Portfolio Insurance with Liquidity Risk

This paper studies a portfolio insurance problem with liquidity risk. We consider an investor who wants to maximize the expected growth rate of wealth in a low liquid market. The investor can trade assets only at random times and his wealth must not fall below a predetermined floor. We find the optimal expected growth rate and an optimal strategy. The optimal strategy is closely related with a traditional constant proportion portfolio insurance strategy. Also we show that the same strategy maximizes the growth rate almost surely. Further we study the floor effect on the growth rate.     

Portfolio Manager Ownership and Mutual Fund Performance

This paper examines the association between a mutual fund manager's personal fund investment and mutual fund performance. From a data set of newly released managerial ownership disclosures, I find that fund ownership levels are diverse and, in many instances, quite large. Mutual fund returns are increasing in the level of managerial investment, consistent with personal ownership realigning decision-maker and shareholder interests. Also consistent with the reduction of agency costs, I find that managerial ownership is inversely related to fund turnover. However, there is no evidence of an association between managerial ownership and a mutual fund's tax burden.     

Mandatory Portfolio Disclosure,Stock Liquidity,and Mutual Fund Performance

We examine the impact of mandatory portfolio disclosure by mutual funds on stock liquidity and fund performance. We develop a model of informed trading with disclosure and test its predictions using the May 2004 SEC regulation requiring more frequent disclosure. Stocks with higher fund ownership, especially those held by more informed funds or subject to greater information asymmetry, experience larger increases in liquidity after the regulation change. More informed funds, especially those holding stocks with greater information asymmetry, experience greater performance deterioration after the regulation change. Overall, mandatory disclosure improves stock liquidity but imposes costs on informed investors.     

Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry

We study compensation contracts of individual portfolio managers using hand‐collected data of over 4,500 U.S. mutual funds. Variations in the compensation structures are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. The likelihood of explicit performance‐based incentives is positively correlated with the intensity of agency conflicts, as proxied by the advisor's clientele dispersion, its affiliations in the financial industry, and its ownership structure. Investor sophistication and the threat of dismissal in outsourced funds serve as substitutes for explicit performance‐based incentives. Finally, we find little evidence of differences in future performance associated with any particular compensation arrangement.     

Asset Liquidity and Stock Liquidity: International Evidence

This study examines the relationship between asset liquidity and stock liquidity across 47 countries. In support of the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, we find that firms with greater asset liquidity on average have higher stock liquidity. More importantly, our study shows that asset liquidity plays a more significant role in resolving valuation uncertainty in countries with poor information environment. For example, we find that the asset–stock liquidity relationship is stronger in countries with poor accounting standards. We further find evidence that after the adoption of IFRS, the improved accounting information environment results in a weaker asset–stock liquidity relation, but only in countries with a strong legal regime. Finally, our study shows that the positive asset–stock liquidity relationship may be attributed to transparency and/or liquidity reasons.     

Sources of Liquidity and Liquidity Shortages

We develop a model of liquidity shortages that incorporates a general equilibrium feature of liquidity: when banks hold more liquidity, other agents in the economy hold less of it and will supply less in times of crisis. We show that the private holdings of liquidity at banks are inefficient, with the direction of the bias being determined by the characteristics of the suppliers of liquidity to banks. Minimum liquidity requirements for banks may reduce welfare; in such cases interest rate policies that stimulate the ex-post supply of liquidity can restore efficiency. Overall, our results show that optimal liquidity policies critically depend on a financial institution’s (marginal) source of liquidity and will hence differ across institutions of different types.     

Financing a Portfolio of Projects

This article shows that investors financing a portfolio of projectsmay use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurialincentive problems. Competition for scarce informed capitalat the refinancing stage strengthens investors' bargaining positions.And yet, entrepreneurs' incentives may be improved, becauseprojects funded by investors with "shallow pockets" must havenot only a positive net present value at the refinancing stage,but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio projects.Our article may help understand provisions used in venture capitalfinance that limit a fund'sinitial capital and make it difficultto add more capital once the initial venture capital fund israised.     

流动性导流——中国货币需求及现阶段流动性过剩问题研究

近年来,流动性过剩成为了我国宏观经济的要害性问题.所谓"流动性导流",就是将目前过剩的流动性通过若干可能的渠道疏导到实体经济之外,使之基本不对实体经济产生负面影响.我国流动性过剩是由外向型经济结构引起的外汇过多流人造成的,在经济结构短期内难以根本改变且人民币升值预期难以根本逆转的情况下,只能从疏导过多流动性的角度来寻找防治通胀之道.具体的疏导渠道包括将一部分流动性导向境外和在境内扩大虚拟经济以吸收一部分流动性.后者是解决当前通胀压力和股市扩容压力的一箭双雕之策,也是本文的新观点所在.     

商业银行经营中的流动性、流动性风险及其管理

一、流动性、流动性风险与银行挤兑 商业银行的流动性是指银行能够随时满足存款者的提现需求和借款者的正当贷款需求的能力.流动性是银行的生命线,也是整个金融体系及至整个经济体系对流动性需求的保证.盈利性和流动性是银行风险管理首先要解决的一对矛盾.如果银行持有大量的高流动性资产,当然可以减少流动性风险,但是同时也降低了银行的收益.     

流动性剩余、流动性风险与银行业系统性风险测量

全球性金融危机过后,世界范围内的政策制定者、经济学家以及时评人士对加强金融市场监管、防范系统性风险基本达成共识。本文从流动性角度出发,对我国商业银行部门系统性风险进行了度量,同时衡量了我国上市银行的系统重要性程度。通过对商业银行个体的资产负债表数据分析,本文提出一种基于系统相对流动性剩余的概率分布来度量流动性风险,以及基于绝对流动性剩余的方差贡献度来衡量银行系统重要性程度的方法,并对我国上市银行系统性风险进行了实证分析。本文的研究结果表明,从流动性风险视角来看,部分银行对我国商业银行体系的系统风险贡献程度较高。     

Portfolio selection, diversification and fund-of-funds: a note

The present paper examines the performance and diversification properties of active Australian equity fund‐of‐funds (FoF). Simulation analysis is employed to examine portfolio performance as a function of the number of funds in the portfolio. The present paper finds that as the number of funds in an FoF portfolio increases, performance improves in a mean–variance setting; however, measures of skewness and kurtosis behave less favourably given an investor's preferences for the higher moments of the return distribution. The majority of diversification benefits are realized when a portfolio of approximately 6 active equity funds are included in the FoF portfolio.     

Portfolio Performance Measurement: a No Arbitrage Bounds Approach

This paper presents a new method to examine the performance evaluation of mutual funds in incomplete markets. Based on the no arbitrage condition, we develop bounds on admissible performance measures. We suggest new ways of ranking mutual funds and provide a diagnostic instrument for evaluating the admissibility of candidate performance measures. Using a monthly sample of 320 equity funds, we show that admissible performance values can vary widely, supporting the casual observation that investors disagree on the evaluation of mutual funds. In particular, we cannot rule out that more than 80% of the mutual funds are given positive values by some investors. Moreover, we empirically demonstrate that potential inference errors embedded in existing parametric performance measures can be of important magnitude.     

分业经营:我国流动牲过剩原因的一种新视角

本文从分业经营的金融体制这一角度探讨了我国流动性过剩的原因.首先分析了分业经营体制通过何种渠道造成了流动性过剩,然后对改革我国目前的分业经营体制,循序渐进的使分业经营的金融体制向混业经营过渡提出了建议.     

Locked Up by a Lockup: Valuing Liquidity as a Real Option

Hedge funds often impose lockups and notice periods to limit the ability of investors to withdraw capital. We model the investor's decision to withdraw capital as a real option and treat lockups and notice periods as exercise restrictions. Our methodology incorporates time-varying probabilities of hedge fund failure and optimal early exercise. We estimate a two-year lockup with a three-month notice period costs approximately 1% of the initial investment for an investor with constant relative risk aversion utility and risk aversion of three. The cost of illiquidity can easily exceed 10% if the hedge fund manager can arbitrarily suspend withdrawals.     

Liquidity: Urban versus rural firms

Our paper examines the impact of geographic location on liquidity for U.S. rural- and urban-based companies. Even after adjusting for size and other factors, rural firms trade much less, are covered by fewer analysts, and are owned by fewer institutions than urban firms. Trading costs are higher for rural Nasdaq firms, and volume that can be attributed to marketwide factors is lower for rural stocks. The findings add to our understanding of the way that access to information and familiarity affect liquidity.