrease the extent of hedging. At the same time, one version of Smith and Stulz's (1985) tax hypothesis implies that a given firm is expected to increase the extent of hedging under a more convex tax exposure. I address this ambiguity in the literature by showing that, in incomplete markets, value-maximizing firms that stand to gain the most from hedging may in fact hedge less than otherwise identical firms with less to gain from hedging. This hedging paradox can partly account for the lack of conclusive evidence to suggest that convex costs can influence both a firm's decision to hedge and the extent of the firm's hedging. Finally, I introduce a new interpretation of empirical relations between potential hedging gains and the extent of hedging.     

A resolution of the distress risk and leverage puzzles in the cross section of stock returns

We revisit findings that returns are negatively related to financial distress intensity and leverage. These are puzzles under frictionless capital markets assumptions but are consistent with optimizing firms that differ in their exposure to financial distress costs. Firms with high costs choose low leverage to avoid distress, but they retain exposure to the systematic risk of bearing such costs in low states. Empirical results are consistent with this explanation. The return premiums to low leverage and low distress are significant in raw returns, and even stronger in risk-adjusted returns. When in distress, low-leverage firms suffer more than high-leverage firms as measured by a deterioration in accounting operating performance and heightened exposure to systematic risk. The connection between return premiums and distress costs is apparent in subperiod evidence. Both are small or insignificant prior to 1980 and larger and significant thereafter.     

Outsourcing with long term contracts: capital structure and product market competition effects

This paper analyzes how capital structure and product market competition affect the firms’ strategic choice between outsourcing with long term contracts and outsourcing to the spot market. When outsourcing to the spot market firms are exposed to price uncertainty, whereas a long term contract allows them to set in advance the outsourcing price. We show that, to the extent that leverage and uncertainty can lead to financial distress costs in bad states of nature, firms may use long term contracts as a risk management device to hedge input price uncertainty. With a monopoly in the final product market, the outsourcing decision involves a trade-off between a positive convexity effect of input price uncertainty under the spot regime and the option to avoid financial distress costs under the long term contract regime. Moreover, product market competition among buyers can lead to an increase in financial distress costs not only for firms outsourcing to the spot market but also for firms outsourcing with a long term contract. We examine the monopolist’s outsourcing decision and derive the equilibrium for an oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium depends on the magnitude of these costs and on the level of efficiency of the supplier.     

杠杆率变动、固定资产投资与研发活动——兼论金融赋能高质量发展

本文通过构建一个包含企业固定资产投资与研发投资的理论模型,分析得出企业杠杆率变动与投资行为的非线性关系。实证结果表明,低杠杆下,杠杆率的增大会使企业增加固定资产和研发投资的规模。对于财务柔性更强、发展前景更好的企业,杠杆率的提升能够增大此类企业的研发投入占比,即企业开展更多能够提升技术水平的研发活动。进一步研究发现,短期杠杆与商业信用杠杆的提升有助于财务柔性较好的企业提高研发投资占比,而对于发展前景不佳的僵尸企业,长期杠杆和银行杠杆的提升反而会使其扩大固定资产投资,加剧产能过剩问题。本文的政策含义在于,要在保持宏观杠杆率基本稳定的前提下,引导金融资源更多投入到创新型经济上,给予优质及前景较好的企业一定杠杆率调整空间和自由度,使其能够更好地利用社会资金,激励其开展研发活动,促进金融更好地服务实体经济,赋能高质量发展。     

产业政策与企业资本结构调整速度

本文以2006-2015年我国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,在“十一五”与“十二五”产业规划所处的时间区间内,考察了产业政策对企业资本结构调整速度的影响以及作用路径。结果显示,产业政策与企业资本结构调整速度显著正相关,且分别在非国有、小规模和融资约束较严重的企业中更加显著。区分调整方向后发现,产业政策能提高资本结构向上调整的速度,但只有重点产业政策能提高固定资产比例较低的企业向下调整的速度。基于作用路径的分析发现,产业政策提高了企业选择增加债务的方式来调整资本结构的概率;重点产业政策提高了特定类型企业以增加权益方式向下调整资本结构的概率。上述结果表明,产业政策主要通过债务融资方式影响资本结构调整速度,而只有受到重点产业政策支持的特定类型的企业能够通过权益融资方式提高资本结构调整速度。     

资本支出、公司规模与账面市值比效应——基于A股上市公司的研究

基于成熟资本市场的理论及实证研究表明,在不确定的环境下,公司最优资本支出提高了市场价值,降低了账面市值比,账面市值比对收益率的预测作用可以通过公司的最优投资行为来解释。基于这一机制,本文对我国上市公司规模、资本支出及账面市值比效应进行了研究。我们发现,第一,按照Fama-French(1992,1993)方法构建投资组合的潜在条件同样是公司前期的资本支出,本期资本支出在提高公司市场价值的同时,非但没有降低反而提高了小规模组公司期末账面市值比;第二,控制规模的情况下,资本支出较显著降低了公司的预期收益,在大规模公司中表现最明显;第三,本期资本支出对规模效应具有一定解释力,但对账面市值比效应并不具有显著解释力;第四,我国上市公司股票价格变动更多由会计业绩变动决定而非风险变动所决定,据此对上述发现作出了尝试性的解释。     

Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation

In this paper, a model of corporate leverage choice is formulated in which corporate and differential personal taxes exist and supply side adjustments by firms enter into the determination of equilibrium relative prices of debt and equity. The presence of corporate tax shield substitutes for debt such as accounting depreciation, depletion allowances, and investment tax credits is shown to imply a market equilibrium in which each firm has a unique interior optimum leverage decision (with or without leverage-related costs). The optimal leverage model yields a number of interesting predictions regarding cross-sectional and time-series properties of firms' capital structures. Extant evidence bearing on these predictions is examined.     

Firing Costs and Capital Structure Decisions

I exploit the adoption of state‐level labor protection laws as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs to examine how the costs associated with discharging workers affect capital structure decisions. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws, with this result stronger for firms that experience larger increases in firing costs. I also document that, following the adoption of these laws, a firm's degree of operating leverage rises, earnings variability increases, and employment becomes more rigid. Overall, these results are consistent with higher firing costs crowding out financial leverage via increasing financial distress costs.     

Carbon risk and corporate capital structure

This research exploits Australia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, which mandates the country to reduce carbon emissions, thereby exposing Australian firms to increased carbon risk, as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the causal effect of carbon risk on firm capital structure. We find that the Kyoto Protocol ratification leads to a decrease in financial leverage of heavy carbon emitting firms and such a decrease is more pronounced for financially constrained firms. Further analysis indicates that increased carbon risk leads to higher financial distress risk, which motivates firms to decrease financial leverage.     

Preemption,leverage, and financing constraints

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We investigate both a case in which the firms have optimal financial structures, and a case in which financing constraints require firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings are that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the leader, although the leader may exit before the follower's entry. The leverage effects of debt financing can increase the value of a firm and accelerate investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. Notably, financing constraints can delay preemptive investment and improve firm values in preemptive equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's high leverage due to financing constraints can lower the first-mover advantage and weaken preemptive competition. Especially with strong first-mover advantage, the financing constraint effects can dominate the leverage effects. These findings are almost consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows that high leverage leads to competitive disadvantage and mitigates product market competition.     

Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms

This study provides evidence that transactions costs discourage debt reductions by financially distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court. As a result, these firms remain highly leveraged and one-in-three subsequently experience financial distress. Transactions costs are significantly smaller, hence leverage falls by more and there is less recurrence of financial distress, when firms recontract in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 therefore gives financially distressed firms more flexibility to choose optimal capital structures.     

CEO EXTRAVERSION AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF FIRM DYNAMICS,PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION,AND FINANCIAL CRISIS

Using panel data of U.S. firms, we focus on an important yet understudied facet of the chief executive officer's (CEO) personality—extraversion—and how it affects corporate capital structure decisions. We examine how this relation is moderated by financing (tax) benefits, financial crisis, firm size, growth opportunities, and collateralization. The results show that firms managed by extraverted CEOs use greater financial leverage, adjusting toward target leverage levels at a faster speed, with about half-life within a year for book and market leverage. In addition, the positive extraversion–leverage relation is enhanced for firms that are large, have greater collateralizable assets, and are more vulnerable to external shocks (financial crisis). Last, although the positive extraversion–leverage relation holds particularly when product market competition is high, the effect is attenuated for high-growth opportunity firms.     

On the Determinants of Corporate Hedging

Finance theory indicates that hedging increases firm value by reducing expected taxes, expected costs of financial distress, or other agency costs. This paper provides evidence on these hypotheses using survey data on firm's use of forwards, futures, swaps, and options combined with COMPUTSTAT data on firm characteristics. Of 169 firms in the sample, 104 firms use hedging instruments in 1986. The data suggest that firms which hedge face more convex tax functions, have less coverage of fixed claims, are larger, have more growth options in their investment opportunity set, and employ fewer hedging substitutes.     

Hierarchical determinants of capital structure

We analyze the influence of time-, firm-, industry- and country-level determinants of capital structure. First, we apply hierarchical linear modeling in order to assess the relative importance of those levels. We find that time and firm levels explain 78% of firm leverage. Second, we include random intercepts and random coefficients in order to analyze the direct and indirect influences of firm/industry/country characteristics on firm leverage. We document several important indirect influences of variables at industry and country-levels on firm determinants of leverage, as well as several structural differences in the financial behavior between firms of developed and emerging countries.