Debt,Agency Costs,and Industry Equilibrium

We show that risk characteristics of projects' cash flows are endogenously determined by the investment decisions of all firms in an industry. As a result, in reasonable settings, financial structures which create incentives to expropriate debtholders by increasing risk are shown not to reduce value in an industry equilibrium. Without taxes, capital structure is irrelevant for individual firms despite its effect on the equityholders' incentives, but the maximum total amount of debt in the industry is determinate. Allowing for a corporate tax advantage of debt, capital structure becomes relevant but firms are indifferent between distinct alternative debt levels.     

Dividends,Corporate Monitors and Agency Costs

We report new evidence on the hypothesis that dividends reduce agency costs. Consistent with dividends as a mechanism to reduce agency costs, we find that, on average, firms with a majority of strict outside directors on their boards experience significantly lower mean abnormal returns around the announcements of sizeable dividend increases. Our results are robust to multivariate controls for firm size, leverage, ownership, growth options, and change in dividend yield. However, we find no evidence that dividend increases reduce agency costs as measured by poison pills or outside blockholdings.     

股权结构、动态内生性与公司代理成本

本文以716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的系统GMM估计方法,同时考虑了三种内生性,以动态性的视角,不仅研究了当期股权结构对当期代理成本的影响,还研究了股权结构与代理成本间的跨时期相互作用。通过研究,我们发现：（1）不仅当期股权结构对当期代理成本有影响,而且前期股权结构也对当期代理成本有影响,股权结构对代理成本的影响有持续期;（2）前期代理成本对当期股权结构有反馈效应;（3）股权结构与代理成本间存在动态内生性。     

社会责任投资基金的实施契约与代理成本的关系研究

通过对社会责任投资基金契约条款适应社会责任目标而进行的规范和调整进行评估,并采用异质性随机前沿分析和LSDV法阐释基于契约的社会责任约束程度与基金代理成本之间的关系,研究发现,非市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金的契约对社会责任主题的约束程度普遍高于市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金,这种差异主要体现在投资目标和投资范围的契约条款设计方面。社会责任投资基金的契约得分与基金的代理成本呈正相关关系,尤其是非市场利率追逐型社会责任投资基金表现得更加明显。因此,“规则前置”的契约条款对社会责任主题的限制和约束增加了代理成本,契约作为一种硬约束手段在解决委托代理问题上作用有限。     

两类代理成本、债务治理及其可观测绩效的研究——来自我国中小上市公司的经验证据

在改进国内学者对债务治理效应实证研究不足的基础之上,我们对深圳证券交易所中小企业板上市的102家公司2004—2006年三年数据共306个观测值进行实证分析发现:(1)我国中小上市公司债务对显性代理成本具有显著抑制作用(表明债务客观上存在一定的治理效应),而对隐性代理成本却无抑制作用或者抑制作用不显著,因此,无法形成债务治理可观测的债务治理财务绩效;(2)短期负债主要抑制显性代理成本,而长期负债主要抑制隐性代理成本。我国中小上市公司债务期限结构极其不平衡是债务治理整体效应不显著的一个重要原因;(3)虽然我国中小上市公司债务治理效应难以形成其可观测的财务绩效,但由于财务杠杆效应的原因,存在可观测的债务综合财务绩效。     

Optimal Refunding Strategies, Transaction Costs, and the Market Value of Corporate Debt

The primary purpose of this paper is to consider both qualitatively and quantitatively the effects of refunding transaction costs and interest rate uncertainty on optimal refunding strategies and the market value of corporate debt. A dynamic model of corporate bond refunding with transaction costs is developed that simultaneously solves for the optimal refunding strategy, the value of the refunding call option, the value of the bond liability to the firm, and the market (investor) value of the fixed-rate contract. We provide examples in which the price of the callable bond does exceed the call price, and we examine whether or not typical levels of refunding costs are sufficient to explain the magnitude and duration of frequently observed premiums on callable corporate bonds.     

融资约束、代理成本对企业R&D投资的影响——基于我国上市公司的经验证据

本文以2009-2012年中国上市公司年报数据为研究样本,基于欧拉方程投资模型,采用Kumbhakar and Parmeter(2009)提出的双边随机边界法实证检验融资约束和代理成本对企业R&D投资的影响。结果发现:融资约束与R&D投资显著负相关,代理成本与R&D投资显著正相关。即融资约束导致R&D投资不足,代理成本导致R&D投资过度。进一步分析发现:融资约束使上市公司R&D投资的绝对值(相对值)整体上较最优水平低42.41%(43.27%),代理成本使上市公司R&D投资的绝对值(相对值)整体上较最优水平高22.48%(21.73%),二者抵消后最终表现为净低于最优水平的19.93%(21.54%)。这种差异在不同地区、行业、公司性质及年度里略有不同。由此可见,我国上市公司尚未陷入R&D投资的"加速化陷阱",仍有必要加大R&D投资。论文最后针对研究中发现的问题提出了相应的对策和建议。     

The Choice of Call Provision Terms: Evidence of the Existence of Agency Costs of Debt

An examination of the provisions of bond issues reveals that most bonds prohibit firms from calling the issue during the initial years, after which time the bond can be called at the option of the firm. A substantial number of firms, however, also reserve the right to call the issue during this initial period for purposes other than refinancing at a lower coupon rate. The additional flexibility which accompanies the option of early redemption can be used to reduce the agency costs of debt associated with future investment opportunities, informational asymmetry, and the risk incentive problem. Using a sample of newly issued bonds, statistical tests are performed to show that there are, in fact, differences between firms which do and do not reserve the right of early redemption. This paper shows that these differences provide empirical evidence which is consistent with the hypothesis that firms use the option of early redemption to reduce agency costs.     

Measuring the Agency Cost of Debt

We adapt a contingent claims model of the firm to reflect the incentive effects of the capital structure and thereby to measure the agency costs of debt. An underlying model of the firm and the stochastic features of its product market are analyzed and an optimal operating policy is chosen. We identify the change in operating policy created by leverage and value this change. The model determines the value of the firm and its associated liabilities incorporating the agency consequences of debt.     

Agency Costs and Ownership Structure

We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency-cost firm, where the manager is the firm's sole shareholder. We utilize a sample of 1,708 small corporations from the FRB/NSSBF database and find that agency costs (i) are significantly higher when an outsider rather than an insider manages the firm; (ii) are inversely related to the manager's ownership share; (iii) increase with the number of nonmanager shareholders, and (iv) to a lesser extent, are lower with greater monitoring by banks.     

Variable Rate Debt Instruments and Corporate Debt Policy

Sustained high rate of inflation has led to the creation of debt instruments with variable interest rate. The availability of these debt instruments presents management with the problem of the choice of the optimal debt portfolio. This paper deals with this problem assuming a given, and optimal, debt to equity ratio. Given expected monetary value maximization, an efficient frontier is derived in terms of the expected net income and probability of bankruptcy, where net income is defined as operating income minus debt repayment. This efficient frontier is shown to be also mean-variance efficient. It is also shown that in most cases the optimal debt portfolio includes more than one debt instrument. In other words, the firm will avoid the policy of minimizing the expected cost of its debt repayments or the policy of minimizing the costs of bankruptcy. The optimal solution itself is affected by market variables like the relative expected cost of different debt instruments and by firm specific variables like the variability of its operating income stream, and the covariance between the operating income and the debt repayments.     

Corporate Capital Structure,Agency Costs,and Ownership Control: The Case of All-Equity Firms

This paper provides evidence that all-equity firms exhibit greater levels of managerial stockholdings, more extensive family relationships among top management, and higher liquidity positions than a matched sample of levered firms. Further, top managers of all-equity firms with family involvement in corporate operations have greater control of corporate voting rights than managers of all-equity firms without family involvement. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that managerial control of voting rights and family relationships among senior managers are important factors in the decision to eliminate leverage.     

Corporate Diversification and the Cost of Debt

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - This paper investigates whether corporate diversification by property type and by geography reduces the costs of debt capital. It employs...     

Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity

I define and analyze the agency costs of overvalued equity. They explain the dramatic increase in corporate scandals and value destruction in the last five years; costs that have totaled hundreds of billions of dollars. When a firm's equity becomes substantially overvalued it sets in motion a set of organizational forces that are extremely difficult to manage—forces that almost inevitably lead to destruction of part or all of the core value of the firm. WorldCom, Enron, Nortel, and eToys are only a few examples of what can happen when these forces go unmanaged. Because we currently have no simple solutions to the agency costs of overvalued equity this is a promising area for future research.     

公司治理与代理崇拜

代理理论——适用于公司治理中的争论——构建在所有权和控制权分离的神话之上。然而,真正的分离存在于所有权和所有权,即股东股份所有权和公司资产所有权之间。股东不是被代理人;董事和高管亦不是股东的代理人。股东确实选举董事,不过董事奉公司法为圭臬,根据公司法行事,而公司法极少要求最大化现有股东价值。相反,公司法允许甚至鼓励董事为公司的基业长青而行事,只要董事有合理理由认为其行为符合股东的长远利益。然而,代理理论对此现实置若罔闻。与此不同,正如早期文明通过参照现实世界中的现象与看不见的神之间的关系来解释前者,代理理论学者讲述的是股东们为保持安宁而有所牺牲（支付监督成本）,而管理层则做出承诺并以此行事（引发约束成本）,但股东们最终还是要处理不受诸神控制的一时冲动（剩余经理自主权）。然而,尽管研究成果丰硕纷呈,但表明这场战斗是真实的证据尚付阙如。管理者通常忠诚可靠,这可能是因为现行公司法的重点在于规制管理者不忠,并且商业领域的竞争远比大多数代理成本模型所设想的要激烈得多,其几乎没有留给管理者任何松懈余地。相反,有证据表明管理者受认知偏见的影响,最为重要的是,管理者显得乐观。管理者乐观主义和公司法的灵活性可以为最大化现有股东价值的大多数有争议理论的失败提供解释。如果学者直面现实,将代理崇拜抛之脑后,经济学与法学研究的学术水平都将得到提振。