我国手机银行的风险分析及防范策略

手机银行作为一种实体银行的虚拟工作环境,其潜在的风险远远高于传统银行。本文从手机银行发展历程和业务特点出发,对我国手机银行现状进行分析,并进一步对手机银行存在的风险进行分析,在此基础上提出相应的安全策略。本研究对于如何更好发展手机银行、有效防范和控制手机银行风险,具有现实意义。     

我国手机银行的风险分析及防范策略

手机银行作为一种实体银行的虚拟工作环境,其潜在的风险远远高于传统银行。本文从手机银行发展历程和业务特点出发,对我国手机银行现状进行分析,并进一步对手机银行存在的风险进行分析,在此基础上提出相应的安全策略。本研究对于如何更好发展手机银行、有效防范和控制手机银行风险,具有现实意义。     

多维信任的手机银行风险评价指标体系研究

信任风险是当前手机银行金融交易过程中的主要障碍,因此加强信任风险的评价指标体系和有效评估研究至关重要。本文构建了一个信任的综合模型,分析了影响手机银行信任机制(通信质量、自我效能、感知风险、无处不在、感知满意度、结构保证、初始信任、体验感和信任倾向)的几个主要因素,提出了基于手机银行客户直接信任度、手机银行客户信任衰减、手机银行金融业务信任度和手机银行客户最终的信任评价等的多维信任手机银行风险评价指标体系。采取实地和网络两种方式收集调研数据,并对调研数据进行分析。研究结果表明,多维信任的手机银行风险评价指标体系更加注重客户初始信任和客户体验感,能够促进手机用户接受和信任手机银行金融服务。     

基于BP神经网络的手机银行风险预警模型研究

本文通过全面分析手机银行风险,从中识别出14类重要的影响因素,并构建手机银行风险全息图。在此基础上,进一步运用德尔菲法(Delphi)及层次分析法(AHP)确定手机银行风险指标及其权重,继而使用BP神经网络构建了一个手机银行风险预警模型。     

手机银行风险分析与安全策略

手机银行是商业银行借助于现代信息技术,向客户提供信息和金融交易服务的新型金融服务方式,也是当代金融业发展的新趋势。手机银行作为一种实体银行的虚拟工作环境,其潜在的风险远远高于传统银行。本文对手机银行存在的风险进行分析,并在此基础上提出相应的安全策略。     

Legal Risks in Unauthorized Mobile Banking Transaction and Its Countermeasures

通过对手机银行常见法律风险：未经客户授权手机银行交易的法律风险、未履行（包括不执行、不当执行、迟延执行）法律风险、风险提示不充分等法律风险的分析,提出防范手机银行法律风险的意见和建议。     

手机银行业务风险分析和防范研究

随着3G时代的来临,手机银行迎来了新的发展机遇,手机银行业务也逐渐成为各商业银行的竞争点。随着手机银行的发展,其所带来的风险也逐渐显现。本文结合我国手机银行发展现状对手机银行业务存在的风险进行分析,同时对如何防范风险提出建议。     

手机银行业务风险和防范措施研究

随着科技的进步,现代信息技术也得到迅猛发展,银行充分利用手机普及的优势,开展了手机银行服务,这是一种新型金融服务方式。但是,手机银行的工作环境是处于虚拟状态之中,因此,相对于传统的实体银行来说,很多风险容易产生。文章讨论中国手机银行业务中存在的风险,其目的是为了防范手机银行业务中的风险。从而保障这种移动通信技术与货币电子化充分结合的业务创新模式的安全。     

手机银行业务在欠发达地区发展路径选择——以青海省海东市为例

随着智能手机的普及,手机银行在实际生活中发挥着越来越重要的作用.尤其是在欠发达偏远地区,受实体金融网点有限的限制,手机银行的发展有着更为广阔的空间,同时,手机银行本身带有的先天性的虚拟特点,使得安全隐患不可低估.同时,手机银行业务也面临着本身的风险隐患带来的挑战.本文旨在通过SWOT模型分析手机银行在欠发达地区的优势、弱势、机遇和风险,并通过借鉴国际经验进而选择手机银行在欠发达地区发展的合适路径.     

智能手机的金融应用安全风险分析

2013年5月,业界主要安全机构和厂商纷纷发布一季度手机安全报告。这些报告所揭示的风险预示着,当前智能手机环境所面临的风险越来越趋近于传统计算机环境。而近年来各大银行陆续推出手机银行客户端来满足人们使用移动终端来办理金融业务的需求,由于这些手机银行客户端依托于智能手机操作系统,随着智能手机安全环境的恶化,因此手机银行所面临的挑战必将越来越严峻。     

Financial markets development,business cycles,and bank risk in South America

In this paper, we examine whether banking crises or business cycles affect the influence of financial markets development on bank risk in a sample of 37 publicly listed commercial banks in seven South American countries over a 22-year period between 1991 and 2012. Banking crises in this region offer a natural setting in which the impact of financial markets development on bank risk is examined. We find that financial markets development improves banks’ capitalization ratio and reduces their exposure to non-traditional banking activities, suggesting that financial markets development on average reduces bank risk. In addition, banking crises and business cycles appear to moderate the impact of financial markets development on bank risk. In the aftermath of banking crises, banks appear to concentrate more on their core traditional banking activities.     

Determinants of risk in the banking sector during the European Financial Crisis

Risk assessment in the banking sector has been a prominent topic in the banking literature and has gained attention especially since the recent financial crises. In particular, the European crisis, which was the first since the formation of the Eurozone, underlined a number of significant problems and increased concerns on the tail or crash risk of banks. In the present study, we seek to examine whether information asymmetry, the importance of banks in the financial system and systemic risk play significant roles in the evolution of stock crashes in the banking sector. Information asymmetry is proxied by opacity, the importance of a bank in a financial network is proxied by network centrality, and systemic risk is proxied by clustering. The research framework considers a number of regulatory, reporting and financial market factors that have also been determined to relate to stock crashes and shows that all of the above factors are related to (idiosyncratic) stock crash risk under specific conditions.     

Back to the basics in banking? A micro-analysis of banking system stability

This paper analyzes the relationship between banks’ divergent strategies toward specialization and diversification of financial activities and their ability to withstand a banking sector crash. We first generate market-based measures of banks’ systemic risk exposures using extreme value analysis. Systemic banking risk is measured as the tail beta, which equals the probability of a sharp decline in a bank’s stock price conditional on a crash in a banking index. Subsequently, the impact of (the correlation between) interest income and the components of non-interest income on this risk measure is assessed. The heterogeneity in extreme bank risk is attributed to differences in the scope of non-traditional banking activities: non-interest generating activities increase banks’ tail beta. In addition, smaller banks and better-capitalized banks are better able to withstand extremely adverse conditions. These relationships are stronger during turbulent times compared to normal economic conditions. Overall, diversifying financial activities under one umbrella institution does not improve banking system stability, which may explain why financial conglomerates trade at a discount.     

政策连续性与商业银行系统性风险

本文基于2007年第一季度至2019年第四季度中国A股32家上市银行非平衡面板数据,从“冲击”和“传染”两个维度考察了政策连续性对银行系统性风险的影响。实证结果表明,政策连续性程度的提高通过降低银行个体风险和减弱银行个体与系统的关联性进而显著降低了银行系统性风险。进一步分析发现,政策连续性降低了银行被动风险承担水平而非主动风险承担意愿,减弱了银行间接关联程度而非直接关联程度。异质性分析表明,经济下行和货币宽松时期,政策连续性对系统性风险的降低效应更大,并且本身破产风险越高、信息透明度越低的银行,其系统性风险受政策连续性的影响越大。区分不同类型的政策发现,货币政策、财政政策、汇率与资本项目政策的连续性上升均能显著降低银行系统性风险,其中货币政策连续性对银行系统性风险的影响力度最大。     

Bank Consolidation, Internationalization, and Conglomeration: Trends and Implications for Financial Risk

This paper documents trends in bank activity, consolidation, internationalization, and financial firm conglomeration with data on more than 100 countries, and explores the extent to which financial firm risk and systemic risk potential in banking are related to consolidation and conglomeration. The relationship between consolidation, conglomeration and financial risk is documented using financial data on the largest 500 financial firms worldwide and on large banks in about 90 countries. We find that (a) large conglomerate firms did not exhibit levels of risk‐taking lower than smaller and specialized firms in 1995, while they exhibited higher levels of risk‐taking in 2000; (b) highly concentrated banking systems exhibited levels of systemic risk potential higher than less concentrated systems during the 1993–2000 period, and this relationship has strengthened during the 1997–2000 period. We outline research directions aimed at explaining why bank consolidation and conglomeration may not necessarily yield either safer financial firms or more resilient banking systems.     

对外开放是否导致银行业的风险上升？——基于外资持股比例与海外资产占比的实证检验

对外开放是否导致商业银行的风险上升,以往学者的研究结论并不统一。本文基于中国392家商业银行的微观数据,检验了“引进来”(用外资持股比例作为替代指标)与“走出去”(用海外资产占比作为替代指标)对商业银行风险承担行为的影响。结果显示,对外开放与商业银行的风险之间呈现非线性曲线特征并存在临界点;对中小型商业银行而言,过高的外资持股比例与过低的境外投资规模会带来风险;对大型商业银行而言,境外投资规模存在一个阈值区间,在阈值区间内,可能导致银行风险上升。政策建议是:外资参股中小型商业银行的比例可能不宜过高,鼓励中小型商业银行加大境外投资力度,大型商业银行可以根据特定时期的目标来调整对外开放策略,同时应强化风险预警与防范手段,在坚持与扩大银行业对外开放的背景下,实施宏观审慎原则,维护我国金融体系的整体稳定。     

The impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk—Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk in emerging banking markets using a sample composed of 34 banks from Central and Eastern Europe for a period spanning from 2005 through 2012. Results indicate a positive and significant relationship between central bank transparency and financial institutions’ contribution to systemic risk. On the other side, increased central bank transparency significantly reduces the idiosyncratic risk of banks. The relationship is influenced by the restrictiveness of regulatory framework. We argue that a more transparent central bank is beneficial for the banking sector from a microprudential perspective. However, it may create incentives for financial institutions to engage in risky activities and through herd behavior may increase individual contribution to the risk of the banking system.     

改进的效率测算模型、影子银行与中国商业银行效率

商业银行及其效率的高低是金融供给侧结构性改革的关键环节,而可以压缩的“坏”投入和影子银行对商业银行效率产生重要影响。本文首次建立理论模型并分析影子银行影响商业银行效率的路径;方法上,同时区分投入和产出的“好”或“坏”,拓展只区分产出的“好”或“坏”的效率测算模型;实证上,首次测算并分析“坏”投入、影子银行业务对商业银行利润、风险和效率的影响。结果表明:理论上,影子银行会同时增加风险承担和利润,但无法确定经风险调整后的利润增加能否提升效率;只区分产出的模型高估了效率,尤其是显著高估四大行和股份制商业银行第一阶段的效率,大型商业银行依靠网点的扩张不利于效率的提升;影子银行业务提升了四大国有银行尤其是股份制银行的效率,但对中小型商业银行效率影响较小。总的来看,压缩“坏”投入和规范影子银行是增加有效金融供给、优化金融供给结构和提升银行效率的重要途径。     

影子银行：体系、内生性风险及国际监管取向

摘要：全球金融危机后,国际社会从一个新的视角——影子银行体系来分析现代金融体系,并重构现代国际金融监管制度。影子银行体系的有效监管必须具有翔实的微观基础,比如体系边界、风险特征及表现形式等。国际上对影子银行体系并无公认的定义。影子银行具有证券化程度高、信息不透明、杠杆率较高等特征,这直接引致其存在诸多内生性金融风险,国际社会倾向于采用“类银行化”的监管路径对影子银行进行金融监管。国际社会采取的一系列法律、政策措施对我国影子银行监管具有一定的启示。     

How Theories of Financial Intermediation and Corporate Risk-Management Influence Bank Risk-Taking Behavior

This paper examines the rationales for risk-taking and risk-management behavior from both a corporate finance and a banking perspective. After combining the theoretical insights from the corporate finance and banking literatures related to hedging and risk-taking, the paper reviews empirical tests based on these theories to determine which of these theories are best supported by the data. Managerial incentives are the most consistently supported rationale for describing how banks manage risk. In particular, moderate/high levels of equity ownership reduce bank risk while positive amounts of stock option grants increase bank risk-taking behavior. The review of empirical tests in the banking literature also suggests that financial intermediaries coordinate different aspects of risk (e.g., credit and interest rate risk) in order to maintain a certain level of total risk. The empirical results indicate hedgeable risks such as interest rate risk represent only one dimension of the risk-management problem. This implies empirical tests of the theories of corporate risk-management need to consider individual sub-components of total risk and the bank's ability to trade these risks in a competitive financial market. This finding is consistent with the reality that banks have non-zero expected financial distress costs and bank managers cannot fully diversify their bank-related personal investments.