健康保险中道德风险影响研究

通过对消费者疾病预防投入影响因素的分析,本文得出事前道德风险对发病率的影响极小,因此可以忽略事前道德风险在健康保险中的影响。在事后道德风险方面,对其产生和影响做了系统的分析和讨论,得出即使不考虑Nyman的收入转移效应,传统的事后道德风险损失也是被过高估计的,这对健康保险制度、保单设计及理赔是有理论指导意义的。作者同时提出了道德风险的福利收益问题,认为道德风险福利收益在健康保险中,尤其是社会健康保险中有意义重大。     

新型农村合作医疗中的道德风险分析及控制

新型农村合作医疗的道德风险主要表现在参合农民对医疗资源的过度消费和定点医疗机构的诱导需求行为,新农合中道德风险产生的原因在于参合农民的理性经济人特性和定点医疗机构的医疗服务特殊性,为保持新农合制度的稳定性,实现其可持续发展,必须对其中的道德风险采取控制措施:要加大宣传,引导参合农民合理就医;建立信息披露制度和对定点医疗机构评价机制;加快医药卫生体制改革;改革付费方式;加强管理和监督.     

基于委托代理的代建风险规避研究

代建制的实施使工程建设中的合同关系更复杂,代建单位可能采取不努力工作或与其它工程实施单位相勾结等行为,从而导致道德风险。规避风险是代建制取得成功的关键之一,通过建立博弈模型,分析了规避道德风险的措施。     

基于不完全信息动态博弈的商业银行贷后管理研究

贷后管理在商业银行经营活动中的重要性日益凸显.委托-代理现象、预算软约束等因素导致商业银行必须及时处理贷款中的道德风险问题.在不完全信息状态下,银企双方的博弈行为错综复杂,商业银行需要从事前震慑企业的违约图谋、适当提高核查频度并有效控制核查成本、规范贷后检查流程等方面入手做好贷后管理工作,确保自身利益不受损失.     

农户无公害农产品生产中道德风险程度的影响因素分析

该文利用委托-代理理论的分析框架来探讨农户无公害农产品生产中道德风险程度的影响因素。分析表明:农户发生道德风险行为所能得到的额外收益和不参加认证所能得到的收益越多时,其发生道德风险行为的程度越强。同时,农户未来收益的贴现率提高会增加其道德风险程度。而通过增加农户按照标准进行生产所能得到的收益,提高违反标准进行生产的罚金和加强政府对农户的道德风险行为的监督,可以降低农户生产中的道德风险程度。作为委托人的政府,其对农户生产行为监督程度的高低会影响到其他因素对道德风险程度的影响,因此,政府的监管是农产品质量安全保证的关键。     

控制权收益、道德风险与软预算约束

Dewatripont-Maskin(1995)将软预算约束描述为一种事前无效,事后有效的动态激励问题,认为信贷的分散化有助于消除软预算约束。文章在DM(1995)模型基础上引入控制权收益变量,论证了事前无效,事后也无效软预算约束的存在条件,指出这种软预算约束本质上是控制权人追求私人收益的道德风险行为。信贷的分散化不足以消除事后无效率的软预算约束。完善的公司治理机制和法律机制是减少事后无效率软预算约束的有效途径。     

保险业中道德风险的博弈模型

保险业内的道德风险一直是保险理论和实务界关心的课题。文章通过构建一个动态博弈模型对保险业道德风险的产生和危害进行了分析,并引入道德风险增加的概率Pa等参数考察了保险人和被保险人行为选择的全部过程。基于以上分析框架,文章又引入罚金P和成本E,探讨了防范道德风险措施发挥作用的机理,并对其防范的有效性进行了评价。     

信息不对称视野下中小企业融资分析

信息在交易双方的不对称分布,会导致拥有信息优势的一方给信息劣势者造成损害,进而导致资源配置无效率.信息不对称按发生的时间划分,可分为事前信息不对称和事后信息不对称.事前信息不对称导致逆向选择,事后信息不对称导致道德风险.     

呆险业中道德风险的博弈模型

保险业内的道德风险一直是保险理论和实务界关心的课题。文章通过构建一个动态博弈模型对保险业道德风险的产生和危害进行了分析，并引入道德风险增加的概率P。等参数考察了保险人和被保险人行为选择的全部过程。基于以上分析框架，文章又引入罚全P和成本E，探讨了防范道德风险措施发挥作用的机理，并对其防范的有效性进行了评价。     

试论保险委托代理关系

保险委托-代理关系是一种不完全契约关系,委托人要为代理人的行为承担风险,而契约的执行力掌握在代理人一方,契约的制约力掌握在委托人一方,事前逆向选择和事后道德风险是委托人不能回避的两大难题,其很大程度上取决于代理人的行为。信号传递、激励方式、信誉机制三方面决定了保险委托代理关系的状况,也决定了寿险营销的发展前景。     

Financial constraints and occupational choice in Thai villages

Financial constraints and entrepreneurship are key factors affecting economic performance in developing countries. I formulate and solve a model of occupational choice with moral hazard under three alternative financial market environments: savings only, borrowing and lending with default and moral hazard constrained insurance. I use computationally efficient techniques based on mechanism design, genetic algorithms and maximum likelihood to estimate and statistically test these models of financial constraints. Using occupational choice data from Thai villages I find evidence that the saving only regime is rejected in favor of regimes allowing for borrowing and/or insurance, especially in higher-wealth data stratifications. A direct test between the borrowing and insurance regimes reveals that neither can be rejected in favor of the other. Allowing ex-ante lotteries over wealth improves the explanatory power of the model. I also find evidence for differences in the best fitting regimes by region, wealth, and access to formal credit.     

Can Health Savings Accounts Reduce Health Spending? Evidence from China

Health care costs are high and continue to rise in most major economies, and the health savings account (HSA) is often viewed as an appealing way to contain health care costs because it can potentially solve the moral hazard spending caused by traditional health insurance. This study uses data from the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) to empirically examine the effectiveness of HSAs in containing medical expenses and reducing moral hazard. The findings show that HSAs that restrict the use of funds may lead enrollees to discount the value and thus spend more on health care. In addition, the positive effect of HSAs on medical expenses is larger for the relatively healthier group, which may suggest that moral hazard exists regarding the use of HSA funds. The empirical estimates of the HSA effect on medical expenses are robust when a set of covariates are controlled, and HSA balances are instrumented using housing savings account balances.     

我国汽车保险道德风险博弈研究——基于投保人道德风险角度

从投保人的视角,利用博弈分析,研究我国车险市场存在的道德风险,力图通过为保险公司建立有效的调查机制、惩罚体系,减少车险公司因投保人一方的道德风险所引起的损失,增加车险的盈利能力。     

社会医疗保障改革的福利效应:以中国城镇为例

This paper evaluates Chinese public health insurance reform enforced since 1998 in terms of its welfare effects. We evaluate China health insurance reform since 1998 using the China Health and Nutrition Surveys (CHNS) data with relevant econometric models. The results of empirical studies show that the public health insurance status has significant impact on medical service utilization and expenditure. The reform reduces the positive effect of public health insurance on medical service utilization, meaning the utilization gap is narrowed after the reform. However, the empirical studies find that the medical expenditure growth of the sample individuals in urban China has not been controlled after the Basic Medical Insurance (BMI) program even if a new co-payment is enforced. Two main reasons for this failure might be the rising cost of medical service and physician’s severe moral hazard, while both of them come from no managed care mechanism for medical service providers in China.      

The impact of private hospital insurance on the utilization of hospital care in Australia

We use the Australian National Health Survey to estimate the impact of private hospital insurance on the propensity for hospitalization as a private patient. We account for the potential endogeneity of supplementary private hospital insurance purchases and calculate moral hazard based on a difference-of-means estimator. We decompose the moral hazard estimate into a diversion component that is due to an insurance-induced substitution away from public patient care towards private patient care, and an expansion component that measures a pure insurance-induced increase in the propensity to seek private patient care. Our results suggest that on average, private hospital insurance causes a sizable and significant increase in the likelihood of hospital admission as a private patient. However, there is little evidence of an expansion effect; the treatment effect of private hospital insurance on private patient care is driven almost entirely by the substitution away from public patient care towards private patient care. We discuss the implications for policies that aim to expand supplementary private insurance coverage for the purpose of reducing excess demand on the public healthcare system.     

我国基本医疗保险制度的激励与监督机制——基于道德风险的分析

逐步在我国建立公平有效的基本医疗保障制度是当前医疗体制改革的首要目标.几年来,尽管我国在这方面取得了一定成绩,但为了防范广泛存在的道德风险,政府的不恰当措施却导致我国在医疗保险体制上出现了诸如门诊负担沉重、报销水平偏低、医疗成本控制过严和医疗保险基金挪用等严重问题.如何解决这些问题是本文研究的关键.我们从分析基本医疗保险的性质出发,集中论述了由共用资源和委托代理关系所引发的道德风险以及政府所面临的两难困境.最后,我们提出了相应的政策建议:政府应在放宽对参保人和医疗机构限制的基础上,通过构建合理的激励与监督机制来健全基本医疗保险体系.     

新型农村合作医疗保险对农村居民食物消费的影响分析

始于2003年的新型农村合作医疗保险可以在一定程度上减少农村居民面对的未来不确定性。根据预防性储蓄理论,未来不确定性的降低可以增加居民当前消费。通过对比2004年、2006年参合家庭与未参合家庭各营养物质摄入量,本文得出新型农村合作医疗保险将显著增加居民热量、碳水化合物以及蛋白质等营养摄入量;以货币计算,2004年新型农村合作医疗保险将使居民食品消费支出人均增加约81元,相当于2004年人均财政投入的3.06倍。该结论对缓解我国有效需求不足的现状具有很强的政策意义。     

The Analysis of U.S. Deposit Insurance System and the Enlightenment to China

U.S. deposit insurance system has important and deep influence on the building and operating of the deposit insurance system for many countries in the world. Based on the analysis of the development stage and status quo of the U.S. deposit insurance system, this paper suggests that China should learn from the experience of U.S. deposit insurance system, to build and perfect the laws of deposit insurance system, and the mandatory, the scope, the insurance premium, and the top insurance amount of the deposit insurance system should be stated, and the deposit insurance agencies should maintain their independence and restrain the moral hazard. Only in that way can the deposit insurance system of China be built and perfected.     

Deposit insurance and moral hazard problem: the case of Turkish banking system

We investigate the effect of full deposit insurance introduced in 1994 on the financial performance of Turkish commercial banks. We construct a model, under reasonable assumptions, with deposit insurance where banks undertake excessive risk –?moral hazard risk. Empirical investigation using experimental design approach supports our moral hazard hypothesis. Our findings indicate that banks subject to the moral hazard behaviour show significant increases in foreign exchange position risk and deterioration in capital adequacy relative to their benchmark after introduction of full deposit insurance system. We relate this excessive risk-taking to the moral hazard behaviour by commercial banks. The research results indicate that complete deposit insurance system distorts the incentive structure of commercial banks and thus, prevents proper functioning of market discipline mechanism and leads to the taking excessive risk-taking.     

Voting on Unemployment Insurance

In this article, we ask heterogeneous agents in a dynamic general equilibrium economy to vote on the generosity of their unemployment insurance program. We observe the influence on their vote of (1) moral hazard, (2) private alternatives, and (3) changes in employment status. Agents differ in skills, employment probabilities, income prospects, and assets. For a calibration to the United States, we show that: (1) in contrast to the literature, plausible levels of moral hazard need not induce large cuts in optimal benefits. (2) Switching to private insurance is rejected for most status quo, though it would be as generous. (3) Skill groups vote as a block. For reasonable discount factors, solidarity is never broken simultaneously for more than one group.