弱化我国货币政策传导机制因素探讨

当前我国货币政策传导机制不顺畅，其主要原因是：需求不足制约了中央银行货币供给，经济实体经济结构与金融经济结构的不对称阻碍了货币政策传导的信贷渠道，传导机制的机构活力不足，金融市场发育不成熟使货币政策实施的有效空间减少，等等。因此，必须认真研究提高货币政策传导效率的途径，使中央银行货币政策意图顺利实现。     

Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Accountability

We analyse the issue of central bank accountability with the aid of a simple monetary policy game with uncertainty about the agent's inflation stabilisation preferences. We find that there may be an important economic role for accountability in addition to its political function of making the central bank answerable to voters through its accountability to the executive. The model suggests that for countries with relatively little central bank independence, or perhaps a poor inflationary track record, significant reductions in inflation can be achieved by lowering monetary policy uncertainty. These reductions are much smaller for inflation-averse central banks, when monetary policy uncertainty is reduced by the same absolute amount. Thus, the effectiveness of accountability – as a means of lowering both inflation and inflation uncertainty – is higher the lower the degree of central bank conservativeness.     

关于利率政策与货币政策效力关系的一点思考与探索

利率政策会影响一国货币政策的制定和实施,尤其在开放经济条件下,利率效应在国际间存在传递,加剧了央行制定货币政策的难度。货币政策效力趋于减弱甚至无效。本文从消费、投资两个方面分析了我国利率政策效率低下,货币政策效力不大。在此基础上,提出了如何改善利率政策,进而提高货币政策效力。     

Structural Reform and Transparency in a Monetary Union

We assess how central bank transparency affects the incentives for labour market reform in a monetary union. We introduce transparency as affecting unemployment forecasts that provide information that the central bank has to the private sector and the governments. Under conditions of monetary policy opaqueness and inflation bias, we show that monetary union may induce more reform (as governments mitigate inflation surprises under idiosyncratic shocks), albeit to a lesser extent when inflation bias is only present at the national level. In the absence of inflation bias, central bank transparency, by eliminating inflation surprises in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, induces less reform in a currency union relative to monetary autonomy. Altogether, these results point to the need for a strong political commitment to reform so that member states benefit most from the combination of a credible and transparent single monetary policy with measures aimed at improving competitiveness and enhancing long-term growth.     

美联储货币政策对中国货币政策的溢出效应研究

文章主要研究了美国货币政策对中国货币政策的溢出效应,理论部分分析了在开放经济条件下两国模型关于货币政策跨国传输等相关问题。货币供给分为国内供给和外部输入,通过中央银行资产负债表中资产负债的变化可以分析外部货币的输入影响到基础货币的被动投放,在流通过程中由于乘数效应影响了货币供给量。外部货币的输入影响央行调控独立性的发挥,外部货币的输入容易形成对国内货币市场和产品市场某种程度的冲击,央行货币政策调控的难度增加。经验分析发现,美元输入对中国货币政策存在溢出效应,影响到中国的基础货币投放,影响到中国的货币政策的独立性以及执行的效果。     

货币政策对中国股市的影响力分析——基于VECM模型的实证分析

股市已成为货币政策的传导渠道,央行可以通过货币政策来达到对股市进行干预的目的,央行在运用货币政策工具时,应根据宏观经济发展的实际情况,考虑不同货币政策工具对股市影响的不同程度与时滞因素,择机选择数量型调控和价格型调控或者两者的某种组合。我国货币政策的利率市场化改革的效果是渐进的、有效的。     

数量型还是价格型货币政策比较——基于利率市场化角度的分析

利率市场化进程中,数量型还是价格型货币政策合适?文章考虑金融市场上的金融加速器特征,将其引入DSGE模型,通过校准、模拟,从宏观经济波动幅度、不同货币政策下冲击效应以及福利损失函数三方面综合分析了利率市场化过程中数量型和价格型货币政策有效性问题。研究结果显示,随着存款利率的上升,在熨平经济波动方面,价格型货币政策更有优势;在促进经济增长方面,数量型货币政策更有优势;对央行损失而言,价格型货币政策的损失更小。因此,中央银行应根据需要灵活的运用数量型和货币型搭配使用,做好数量型向价格型转变。     

资产价格在货币政策传导中的作用

文章对资产价格在货币政策传导中的作用进行实证研究，结果表明，我国同时存在着从中央银行到资产价格的高效传导和从资产价格到实体经济的低效传导，资产价格的波动损害了货币政策的传导效率以及金融体系的稳定性。在这种情况下，我国中央银行不应把资产价格纳入货币政策的最终目标，而应适时和适度地对资产价格作出反应。     

通胀预期管理下中央银行沟通的有效性研究——基于中国2003～2010年数据的实证分析

有效管理通货膨胀预期已成为中央银行货币政策调控的重要任务之一。近几年,世界上很多国家通过实施中央银行沟通引导市场预期,实现有效的货币政策调控。本文通过考察通货膨胀预期和中央银行沟通及其他经济变量之间的相关关系,分析中央银行沟通能否有效引导市场通胀预期。结果显示,由于缺乏系统性,中央银行沟通对市场预期的引导作用仍不如其他经济变量,但国内中央银行沟通对市场通胀预期的影响是显著的。其中,相对书面沟通,口头沟通对通胀预期的影响更为显著。在目前较强的通胀预期背景下,系统实施中央银行沟通将对未来通胀预期的管理起到积极作用。     

Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement,Determinants, and Economic Effects

This paper studies monetary policy committee transparency (MPCT) based on a new index that measures central bankers’ educational and professional backgrounds as disclosed through central bank websites. Based on a novel cross-sectional data set covering 75 central banks, we investigate the determinants of MPCT as well as its economic consequences. We find that past inflation, institutional indicators, and monetary policy strategy are important determinants of MPCT. MPCT has a robust and significantly negative impact on inflation variability and inflation expectations, even after controlling for important macroeconomic variables and institutional transparency, as well as instrumenting MPCT in various ways. MPCT can be both a complement to and a substitute for institutional transparency.     

The lending channel of monetary policy in Indonesia

This study evaluates the bank lending channel of monetary policy in Indonesia by using quarterly bank-level data over the period of 2005-2016. I find that the lending channel of monetary policy works for all banks, both large and small. The results suggest that higher capital buffers and better liquidity positions moderate the impact of changes in monetary policy on credit growth for large banks, while capital buffers and liquidity positions do not alter the strength of the lending channel for small banks. The findings indicate that the central bank can use prudential instruments affecting capital buffers and liquidity positions for managing the strength of adjustment in the monetary policy interest rate on bank credit growth.     

地方政府赤字财政下的物价控制与货币政策选择

货币经济学的一个基本观点就是,紧缩的货币政策能够降低通货膨胀,而扩张性的货币政策能够导致通货膨胀。费德斯坦指出,没有充分考虑财政政策的影响,这是货币经济学的严重缺陷。因此,文章结合我国当前的财政政策,探讨了在地方政府赤字财政下,中央银行如何控制和治理通货膨胀。文章认为,在地方政府赤字财政下,如果政府通过银行融资具有优先权的话,紧缩的货币政策不仅不能够控制通货膨胀,反而加速了通货膨胀。     

Central bank credibility and the expectations channel: evidence based on a new credibility index

This article investigates the relationship between central bank credibility and the volatility of the key monetary policy instrument. First, we propose a time-varying measure of central bank credibility based on the gap between inflation expectations and the official inflation target. While this new index addresses the main limitations of the existing indicators, it also appears particularly suited to assess the monetary experiences of a large sample of inflation-targeting emerging countries. Second, by means of EGARCH estimations, we formally prove the existence of a negative effect of credibility on the volatility of the short-term interest rate. In line with the expectations channel of monetary policy, the higher the credibility of the central bank, the lower the need to move its instruments to effectively fulfill its objective.     

On the conduct of monetary policy in Vietnam

Vietnam has the highest inflation rate in Southeast Asia (over 20 per cent year‐on‐year in 2011). This paper examines the extent to which inflation in Vietnam is due to its conduct of monetary policy. It is argued that, had the central bank implemented policy on a more timely basis, inflation would not have been as high as it was, but the more fundamental problem is that the central bank does not have the tools it needs to conduct monetary policy effectively. Monetary policy is further complicated by Vietnam's exchange rate policy. By choosing to peg the currency and maintain fairly free capital mobility, the country has all but given up the ability to pursue an independent monetary policy. As a consequence, the central bank is forced to attempt to sterilise its foreign exchange interventions, which it is ill‐equipped to do. The paper argues that financial sector liberalisation is needed not only to promote growth but also to maintain macroeconomic stability.     

中国货币政策的福利损失与政策规则选择——基于新凯恩斯DSGE模型的分析

本文在新凯恩斯主义DSGE模型框架下,运用福利损失函数和脉冲响应方法研究我国最优货币政策规则选择的问题。研究结果表明,货币供应量规则相对于利率规则,使外生冲击对产出和通货膨胀的影响更持久,造成更大的福利损失,因此中央银行的货币政策规则应该逐步从货币供应量规则转向利率规则;在一定条件下,前瞻型利率规则、后顾型利率规则和泰勒规则所造成的福利损失相差不大,从便利的角度出发,中央银行应该选择后顾型利率规则。     

中国人民银行央行票据的可持续性问题分析

自2003年我国中央银行票据开始登上公开市场的舞台,并且逐步发展成为中央银行公开市场操作的主流工具之一。本文主要从央行票据在公开市场操作中的作用、我国流动性过剩、存款准备金等货币政策的局限性和央行票据所承担的新的政策职能的角度来说明因为我国所处特殊经济金融的环境,央行票据作为我国公开市场操作的中长期工具,具有可持续性。最后本文还对完善央行票据制度提出几点政策建议。     

Does Central Bank Capital Matter for Monetary Policy?

This paper examines empirically whether central bank capital influences the conduct of monetary policy. To this end, we estimate interest rate rules for a sample of 41 countries and employ linear and non-linear regression methods to test if a measure of central bank financial strength can explain deviations of actual interest rates from those predicted by the estimated interest rate (Taylor-like) rules. Our results suggest that central bank capital is indeed a relevant factor behind interest rate policy decisions.     

从“三元悖论”谈我国人民币汇率制度的选择

作为经典的汇率制度选择依据——“三元悖论“，长期以来一直被学术界所信奉，同样在我国，近年来关于人民币汇率制度的选择问题也是一直以此为基石。认为人民币汇率制度的选择主要依据是我国中央银行的货币政策自主。然而本文将利用Mendel-Fleming和Mendel-Fleming-Dombusch两个模型去分析，得出即使在国际资本完全不自由流动下的固定汇率政策以及在国际资本的完全自由流动情况下的浮动汇率政策都无法完全得以实现，从而理清了我国人民币汇率制度选择时依赖于中央银行货币政策自主的模糊认识。     

从“三元悖论”谈我国人民币汇率制度的选择

作为经典的汇率制度选择依据--"三元悖论",长期以来一直被学术界所信奉,同样在我国,近年来关于人民币汇率制度的选择问题也是一直以此为基石.认为人民币汇率制度的选择主要依据是我国中央银行的货币政策自主,然而本文将利用Mendel-Fleming和Mendel-Fleming-Dornbusch两个模型去分析,得出即使在国际资本完全不自由流动下的固定汇率政策以及在国际资本的完全自由流动情况下的浮动汇率政策都无法完全得以实现,从而理清了我国人民币汇率制度选择时依赖于中央银行货币政策自主的模糊认识.     

China's trilemma: monetary policy autonomy in an economy with a managed floating exchange rate

Mundell's trilemma theory says that capital flow, exchange rate stability, and monetary policy autonomy cannot be achieved simultaneously. Using monthly data from the People's Bank of China from 1999 to 2019, we find that the trilemma theory is not nearly as tight in China's practice as in theory, and the central bank can internally offset the effect of exchange rate volatility by ways other than the monetary base (such as central bank securities). Our results also indicate that, before 2012, monetary policy autonomy in China was weak due to the problem of ‘funds outstanding for foreign exchange’. With the reform of the Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate system in 2005, the effectiveness of central bank securities in compensating for the flow of foreign exchange reserves has gradually been strengthened in China.