我国公立大学制度·契约关系及履约状态分析

大学是一组个人契约关系的联结。我国公立大学一般不与其教师和职员签署正式合约,而维系于默认契约。因公立大学产权的不可界定性,以及默认契约中"雇主"和"雇员"的模糊性,使这种契约关系始终表现为雇主虚置的"稀里糊涂的契约关系",这种契约关系是以口头承诺和内部分工为基础的非正式契约关系,该契约关系使公立大学缔约方守信程度较差,毁约的责任风险较低。本文阐述了中国公立大学的制度·契约关系和履约状态,试图阐明现实生活中,公立大学这样庞大的组织系统,依靠非正式契约关系维持其运转,必然使其管理成本居高不下。大学制度应该以正式合约为基础,方能体现大学的管理效率,降低学校的运转成本。     

把握境遇成本 提高决策水平

一、境遇成本与企业决策美国的会计学会（AAA）将成本定义为：‘城本是指以达到特定目的而发生的或可能发生的牺牲的货币额为依据的测定值。”AAA的成本定义是为了将成本应用于不同的目的而确定的依目标而变动的概念。众所周知,目的又取决于企业境遇。因此,一切成本都是随企业境遇变化而变化的。故本文提出境通成本：随境遇决定的成本。决策无疑极需要这样一种成本新概念。决策需要境通成本。基于决策的需要,日本学者西村明教授将决策过程中的成本归集于下表：但是,成本分析不能到此为止。因为不能认为表1中的固定成本等同于沉没成本…     

从不同决策主体角度对药品不良反应相关成本的分析

药品不良反应是当前比较严重的公共卫生问题之一,为避免药品不良反应的发生和处理不良反应引起的后果需要消耗大量的社会资源。根据当前的制度环境,从不同决策主体角度分析与其相关的不良反应成本,为决策者提供参考依据,提高决策水平,优化资源的配置。     

成本利润分析与决策

成本利润分析是企业决策的依据之一。企业每项经营管理决策都需要比较其有关活动的成本与效益。如企业扩大生产规模的决策要求把增加销售量的收入增加额和较高的生产成本相比较;扩充固定资产的决策要求比较投资的预期收入和获取新资产的资金成本;进行广告宣传的预期利益同其预期支出进行比较;对是否开辟一个职工自行车停车场或整修职工食堂等这样一类问题作出决定时,也要比较其计划开支与主观上估计这些职工福利设施可能给生产带来的好处。在上述各种情况下,企业进行适当的决策分析时,都需要把决策行动的效益与其成本相比。但是许多企业在决策时往往以历史成本和会计成     

公共政策的决策成本探析

任何决策都需要成本。作为以政府为主的“公共权力机关经由政治过程所选择和制定的为解决公共问题、达成公共目标、实现公共利益的方案”① 的公共决策 ,自然也不例外。研究公共政策的决策成本 ,对于促进决策的科学化、民主化具有十分重要的意义。一公共政策的决策成本研究始于国外 ,发源于 2 0世纪 5 0年代的“公共选择”理论。是用经济学的方法研究资源配置的非市场过程。简单地说 ,公共权力机关与企业、私人在配置资源上的主要区别是 ,后者基于供求关系的市场决定 ,决策是由企业和个人分别做出 ;前者则通过非市场的政治过程来决定 ,决策…     

企业管理决策科学化与决策合法化的思考

不少企业管理者由于不重视决策,因而在企业管理决策中出现许多误区。实现企业管理决策科学化需要推行企业管理职业化、建立合理的决策组织体制、遵循科学的决策程序、采用科学的决策方法。实现企业决策合法化需要建立事前制衡和事后追究机制、建立法律顾问制度、实行决策程序法定化、建立健全决策者责任制、建立重大决策事项进行合法性论证制度、建立专家咨询制度、建立重大问题集体决策制度。     

浅析领导决策科学化问题

领导怎样进行科学化决策,决策由浅到深,由粗到细,由低级向高级发展,决策也就成为各级领导必须具有的领导艺术和基本素养。作为一个称职的领导者,必须掌握和运用现代科学决策的理论、方法和技巧,认真总结前人决策方面的成功经验,按照客观规律去制定政策,确定目标。现有的人力、物力、财力和社会许可的条件下,进行科学分析、综合概括和准确判断。决策是领导者的基本职责,也是领导工作的核心,决策的正确与否关系到事业的成败。决策的科学化是社会主义民主完善度的直接体现,也是社会主义民主政治建设的重要任务。学习贯彻党的十七大精神,深入贯彻科学发展观,各级党政领导干部能否做到科学决策和民主决策是关键,而科学决策、民主决策的前提,则是着力提高党政领导干部科学决策与民主决策水平。     

股利分配动因与股利决策——基于上市公司股利分配决策的实证分析

股利政策对公司价值的影响、信号传递效应、股东财富效应3种股利分配动因与股利决策存在显著的正相关关系．降低代理成本效应对股利决策影响不显著。上市公司管理层股利决策的动因在于通过股利分配政策影响股票价格．传递公司盈利能力和发展前景的内部信息,帮助投资者实现超额收益．增加股东财富。而降低代理成本并不是他们分配股利的目的。     

公众参与公共投资建设项目决策的决策成本分析

公众参与公共投资建设项目决策将在一定程度上改变公共投资建设项目传统的决策模式和相关程序,导致公共投资建设项目决策成本增加,这也成为国内公众参与公共投资建设项目决策受到诸多限制的重要原因之一。基于公共投资建设项目决策成本的角度,分析了在公众参与的前提下公共投资建设项目决策成本的主要构成要素及相互关系,阐述了影响公众参与公共投资建设项目决策的决策成本因素,并提出了相应的决策成本控制措施。     

行政三分制下的决策节点

从分析行政三分制下行政决策的地位入手,围绕降低决策成本、增强决策方案的可执行性、强化决策责任和提高政策质量几个节点,对决策的创新进行了论述;并引用了经济管理中的有价值理念,提出了若干意见;最后对行政决策的前景作了预测。     

关于大学政治功能的经济成本研究——兼论我国当前公私立大学政党政治成本支付状态

政府政治投资与教育投资的融合,是中央集权制国家教育财政的特点.在这些国家公立大学履行政党政治功能的费用,已成为学校运行成本的重要构成要素.当前我国公私立大学不同的功能设定,导致了支付政党政治成本的巨大差异.政府就大学预算安排方面存在的问题,从一个侧面说明了该成本支出应确定一个边际量,当总成本支出为一个定量时,其构成要素则互为变量.政治成本能否居于节约状态,本身就是检验其组织系统在学校履行政治功能绩效的主要参照系.政府编制财政预算必须考虑大学体制和承担功能的特殊性,并切实加强预算执行过程中的成本分类控制.     

The Cost of Public Funds in Australia*

A model of labour supply is used to calculate Australia's marginal cost of public funds, which is the appropriate cut-off benefit/ cost ratio for an additional public project. The labour supply model incorporates effective average and marginal tax rates faced by the representative household in each gross income decile. These rates are estimated from the ABS 1988–89 Household Expenditure Survey. A simulation analysis is performed to calculate the effect on labour supply of a 1 per cent increase in marginal tax rates. The estimated changes in tax revenues and deadweight loss in each decile are used to estimate the marginal cost of public funds.     

Separation of the redistributive and allocative functions of government: A public choice perspective

The implications of not separating the redistributive and allocative functions of government are examined from a public choice perspective. Many democratic governments lump transfers and public services into a single unified budget. This can distort voter perceptions of the marginal cost of public services relative to the marginal tax price embodied in the taxing institutions employed to generate public revenue. If the median voter's perception of marginal cost is affected, the majority rule outcome with respect to public goods spending will be altered correspondingly.     

外资质量与引资优惠政策分析——基于博弈论的分析框架

从东道国与外商投资者的博弈行为出发,构建了一个用于分析外资优惠政策调整的动态博弈模型,据此模型得到三个命题:东道国引资过程满足边际收益等于边际成本条件,优惠政策的边界条件取决于收益系数、成本系数以及最佳外资规模的大小;优惠政策与投资环境具有反向的替代关系,与外资的最佳规模呈正比关系;低质量的投资对环境的敏感系数要小于高质量投资,低质量的投资对优惠政策的敏感系数要大于高质量投资。并用这三个命题对中国外资政策调整的历程做了解释。     

Stochastic Cost Frontier and Inefficiency Estimates of Public and Private Universities: Does Government Matter?

Stochastic frontier analysis is used to estimate operating cost inefficiencies of public and private non-profit universities in the U.S. while also accounting for the possible effects arising from differences in the degree of government ownership. Using panel data for four academic years, 2005?C2009, inefficiencies are estimated under two model specifications. Results indicate that public universities are more cost efficient when environmental factors influence cost frontiers but private universities are the cost efficient institutions when those factors are determinants of inefficiency. Increased government funding does matter and increases private sector inefficiency but offers some efficiency improvements among public universities. Following the global financial crisis, there is evidence indicating a considerable slowdown in the inefficiency growth among both public and private universities.     

Privatization,Underpricing, and Welfare in the Presence of Foreign Competition

We analyze privatization in a differentiated oligopoly setting with a domestic public firm and foreign profit‐maximizing firms. In particular, we examine pricing below marginal cost by the public firm, the optimal degree of privatization, and the relationship between privatization and foreign ownership restrictions. When market structure is exogenous, partial privatization of the public firm improves welfare by reducing public sector losses. Surprisingly, even at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly below marginal cost, resulting in losses. Our analysis also reveals a potential conflict between privatization and investment liberalization (i.e., relaxing restrictions on foreign ownership) in the short run. With endogenous market structure (i.e., free entry of foreign firms), partial privatization improves welfare through an additional channel: more foreign varieties. Furthermore, at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly above marginal cost and earns positive profits.     

基于边际成本分析的企业资源节约决策研究

边际成本分析能对具有技术可行性的企业资源节约措施作出经济合理性分析,即沿着资源节约效益等于边际成本情况下的速率节约资源,能够在一定程度上有效解决资源环境对企业发展的约束。依据边际成本均衡原理,企业在寻求最优资源节约措施组合方案降低资源消耗时,实际上就是在多种措施组合决策范围内寻求一条恰当的边际成本均衡线,此问题可通过建立目标规划模型解决。经实例计算验证,本文所提的决策方法是切实可行的。     

Do cost efficiency gap and foreign competitors matter concerning optimal privatization policy at the free entry market?

In this paper, we demonstrate that in contrast to the case with exogenous number of foreign private firms, partial privatization is always the best policy for the public firm in long-run equilibrium, which casts doubt on the robust result in Matsumura and Kanda (J Econ 84(1):27–48, 2005) who argued that welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is always optimal in mixed markets. Critical cost gap determines that long-run degree of privatization is larger than the short-run one. In particular, regarding the scenario wherein one public firm competes with domestic private firms and foreign private firms, equilibrium price is lower than marginal cost of public firm instead of being equivalent to marginal cost of the public firm, and that public firm’s outputs, profit, and social welfare is the smallest in the concerned mixed oligopoly models.     

长沙市公立与民办高校人力资源成本比较研究

随着市场经济的不断发展,高校人力资源成本问题不仅关系到高校的发展,而且关系到整个国家和社会的发展。本文通过分析长沙市公立与民办高校人力资源成本现状,并进行实证研究,对公立和民办高校人力资源成本进行比较,得出公立高校人力资源成本的最主要影响因素为人力资源使用成本,而民办高校人力资源成本的最主要影响因素为人力资源保障成本和人力资源使用成本,公立和民办高校的人力资源成本构成不尽相同的结论。并从人力流动机制和人力资源成本角度提出了降低高校人力资源成本的政策建议。     

Bargaining by Limiting Cooperation: Withholding Consent for the Level of a Public Good

This paper analyzes how the ability to limit cooperation influences the outcome of complete information bargaining between two players. When cooperation involves prompt resolution of a conflict, as in alternating-offer games and wars-of-attrition, the solutions equate the marginal rates of substitution between earlier resolution and more private goods. When cooperation involves consent for the level of a public good, the outcome again equates the marginal rates of substitution between greater cooperation (more public good) and more private goods (lower cost shares). Here, the equilibrium consists of balanced linear cost shares given by the ratio of marginal-willingness-to-pay to marginal cost.