Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study

We examine behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi‐battle contests, where each individual battle is modeled as an all‐pay auction with complete information. In simultaneous best‐of‐three contests, subjects are predicted to make positive bids in all three battles, but we find that subjects often make positive bids in only two battles. In sequential contests, theory predicts sizable bids in the first battle and no bids in the subsequent battles. Contrary to this prediction, subjects significantly underbid in the first battle and overbid in subsequent battles. Consequently, instead of always ending in the second battle, contests often proceed to the third battle. Finally, although the aggregate bid in simultaneous contests is similar to that in sequential contests, in both settings, subjects make higher aggregate bids than predicted. The observed behavior of subjects can be rationalized by a combination of multidimensional iterative reasoning and a nonmonetary utility of winning.     

Rational Reserve Pricing in Sequential Auctions

A durable asset is sold in a sealed-bid first price auction. The seller sets an undisclosed reservation price. The seller has no prior information respecting the private valuations of the bidders. If no bid exceeds the reservation price, the asset is sequentially auctioned until it is sold. A rational seller will design an intertemporal series of reservation prices that maximize the discounted value of the transaction price. To accomplish this, the seller uses the history of unsuccessful bids to estimate the probability density functions governing the maximum bids at each hypothetical future auction date.     

Role of Information on Consumers’ Willingness‐to‐pay for Genetically‐modified Rice with Health Benefits: An Application to China

Despite their potential health benefits, the controversial nature surrounding the use of GM technology in biofortified crops remains a subject of discussion. This paper investigates the role of information on willingness‐to‐pay for folate‐biofortified rice in a Chinese folate‐deficient region. We conducted second price auctions with 252 women of childbearing age, split up into two target groups based on street (n = 132, non‐student sample) or school auctions (n = 120, student sample). Notwithstanding a general positive effect of folate‐related information (i.e. content, benefits and regional situation), evidence reveals that the non‐student sample is less concerned about GM technology. The results also provide insight into serial position effects in conflicting GM information. Whereas participants in the non‐student sample are more prone to a primacy bias when receiving both positive and negative information, an alarmist reaction is observed in the student sample. This study highlights the need for segmented, targeted communication strategies on biofortification.     

Information Effects in Uniform Price Multi‐Unit Dutch Auctions

We design a multi‐unit descending‐price (Dutch) auction mechanism that has applications for resource allocation and pricing problems. We address specific auction design choices by theoretically and experimentally determining optimal information disclosure along two dimensions. Bidders are either informed of the number of bidders in the auction, or know that it is one of two possible sizes; they also either know the number of units remaining for sale or are unaware of how many units have been taken by other bidders. We find that revealing group size decreases bids, and therefore revenue, if units remaining are not shown. When group size is unknown the price also falls if the number of units remaining is revealed. The most efficient and largest revenue outcome occurs when bidders are not provided information on either group size or units remaining. These laboratory results conform to some directional predictions from our theory, although overbidding is common.     

The Persistence of Dominant‐Firm Market Share: Raising Rivals' Cost on the New York Stock Exchange

To explain the persistence of dominant New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) market share in stock trading of listed securities from 1992 to 2002, we develop a dominant‐firm price leadership model and hypothesize that NYSE specialists raised the costs of rival market makers. The model predicts that natural and induced cost advantages will determine the NYSE's market share vis‐à‐vis the regional exchanges, electronic trading systems, and NASDAQ dealers. Empirically, NYSE market share increases with economies of scale and scope, abnormal price volatility, high asymmetric information, and with trading practices that raise rivals' costs, such as failure to display limit orders that bettered the existing quotes.     

Readability of 10‐K Reports and Stock Price Crash Risk

This study shows that less readable 10‐K reports are associated with higher stock price crash risk. The results are consistent with the argument that managers can successfully hide adverse information by writing complex financial reports, which leads to stock price crashes when the hidden bad news accumulates and reaches a tipping point. Cross‐sectional analyses show that the effect of financial reporting complexity on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with persistent negative earnings news or transitory positive earnings news, greater chief executive officer stock option incentives, or lower litigation risk. Finally, accrual manipulation appears to be positively related to crash risk, even since the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, if the manipulation is accompanied by complex 10‐K reports.     

Learning in Sequential Auctions

The importance of information transmission and learning is studied in a model of a sequential auction in which bidders have independent private values. In the course of the auction, information about the bidders' values becomes available as winning bids are revealed. From this, bidders learn about their opponents' types. A more subtle effect of information is that bidders anticipate the generation of information and take this into account in the first auction. The equilibrium in this model is contrasted to a scenario in which bidders are unaware of informational effects. It is shown that bidders who are aware of informational effects place lower bids on average and hence have higher payoffs. Properties of the equilibrium price path are studied. Regardless of the outcome of the first auction, the second price is expected to be equal to the first price. Despite this, the probability of a decreasing price sequence depends on the information generated in the first auction. Finally, it is shown that a simultaneous auction, in which informational effects are absent, yields the same expected final allocation as the equilibrium.     

When More Poor Means Less Poverty: On Income Inequality and Purchasing Power

We show theoretically that the poor can benefit from price changes induced by higher income inequality. As the number of poor increases, the market for products aimed toward the poor grows, and such products become more profitable. As a result, there are circumstances where an increase in income inequality associates with higher purchasing power of the poor. Using cross‐country data on the price of one kilogram of rice and the price of a Big Mac hamburger, we confirm a negative association between income inequality and the price of inferior goods, robust to the inclusion of a large set of control variables. Results are also robust to a first difference specification and to a two‐stage instrumental variables approach. Examining economic well‐being, it is thus important to analyze not only the incomes of households, but also the prices of the products and services that they buy.     

WATER BILL ESTIMATION WHEN PRICE IS CRYPTIC: EXPERIENCE FROM WINDHOEK,NAMIBIA

For water policy to be effective, policy makers must know how water users perceive and respond to changes in water prices. However, it is not uncommon for water prices faced by consumers to be unclear. In Windhoek, Namibia, the marginal and average water price is difficult to calculate from the information provided in users' utility bills. This paper applies a hedonic pricing approach to investigate price perceptions of water users in a setting with cryptic price information. Using self‐reported water charges as the dependent variable, the pricing model utilises reported utility characteristics and other factors that may affect perceived price. Low‐income standpipe water users report a weighted average monthly charges of N$24.68, whereas users in high income segments report N$521.34. This reflects differences in service levels, possible subsidies to low‐income users and potential errors in respondents' understanding of their water price. Average price per litre (N$11.78 for the low‐use segment; N$1.89 for the highest segment of Tier 1 water use) tends to be perceived as higher by those with lower water use even though average prices in the relevant range should generally be identical.     

Positive and Negative Earnings Surprises,Regulatory Climate,and Stock Returns*

This study focuses on electric utilities in the United States to consider two related issues. First, the study tests for asymmetric price reactions to positive and negative earnings surprises (ES). Second, the study associates policy differences across jurisdictions with variations in the cash flow effects of positive and negative ES and then uses the framework to consider variations in price responses across regulatory climates. In the same context, the study investigates the effects of a utility's abnormal profits on the asymmetry of price reactions to positve and negative ES. The empirical predictions are motivated by the disparity between the principles and practices that underlie cost recovery for the utilities and the uneven effects of the cost‐recovery practies on the cash flows associated with positve and negative ES. The results show that the sign of ES and the climate in which a utility operates are related to the size of price reactions to ES. Furthermore, a utility's abnormal profit status has significant effects on the size of price reactions to ES. Only a modest price response asymmetry is indicated for manufacturing firms.     

Consumers' Valuation of Geographical Indication‐Labeled Food: The Case of Hom Mali Rice in Bangkok*

This study investigated consumers' valuation of geographical indication (GI) and protected geographical indication (PGI)‐labeled rice in Bangkok using a non‐hypothetical experimental auction in a field setting. We also examined the effects of sequentially providing information about geographical indications on product valuation. The results suggest that consumers are willing to pay premiums for rice with geographical certifications, with the highest premium for the rice with both GI and PGI certifications. The provision of detailed information about the geographical indications further increases the premiums. However, consumers suffer a welfare loss under the current high market prices for rice with geographical certifications. A price reduction of approximately 10 percent would be needed to gain consumer welfare from the introduction of GI and PGI certification.     

The Effect of Alternative e-Prices on eBay Book Auctions

This paper uses the usual eBay auction variables and some data from ABE and Amazon, namely, lot size and the alternative e-price, the lowest price for a given book on a given site, to examine in the question of how information from ABE and Amazon affects eBay auction outcomes. We find that although lot-size sometimes affects bids and final sale price, the alternative e-price effects are more important. Sellers on eBay set their minimum prices below the alternative e-prices, but the closer the minimum price is set to the alternative e-price, the lower the final sale price. Decomposing this result into bidding versus final sale price per se effects, our evidence suggests that the primary comparison shopping effect is on bidding behavior.     

Market Structure and Audit Fees: A Local Analysis*

This study conducts a local analysis of the relation between market structure and audit fees. The research question of interest to us is how audit fees are determined by each practicing local office, after taking into account the auditor's own position in a local market and the influence exerted by his or her clients. Appealing to the economic theories of monopoly and monopsony power, we hypothesize a positive audit fee‐concentration relation, and a negative audit fee‐client influence relation. Results indicate that auditor market concentration is positively associated with the non‐Big 6 audit fees but is unrelated to the Big 6 audit fees. Evidence is mixed concerning the client influence hypothesis. When this construct is proxied by the number of rival auditors operating within a geographic area centered on the municipality, the prediction of negative audit fee‐client influence relation is strongly supported for both groups of auditors. Results are much weaker using measures developed based on the relative importance of a municipal client to its auditor's audit portfolio. The issues addressed in this study are important at a time when the Canadian municipal sector is undergoing major changes because of municipal amalgamation, altering the underlying market structure for audit services and the bargaining position of a municipality vis‐Ã‐vis its auditor. More broadly speaking, our analysis implies that when assessing an auditor's report for signs of client pressure, the professional oversight bodies and regulatory authorities need to consider the relative, rather than the absolute, bargaining position of the client in question.     

Agricultural productivity and rural incomes in England and the Yangtze Delta,c.1620–c.18201

The productivity of agriculture in England and the Yangtze Delta are compared c.1620 and c.1820 in order to gauge the performance of the most advanced part of China vis‐à‐vis its counterpart in Europe. The value of real output is compared using purchasing power parity exchange rates. Output per hectare was nine times greater in the Yangtze Delta than in England. More surprisingly, output per day worked was about 90 per cent of the English performance. This put Yangtze farmers slightly behind English and Dutch farmers c.1820, but ahead of most other farmers in Europe—an impressive achievement. There was little change in Yangtze agricultural productivity between 1620 and 1820. In 1820, the real income of a Yangtze peasant family was also about the same as that of an English agricultural labourer. All was not rosy in the Yangtze, however, for incomes there were on a downward trajectory. Agriculture income per family declined between 1620 and 1820, even though income per day worked changed little since population growth led to smaller farms and fewer days worked per year. The real earnings of women in textile production also declined, since the relative price of cotton cloth dropped—possibly also because a larger population led to greater production. The implication is that the Yangtze family, unlike the English family, had a considerably higher real income c.1620, and that period was the Delta's golden age.     

The Role of Informal Controls and a Bargaining Opponent's Emotions on Transfer Pricing Judgments

While accounting research has demonstrated the role of a decision maker's own emotions during judgments, psychology research proposes that others’ emotions provide an informational signal to assess an opponent's limits, cooperativeness, and toughness during bargaining. We examine how a bargaining opponent's emotions provide information signals that can be used by a selling division manager during transfer pricing decisions and whether informal control system choices by corporate management to foster cooperation can create a context that influences how managers react to these signals. In an experiment, when informal controls to encourage cooperation were absent (less collaborative environment), managers’ selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent was described as displaying negative emotions than when described as displaying positive emotions. However, when informal controls to cooperate were present (more collaborative environment), managers’ selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent displayed positive rather than negative emotions. Path analyses suggest that managers’ perception of their opponents’ signals is the mechanism by which opponents’ emotions influence transfer‐price decisions. This study highlights the role of others’ emotions as information signals during accounting bargaining and provides insight into the context dependency of opponents’ emotions under various control system structures.     

Competition and collusion in a government procurement auction market

This paper tests the structure performance hypothesis by examining a highway construction industry in Florida. In the first-price sealed bid auction literature, there is little evidence on how many bidders are required for these markets to be competitive. Two different indicators are used to capture the transition from collusion to competition—a discontinuous effect of the number of bidders on winning bid price, and an associative effect of repeat bidding of a contractor with the same set of firms. The results suggest that winning bids decrease as the number of bidders rises until there are about six to eight firms. Since subsequent entry has no effect on the winning bid price, it is concluded that the highway construction market becomes competitive with about eight bidders.     

The Effect of Short Selling on Market Reactions to Earnings Announcements*

This paper examines the effect of the inherent demand implied by short interest by studying how stock price reactions to earnings announcements depend on the level of short interest. We find that, for extreme good and bad news events, the inherent demand increases stock prices around the earnings announcement date, with the effect being stronger for good news relative to bad news. Specifically, the initial market reaction to an extreme positive earnings surprise is larger for firms with high levels of short interest. On the other hand, for an extreme negative earnings surprise event, the initial market reaction is less negative for heavily shorted firms. Furthermore, we find that the post‐earnings‐announcement drift is smaller (larger) in magnitude for extreme positive (negative) earnings surprises for the heavily shorted firms.     

Did Houston Clients of Arthur Andersen Recognize Publicly Available Bad News in a Timely Fashion?*

Despite the allegations of audit failure and the enormous publicity surrounding Arthur Andersen's indictment, there is no systematic empirical evidence on characteristics of accounting information of clients of Arthur Andersen vis‐à‐vis other Big 6 auditors. I examine whether earnings of Andersen's Houston‐based clients are timely in reporting bad news about future cash flows. I find that relative to a control group consisting of Houston‐based clients audited by other Big 6 auditors, earnings of Andersen clients are less timely in reporting bad news. Further, it appears that operating accruals of Andersen clients are less effective in accelerating the timely recognition of bad news than operating accruals of non‐Andersen clients. The findings suggest that the clients of Andersen's Houston office engaged in aggressive accounting practices, including delayed recognition of publicly available bad news.     

Price‐Match Announcements in a Consumer Search Duopoly

Using a model of sequential search, we show that announcements to price‐match raise prices by altering consumer search behavior. First, price‐matching diminishes firms’ incentives to lower prices to attract consumers who have no search costs. Second, for consumers with positive search costs, price‐matching lowers the marginal benefit of search, inducing them to accept higher prices. Finally, price‐matching can lead to asymmetric equilibria where one firm runs fewer sales and both firms tend to offer smaller discounts than in a symmetric equilibrium. Price increases grow in the proportion of consumers who invoke price‐matching guarantees and in the level of equilibrium asymmetry.     

Competition and Prices in USDA Commodity Procurement

We evaluate United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) food procurement auctions. The Department spends nearly $1 billion a year for products for domestic feeding programs, such as the National School Lunch Program, and another $2.5 billion for international food programs. USDA's purchasing relics primarily on auction mechanisms designed to induce “hard” manufacturer price competition. We compare private-sector prices to low bids in 25,000 auctions, and find that typical private-sector prices substantially exceed USDA low bids for comparable products. We also assess the effects of competition on low bids. Low bids fall as the number of bidders increases, and the effects are nonlinear. Additional bidders have a very small effect on prices when there are already five or six bidders, but a stronger effect in markets with only one or two bidders. Even in this highly transparent bidding environment, competition matters.